How do you imagine kicking puppies solves cooperation problems? You are just making up nonsense. — Mark S

I think the puppy kicking is just an analogue for any kind of egregious potential human behavior that can be assessed as right or wrong, regardless of any cooperative components. Humans cooperating may lead to human sacrifice, burning of witches, hanging of gay people, gassing of minority groups - all as part of a prevailing social order.

The OP proposes that the function of past and present cultural moral norms is solving cooperation problems. — Mark S

And what cooperating to kick puppies shows is that this is misguided. It does this by setting out an instance of cooperation that is not morally acceptable.

The function of past and present cultural moral norms is to tell us what to do.

Sure, that might on some, or even most occasions lead to improved cooperation, but that is incidental, and not their function.

What you are proposing here and in your other thread is blind to the purpose of moral and ethical discussion, that being deciding what we ought to do. As points out, the discussion is about good answers, it is about the endless unsolvable debates. And this is simply because what we do changes what we ought to do. The discussion goes on.

To put it bluntly, what you are suggesting is that cooperation is useful. Well, yes, but that does not even begin to address issues of morality, of what it is we ought cooperate in doing.

any kind of egregious potential human behavior that can be assessed as right or wrong, regardless of any cooperative components — Tom Storm

Yep.

Innate to our universe? What does that mean?

Healthy cooperation is based on mutual benefit, between you and the other parties, but not necessarily outside of that. You're imposing this kind of species-wide cooperation mandate that doesn't make any sense, as though all humans need to cooperate with each other.

Doesn't healthy cooperation require aligning interests? Do all humans have aligning interests?

If you have no desire to resolve such disputes, you would not be a good person to associate with. OK. — Mark S

There is only one way to resolve these disputes, and it's through tyranny. Oh, of course, our noble philosophers wouldn't ever dare dream of tyranny, they only assert objective moral truths which do the tyranny for them. The truth imposes itself on everyone by its nature, and so wipes one's hands clean from having to do the imposing themselves. Disagreement is an obvious outcome of freedom, for people to fight for what works best for them, to fight for their ideals and beliefs. What's wrong with a dispute? Is it your desire to rid the world of moral disputes? Why? So we can all hold hands and work together in a beautiful utopia? Ugh, I despise the attempt, and it won't ever work out that way.

We should only aim to limit our cooperation to peaceful means and to reconcile our disputes in peaceful ways. I know I'll never see eye to eye with everyone else regarding what's right or wrong, but we could at least try to be respectful of our differences. Isn't that what things such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and so on, are all about? We want to create the perfect environment for disagreement to be conducted in a peaceful, civil and productive manner., not eliminate disagreement...

Sure, ethics has grown far beyond cooperation strategies to include answers to broader questions such as “What is good?”, “How should I live?”, and “What are my obligations?” — Mark S

Morality doesn't exist in a vacuum. For example, through propaganda in the late 20th century, the US demonised communism, consistently morally condemning it and this caught on and continued within US society for decades. This moral condemnation was politically motivated, and it's a good example of how outside influences are impacting moral views. You're acting like morality exists just to solve problems of cooperation, and this is just entirely lacking in nuance, it's rarely that simple, or innocent.

In contrast, the spontaneous feeling of satisfaction and optimism in the cooperative (moral) company of friends and family is a primary source of durable happiness for most people. — Mark S

I'm afraid of the moral views of others, we hurt others in the name of righteousness, and think of ourselves as just. We can be so brutal in doing it... humans aren't saved by morality, we've done terrible things in the name of justice. Look at some of the prisons of our world, people there are treated like animals, deprived of any dignity or safety. It's fine though, they deserved it, and it's morally okay.

Don't expect me to view the invoking of the term morality with trust, I don't have any respect for the concept of morality as a whole. It's a feature of the concept that one views themselves as trustworthy, "we won't hurt anyone unless they deserve it", great, how reassuring. Morality is only beautiful when you're only looking at it from the perspective of what you find moral. Because what you find moral will always take your needs and desires into account, but the morality of others isn't so convenient. Species-wide cooperation lol... under whose rule?

As to what I claim, referring once again to my OP,

Cultural moral norms are arguably heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for subcomponents of strategies that solve cooperation problems. — Mark S

I argue that this knowledge is useful for resolving many disputes about when and if cultural moral norms will be advocated in a society. Therefore, understanding that past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies is culturally useful knowledge.

Your objection, as I understand it, is there is no normative content to this science telling us what we morally ought to do – the business of ethics as you see it.

Ace! You’ve got it!

But rather than the downfall you see, its lack of normative claims is its power. It provides a culturally useful basis for resolving common moral disputes (as described in the OP) without the necessity for any agreement on moral premises or normativity. No requirements for agreement on moral premises or normativity is a big advantage.

I see the business of ethics as also helping people resolve common disputes about cultural moral norms using the most effective means available. You disagree?

Do you propose to help people resolve their common disputes about cultural moral norms based on sophisticated, complex, unresolved assertions about moral premises and sources of normativity?

Good luck with that. That huge mess is what I am looking to help people avoid. Not everyone is a philosophy major who loves nothing better than endless arguments about moral premises and normativity.

On the other hand, principles that underlie the empirical observations about the function of past and present cultural moral norms may (spoiler alert) turn out to be normative – what we ought and ought not to do. This is possible. We are talking about the function of all cultural moral norms no matter how diverse, contradictory, and strange. That function should have something to do with morality.

Coincidentally, I am just finishing a post on the normativity of MACS and will present it in a day or two. I define the universal principles underlying MACS and argue for their normativity. I hope for many good comments.

But that argument is complicated and not one I would inflict on average people looking to resolve a dispute about when to advocate not following the Golden Rule.

Most people trying to resolve disputes about moral norms will be more successful starting with the elementary understanding that cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies.

You're acting like morality exists just to solve problems of cooperation, and this is just entirely lacking in nuance, it's rarely that simple, or innocent. — Judaka

No. I am discussing the cultural usefulness of understanding that past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies.

Of course, ethics is a much broader topic than the function of cultural moral norms.

From my OP

What about its limits? This observation’s usefulness in resolving moral disputes is limited by its silence on important ethical questions. It is silent about what our ultimate moral goals either ‘are’ or ought to be and what we imperatively ought to do. It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited. And except regarding cooperation with other people, the observation is silent concerning:

1) How should I live?
2) What is good?
3) What are my obligations? — Mark S

Cultural norms may track other things as well

But rather than the downfall you see, its lack of normative claims is its power. It provides a culturally useful basis for resolving common moral disputes (as described in the OP) without the necessity for any agreement on moral premises or normativity. — Mark S

Your theory provides an answer to what we might do derived from what we have done in the past.

But is that what we ought to do?

Again your answer seems to be to some other question.

But is that what we ought to do? — Banno

Does MACS define what we imperatively ought to do? No, of course not. I have no reasons to believe such imperative oughts ever have or ever will exist.

Does MACS define what all (or virtually all) well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral in their society? I argue it does, and is therefore normative, in my post “Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies”.

Without considering what all rational people would do (with no assumed normative content), is MACS useful for resolving disputes about when to advocate cultural moral norms? Yes, that is the point of this post as:

This knowledge can help resolve disputes about cultural moral norms because it provides an objective basis for:

1) Not following moral heuristics (such as the Golden Rule or “Do not steal, lie, or kill”) when they will predictably fail in their function of solving cooperation problems such as in war and, relevant to the Golden Rule, when tastes differ.
2) Revealing the exploitative component of domination moral norms and the arbitrary origins of marker strategies.
3) Piercing the mysticism of religion and cultural heritage that protects moral norms from rational discussion by revealing that cultural moral norms have natural, not mystical, origins.
4) Refining cultural moral norms to be more harmonious with our moral sense (because our moral sense also tracks cooperation strategies). — Mark S

Does MACS define what we imperatively ought to do? No, of course not. I have no reasons to believe such imperative oughts ever have or ever will exist.

Does MACS define what all (or virtually all) well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral in their society? I argue it does, and is therefore normative, in my post “Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies”. — Mark S

If these do not contradict one another, they are at the least contrary.

So again, sure, it's nice when folk cooperate. But morality and ethics do not consist in cooperation.

Your theory does not tell us what we ought do. And from what you have said, you agree with this.

No, the two claims are not contrary.

Does MACS define what we imperatively ought to do? No, of course not. I have no reasons to believe such imperative oughts ever have or ever will exist.

Does MACS define what all (or virtually all) well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral in their society? I argue it does, and is therefore normative, in my post “Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies”. — Mark S

Your theory does not tell us what we ought do — Banno

As I argue in this thread, MACS is useful for resolving many disputes about moral norms (disputes about what we ought to do) despite lacking arguments for any kind of normativity (and especially imperative ought normativity, which I expect exists only in our delusions). So, yes, MACS, even with no normative claim tells us about what we ought to do.

Being culturally useful without any normativity makes MACS an excellent candidate to evaluate for normativity, as I do in “Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies”.

By Gert’s definition of normativity – “what all rational people would advocate under specified conditions” MACS is normative in the sense of defining right and wrong. But there is no source of imperative bindingness in Gert’s definition – hence no imperative ought; it can be rational to act immorally.

MACS without normative claims helps resolve many disputes about cultural moral norms. When shown to meet Gert’s definition of normative, MACS tell us much more (but not all) about what is moral and immoral.

By Gert’s definition of normativity... — Mark S

You are referring back to one of your other threads, which shows that the three ought be merged.

And Gert is defining morality, not normativity. Here's the quote:

There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions. One reason for this is that “morality” seems to be used in two distinct broad senses: a descriptive sense and a normative sense. More particularly, the term “morality” can be used either

* descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or
* normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people. — Gert

You would replace doing what is right - being ethical - with doing what is expected, what is "normal". You want "well-informed, mentally normal, rational people" - presumably white middle class cis hetro males. :rofl:

Look a that first line again: "There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions."

Sorry for the delay in responding. I had immediately composed my reply but then did not hit the post comment button.
You are misreading Gert.
He says:
"There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions.One reason for this is that “morality” seems to be used in two distinct broad senses: a descriptive sense and a normative sense. More particularly, the term “morality” can be used either
1) descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or
2) normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people."

In the article, he goes on to describe the rarity of definitions of moral normativity and why he thinks defining it is important.

But perhaps our miscommunication is due to different understandings of what descriptively moral and normatively moral refer to. What do you think they refer to?

You are misreading Gert. — Mark S

Well, you've got some gall. :grin:

Saw the video. Gert seems an amiable, practical kind of fellow. As you say, he ends up with 10 commandments (no doubt a cultural preference) although god is absent from it all. Significant pockets of American society will surely challenge any moral system that isn't grounded in a theistic perspective. Not sure how much cooperation we'd get from them.

Other than as a starting point for discussion, does any of this really help us determine the more pressing question of what we ought, or ought not do?

Tom, you did not address your question to me, but briefly:
1) Gert provides a useful criterion for what is normative - what we ought or ought not do. If you have a better alternative, don't keep it to yourself.
2) Understanding the underlying universal function of cultural moral norms as parts of cooperation strategies provides a well-grounded candidate for normativity by Gert's definition.