There is nothing left but space-time, elementary forces and elementary particles, along the lines of Neutral Monism and Panprotopsychism. Everything else exists in the mind, such as tables, mountains, apples, governments, morality, ethics and green trees.

"What is an event that is unperceived.................what does that even mean for space and time to be a placeholder for an event sans perceiver?"
— schopenhauer1

In conceptual terms, what is most widely accepted today is the giant-impact theory. It proposes that the Moon formed during a collision between the Earth and another small planet, about the size of Mars. The debris from this impact collected in an orbit around Earth to form the Moon.

In reductionist terms, there were changes to the elementary forces and elementary particles within space-time.

Wasn't this an event in space-time without a perceiver ? — RussellA

Yes indeed, it seems space-time is what saves realism for the events to obtain (or does it?). What does it mean to be a localized event or interaction? What comes to my mind is a large space-time space and grid and then zooms in on a particular event that is very small and keeps zooming in. But that is preposterously anthropomorphic and conceptual. Can we really talk about non-perceived events and interactions, even WITH the saving grace of the container of "space-time"? Certainly we can "talk" about it in entertaining the notion, as pragmatically, it fits our schema. But otherwise, I am skeptical.

If there’s no model or prediction then how can we learn a skill like giggling, for instance, and eventually learn it so well that it requires little if any conscious attention?

What model or prediction of giggling do you propose we are learning from?

Ok, I'm stuck on this point because you seem to be incredibly wrong to me. I see some stars very far away. There is obviously an intermediary between my perception and the stars which I perceive. What is this intermediary, space, light, ether? How do you think that any of these proposals to account for the apparent separation between me and the stars, would be directly accessible to be perceived? I see each and every one of such proposals as a logical construct produced as a means to account for the intermediary. Don\t you? If I could see the thing between me and the stars, it would block my vision of the stars.

No matter which intermediary you choose, all of it is a part of the environment, which is directly accessible and perceived directly.

:grin: I meant to say juggling. Could be any skill, like swimming or even walking.

Anyway, what model do we learn from? We learn with our own models (such as a model or concept of a ball) to learn or improve particular models, like juggling. Of course, we can learn from other people's models as well, through instruction or just observation.

One reason philosophers in the past have rejected Direct Realism is because of The Argument from Illusion, which is obviously a strong argument. It is argued that the hallucination and veridical experience can be type identical, such that if an hallucination can only be explained by seeing sense data, then a veridical visual experience must also be explained by seeing sense data. — RussellA

We understand someone is hallucinating because others have "veridical experiences" and judge the one hallucinating is not acting normally. So how can one establish that someones "sense data" is identical to the other's "veridical experience" when it is inaccessible to verification, testing, or evaluation? How can we even establish if the memory of the hallucination is accurate? Or, if the one hallucinating uses the appropriate words to describe? All of this is not available to us. This undermines the testimony that can be provided by the one who hallucinates. Then what value does positing "sense data" have? None.

I would suggest abandoning such a metaphysical theory, and if you seek an "explanation", maybe look toward scientific theories, such understanding how pharmacological agents impact our the brain. There may be more satisfying explanations to be found.

However, he doesn't explain how one knows whether one's visual experience is an hallucination or a veridical visual experience, and if two visual experiences appear the same, such that we don't know which is an hallucination and which is veridical, then how do we know in which each sense "see" is being used. — RussellA

If you need that explaining you may want to seek professional help. — Isaac

Yep.

Searle sets out with great clarity the difference. When one sees a tree, there is a tree to be seen. When one hallucinates a tree, there is no tree to be seen.

He does take this distinction as granted, as well as that the folk he is addressing can, at least for the most part, tell the difference. But I suppose that @RussellA and @schopenhauer1 cannot tell if they are hallucinating gives us an explanation for why there is not much hope of "penetrating the darkness here".

One problem with Direct Realism is that it requires backwards causation, from perceiving a green tree to knowing that the cause of this perception was also a green tree. — RussellA

You've mixed your intentionality with your causation. Knowing involves intentionality, rather than cause. That is, claiming to know something is adopting a certain intentional attitude towards that state of affairs: that this is true. So Isaac is right:

But there's nothing causal here. Not knowing whether A caused B has no bearing on the plausibility of an hypothesis that A causes B. — Isaac

We understand someone is hallucinating because others have "veridical experiences" and judge the one hallucinating is not acting normally. — Richard B

Yep.

As Searle says in his conclusion, the core of the bad argument is to "...think that somehow or other, the experiences are themselves the object of the experiences". There is a sort of folding of the mind in on itself, so that the picture is of a homunculus attempting and failing to prove that there is a world "outside". The homunculi conclude that there are only experiences, never the things experienced. In Wittgensteinian terms, they suppose there only to be a private world. But mind is inherently embedded in a shared, public world. The implications of the private language argument are vast.

As Searle says in his conclusion, the core of the bad argument is to "...think that somehow or other, the experiences are themselves the object of the experiences". There is a sort of folding of the mind in on itself, so that the picture is of a homunculus attempting and failing to prove that there is a world "outside". — Banno

Indeed, one of the things one almost never sees, is the inverted image on the back of the eye. Not even if one peers into the mirror. It's just too dark in there, and there's nowhere to sit.

There is no mitigating factor or intermediary between perceiver and perceived, therefor the perception is not indirect. — NOS4A2

When you see a tree, you are directly seeing not the tree but it's reflected light. That is one level of indirection.

Your body might tumble around and bump into other objects. But, you are not your body. You are the part of your brain that is aware. If you fall into a vegetative coma, you are gone, even if the rest of your body is healthy. If your awareness survived your body's death, you would survive.

This part of the brain that is aware has no direct access to the world. It can only interpret certain brain activity sensorily. These interpretations, experiences, are at a great remove from the objects that stimulate them.

Which is not to say you only access these experiences. These experiences track real actions and properties of real objects, and so you are aware of objects, not merely experiences. But this awareness is at a remove from the objects, it is indirect.

You cannot see the tree as it really is, this is a contraction. To see is to experience subjectively. Bats will see the tree differently than us, and aliens will see it differently than us and bats. There is no right answer among these different ways of seeing, they are all interpretations.

When you see a tree, you are seeing not the tree but it's reflected light. — hypericin

Bang, The bad argument.

He does take this distinction as granted, as well as that the folk he is addressing can, at least for the most part, tell the difference. But I suppose that RussellA and @schopenhauer1 cannot tell if they are hallucinating gives us an explanation for why there is not much hope of "penetrating the darkness here". — Banno

That is a straw man. There may be a tree, but is it the veridical access to the tree?
Rather, the human mind constructs a tree otherwise what is cognition versus any old interaction of the tree?

Rather, you do not *directly* see the tree. To see is to indirectly experience something visually.

But that's not what you said. You said one does not see the tree, but the light from the tree. That's not so.

There may be a tree, but is it the veridical access to the tree? — schopenhauer1

Usually.

What is risible is to suppose that one never sees the tree.

To see something *is* to experience it via its reflected light, so yes you see the tree. The argument is not that you don't see it, but that you see it via layers of indirection.

But you made the claim that we see the reflected light from the tree. That's not so. What one sees is the tree. That seeing might well involve reflected light, but it is an error to suppose that this means one never sees the tree.

Usually.

What is risible is to suppose that one never sees the tree. — Banno

Even Kant supposed a thing in itself. Something may be there. An apple on a table- how do you suppose the apple interacts with the table? Certainly you would say it’s different than cognition and there a difference lies. What is that distinction? A constructed view of the tree for one.

Reflected light is what the eye directly interacts with, not the tree. Only in this sense do we "only see" the reflected light.

This thread has given me a good laugh. both sides of the debate are so convinced they are right and neither side of the "debate", seems to realize that nothing more significant than playing with words is going on here.

What?

An appeal to the supposed authority of Kant will not carry much weight here.

Have you an argument? Your claim is that we cannot have veridical access to the tree. I have sufficient access to it to be able to prune it. What more do you need? If there is a "thing in itself" about which we can know nothing, then it is irrelevant and need not concern us.

We see the tree.

Pfff. All philosophy is word play.

nothing more significant than playing with words is going on here. — Janus

What is at stake is the nature of perception. Claims like

For the direct realist, the man directly perceives a tree. X directly perceives Y. — NOS4A2

Are contradictory and fundamentally misunderstand perception.

Your claim is that we cannot have veridical access to the tree. I have sufficient access to it to be able to prune it. — Banno

I think this may be my favourite line here so far.

Reflected light is what the eye directly interacts with, not the tree. Only in this sense do we "only see" the reflected light. — hypericin

"Only"? No, we see the tree. We see the tree as a result of the reflected light, sure. But we do not see the reflected light. Your statement was wrong.

Are contradictory and fundamentally misunderstand perception. — hypericin

It's not @NOS4A2 who has the fundamental misunderstanding.

:wink:

Presumably I can only prune the light from the tree and not the tree-in-itself...?

Maybe with a light sabre?

Experientially considered perception seems direct, but scientific analysis of the organs of seeing show that it is a process. Does that mean it is indirect? Depends on interpretation, I would say.

I don't think it's possible to get to a clear view of this, since we are embedded in what we are trying to gain a "god's eye view' of. And further, what difference would it make as to what view one holds?

But we do not see the reflected light. — Banno

Then we do what with it?

What is at stake is not vocabulary debates over how "see" shall or shall not be used, but rather how perception should be understood.

Pray tell what is my fundamental misunderstanding?

Pfff. — Banno

:rofl: That so encapsulates the image I have of your character.

All philosophy is word play. — Banno

Yes, it is. Some wordplay is more interesting and some less.The wordplay varies according to what starting assumptions are made. There is no right or wrong answer, just two dogmas shadowboxing the world with their images.

Experientially considered perception seems direct, but scientific analysis of the organs of seeing show that it is a process. Does that mean it is indirect? — Janus

Yes.

And further, what difference would it make as to what view one holds? — Janus

This is a question you can ask of all philosophy.