And recent revelations about the peace negotiations that took place weeks into the conflict might actually support that view. The Russians were willing to make major concessions when they negotiated for Ukrainian neutrality, and it might only be after the negotiations failed that the Russian strategy changed to annexing parts of Ukraine. — Tzeentch

Yep. Axios reported in March 2022...

According to Israeli officials, Putin’s proposal is difficult for Zelensky to accept but not as extreme as they anticipated. They said the proposal doesn’t include regime change in Kyiv and allows Ukraine to keep its sovereignty. — https://www.axios.com/2022/03/08/israel-russia-ukraine-ceasefire-critical-point

But, let's not let the actual facts get in the way of a good story. I'm sure @ssu can dredge up for us some speech Putin made in high school where he mentioned Rome - proving all along his imperialist ambitions.

With the amount of financial and military support that was flowing into Ukraine before the war, there was no chance of Russia destabilizing Ukraine. Ukraine was rapidly shedding all Russian influence. In terms of soft power the Russians were already on the defensive. That's why they had to resort to hard power and that's the reason they invaded. The idea that Russia could have gotten what it wanted without military means is nonsensical given the gravity of the military invasion that took place, which they themselves must have been fully aware of. In other words, I pretty much exclude the possibility that Russia could have gotten its way in Ukraine without resorting to military means. — Tzeentch

Russia was already engaged in a war with Ukraine in 2014 (so ALREADY destabilising the territorial and political integrity of Ukraine!). However this wasn’t enough to trigger the kind of military aid and sanctions we see now after the invasion of Ukraine. Until the war of 2022 started, the financial and military flow from the US was constrained by 3 factors (type and volume of military aid, lack of wider support from the West), the political pressure from the West was constrained by the fact the Western Europeans wanted to keep their business with Russia (which Nord Stream 2 would have further encouraged) and by the fact that Russia could still pressure the Ukrainian domestic politics due to pro-Russian propaganda and parties. Add to that, the effort that Russia is sustaining now and it seems determined & capable to sustain in the long run could have been invested in consolidating the control of the territories pre-February 2022. So all else equal (in the pre-war conditions) the counterfactual scenario I suggested would have favoured Russia more than it did the ongoing war.
Your objection is nothing more than just questioning the efficacy of all these factors on the assumption that flow of financial and military and soft power would have been enough anyways. That's a cheap objection.

I don’t see how the pre-war “amount of bilateral support” to Ukraine could have rendered the Russian resistance unsustainable in a counterfactual scenario that is way less challenging than the current conflict. — neomac

Because Russia changed the rules of the game when it invaded. In war, soft power goes (mostly) off the table, and in terms of hard power Russia (for now) has the advantage. — Tzeentch

Meaning?

Spare me the apologetics. — Tzeentch

That’s not even an argument. Is it?

Given the fact that the US was never planning to take Russian security concerns into consideration and basically invited war at every turn, certainly inevitable. — Tzeentch

Even if one is generically convinced about this, still Russia could have postponed further the confrontation to its own advantage. The US has already enough domestic and foreign issues to deal with, and these issues over time may have turned into Russia’s favour as they did already once (under Trump).
Besides, it’s claimed that even the US wasn’t sure about the Ukrainian resistance capacity against the Russian aggression. So even for the US it wasn’t obvious that their support to Ukraine would have taken the form it very slowly took as of now. So I don’t see anything as “inevitable” as you seem to do.

The small number of troops at the beginning of the war was likely because Russians didn’t expect the kind of fierce resistance the Ukrainians demonstrated... — neomac

Unlikely, since the Russians were fully aware of the size of the Ukrainian force, and the fact that it was equipped and trained by the US.
It's equally unlikely that with such a small force they sought to both occupy and hold Kiev and install a puppet regime and occupy and hold the southern regions. The theories you're suggesting are basically military impossibilities, though popular among laymen and the ever-churning propaganda machines. — Tzeentch

Another cheap objection. And, also your thesis is popular among layman and ever-churning pro-Russian propaganda machines.
It would be more useful if you posted the military expert source, you rely on.

23:05 - 27:20 discusses the implications of the size of the Russian invasion force.
1:30:40 - 1:32:00 Mearsheimer makes the point that he believes Russian territorial ambitions escalated as the war progressed.
Mearsheimer throughout the lecture actually argues that Russia might not have had any major territorial ambitions at all at the start of the war.
And recent revelations about the peace negotiations that took place weeks into the conflict might actually confirm that. The Russians were willing to make major concessions when they negotiated for Ukrainian neutrality, and it might only be after the negotiations failed that the Russian strategy changed to annexing parts of Ukraine. — Tzeentch

In the first clip Mearsheimer’s is questioning the idea that Russia could conquer the entire of Ukraine. In the second clip Mearsheimer is questioning the alleged imperialistic ambitions of Putin. Neither of these arguments are relevant to counter the arguments that there were intelligence failures on the Russian side that might have compromised their strategic objectives whatever they were.
Said that, I also remark that at minute 24:20 Mearsheimer is claiming that the strategic objective of 190K Russian troops were aiming at either capturing or threatening Kiev and conquer a large swath of territory in East and South Ukraine. That doesn’t seem to support your claim “It's equally unlikely that with such a small force they sought to both occupy and hold Kiev and install a puppet regime and occupy and hold the southern regions”, it just supports the idea that the Russian military deployment wasn’t enough to subdue the entire Ukraine.

So all else equal (in the pre-war conditions) the counterfactual scenario I suggested would have favoured Russia more than it did the ongoing war. — neomac

I disagree, and evidently so did the Russians or they wouldn't have invaded.

Meaning? — neomac

That Russia was losing the conflict over Ukraine prior to the invasion when it was primarily decided through soft power, and is now winning (or at least shifted the balance in its favor) since by invading it shifted the emphasis to hard power, which under current conditions it can apply much better than the West.

Even if one is generically convinced about this, still Russia could have postponed further the confrontation to its own advantage. — neomac

Again I disagree, and apparently so did the Russians.

The longer the Russians let the US train, arm and finance the Ukrainians, the harder the eventual military invasion would be.

It would be more useful if you posted the military expert source, you rely on. — neomac

I already did, with time stamps and all.

Neither of these arguments are relevant to counter the arguments that there were intelligence failures on the Russian side that might have compromised their strategic objectives whatever they were. — neomac

Nonsense. Any notions your previous argument was based on isn't in any way compatible with the picture of the war from the Russian perspective that Mearsheimer sketches.

You stated the Russian troop numbers were the result of intelligence failures.

That doesn’t seem to support your claim “It's equally unlikely that with such a small force they sought to both occupy and hold Kiev and install a puppet regime and occupy and hold the southern regions”, it just supports that that military deployment wasn’t enough to subdue the entire Ukraine. — neomac

I think that supports my claim.

Mearsheimer explains how controlling a country as large as Ukraine with 190,000 troops is military fantasy, especially considering the expected resistance from the Ukrainian population. It doesn't even come close. He even states he doesn't believe the Russians had any major territorial ambitions in Ukraine for the very same reasons.

I think that supports my claim.

Mearsheimer explains how controlling a country as large as Ukraine with 190,000 troops is military fantasy, especially considering the expected resistance from the Ukrainian population. It doesn't even come close. He even states he doesn't believe the Russians had any major territorial ambitions in Ukraine for the very same reasons. — Tzeentch

And how many troops did it take to grab Crimea?

Then the admiral charge of the Ukrainian navy joined the Russian fleet as an admiral, so the idea of the cakewalk to continue isn't so far fetched, especially when Russian intel had what seemed to be plenty of people "friendly to Russia", starting from the former chief of staff to the Ukrainian president and a personal friend of Putin, Viktor Medvedchuk (who later was swapped for Ukrainian POWs).

It's fantasy ...in hindsight. Remember that the West thought that the only defense that Ukraine could stage was an insurgency.

And Putin's anger at bad intel given to him was obvious, btw, from the way he handled with those in charge of Ukraine prior to the February invasion.

So all else equal (in the pre-war conditions) the counterfactual scenario I suggested would have favoured Russia more than it did the ongoing war. — neomac

I disagree, and evidently so did the Russians or they wouldn't have invaded. — Tzeentch

I'm not questioning the fact that you agree with the Russians, I'm just questioning the reasons of your assumptions. Russians may have made miscalculations. And you with them.

That Russia was losing the conflict over Ukraine prior to the invasion when it was primarily decided through soft power, — Tzeentch

What are you referring to with "losing the conflict over Ukraine"? Russia was already occupying Donbas and Crimea. No soft power was changing that until February 2022.

Again I disagree, and apparently so did the Russians.
The longer the Russians let the US train, arm and finance the Ukrainians, the harder the eventual military invasion would be. — Tzeentch

Once again, we are talking past each other. If your reasoning starts with the assumption that Russia was set to start the kind of invasion we see now no matter what, one can then argue what was the best time window for Russia to do so. However I'm questioning that assumption and you yourself assumed that Russian were "still trying to pursue a diplomatic solution". So the war might have evolved in realistic ways that could still be more advantageous to Russia than the current war. Especially if Donbas+Crimea+land bridge were not Putin's endgame. As Mearsheimer says in your video “Winning for Putin is putting an end to Ukraine joining the West, joining NATO, joining the EU” (minute 1:40:04)

It would be more useful if you posted the military expert source, you rely on. — neomac

I already did, with time stamps and all. — Tzeentch

Mearsheimer?! If you want to accuse me of being layman on military/intelligence issues seriously, you better point me at some feedback grounded on documented military/intelligence expertise not at geopolitical academics. I've done my homework on this. Don't even waste your time.

That doesn’t seem to support your claim “It's equally unlikely that with such a small force they sought to both occupy and hold Kiev and install a puppet regime and occupy and hold the southern regions”, it just supports that that military deployment wasn’t enough to subdue the entire Ukraine. — neomac

I think that supports my claim. Mearsheimer explains how controlling a country as large as Ukraine with 190,000 troops is military fantasy, especially considering the expected resistance from the Ukrainian population. He even states he doesn't believe the Russians had any major territorial ambitions in Ukraine for the very same reason. — Tzeentch

You seem confused. Neither I [1] nor Mearsheimer (in that clip) nor you (in that quotation) were talking about "controlling a country as large as Ukraine" or "any major territorial ambitions".


[1]

Russia pursued regime change, denazification of Ukraine. This doesn’t require the occupation of all Ukraine, it requires to take control over Kiev and install a pro-Russian puppet regime (as the US did in Afghanistan) — neomac

What are you referring to with "losing the conflict over Ukraine"? Russia was already occupying Donbas and Crimea. No soft power was changing that until February 2022. — neomac

Ukrainian alignment is what the conflict is about. Donbas and Crimea did not stop Ukraine from being turned into what Russia deemed a "western bulwark on Russia's borders". That's why it was (or considered itself) losing.

So the war might have evolved in realistic ways that could still be more advantageous to Russia than the current war. — neomac

I don't see the point in indulging in fantasy. Where would you even find the type of information necessary to make a judgement about that? We probably have access to only a fraction of the relevant information as is.

I've done my homework on this. — neomac

Russia pursued regime change, denazification of Ukraine. This doesn’t require the occupation of all Ukraine, it requires to take control over Kiev and install a pro-Russian puppet regime (as the US did in Afghanistan) — neomac

When you did your homework, where did you come across ideas like this?

Straight out of military fantasy land.

Are you really implying the Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country, with a western-trained, western-backed Ukrainian military occupying the rest, and an angry Ukrainian population to reckon with, with 190,000 troops?

If you're going to scoff at Mearsheimer and claim knowledge on the subject, don't come at me with outlandish notions such as this one. You're making a fool of yourself.

The problem of Russian expansion (land grabbing) has come up before, starting a good while back. At first for Moldova, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, the Baltics, with Moldova being the more vulnerable. Presently for Ukraine. Putin bemoans NATO (well, "the West" I suppose, at least that's what they want others to hear), others bemoan Putin's Russia bulging towards them. Some of this is expressed here as well:

Opinion: Moldova isn’t on the front page, but it could be in Putin’s crosshairs
^{— Cristian Gherasim · CNN · Feb 15, 2023}

Anyway, we have others that don't want to become under Putin's thumb, under Kremlin control. The fear is real enough.

For all the fallen :flower: :death: Requiescat in pace!

What are you referring to with "losing the conflict over Ukraine"? Russia was already occupying Donbas and Crimea. No soft power was changing that until February 2022. — neomac

Ukrainian alignment is what the conflict is about. Donbas and Crimea did not stop Ukraine from being turned into what Russia deemed a "western bulwark on Russia's borders". That's why it was (or considered itself) losing. — Tzeentch

Ukraine was not within NATO nor EU either. And again until February 2022 it wasn’t obvious that Ukraine would have joined NATO/EU imminently no matter what. No timeline no positive assessment about Ukraine eligibility. Plus the resistance of France and Germany. It’s not even obvious now, go figure

So the war might have evolved in realistic ways that could still be more advantageous to Russia than the current war. — neomac

I don't see the point in indulging in fantasy. Where would you even find the type of information necessary to make a judgement about that? We probably have access to only a fraction of the relevant information as is. — Tzeentch

You do indulge in such counterfactual speculations, when it’s matter to strategically justify Russian aggression of Ukraine. And again my reasoning is still based on known pre-war conditions. So I expect you to reciprocate in the same vain. Instead of throwing random objections.

Are you really implying the Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country, with a western-trained, western-backed Ukrainian military occupying the rest, and an angry Ukrainian population to reckon with, with 190,000 troops? — Tzeentch

Yes I do. And also Mearsheimer is confirming it at minute 24:20 Mearsheimer of your video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM) where he claims that the strategic objective of 190K Russian troops were aiming at either capturing or threatening Kiev and conquer a large swath of territory in East and South Ukraine. And that is not implausible if one takes into account the Russian intelligence failure I was talking about (among other possible miscalculations, of course).

If you're going to scoff at Mearsheimer and claim knowledge on the subject, don't come at me with outlandish notions such as this one. You're making a fool of yourself. — Tzeentch

The problem is not scoffing Mearsheimer. But that his claims question yours (“It's equally unlikely that with such a small force they sought to both occupy and hold Kiev and install a puppet regime and occupy and hold the southern regions”).
Besides I'm not scoffing Mearsheimer, I’m just saying that if you want to give me military/intelligence lessons, better go directly to military/intelligence input, not to geopolitical academics like Mearsheimer.

Yes I do. And also Mearsheimer is confirming it at minute 24:20 Mearsheimer of your video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM) where he claims that the strategic objective of 190K Russian troops were aiming at either capturing or threatening Kiev and conquer a large swath of territory in East and South Ukraine. And that is not implausible if one takes into account the Russian intelligence failure I was talking about (among other possible miscalculations, of course). — neomac

That's clearly not what Mearsheimer "is confirming".

You have no idea what you're talking about if you consider it feasible to install a puppet regime when an enemy force is occupying the vast majority of a country. Where'd you even get such a notion?

It's no wonder your theory hinges on Russian intelligence failures of colossal proportions, since it would require the Russians to know as little about the conduct of war as you yourself seem to.

From https://news.antiwar.com/2023/02/14/zelensky-signs-agreement-with-jp-morgan-on-ukraines-reconstruction/

What a surprise. A massive American corporation stands to benefit from the destruction wreaked by the war we now know their government was pushing to prolong.

But I'm sure that's all just another one of those massive coincidences we so frequently accept.

Certainly this had nothing whatsoever to do with it... JPMorgan Chase Spent $8 Million On Lobbying Last Year, More Than Any Other Bank

That's clearly not what Mearsheimer "is confirming". — Tzeentch

Mearsheimer is claiming at minute 24:20 Mearsheimer of your video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM) that the strategic objective of 190K Russian troops were aiming at either capturing or threatening Kiev. So what else was the purpose of aiming at capturing or threatening Kiev if not regime change? If the endgame is the political alignment of Ukraine, either there is a regime change or Zelensky's regime surrenders to Russian demands. So regime change was likely an option (and after all there was already an Ukrainian ex-president removed by the American "coup d'etat" to reinstate).

You have no idea what you're talking about if you consider it feasible to install a puppet regime when an enemy force is occupying the vast majority of a country. — Tzeentch

First, it's not on me to consider it feasible. I'm talking about the likely strategic objectives at least of the first phase of the war.
Second, you keep ignoring/dismissing the possible miscalculations of the Russians.
Third, notice also that there was a network of collaborationist within the Ukrainian armee and secret service that could have tried a coup d'etat favorable to Putin. See Zelensky's purges among generals and security Services:
https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-04-01/card/president-zelensky-fires-two-generals-cASwBg7pfy4FKlh2f25t
https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/87585
Fourth, even Yanukovic was warming up: https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/ex-ukraine-president-yanukovych-asks-zelensky-to-overcome-pride-and-stop-war-with-russia-articleshow.html

Where'd you even get such a notion? — Tzeentch

From different sources, which I can only partly link here.

- Putin himself:
the Russian president struck an uncompromising tone in a Friday address to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU), describing the government in Kiev as a “gang of drug addicts and neo-Nazis who have settled in Kyiv and taken the entire Ukrainian people hostage.” Putin appeared to welcome the prospect of—If not explicitly call for—a military coup, encouraging the ZSU to “take power into your own hands” and opining that it would be “easier” to negotiate with Ukraine’s top brass than with the Zelenskyy administration.
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-russia-and-ukraine-negotiate-end-war-200858
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/25/its-not-rational-putins-bizarre-speech-wrecks-his-once-pragmatic-image

- Experts:
The Center for Naval Analyses said that Russia would create a pincer movement to encircle Kyiv and envelop Ukraine's forces in the east, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies identifying three axes of advance: from Belarus in the north, from Donetsk in the center, and from Crimea in the south. The US said it believed that Russia intended to "decapitate" Ukraine's government and install its own, and US intelligence officials believed that Kyiv would fall within 96 hours
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine:_phase_1

It's no wonder your theory hinges on Russian intelligence failures of colossal proportions — Tzeentch

"My theory" hinges on what has been reported by many mainstream outlets:
https://www.ft.com/content/ba440d90-b0ba-4a73-a138-9cb1229b6cac
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/putins-colossal-intelligence-failure
https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a39376114/is-putin-crazy-or-bad-intel/
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220303-us-experts-militarily-the-russian-invasion-is-a-disaster-so-far

So what else was the purpose of aiming at capturing or threatening Kiev if not regime change? — neomac

Options include:
1) Showing the West the Russian threats were no bluff.
2) Forcing Kiev to the negotiating table, which, we now know, they succeeded in.
3) Creating a diversion for the offensive in the south.

The pattern of troop movements suggests the Russian drive on Kiev was unlikely to have as its goal to occupy and hold. They bypassed large pockets of resistance, which is something you can still see on the live maps today, and retreated as fast as they came.


The idea that Kiev represented the promise of victory is a notion I already dealt with before and you can find most of that exchange on page 309 and page 313 of this thread.

The idea that US experts were in some sort of unanimous agreement that Russia's invasion would be a cakewalk is debunked on the same page.


I've got nothing to say about statements of "anonymous US intelligence officials" or mainstream media.


Besides, you are making the point that the Russians suffered some colossal intelligence failure, so why are you referring to western experts and articles?

Yeah, he actually did argue that Russia was a potential threat to Ukraine, at least back in the 1990s. Russia loves to cite his work in regards to NATO expansion but quite conveniently forgets to mention that right after the end of the Cold War, he also argued in favor of a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent. If only someone would remind Russia of this. Seriously. A deal where Ukraine gets eventual EU membership, Austria-style neutrality, and its own nuclear deterrent seems like a great deal for both Ukraine and the West and would be a viable alternative to Ukrainian NATO membership!

So what else was the purpose of aiming at capturing or threatening Kiev if not regime change? — neomac

Options include:
1) Showing the West the Russian threats were no bluff.
2) Forcing Kiev to the negotiating table, which, we now know, they succeeded in.
3) Creating a diversion for the offensive in the south. — Tzeentch

The only aim I care discussing is 2. Forcing Kiev to the negotiating table, which, we now know, they succeeded in.
First, forcing a negotiation doesn’t exclude regime change. Putin’s request might have been a transition to a pro-West political leadership without bloodshed or detention or persecution for Zelensky.
Second, I don’t need to question the fact that Putin had other options than the decapitation of Zelensky’s regime, or that Putin preferred negotiation with Zelensky over regime change. Either cases do not exclude the fact that Putin ALSO pursued regime change, given that in phase one of the war there were also several Russian backed assassination attempts against Zelensky (https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-zelensky-russia-backed-assassination-attempts-report-2022-3?r=US&IR=T)

The pattern of troop movements suggests the Russian drive on Kiev was unlikely to have as its goal to occupy and hold. — Tzeentch

I would prefer to read directly from your source. In general, execution can also be mismanaged and Western military experts have already reported on the poor Russian military performance.
Said that, I’m interested less in discussing the details of Putin’s military tactics and strategy on the battlefield, than discussing the overall status of Putin’s “special military operation” in light of Putin’s endgame
(In Mearsheimer’s words “Winning for Putin is putting an end to Ukraine joining the West, joining NATO, joining the EU” at minute 1:40:04 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM)

The idea that Kiev represented the promise of victory is a notion I already dealt with before and you can find most of that exchange on page 309 and page 313 of this thread. — Tzeentch

I also find it plausible that the Russians did not intend to take and hold Kiev, even if they could have. I've already presented arguments why I believe that.

In summary:

- The Ukraine's centre of gravity is not in Kiev, because this war isn't conducted from Kiev. It's foreign support that is keeping this war going. Capturing Kiev would be symbolic, but not decisive.

- With the limited amount of troops Russia has deployed, it is unlikely they intended to spend the time and effort it would require to capture Kiev, when they had areas of strategic significance to occupy in the south.

- It is in Russia's primary interest that Ukraine continues to fight this war themselves. The capture of Kiev and it's C&C facilities could bring a western intervention closer.

- My view is that the drive on Kiev was a show of force and Russia's last attempt at finishing the conflict quickly. By showing they were not bluffing, they could conceivably have made the West back off and forced a renegotiation of Ukraine's position. If this were to fail, which it did, it could double as a diversionary attack to allow Russian forces to occupy the south with less resistance. — Tzeentch

Concerning the first point, Kiev is the political capital if the endgame is to impact Kiev’s foreign politics would obviously be the first place to go. What was military feasible to the Russians and actually pursued is not on me to establish. I can just read what has been reported and reason from there.
Concerning the second, as I said movements on the battlefield (independently from the intelligence/military poor performance) are not the only relevant factor, Putin might have counted also on a network of collaborationist insiders (he also publicly singled his favour for an Ukrainian military coup). Besides Russians tried to assassinate Zelensky and let's not forget the heavy shelling of the capital (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kyiv_(2022)).
Concerning the third, it’s been reported that the Westerners were expecting Ukraine to capitulate soon in the first phase.
Concerning the fourth, your views do not change what we know about the geopolitical endgame of Putin, nor Putin’s and other Russian government representatives’ declarations against Zelensky’s regime, nor Russian deal-breaker conditions for a negotiation. I care discussing what Russians did up until now on the battlefield in different phases wrt these points. Suggesting that military threatening Kiev in the first phase was just to show off their seriousness without being ready and finding feasible to follow through, goes against the logic of “they were not bluffing”. Or else that failing that, they could still exploit the move as a diversion in occupying East-Southern part of Ukraine (as opposed to simply and maybe more conveniently focusing on this part of Ukraine from the start), can’t underplay the relevance of such military failure wrt Putin’s geopolitical endgame.

Besides, you are making the point that the Russians suffered some colossal intelligence failure, so why are you referring to western experts and articles? — Tzeentch

Meaning? I doubt that Russians would be free to acknowledge “colossal intelligence failures” especially if that might involve Putin’s responsibilities. There have been Putin’s purges though: https://www.businessinsider.com/putin-purges-fsb-over-ukraine-failures-bellingcat-expert-2022-4?r=US&IR=T

First, forcing a negotiation doesn’t exclude regime change. Putin’s request might have been a transition to a pro-West political leadership without bloodshed or detention or persecution for Zelensky. — neomac

We know roughly what was on the table during those first negotiations, and it didn't include regime change.

Second, I don’t need to question the fact that Putin had other options than the decapitation of Zelensky’s regime, or that Putin preferred ta negotiation over a regime change. Either cases do not exclude the fact that Putin ALSO pursued regime change, given that in phase one of the war there were also several Russian backed assassination attempts against Zelensky — neomac

Installing a puppet regime, regime change and decapitation are three completely different subjects. You are shifting your goalposts.

Decapitation is a military-strategic goal that aims to sow chaos in the enemy's command & control, for example by taking out leadership figures and destroying central communication networks. The Russians probably pursued that strategy as a integral part of their military doctrine (so does the US).

The idea that the Russians could pursue the political goal of regime change in Ukraine by killing Zelensky is just silly. Zelensky would simply be replaced by another pro-Western talking head and literally nothing would change.

And we've already discussed the notion of installing a puppet regime without actually controlling Ukraine or destroying the Ukrainian military - outlandish.

I would prefer to read directly from your source. — neomac

https://liveuamap.com/



You can see the territories the Russian forces occupied during their drive on Kiev, which are now coloured in blue. Urban areas were bypassed, large swathes of open ground were left completely ignored. That's not what an attempt to seize and hold looks like.

You can contrast it with the manner in which southern Ukraine was occupied - every free inch of ground was taken and nests of resistance were systematically sieged and wiped out.

Said that, I’m interested less in discussing the details of Putin’s military tactics and strategy on the battlefield, than discussing the overall status of Putin’s “special military operation” in light of Putin’s endgame — neomac

Alright. Lets start with hearing the details of how the Russians planned to install a puppet regime while occupying less than 20% of the country and with the Ukrainian military occupying the rest.

They somehow capture Kiev, install a puppet, and the western backing, Ukrainian military and Ukrainian resistance magically go 'poof!' while an 190,000 man army maintains control over a population of 41 million in a country that has an area of 600,000 square kilometers?

Concerning the first point, Kiev is the political capital if the endgame is to impact Kiev’s foreign politics would obviously be the first place to go. — neomac

The Russians clearly sought to impact Kiev's foreign policy. The point of contention is whether capturing Kiev was their main goal in order to do so, and there doesn't seem to be much evidence to support that view. Capturing Kiev would take days, weeks even months of urban fighting and an enormous amount of manpower.

It seems way more likely, given the way the Russian forces invaded northern Ukraine, that they sought to force Kiev to negotiate, which again, they succeeded at. In case negotations failed the attack in the north would have still created room for the attack in the south.

Concerning the second, as I said movements on the battlefield (independently from the intelligence/military poor performance) are not the only relevant factor, Putin might have counted also on a network of collaborationist insiders (he also publicly singled his favour for an Ukrainian military coup). — neomac

I will take verifiable facts over rumors and hearsay. The things you are suggesting; military incompetence, intelligence failures, miscalculations - they all fit the "Russian incompetence" narrative the West has been spinning since the start of the war, yet when we look at what evidence there actually is to support it, there's little to no substance. Speculation, anonymous US intelligence officals, etc.

Fact remains that the Russians went to war against a larger force, which had been heavily supported by the US for years. Going to war under such terms, even to a layman, should be a highly risky proposition and to suggest the Russians weren't aware of that I think is short-sighted and simple.

Concerning the fourth, your views do not change what we know about the geopolitical endgame of Putin, nor Putin’s and other Russian government representatives’ declarations against Zelensky’s regime, nor Russian deal-breaker conditions for a negotiation. — neomac

Ok, what do you think we know about the Russians' geopolitical endgame?

Do you know more than us? The closest we have come to getting a glimpse are the negotiations that took place in March. Several reliable sources have given similar accounts that the Russians and Ukrainians were prepared to make serious concessions. The most important demand of the Russians: Ukraine does not join NATO.

That just so happens to fit exactly with what they have been telling us for the last 15 years.

I doubt that Russians would be free to acknowledge “colossal intelligence failures” especially if that might involve Putin’s responsibilities. — neomac

You're just assuming colossal intelligence failures took place, without actually having any idea of what Russian intelligence looked like? Odd.

I don't think the Russian invasion needs to be viewed as a colossal disaster when we take into consideration the Russians went into Ukraine with a "limited aim strategy," which is Mearsheimer's argument.

I think there are strong indications that the Russians went into Ukraine with limited aims. The number of troops they deployed, the terms they presented during the negotations, etc.

Installing a puppet regime, regime change and decapitation are three completely different subjects. You are shifting your goalposts.
Decapitation is a military-strategic goal that aims to sow chaos in the enemy's command & control, for example by taking out leadership figures and destroying central communication networks. The Russians probably pursued that strategy as a integral part of their military doctrine (so does the US).
The idea that the Russians could pursue regime change in Ukraine by killing Zelensky is just silly. Zelensky would simply be replaced by another pro-Western talking head and literally nothing would change. And we've already discussed the notion of installing a puppet regime without actually controlling Ukraine or destroying the Ukrainian military - outlandish. — Tzeentch

First, you just keep repeating your claims as if you already counter-argued my views in a very compelling way. Which is not the case.
Second, nowhere we have discussed related terminology so you can not accuse me of shifting goalposts because to you those terms mean completely different things. Even more so if I’m less interested in arguing the details of the Russian military plans (in different phases), independently from the geopolitical endgame.
Third, I do not believe that "installing a puppet regime, regime change and decapitation are three completely different subjects". They are all arguably linked as steps toward the same goal. And I backed that with several clues (Putin's support for Yanukhovic as Russian puppet, killing attempts against Zelensky, and possibilities for Putin to conspire with collaborations within the Ukrainian army and intelligence).

You can see the territories the Russian forces occupied during their drive on Kiev, which are now coloured in blue. Urban areas were bypassed, large swathes of open ground were left completely ignored. That's not what an attempt to seize and hold looks like. — Tzeentch

Yes because the Russian failed (and let’s not forget that their military effort on the ground was supported by heavy shelling too). This fact however doesn’t exclude that this could plausibly be their initial aim.
Initially, Russian forces captured key areas to the north and west of Kyiv, leading to international speculation of the city's imminent fall. However, stiff Ukrainian resistance sapped the momentum. Poor Russian logistics and tactical decisions helped the defenders to thwart efforts at encirclement, and, after a month of protracted fighting, Ukrainian forces mounted successful counterattacks.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kyiv_(2022)

They somehow capture Kiev, install a puppet, and the western backing, Ukrainian military and Ukrainian resistance magically go 'poof!' while an 190,000 man army maintains control a population of 41 million in a country that has an area of 600,000 square kilometers? — Tzeentch

Installing a puppet regime doesn’t need military control over the whole territory. Even the puppet regime installed by the US in Afghanistan did NOT have military control over all the territory (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-57933979). The difference from the US case however is that Putin could arguably rely on collaborationists in the army/intelligence (like the ones purged by Zelensky), pro-Russian political parties (that during the war were banned by Zelensky), and an ousted Ukrainian president to be reinstalled if needed. So no my speculation about Russian military goals (at least during the first phase) is not outlandish at all, nor unpopular among Western experts.
Prof Mearsheimer, a noted political scientist of the University of Chicago, feels that Russia’s aim is not to seize and defend territory in Ukraine (as it could get bogged down in an Afghanistan-like quagmire). The Russian aim is simply to either wreck Ukraine as a functional state or ensure regime change. https://thedailyguardian.com/putin-may-be-aiming-to-wreck-ukraine-as-a-functional-state/

Ok, what do you think we know about the Russians' geopolitical endgame?

Do you know more than us? — Tzeentch

Waste of time. I answered that already (and I was already using the first-person plural):

Putin’s endgame
(In Mearsheimer’s words “Winning for Putin is putting an end to Ukraine joining the West, joining NATO, joining the EU” at minute 1:40:04 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM) — neomac

You're just assuming colossal intelligence failures took place, without actually having any idea of what Russian intelligence looked like? Odd. — Tzeentch

I'm not randomly assuming Russian military/intelligence failures, I'm relying on what has been reported by legit sources (I gave you some links). If you have legit sources debunking what has been reported, just post them here. Sarcasm doesn't replace a substantive argument. As I said, I’m an avg dude so I’ll reason over the evidences accessible to me.

I don't think the Russian invasion needs to be viewed as a colossal disaster when we take into consideration the Russians went into Ukraine with a "limited aim strategy," which is Mearsheimer's argument.

I think there are strong indications that the Russians went into Ukraine with limited aims. The number of troops they deployed, the terms they presented during the negotations, etc. — Tzeentch

Things may have evolved differently from what initially planned, and still be worth it. I don't deny that.
And mine remain speculations, after all. Yet movement and size of the troops in the battle of Kiev are not strong indications against the idea that Russia might have tried to pursue regime change in the first phase of the war (indeed that is what one could expect under the premises I discussed).
Besides in the video you posted to support your claims, Mearsheimer has claimed:
- At minute 24:20 Mearsheimer of your video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM) that the strategic objective of 190K Russian troops were aiming at either capturing or threatening Kiev.
- At minute 1:40:04 “Winning for Putin is putting an end to Ukraine joining the West, joining NATO, joining the EU”
In other words, so far, if Russians wanted to threaten/capture Kiev as expected, they failed. If the Russians wanted just to consolidate the Eastern-South, they didn't ensure the geopolitical victory they were after.

Had Russia taken over Kyiv in Feb 2022 and taken the government into custody (or worse), then Ukraine would more or less have fallen under Kremlin rule, at least in the eyes of a few. There would be resistance, more scattered, less organized, that would end up being labeled "terrorists" — terrorists (and Nazis) are fair game after all, right? Would have been a victory for Putin, and, say, like "an intervention stopping a Nazi regime".
Kyiv didn't go like Crimea, though. Since then, their invasion has relied on numbers/resources (large hinterland that sort of includes Belarus), no particular threat to Russia (anywhere, no one's going to invade Russia, Putin + team can shuffle things about worryfree, or so they think :wink:), "no part of Ukraine is safe", others' restraints (e.g. no foreign battalions kicking them out, no NFZ), all that. So, they can just keep pouring on people and bombs, perhaps other openings will present themselves.
Maybe they hoped for Kyiv and expected shooting as usual in the east?

Zelensky asks for proof of invasion of Ukraine allegedly planned for February 16
^{— TASS · Feb 12, 2022}
Washington’s warnings that Russia is about to invade frustrate Ukrainians
^{— Matt Bradley, Veronika Melkozerova · NBC News · Feb 15, 2022}
Hacked News Channel and Deepfake of Zelenskyy Surrendering Is Causing Chaos Online
^{— Samantha Cole · VICE · Mar 16, 2022}
EU 'did not believe' US warnings of Russian war
^{— John Silk · Deutsche Welle · Oct 11, 2022}

A report from the frontlines:

‘Better than nothing’: Outgunned Ukrainian pilots take the fight to Russia in ancient Soviet-era helicopters
^{— Sam Kiley, Olha Konovalova, Sarah Dean, William Bonnett · CNN · Feb 17, 2023}

Doesn't seem to be a whole of such reports with the invaders.

Second, nowhere we have discussed related terminology... — neomac

There's no need for us to discuss it, since those terms are already neatly defined. It's up to you to use those terms properly.

Initially, Russian forces captured key areas to the north and west of Kyiv, leading to international speculation of the city's imminent fall. However, stiff Ukrainian resistance sapped the momentum. Poor Russian logistics and tactical decisions helped the defenders to thwart efforts at encirclement, and, after a month of protracted fighting, Ukrainian forces mounted successful counterattacks. — neomac

Why are you using wikipedia as a source?

Also, note the claim there: "Stiff Ukrainian resistance sapped the momentum."

Where is the proof of that?

As far as I can tell the Russians never made a serious attempt at attacking Kiev itself.

Installing a puppet regime doesn’t need military control over the whole territory. — neomac

The invasion of Afghanistan started with the crushing defeat of the Taliban from which they took years to recover.

You're proving how far out of book you are by insisting on this issue. You're basically telling me the earth is flat.

The difference from the US case however is that Putin could arguably rely on collaborationists in the army/intelligence... — neomac

"Arguably" meaning, in contrived scenarios that you invented specifically to suit your argument, without a shred of evidence given?

Prof Mearsheimer, a noted political scientist of the University of Chicago, feels that Russia’s aim is not to seize and defend territory in Ukraine (as it could get bogged down in an Afghanistan-like quagmire). The Russian aim is simply to either wreck Ukraine as a functional state or ensure regime change. — neomac

I highly doubt Mearsheimer made that claim. There's no source given and a Google search yielded nothing.

I'm not randomly assuming Russian military/intelligence failures, I'm relying on what has been reported by legit sources. — neomac

What makes these sources legit in your mind? They provide no actual evidence to back up their claims, and their claims are counter to what military logic dictates.

As I said, I’m an avg dude so I’ll reason over the evidences accessible to me. — neomac

The thing is, you're not actually providing any evidence even when I've been repeatedly asking for it. Newspaper clippings and wikipedia articles are not evidence. Furthermore, you seem to lack the basic foundational knowledge on the topic to detect complete fiction.

In other words, so far, if Russians wanted to threaten/capture Kiev as expected, ... — neomac

Either of those options would have vastly different implications, so I'm not sure why you are treating them as though they are the same.

Threatening Kiev is what actually happened, and it actually ended up with the Ukrainians and Russians entering negotations, which proceeded to a stage where an agreement was nearly reached.

What you're arguing is that the "real" Russian intentions were to capture Kiev. To make that argument you will need to provide some kind of evidence that you know something about the "real" Russian intentions. Predictably, no such evidence has been presented.


There is little information about the Battle of Kiev and the Kiev offensive. The Ukrainian order of battle is undisclosed. The Russian forces were only estimated between 15,000 - 30,000 over a month-long period, out of a 190,000.

The only source for losses I was able to find was this one, stating some ~200 Ukrainians have died in the fighting for Kiev roughly one month into the invasion, and that includes civilians.

Does this give the impression that capturing Kiev was of great importance to the Russians?

No, of course not.

It suggests the exact opposite: that very little intense fighting took place at all.

You'll have to come with explanations why many of the facts do not seem to line up with your view. And with every "special" explanation that accounts for the lack of factual evidence, your position becomes less convincing.


I wonder why the Ukrainian order of battle remains undisclosed. Perhaps it has something to do with the heroic victory it has been framed as by the mainstream media, and that the Ukrainian order of battle may suggest something less heroic - perhaps even suggest something like a successful Russian diversion?

https://www.nationalreview.com/2023/02/russian-land-mines-disguised-as-toys-target-the-children-of-ukraine/

Tragic, and inhumane. What do you propose we do about it?

Second, nowhere we have discussed related terminology... — neomac

There's no need for us to discuss it, since those terms are already neatly defined. It's up to you to use those terms properly. — Tzeentch

Prove that I didn’t use those terms properly. You just clarified your understanding of one term: “decapitation is a military-strategic goal that aims to sow chaos in the enemy's command & control, for example by taking out leadership figures and destroying central communication networks.“
But that’s obviously a questionable definition, “decapitation” is neither specifically nor primarily a military-strategic term. As far as I’m concerned, I talked about “the decapitation of Zelensky’s regime”, “The US said it believed that Russia intended to ‘decapitate’ Ukraine's government”, so I was always talking regime change. No goalpost shift.

Why are you using wikipedia as a source? Also, note the claim there: "Stiff Ukrainian resistance sapped the momentum." Where is the proof of that? As far as I can tell the Russians never made a serious attempt at attacking Kiev itself. — Tzeentch

Or maybe Russia failed due to all sorts of miscalculations, even about Ukrainian resistance (https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare). Write to wikipedia if you want evidences for its claims.
As I said, I rely on experts’ feedback and mainstream sources accessible to me. If you have legit sources that can debunk the thesis of Russian miscalculations and intelligence failures in the first phase of the war, post them here.

Installing a puppet regime doesn’t need military control over the whole territory. — neomac
The invasion of Afghanistan started with the crushing defeat of the Taliban from which they took years to recover. — Tzeentch

First things first, the puppet regime in Afghanistan didn’t have military control of the whole country, right? Right, so it’s FALSE the assumption that one needs military control over the whole territory to install a puppet regime.
Second, as I told you many times, it’s possible that the Russians didn’t rely just on the efficacy of military action on the ground (backed by rocket shelling and air force), but also on certain weaknesses of the Ukrainian regime backed by the unreliable FSB intelligence pre-war investigation (https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraine-through-russias-eyes) and the likely presence of Ukrainian political/military/intelligence collaborationist (or potential defectors). Early purges on both sides support these hypotheses. Putin’s suggesting an Ukrainian military coup (to replace a “gang of drug addicts and neo-Nazis who have settled in Kyiv and taken the entire Ukrainian people hostage”) would fit well in this scenario too.
That regime change was a likely goal is confirmed by attempts to kill Zelensky. And implied by official declarations: if among the declared objectives there is “denazification of Ukraine” (not part of Ukraine, not 4 oblasts of Ukraine, but Ukraine https://tass.com/politics/1409189) and the government is called “nazi” I don’t know how else anybody can interpret this stated objective other than regime change (even Lavrov and Medvev repeatedly called for regime change in Ukraine).
Since Russia’s launch of a large-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, it has been clear that Vladimir Putin’s announced “special operation” did not go according to plan. Putin’s proclaimed goals of “demilitarizing” and “denazifying” the government of Ukraine—combined with the Russian military posture and performance in the opening days of the invasion—led many experts to conclude that Putin’s original war aims were nothing short of regime change in Kyiv.
However, faced with fierce Ukrainian defense and the West’s crippling economic sanctions, Putin appears to be recalculating his initial maximalist aims. Putin’s efforts to force Zelensky to concede on all demands—lay down arms, forswear membership in Western alliances, and recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the independence of the "republics" in the Donbas—would essentially amount to Ukraine’s surrender, and thus have proven futile.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/why-putin-scaling-down-his-political-aims-while-scaling-fight

The difference from the US case however is that Putin could arguably rely on collaborationists in the army/intelligence... — neomac

"Arguably" meaning, in contrived scenarios that you invented specifically to suit your argument, without a shred of evidence given? — Tzeentch

Again, I didn’t invent anything, I gave you the evidence accessible to me. “Arguably” in that sentence means that I can argue that claim based on the evidence accessible to me.

Prof Mearsheimer, a noted political scientist of the University of Chicago, feels that Russia’s aim is not to seize and defend territory in Ukraine (as it could get bogged down in an Afghanistan-like quagmire). The Russian aim is simply to either wreck Ukraine as a functional state or ensure regime change. — neomac


I highly doubt Mearsheimer made that claim. There's no source given and a Google search yielded nothing. — Tzeentch

You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv?
No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests.
https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine (March 1, 2022)

What's your excuse now?

I'm not randomly assuming Russian military/intelligence failures, I'm relying on what has been reported by legit sources. — neomac

What makes these sources legit in your mind? They provide no actual evidence to back up their claims, and their claims are counter to what military logic dictates. — Tzeentch

Even if they provided evidences, I might still be accused of being unable to assess the authenticity or the implications of such evidences.
You can’t raise the standards for what constitutes “evidence” arbitrarily high, even more so in the relaxed context of a philosophy forum. Again, I’m an avg dude, and I speculate over the evidences available and computable by me. Therefore if you have better sources than the ones I provided, post them here.

What makes those sources legit? In general, the reputation of the publication platform, the fact they support each other, and the fact that they appear plausible enough wrt my background knowledge.

As I said, I’m an avg dude so I’ll reason over the evidences accessible to me. — neomac

The thing is, you're not actually providing any evidence even when I've been repeatedly asking for it. Newspaper clippings and wikipedia articles are not evidence. Furthermore, you seem to lack the basic foundational knowledge on the topic to detect complete fiction. — Tzeentch

First, you have to clarify what constitutes evidence to you, and you too cite experts (like Mearsheimer)
Second, you can’t set standards for evidence arbitrarily high (e.g. I can’t certainly provide a police dossier with all the material evidences proving beyond any doubt that Zelensky has been subject to 3 attempts of murder by the Russians), even more so in a relaxed context of a philosophy forum.
Third, as I never claimed I’m an expert or even an amateur of military/intelligence field, and made it clear repeatedly, it’s pointless to accuse me of lacking “basic foundational knowledge” in the military/intelligence field. I’m fine with relying on military/intelligence experts’ feedback for that matter. It’s not evident to me you are one, nor even Mearsheimer, for that matter.

In other words, so far, if Russians wanted to threaten/capture Kiev as expected, ... — neomac

Either of those options would have vastly different implications, so I'm not sure why you are treating them as though they are the same.
Threatening Kiev is what actually happened, and it actually ended up with the Ukrainians and Russians entering negotations, which proceeded to a stage where an agreement was nearly reached. — Tzeentch

Because to me, “threatening Kiev” roughly means “threatening to capture Kiev”.
BTW what does “threatening Kiev” mean to you? What did the Russian threaten to do with their troops in Kiev if it was evident to anybody with “basic foundational knowledge” that the Russians were most certainly unable to capture Kiev?

What you're arguing is that the "real" Russian intentions were to capture Kiev — Tzeentch

No, dude, let’s not twist things around at your convenience. I’m talking about what has been officially reported by legit sources about Russian intentions in the first phase. While you are arguing that Putin’s “real” intentions weren’t the ones reported by those legit sources.
As far as I’m concerned, to repeat it once again, I don’t find implausible that Putin aimed at pressuring Kiev to a negotiation. Nor that negotiation might have been possible even without regime change. Nor that Russian troops on the ground weren’t enough to ensure the capture of Kiev all alone. I simply find implausible to claim that it’s unlikely that Russia pursued regime change because of lack of manpower or because negotiation was most certainly the only realistic goal. As I said many times, I don’t think that Russians necessarily counted on the sheer force and size of their troops to make Kiev capitulate. Support from air force and heavy rocket shelling could have also played an important role in wrecking Kiev’s morale or capacity of resistance. At the same time the Russians might have also counted on/expected some inside defection/support to regime collapse. Not to mention that the the poor execution of the first phase of the war makes it more likely that the Russians have tried to achieve something beyond their means. “It’s taken me a while to figure out what they’re trying to do because it looks so ridiculous and incompetent,” Michael Kofman, director of Russian studies at the CNA think tank, said on Twitter of the Russian advance. “The Russian operation is a bizarre scheme, based on terrible political assumptions, with poor relationship to their training & capabilities.” (https://www.vox.com/22954833/russia-ukraine-invasion-strategy-putin-kyiv)

You'll have to come with explanations why many of the facts do not seem to line up with your view. — Tzeentch

What many facts? You just talked about size and movement of the Russian troops on the ground. And “peace talking” isn’t a confirmation against my claims , for 2 reasons: I didn’t exclude that negotiation was a pursued objective (I just argued that Russia might likely have pursued also regime change), an attempted capture of Kiev could have led to peace talks as well.
Now my questions to you. If Russians most certainly didn’t pursue regime change:
- Why did the Russians try to kill Zelensky?
- Why did the Russian troops try to encircle Kiev ?
- Why did the Russians engage in troop battles, if they could simply heavy shell Kiev?

Write to wikipedia if you want evidences for its claims. — neomac

Why would I? You're the one trying to use it to make an argument. If you don't care about searching and providing evidence for your views or the persuasiveness of your argument that's your problem, not mine.

(https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare — neomac

Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation.

No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests. — neomac

Both the article and Mearsheimer's view on regime change in Ukraine (that he shared only days after the invasion - way too early for it to be viewed as a detailed assessment, in my opinion) are directly contradicted by a point Mearsheimer made himself more recently, namely that the Russian troop deployments were far too small to carry out a classic blitzkrieg necessary to facilitate such a thing. He states that almost literally word for word in one of the clips I gave you.

I don't agree with the point Mearsheimer made in March. It's incompatible with arguments he put forward later.

Furthermore, the article makes the same point I made before. It literally states:

Second, the Russian invasion force was far too small to seize and hold territory, ...

... Russia utilized between 150,000 and 190,000 soldiers—including regular and irregular forces—for the initial invasion of Ukraine, a country of approximately 44 million people with an area of over 600,000 square kilometers.34 Those numbers translate into a force ratio of 4 Russian soldiers per 1,000 Ukrainian inhabitants.

There are no exact formulas for how many soldiers are required to hold conquered territory, but a force ratio of as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants has sometimes been necessary to pacify a hostile local population.35 Large numbers of troops are generally essential to establish basic law and order. By the end of World War II, for example, there were 101 U.S. soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in the U.S.-controlled sector of Germany. More recently, there were 19 U.S. and European soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in Bosnia in 1995 and 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in Kosovo in 2000.36

Lower ratios are generally insufficient to pacify hostile populations. In Iraq, for instance, the United States had 7 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants and faced a persistent deadly insurgency—even with the help of Iraqi government forces and Sunni militia members. U.S.

Note that this doesn't even yet take into account a 200,000+ strong Ukrainian military that would not magically disappear.

The rest of the article isn't particularly convincing towards your point, as it talks mostly of operational matters and not about the intelligence upon which the Russians based themselves.

First things first, the puppet regime in Afghanistan didn’t have military control of the whole country, right? — neomac

Anything that smelled of Taliban was bombed into dust by the US Air Force. There wasn't a Taliban flag or outpost left standing anywhere in the country. I don't see how that can be classified as anything other than an exceptionally high degree of military control. Of course that military control started getting gradually eroded by an increasingly intense insurgency.

But my point never was that control of the whole country is necessary (nice strawman), but that enacting regime change while holding less than 1/5th with the 4/5ths being occupied by a western-backed, western-trained enemy military is utter fantasy.

That regime change was a likely goal is confirmed by attempts to kill Zelensky. — neomac

That does not confirm that at all.

Killing off leadership figures is a common method in warfare, which I already explained to you.

And it's not obvious at all that killing Zelensky would change anything about Ukraine's political course. In fact, I believe it would change nothing. How much influence do you believe Russia has in Ukraine, outside of the areas it directly controls? Virtually zero.

However, faced with fierce Ukrainian defense and the West’s crippling economic sanctions, Putin appears to be recalculating his initial maximalist aims. — neomac

More articles with claims about the inner goings-on of the Kremlin, without a shred of evidence presented.

This is a recurring theme: the entirety of your argument, nay the entire western narrative, hinges on the idea that the Russians went in with a force to destroy the Ukrainian military and occupy all of Ukraine - something which is almost directly contradicted by the facts.

It's obvious why they should argue this - because the idea of Russian imperialism and a Ukrainian resurgence is much easier to peddle if a narrative of grandiose Russian goals followed by a massive Russian failure to achieve those goals is established. However, much seems to indicate that the Russian initial aims weren't "maximalist". I think the negotiations that took place in March provide a solid basis for that view, since the terms that were almost agreed upon there were essentially the exact ones that Russia had been insisting on for years.

Further, there's really no way to save the "maximalist" argument from the fact that the 190,000 troops Russia deployed are completely insufficient for the goals you purport they had.

Even if you want to make the point that their goal was to enact regime change in Kiev, you cannot explain why only a small portion of those forces actually marched on Kiev, and intense fighting over the city never took place.

You can’t raise the standards for what constitutes “evidence” arbitrarily high, — neomac

I'm not raising standards "arbitrarily" high. The holes in your argument are utterly blatant, and instead of addressing those holes, you pile on more articles of people who seem similarly unaware of them.

What makes those sources legit? — neomac

Sources are legit when they produce a coherent argument based on verifable facts and evidence, or at least things which can be verified with a high degree of certainty. When their argument defies common logic, or features obvious holes, a detailed explanation should be in place to account for that.

Third, as I never claimed I’m an expert or even an amateur of military/intelligence field, and made it clear repeatedly, it’s pointless to accuse me of lacking “basic foundational knowledge” in the military/intelligence field. I’m fine with relying on military/intelligence experts’ feedback for that matter. It’s not evident to me you are one, ... — neomac

You say that, but you don't give the impression you wish to solely base yourself on expert opinions.

You take the smallest snippets of circumstantial proof and use it to argue the most far-reaching claims, generally without even checking if the snippets you use are based on anything tangible and real.

Because to me, “threatening Kiev” roughly means “threatening to capture Kiev”.
BTW what does “threatening Kiev” mean to you? What did the Russian threaten to do with their troops in Kiev if it was evident to anybody with “basic foundational knowledge” that the Russians were most certainly unable to capture Kiev? — neomac

That's another strawman.

I never argued the Ukrainians could have known prior to the invasion that the Russians would not try to take Kiev.

The fog of war can make diversionary attacks very effective, and we know for a fact that the Russians employ deception as a core pillar of their military doctrine.

The fact that the Russians used 15,000 - 30,000 out of a 190,000 men in their offensive towards Kiev, and the fact that very little heavy fighting seems to have taken place, does not imply the Russians attributed high strategic significance to the capture of Kiev.

I’m talking about what has been officially reported suggested by legit western [potentially highly biased and/or politicized] sources — neomac

Fixed.

I simply find implausible to claim that it’s unlikely that Russia pursued regime change because of lack of manpower or because negotiation was most certainly the only realistic goal. — neomac

I don't see how regime change is even a reasonable option without decisively defeating the Ukrainian military and occupying the vast majority of the country.

Again I ask you, Russia installs a puppet. What happens to the areas that aren't under Russian control? What happens to the Ukrainian military consisting of hundreds of thousands of men? What happens to western support?

Do those things magically disappear?

No. The war would obviously continue and the "regime change" would be completely meaningless in areas that Russia doesn't directly control.

You just talked about size and movement of the Russian troops on the ground. — neomac

I've talked about those things because they are in direct contradiction to the argument you have been putting forward.

- Why did the Russians try to kill Zelensky? — neomac

I've already explained. Decapitation is a common military strategy to diminish an enemy's command and control capabilities. Killing Zelensky would be a big symbolic victory and sow chaos and fear.

- Why did the Russian troops try to encircle Kiev ? — neomac

The obvious answer would be that even a diversionary attack needs to be credible.

But what do you mean when you say "try"?

There is no evidence of particularly heavy fighting around Kiev. As such, there is no indication that the Russians were prepared to overcome significant resistance in order to achieve whatever their goals may have been.

- Why did the Russians engage in troop battles, if they could simply heavy shell Kiev? — neomac

I don't know how you envision incursions into a foreign nation to take place without troops getting into combat with each other.

Troop movements require scouting, vanguards, rear security, logistics, etc. All those things involve physical men putting themselves in harms way.

Blindly shelling Kiev from the other side of the border is just another silly notion. Kiev has an area of 839 square kilometers. Randomly lobbing shells into it would have no impact whatsoever, besides fueling western propaganda. Cities are captured through urban combat - notoriously bloody and difficult - not unguided artillery barrages.
________________________________________________

What's your excuse now? — neomac

It's odd you get so adverserial about a genuine inquiry for a source. Is it not normal to you that people ask for sources when they are presented with claims they think are questionable? I would expect you to do the same.

Until the war of 2022 started, the financial and military flow from the US was constrained by 3 factors (type and volume of military aid, lack of wider support from the West), the political pressure from the West was constrained by the fact the Western Europeans wanted to keep their business with Russia (which Nord Stream 2 would have further encouraged) and by the fact that Russia could still pressure the Ukrainian domestic politics due to pro-Russian propaganda and parties. — neomac

Yes. Back then as Russia hadn't gone on an all-out conventional attack, worries about escalation were obvious... I remember especially the Obama administration was very worried about escalation. Prior last year there for example was no air warfare from the Russian side. Before the February 24th assault the military aid was more about other things than those that go boom, yet this aid consisted for example modern communications and radios and training, which are surprisingly important. Now it's nearly full spectrum assistance. The US has given about 26,7 billion dollars in military aid to Ukraine since February 24th of last year.

Let's put that to perspective: during 2001 to 2020 the US gave Afghanistan military aid about 81 billion (dollars in 2019 dollars). To Israel the US gives military aid about 3,8 billion dollars annually.

26,7 billion dollars is 40% of what Russia's defence spending in 2021 (66bn USD), before the special military operation.

Add to that what Ukraine gets from West Europe and other countries. European countries seem to want a decision from the US before they make the same decision (just as Germany did with finally accepting to send main battle tanks). Likely they don't want to be the sole country that "antes up" and faces the wrath of Putin.

Yeah, he actually did argue that Russia was a potential threat to Ukraine, at least back in the 1990s. Russia loves to cite his work in regards to NATO expansion but quite conveniently forgets to mention that right after the end of the Cold War, he also argued in favor of a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent. If only someone would remind Russia of this. Seriously. A deal where Ukraine gets eventual EU membership, Austria-style neutrality, and its own nuclear deterrent seems like a great deal for both Ukraine and the West and would be a viable alternative to Ukrainian NATO membership! — Xanatos

EU membership and Austria-style neutrality could have been a great option... prior to February 24th 2022.

Now Russia simply can repeat the Russo-Japanese war and accept something similar in the peace terms as in that war. Or then something similar to the Peace of Riga in 1921. There's ample examples of Russian wars that they have started and which haven't gone as well as they thought at first, but have ended in defeat.

Both the article and Mearsheimer's view on regime change in Ukraine (that he shared only days after the invasion - way too early for it to be viewed as a detailed assessment, in my opinion) are directly contradicted by a point Mearsheimer made himself more recently, namely that the Russian troop deployments were far too small to carry out a classic blitzkrieg necessary to facilitate such a thing. He states that almost literally word for word in one of the clips I gave you. — Tzeentch

Mearsheimer in the clips you linked talks about occupying all of Ukraine and imperialism. However at minute 24:20 of your video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM) Mearsheimer claims that the strategic objective Russians were aiming at were either capturing or threatening Kiev. He uses the word “capturing”. He doesn’t exclude that “capturing Kiev” might have been their intention. So suck it up and move on.

my point never was that control of the whole country is necessary (nice strawman), but that enacting regime change while holding less than 1/5th with the 4/5ths being occupied by a western-backed, western-trained enemy military is utter fantasy. — "Tzeentch

the entirety of your argument, nay the entire western narrative, hinges on the idea that the Russians went in with a force to destroy the Ukrainian military and occupy all of Ukraine - something which is almost directly contradicted by the facts. — "Tzeentch

I don't see how regime change is even a reasonable option without decisively defeating the Ukrainian military and occupying the vast majority of the country. — Tzeentch

You look confused. First of all, you accuse me of strawmanning you because “occupy all of Ukraine” to achieve regime change is not what you are objecting to me, yet in the same post you claim that my argument hinges on “occupy all of Ukraine”. So no, I’m not strawmanning you. At best, you are strawmanning yourself.
Second, I do not have an equation on how many ground troops are necessary to ensure the success of a regime change in Ukraine. So the quantities you are considering in your arguments (“1/5th with the 4/5ths”, “occupy all of Ukraine”, “the vast majority of the country”) may make sense to support your claims under certain conditions, but not under all conditions (e.g. it depends on how hostile the population is, the contribution from state apparatus insiders, the support of aircraft/rocket shelling, the size of the targeted territory, etc.).

Again I ask you, Russia installs a puppet. What happens to the areas that aren't under Russian control? What happens to the Ukrainian military consisting of hundreds of thousands of men? What happens to western support? Do those things magically disappear?
No. The war would obviously continue and the "regime change" would be completely meaningless in areas that Russia doesn't directly control. — Tzeentch

Even if you want to make the point that their goal was to enact regime change in Kiev, you cannot explain why only a small portion of those forces actually marched on Kiev, and intense fighting over the city never took place. — Tzeentch

Killing off leadership figures is a common method in warfare, which I already explained to you. And it's not obvious at all that killing Zelensky would change anything about Ukraine's political course. In fact, I believe it would change nothing. How much influence do you believe Russia has in Ukraine, outside of the areas it directly controls? Virtually zero. — Tzeentch

You keep focusing on the number of deployed ground troops as if my argument essentially hinges on that. But that’s not what I argued (nice strawman). Russia might have had a complex strategy wrt Kiev (based on different possible scenarios), which include regime change. To achieve regime change ground troops might have not been enough (also depending on how hostile the population would have proven to be), but in addition to that rocket/air-force strikes, possible inside jobs (especially by collaborationists within military/intelligence service favourable to a coup [1]) and killing Zelensky might have compensated. All these conditions are not implausible since they have some support from the available reports.
Detecting intentions from the troop movements on the ground may underestimate the impact of logistic and coordination problems and the equipment losses the Russians suffered.
The West propaganda objection is as good as the Russian propaganda counter-objection.

That's another strawman. I never argued the Ukrainians could have known prior to the invasion that the Russians would not try to take Kiev. The fog of war can make diversionary attacks very effective, and we know for a fact that the Russians employ deception as a core pillar of their military doctrine. The fact that the Russians used 15,000 - 30,000 out of a 190,000 men in their offensive towards Kiev, and the fact that very little heavy fighting seems to have taken place, does not imply the Russians attributed high strategic significance to the capture of Kiev. — Tzeentch

First, it’s not a strawman because you are making now the distinction between prior to the invasion and during the invasion, and I didn’t make this distinction either. I didn’t even exclude that “things may have evolved differently from what initially planned, and still be worth it. I don't deny that.” But estimates about the number of the deployed Russian troops were available very early in March 2022 (while the Russian attempt lasted till end march), so that begs the question: how credible was the Russian threat to the Ukrainians backed by the Americans if the number of ground troops was all the counts and it was evident to all military experts that they were insufficient to capture Kyiv?
Second, the arguments supporting the “diversion” hypothesis have been questioned for several reasons: They are not consistent with the structure of Russia’s military campaign, public statements by Russian authorities, or even a basic cost-benefit analysis. Here for more details: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/23003689/putin-ukraine-russia-donbas-energy-feint
But the point I care mostly about remains the same. So far, if Russians wanted to threaten/capture Kiev as expected (also because without control over Malorossia there is no buffer territory wrt NATO), they failed. If the Russians wanted just to consolidate the Eastern-South, they didn't ensure the geopolitical victory they were after (at minute 1:40:04 of your video “Winning for Putin is putting an end to Ukraine joining the West, joining NATO, joining the EU”).


[1]
Russian intelligence and military agencies are also supporting paramilitary actors in Ukraine to conduct sabotage and subversion. The highest density of Russian-backed units appears to be in eastern Ukraine, where Russia has provided tanks, small arms, mobile artillery, fuel, training, and other aid to separatist rebels.15 Russian forces have helped create, sustain, and fund separatist political parties in Ukraine; established and aided paramilitary groups such as the Russian Orthodox Army and the Night Wolves; and recruited Cossack, Chechen, Serbian, and Russian paramilitaries to fight in Ukraine.16 But this Russian assistance to groups in Ukraine appears to be growing. One use of these groups may be in sabotage and other irregular warfare or “fifth column” activities in the capital of Kiev or in the rear of Ukrainian military forces while Russian conventional forces advance from the east. In addition, the Kremlin has developed plans to install a pro-Russian leader in Ukraine, according to British intelligence, possibly via a coup. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-gamble-ukraine

:up:

Russia blocks access to The Bell news website
^{— Caleb Davis, Guy Faulconbridge · Reuters · Feb 19, 2023}

Rights groups say Russia is trying to control the entire media landscape by blocking independent news outlets, stopping their reporting on the war from reaching ordinary Russians.

Some degree of media control is expected when waging war I s'pose; theirs went overboard some time ago though. :/ "Foreign agents" has become a go-to allegation and judicial process has gone down the drain.

Mearsheimer claims that the strategic objective Russians were aiming at were either capturing or threatening Kiev. — neomac

He does say that, without any elaboration whatsoever.

You look confused. — neomac

Are you really implying the Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country, with a western-trained, western-backed Ukrainian military occupying the rest, and an angry Ukrainian population to reckon with, with 190,000 troops? — Tzeentch

Right, so it’s FALSE the assumption that one needs military control over the whole territory to install a puppet regime. — neomac

Do you know what a strawman is?

... yet in the same post you claim that my argument hinges on “occupy all of Ukraine”. — neomac

Which it essentially does, whether you realise it or not.

Second, I do not have an equation on how many ground troops are necessary to ensure the success of a regime change in Ukraine. So the quantities you are considering in your arguments (“1/5th with the 4/5ths”, “occupy all of Ukraine”, “the vast majority of the country”) may make sense to support your claims under certain conditions, but not under all conditions (e.g. it depends on how hostile the population is, the contribution from state apparatus insiders, the support of aircraft/rocket shelling, the size of the targeted territory, etc.). — neomac

It makes imminent sense in the conditions the Ukraine war is fought under.

A large, capable Ukrainian military (outnumbering the Russians even). Vast amounts of Western support, etc.

Regime change under the conditions you have suggested is outlandish.

Russia might have had a complex strategy wrt Kiev (based on different possible scenarios), which include regime change. — neomac

Again, lovely theory, but where is the evidence?

Every time you need to invent a more complicated explanation as to why the facts don't line up with your view it becomes less convincing.

To achieve regime change ground troops might have not been enough (also depending on how hostile the population would have proven to be), but in addition to that rocket/air-force strikes, possible inside jobs (especially by collaborationists within military/intelligence service favourable to a coup [1]) and killing Zelensky might have compensated. All these conditions are not implausible since they have some support from the available reports. — neomac

You vastly overestimate the weight of miscellaneous factors, and underestimate the importance of boots on the ground. No control means no regime change.

Your own article already blows your theory out of the water since it puts into perspective what kind of force is needed to occupy and control a population and what the Russians actually fielded.

Remember your example of Afghanistan? The US enjoyed every advantage imaginable. A decisive military victory, complete air dominance, support from multi-national coalitions and indigenous forces, a way higher troop-to-population ratio - almost double.

It was fighting a third world country. And it still lost.

Russia has none of those things.

The West propaganda objection is as good as the Russian propaganda counter-objection. — neomac

Except that I'm not basing myself on Russian or even pro-Russian sources, but nice try.

But estimates about the number of the deployed Russian troops were available very early in March 2022 (while the Russian attempt lasted till end march), so that begs the question: how credible was the Russian threat to the Ukrainians backed by the Americans if the number of ground troops was all the counts and it was evident to all military experts that they were insufficient to capture Kyiv? — neomac

That the Russians might want to take Kiev is pretty obvious, even just as a bargaining chip or a symbolic victory. The question is what importance they attributed to it, and what cost they would be willing to pay. The facts imply the answer is 'relatively little'.

I can't look into the minds of the Ukrainian leadership.

The Ukrainian order of battle for the Battle of Kiev remains undisclosed, so we don't actually know how seriously they took the threat because for that we need to know the numbers of troops they deployed in defense of it.

Casualty figures as far as they are available imply little heavy fighting, which means that whatever the Ukrainians defended with was enough for the Russians to decide not to even try capturing the city.

Here for more details: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/23003689/putin-ukraine-russia-donbas-energy-feint — neomac

Don't bother with such blatantly biased and low-quality articles. Some of the sources linked in that article literally lead to Twitter. I did read the article, and it's basic regurgitation of points already made and debunked here.

It insists Kiev was the main prize, while the fighting around Kiev does not imply this at all.

If you want to make a convincing argument, you should see if such articles are based on anything substantial, and provide a link to the substance instead.

So far, if Russians wanted to threaten/capture Kiev as expected (also because without control over Malorossia there is no buffer territory wrt NATO), they failed. If the Russians wanted just to consolidate the Eastern-South, they didn't ensure the geopolitical victory they were after (at minute 1:40:04 of your video “Winning for Putin is putting an end to Ukraine joining the West, joining NATO, joining the EU”). — neomac

If the point of the advance on Kiev was to force the Ukrainian leadership to the negotiating table they succeeded actually. Those negotiations failed, though - blocked by the US, we now know.

And obviously Russia is so far unable to end the western policy of NATO membership for Ukraine, which I agree is probably their primary strategic objective.

I think it was also fairly obvious from the onset of the invasion that such a policy change would only come as the result of a brokered deal, and Russia lacked the power to enforce it unilaterally through military force.