Note the irony. Elsewhere Socrates tells the myth of recollection, but here in the dialogue about knowledge, where we might think we are most likely to find it, he is silent. Rather than recollection there is the problem of forgetting. — Fooloso4

Yes. I found that puzzling, given that, so far as I know, he never abandoned the doctrine of reincarnation. But perhaps we can see it buried in the discussion of memory, since, for Plato, all knowledge is really memory.

He doesn't mention the theory of recollection in the Gorgias either. But again, perhaps it is buried in his mention of philosophical "understanding".

Plato's idea of an account in the Theaetetus is what we might call an analysis of whatever we are giving an account of in terms of its elements. (I would look up a quotation, but I don't have much more time for philosophy right now.)

He's lacking justification, so JTB doesn't work here. — frank

He's lacking conclusive justification, that's true. But I'm not sure that justification must be conclusive. If that is the case, the J clause and the T clause will have exactly the same content and it's clearly a presupposition of the JTB account that they will be different.

I'm still puzzled about this.

I found that puzzling, given that, so far as I know, he never abandoned the doctrine of reincarnation. — Ludwig V

Plato does not have a doctrine of reincarnation.Socrates tells some problematic myths. One problem is that if we start with the premise that knowledge is recollection of what was learned in a previous life then there would never be a time when knowledge was learned. But, on the other hand, if it was learned then it could not have been in that case that knowledge was recollected.

In the Phaedo the immutable human soul can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (82a -b)

The problem is obvious. What happens to the human soul? The soul of these animals is not a human soul. Such transformation is contrary to the claim of an immutable human soul.

Socrates is well aware of the weakness of his arguments:

“Certainly, in many ways it’s still open to suspicions and counterattacks - if, that is, somebody’s going to go through it sufficiently. “(84c)

His hint should not be overlooked. If you go through the argument sufficiently then its weakness becomes apparent.

Plato's idea of an account in the Theaetetus is what we might call an analysis of whatever we are giving an account of in terms of its elements. — Ludwig V

An analysis of an account is itself an account, but the Greek term logos, is much broader than analysis. Perhaps @Paine can point to the passage from the dialogue.

He's lacking conclusive justification, that's true. But I'm not sure that justification must be conclusive. If that is the case, the J clause and the T clause will have exactly the same content and it's clearly a presupposition of the JTB account that they will be different.

I'm still puzzled about this. — Ludwig V

If he lived in a universe where cars never move once you park them, he'd be justified in his belief.

In this universe, a person would be a fool to imagine their car couldn't be towed or stolen or molested by small, mutant drug addicts.

He's not justified in believing he knows where his car is unless he has access to a surveillance cam? Or he has small, mutant, drug addicted minions who check on it for him?

He's lacking conclusive justification, that's true. But I'm not sure that justification must be conclusive. If that is the case, the J clause and the T clause will have exactly the same content and it's clearly a presupposition of the JTB account that they will be different.

I'm still puzzled about this. — Ludwig V

What then could be the general criteria to justify thinking there is or could be justification for belief in any particular case?

I've looked at some sources and I agree that I was wrong to be so confident that he believed in reincarnation when he wrote the Theaetetus. I still think it likely that he did when he wrote earlier dialogues. Presenting an idea as a myth, I suggest, is evidence that he could not prove what he was saying, but not necessarily evidence that he does not believe it. As I'm sure you know, mythos in ancient greek just means story, not necessarily false story.

the Greek term logos, is much broader than analysis. — Fooloso4

Yes, I was aware of that and pointed it out in what I wrote. But the example he presents in the Theaetetus is as I describe it. My point is precisely that the model of account is not helpful for the problem he is considering. He was quite capable of presenting a different kind of logos which would have been less obviously unhelpful.

What then could be the general criteria to justify thinking there is or could be justification for belief in any particular case? — Janus

I'm sorry, I'm not ready to venture on articulating general criteria. It's a very complex topic and I have never seen anything more helpful than very general remarks.

Do you have something specific in mind?

If he lived in a universe where cars never move once you park them, he'd be justified in his belief. — frank

This is the problem. A complete justification would consider every possibility (except, perhaps, the purely imaginary ones), including the possibility that it might be struck by a meteorite. Theoretically doubtful, practically impossible. So the question is, what possibilities can he not cover and still count as knowing?

This is the problem. A complete justification would consider every possibility (except, perhaps, the purely imaginary ones), including the possibility that it might be struck by a meteorite. Theoretically doubtful, practically impossible. So the question is, what possibilities can he not cover and still count as knowing? — Ludwig V

I think we can just rely on cultural norms here. If common sense says I was justified, I was.

I'm justified in believing there are satellites orbiting the earth, even though I have no way of checking on that. My justification is that experts tell me so and I have no good reason to doubt it.

Do I have good reasons to doubt the location of my car? I do, but maybe others don't?

I mean, if you parked your car somewhere, would you say you know where it is? Or just that you know where you parked it?

I mean, if you parked your car somewhere, would you say you know where it is? Or just that you know where you parked it? — frank

That's really interesting. I don't know which I would say. It might be one in one situation and another in another situation.

But most people would regard it as indifferent which I said, because, they would assume, that one follows from the other.

Which reinforces the view that I'm developing, that many of these problems are created by the bad habit of saying more than we need to. If I say I know where it is, I'm making assumptions that I'm not making if I say I know where I parked it.

That's why I suggest holding off being pushed to decide whether he knows where it is or not until all the evidence is in.

He was quite capable of presenting a different kind of logos which would have been less obviously unhelpful. — Ludwig V

Without the specifics of the account I can only speak in generalities. When you say he is capable do you mean Socrates or Theaetetus or Plato? If he was capable of presenting a different kind of logos then why didn't he? What is this different kind of logos? It should be noted that the problem of the logos of knowledge leads to the problem of knowledge of logos.

As I'm sure you know, mythos in ancient greek just means story, not necessarily false story. — Ludwig V

Yes, but in some cases, such as the myth of the metals is the Republic they are lies, even if noble lies. Myths are a mode of persuasion. In Plato's dialogues they are mostly salutary. It is not a question of true or false but of engendering good behavior. I do not think that Plato ever believed the myths but he did believe that believing them could be, for those in need of them, beneficial.

I think Plato frequently used myths to paint pictures of our capacities and environment rather than completely explain matters. This is why I challenged Cornford's interpretation in the Socrates and Platonic Forms OP. The focus on immortality misses the role recollection plays in the dialogues.

In the Meno, for example, recollection is a myth being used in another myth:

Soc. I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain. — Meno, Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett

By saying "as you and I have agreed to call it", it becomes a dialectical X that can be treated as a known for the purpose of separating elements of our experience. It assumes the difference between knowledge and true opinion rather than arguing for that difference.

In Theaetetus, however, we find Socrates demonstrating that knowledge is not true opinion (as I summarize here and here).

But the example he presents in the Theaetetus is as I describe it. My point is precisely that the model of account is not helpful for the problem he is considering. He was quite capable of presenting a different kind of logos which would have been less obviously unhelpful. — Ludwig V

Do you think Socrates playing a mid-wife is withholding something from us?

Which reinforces the view that I'm developing, that many of these problems are created by the bad habit of saying more than we need to. If I say I know where it is, I'm making assumptions that I'm not making if I say I know where I parked it. — Ludwig V

Right. There's a thing where a news broadcaster asks if you know where your children are. The point is to suggest you might not. So if the issue of knowledge is spoken of, it's likely that said knowledge is in question, right?

I'm sorry, I'm not ready to venture on articulating general criteria. It's a very complex topic and I have never seen anything more helpful than very general remarks.

Do you have something specific in mind? — Ludwig V

I'm trying to point out that the notion of justification is vague and that judgement in particular cases that beliefs are justified is therefore more or less arbitrary, so as a general principle justification fails at its purported task of providing a criterion for differentiating between what is knowledge and what is not.

Do you think Socrates playing a mid-wife is withholding something from us? — Paine

Like what?

I am not the one who expressed dissatisfaction with the dialogue. Do you have an opinion on the matter?

I am not the one who expressed dissatisfaction with the dialogue. Do you have an opinion on the matter? — Paine

Cryptic. :chin:

In the passage from the Meno what must be held fast to are the images of Daedalus. But he goes on to say that this is an illustration of the nature of true opinion.

... while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul ...

There is a connection here with elenchus and Meno's complaint that Socrates is like a torpedo fish. Socrates questioning leaves his interlocutor numb and unable to answer. If one has knowledge, however, then it is held fast to and abides. The interlocutor is not made numb and is able to give an account, a logos. Where there is knowledge there is not forgetfulness, rather than becoming confused one recollects what is known.

More cryptic than asking: "Like what?"

Are you asking me to present possible candidates for an argument I am not making? I was not asking a rhetorical question of Ludwig V. I don't know the answer. I am genuinely interested in any reply.

Are you asking me to present possible candidates for an argument I am not making? I was not asking a rhetorical question of Ludwig V. I don't know the answer. I am genuinely interested in any reply. — Paine

Oh, sorry. I misunderstood.

'm trying to point out that the notion of justification is vague and that judgement in particular cases that beliefs are justified is therefore more or less arbitrary, so as a general principle justification fails at its purported task of providing a criterion for differentiating between what is knowledge and what is not. — Janus

I agree that the notion of justification is vague. It follows that judgements about it are not as crisp and clear as they hopefully would be if there were clear criteria. But that's not the same as being arbitrary

The game of giving a formal definition is quite difficult. Fortunately, we manage to function, linguistically speaking, perfectly well with concepts that we have learnt, but never learnt to define. Formal definitions have their place and their usefulness, but they are not an absolute requirement, as they are, for example, in logic and mathematics.

Right. There's a thing where a news broadcaster asks if you know where your children are. — frank

You're right. Asking the question changes the context, which can change one's attitude to what one thought one knew. That's inherent in the example, which is constructed to exploit it.

So it looks as if we expect knowledge to be proof against changes in context. That's a tall order.

Suppose I asked Al whether he is aware that there is a non-zero probability that his car will be hit by a falling meteorite. Do you think he would change his mind then?

Do you think Socrates playing a mid-wife is withholding something from us? — Paine

You mean that Socrates is offering a wrong, or at least incomplete, account in order to stimulate Theaetetus to come up with something better. I guess that's a possibility.

But I have the impression that when he made that remark he meant to compare the process of cross-questioning someone with being a midwife. So I would expect Socrates to cross-question Theaetetus to elicit the alternative. That's more like his usual procedure, isn't it?

The awkward thing about Plato is that he never speaks in his own voice (except possibly the Seventh Letter). I think he's only mentioned once - a walk-on part present in Socrates' death-cell. So we never know for sure. It is possible that when I criticize the Theaetetus I'm going beyond what we can be sure of.

So our difference of opinion probably cannot be resolved. The issue at stake was whether I was justified in thinking that citation of that dialogue in the context of our discussion about knowledge was helpful or not. I'm saying that I regard that dialogue as irrelevant because the notion of justification that is considered is obviously inadequate and the dialogue recognizes that. More than that, no-one nowadays is suggesting an account anything like that one.

So it looks as if we expect knowledge to be proof against changes in context. That's a tall order. — Ludwig V

It's the measurement problem. Looking at it changes it.

Suppose I asked Al whether he is aware that there is a non-zero probability that his car will be hit by a falling meteorite. Do you think he would change his mind then? — Ludwig V

If it was me, I'd say that I'm VERY aware of it and glare at you knowingly. I don't know what Al would do.

the notion of justification that is considered is obviously inadequate — Ludwig V

What counts as justification depends on what the justification is of. In the case of the car it is seeing or showing that the car is still there. Plato's question is quite different. He is asking about knowledge of knowledge, what it means to know. Knowing where your car is hardly stands as an adequate exemplar of the scope of knowledge. Of utmost importance for Plato is self-knowledge. How does one justify that one possesses self-knowledge? What would count as justification of ethical knowledge?

What counts as justification depends on what the justification is of. ....... How does one justify that one possesses self-knowledge? What would count as justification of ethical knowledge? — Fooloso4

There are ways of justification available in both those cases. Not that I can write down a rule book, but I'm sure you are familiar with both practices. The question how to justify one's knowledge of knowledge is one thing, but not the same as what Plato has been discussing, which is knowledge of everything else.

It's the measurement problem. Looking at it changes it. — frank

That's very good. :smile:

If it was me, I'd say that I'm VERY aware of it and glare at you knowingly. I don't know what Al would do. — frank

Quite so. But this is philosophy, which Has great difficulty recognizing irony except in Socratic dialogues and Kierkegaard, where it is officially allowed. Al would undoubtedly do whatever the author of the story makes him do; he doesn't have free will, or any will.

We could get chat-gpt to tell us what he said.

I'm not really clear what ChatGP is. But if you think it has some special access to what's going in Al's head, there's no harm in hearing what it says. There's a good chance it would be amusing and an outside chance it might be helpful.

But that's not the same as being arbitrary — Ludwig V

Right, I did say "more or less arbitrary". The point is not that we don't know anything, but that any attempt to show that we do know is subject to skeptical critique. Knowing is easy; it is trying to show knowing that you know which brings all the issues.