The dialogue begins and ends with the question of reputation.

Socrates:
But what if he should praise the soul of one of us for virtue and wisdom? Is it not worth while for the one who hears to examine eagerly the one who is praised, and for that one to exhibit his qualities with eagerness?

Theaetetus
Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates
Then, my dear Theaetetus, this is just the time for you to exhibit your qualities and for me to examine them ... (145b)

Theaetetus quickly agree when Socrates asks him:

Then knowledge and wisdom are the same thing? (145e)

But Socrates has his doubts.

Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about and cannot fully grasp by my own efforts—what knowledge really is. (145 e)

It is significant that Theaetetus is a mathematician. They are skilled at providing proofs and demonstrations. The mathematician has demonstrated knowledge. It is not simply that he has a good reason the believe what he says, for example, about roots is true (147d). What justifies that he knows rather than believes is the ability to demonstrate that knowledge.

In some sense Theaetetus knows what it is to know, even though he is not able to say what it is that all forms of knowledge have in common. But Socrates' concern goes beyond giving a definition. In the exchange above, in asking Theaetetus to exhibit his qualities , he is looking to see not only if Theaetetus is virtuous and wise, but if one who possesses knowledge is virtuous and wise.

He addresses the same question in the Apology. The craftsmen have knowledge of their craft. This is not simply knowledge how but knowledge that. They know their materials. But they are not wise. It is then not only a question of what forms of knowledge have in common, but of how knowledge differs from ignorance, as well as how knowledge related to wisdom.

Socrates pursuit of knowledge of knowledge is part of his desire to be wise. Abstracted puzzles fail to catch what is at issue in the question of knowledge.

That certainly seem to be true.

Socrates pursuit of knowledge of knowledge is part of his desire to be wise. Abstracted puzzles fail to catch what is at issue in the question of knowledge. — Fooloso4

That is certainly an interesting question. But Plato seems to veer away from it when Socrates says

Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about and cannot fully grasp by my own efforts—what knowledge really is.

I'm not sure what you mean by "abstracted puzzles". Perhaps you mean the thumbnail sketches that are used as examples? I'm not very fond of them myself, I admit. But they seem to focus attention and discussion better than abstract statements.

And, what is at issue in the question of knowledge. Do you mean wisdom? Then by all means, let's discuss the relationship between knowledge and wisdom.

I think it would help to take a step back. You claimed:

Plato's idea of an account in the Theaetetus is what we might call an analysis of whatever we are giving an account of in terms of its elements. — Ludwig V

What you are referring to is Socrates dream, which begins at 201d:

I used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation ...

What he used to imagine he heard certain persons say does not stand as Plato's idea of an account. Socrates intentionally distances himself, and Plato distances even further. Why relate it in terms of a dream? Why say that it is something he imagined he heard? Who are these persons?

My point is precisely that the model of account is not helpful for the problem he is considering — Ludwig V

Why would he use this as the model of an account if it is not helpful? The question becomes more pressing if this is the only account given, and that he could have provided a different kind of account but didn't.

The point of all these questions is to question your assumption. If this is not intended to stand as the model of an account we should not dismiss it on the basis of that false assumption.

Socrates pursuit of knowledge of knowledge is part of his desire to be wise. Abstracted puzzles fail to catch what is at issue in the question of knowledge.
— Fooloso4

That is certainly an interesting question. But Plato seems to veer away from it when Socrates says
Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about and cannot fully grasp by my own efforts—what knowledge really is. — Ludwig V

He does not veer away, he is in pursuit of the question of the relationship between knowledge and wisdom. Knowledge can lead to ignorance, more specifically ignorance of ignorance. Socrates human wisdom, his knowledge of ignorance, is in a limited sense knowledge of knowledge. It is knowledge of both what one knows and does not know.

I'm not sure what you mean by "abstracted puzzles". — Ludwig V

More specifically, extracting things from the dialogue, as if they were stand alone arguments.

Why would he use this as the model of an account if it is not helpful? — Fooloso4

That is the puzzle.

More specifically, extracting things from the dialogue, as if they were stand alone arguments. — Fooloso4

It seems to me that what the citations I'm complaining about are doing. They ignore the conclusion that Plato draws, without refuting his refutation.

Socrates human wisdom, his knowledge of ignorance, is in a limited sense knowledge of knowledge. — Fooloso4

True, knowing what one doesn't know may be wisdom or at least the beginning of wisdom. I can see that the dialogue could then be an object lesson. But I don't see that justifies citing the dialogue and then ignoring it.

Why would he use this as the model of an account if it is not helpful?
— Fooloso4

That is the puzzle. — Ludwig V

The reason, I think, he introduces it is not to provide a model of an account but to address "certain persons". Empedocles, for example, claimed there were four elements. Leucippus and his student Democritus, who proposed an atomic theory.

But I don't see that justifies citing the dialogue and then ignoring it. — Ludwig V

Are you referring to anyone specific? Do you think that this is what I am doing, despite my many references to the dialogue including Stephanus numbers?

In general I agree that we need to pay attention to the dialogue, but I am not sure what you mean when you say that the Theaetetus is of no help. Does this mean that it does not address JTB because you think it gives only one example of logos, a bad one, or that since the dialogue does not answer the question of what knowledge is it is of no help? I have already addressed the former. As to the latter, it is helpful to the extent that it says what knowledge is not, that is, JTB.

The reason, I think, he introduces it is not to provide a model of an account but to address "certain persons". — Fooloso4

Good point. That seems very likely. Thanks.

it is helpful to the extent that it says what knowledge is not, that is, JTB. — Fooloso4

It doesn't disprove JTB. It disproves that the model he proposes isn't appropriate for JTB (or anything else very much).

That's helpful if anyone has proposed such a model, as you point about "certain persons" shows. But I don't think anyone since Plato has.

Are you referring to anyone specific? — Fooloso4

I wasn't. But I can cite Gettier as an example.

You didn't drag Plato into the discussion. Banno did. He was bemoaning the fact that philosophy was still discussing JTB without any results. As I said at the time, my post wasn't directed directly at him, but was an excuse to vent about the use so often made of Plato in discussing JTB.

But I've benefited from the opportunity to discuss it with you. If you can check out Gettier's original article, you can decide for yourself about my complaint.

If you can check out Gettier's original article, you can decide for yourself about my complaint. — Ludwig V

I have read it. It is actually Gettier himself who drags Plato in. He says in a footnote:

1. Plato seems to be considering some such definition at Theaetetus 20 I, and perhaps accepting one at Meno 98.

The passage from Theaetetus is like the Gettier cases in that the the distinction between knowledge and true opinion is maintained:

Then when judges are justly persuaded about matters which one can know only by having seen them and in no other way, in such a case, judging of them from hearsay, having acquired a true opinion of them,they have judged without knowledge, though they are rightly persuaded, if the judgement they have passed is correct. (201b-3)

But the questions of knowledge that Plato raises far exceed the narrower cases that Gettier addresses. In addition, for Plato the issue is not "are you justified for believing" in the sense of having some reason, however insufficient for believing, but "can you defend the belief" in such a way so as to demonstrate its truth.

... the use so often made of Plato in discussing JTB. — Ludwig V

My contention is that it is the misuse of Plato, based on a misunderstanding of the dialogue.

My contention is that it is the misuse of Plato, based on a misunderstanding of the dialogue. — Fooloso4

I'm glad we agree about that.

I have read it. It is actually Gettier himself who drags Plato in. He says in a footnote: — Fooloso4

Yes. "Drag Plato in" is exactly right. And his footnote, though it shows a certain respect for him, doesn't help matters.

Actually, given that he actually cites three different versions - all modern - and explicitly claims that his argument will refute all of them, we might guess that citing Plato recognizes that to cite just one version of the definition may mean that he (Gettier) only refutes one version. But then, he should perhaps have included Plato's version in his collection and added it to the list to be refuted. Perhaps he didn't believe that his argument does refute Plato's version. I think he may be right. But then, Plato refutes it anyway. So it's all a bit of a mystery.

It reminds me of the way some people like to cite Epicurus' atomic theory as in some sense a predecessor of modern atomic theory. Which it isn't. Why would it be? I think it is an attempt to give modern theories respectability. But they would do better to let their own theory stand on its own feet. Indeed, I haven't seen that trope for quite a while, so perhaps it isn't done any more.

But the questions of knowledge that Plato raises far exceed the narrower cases that Gettier addresses. In addition, for Plato the issue is not "are you justified for believing" in the sense of having some reason, however insufficient for believing, but "can you defend the belief" in such a way so as to demonstrate its truth. — Fooloso4

Quite so. For me, that's a dilemma. My problem is I haven't been able to develop a third alternative. But I haven't given up hope.

The paradox is best visible when we ask a question other than "do you know where your car is, monsieur/mademoiselle?"

Perhaps he didn't believe that his argument does refute Plato's version. — Ludwig V

What is Plato's version? Gettier may have an opinion on this, but is noncommittal. He does not know if his opinion, whatever it might be, is a true opinion:

Plato seems to be considering some such definition at Theaetetus 20 I, and perhaps accepting one at Meno 98.

Emphasis added.

The case cited from Theaetetus does not argue in favor of some version of JTB. It states that the judges:

... have judged without knowledge

This is not a version of JTB.

The passage from Meno also makes the distinction between knowledge and true opinion. Socrates says:

... yet that there is a difference between right opinion and knowledge is not at all a conjecture with me but something I would particularly assert that I knew: there are not many things of which I would say that, but this one, at any rate, I will include among those that I know.

Socrates claims that he knows they are not the same.

He goes on to say:

So that right opinion will be no whit inferior to knowledge in worth or usefulness as regards our actions ...

The assertion is that knowledge and true opinion are not the same, but there is no difference when it comes to actions based on one or the other. Theaetetus agrees but has already forgotten what he had just agreed with, that true opinions, are like the statues of Daedalus, do not stay put. So too, the man who acts on true opinion may not stay put either. Fleeing when his conviction fails.

For me, that's a dilemma. My problem is I haven't been able to develop a third alternative. — Ludwig V

If we let go of the false belief that knowledge is JTB the dilemma is dissolved. In both the Theaetetus and Meno mathematics plays a key role. Socrates KNOWS how to solve the geometric problem in the Meno, he does not just have an opinion, true or false, about how to solve it.

What one knows and what one believes are not the same, but one can believe he knows.

If we let go of the false belief that knowledge is JTB the dilemma is dissolved. In both the Theaetetus and Meno mathematics plays a key role. Socrates KNOWS how to solve the geometric problem in the Meno, he does not just have an opinion, true or false, about how to solve it. — Fooloso4

I'm very confused by what you say about the dialogues. I would have to look up the dialogues to comment intelligently.

But what I collect from the passage I quote is that you think that the difference between knowledge and true belief is that one has the skill to establish the truth that is at stake. (I'm not sure that's an adequate formilation, so I hope that's reasonably close.) That's a theory and it fits well with what Plato says in the Gorgias about episteme. It's a very demanding criterion, but that also fits well with Plato's ideas about philosophy and common life.

The paradox is best visible when we ask a question other than "do you know where your car is, monsieur/mademoiselle?" — Agent Smith

That puzzles me. I was suggesting that the paradox is best understood when we move away from that question and begin to ask others, like "Where did you park your car?". Simply asking "Do you know where your car is?" presents a limited choice of answers and masks the complexities of the situation. These are revealed when you start to ask other questions.

Is that what you meant?

But what I collect from the passage I quote is that you think that the difference between knowledge and true belief is that one has the skill to establish the truth that is at stake. — Ludwig V

I think so, but that is not the whole of it. There are two senses of establish The first is to determine that something is true, the other is to demonstrate that it is true. The first is a form of learning or coming to know, the second is the ability to provide and defend an account of what one knows. One wrinkle here is that A, who does not know, may be convinced by B, who also does not know, but is able to persuade A that he does.

The rejection of the claim that knowledge is perception can obscure the role of seeing in knowledge. Note that in a passage quoted about Socrates says:

... matters which one can know only by having seen them and in no other way, (201b)

There is also the case of knowledge via noesis, what the mind sees. There is the well known example of working on a math problem and not making much progress until "now I see!".

When Socrates says:

Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about and cannot fully grasp by my own efforts—what knowledge really is. (145 e)

I think he is expressing a genuine type of skepticism. We do know what knowledge is but in trying to say exactly what it is and is not, it alludes us.

... what Plato says in the Gorgias about episteme. — Ludwig V

What does he say?

"Where is your car?" is a question that doesn't do justice to the scenario as described. How is Al or Betty supposed to answer it?

Where is your car?" is a question that doesn't do justice to the scenario as described. How is Al or Betty supposed to answer it? — Agent Smith

Yes. Exactly.

I think he is expressing a genuine type of skepticism. We do know what knowledge is but in trying to say exactly what it is and is not, it alludes us. — Fooloso4

Well, that is the classic conclusion of the early dialogues. So you are probably right about that.

I'll look up the Gorgias and give you a reference. It gives you the opportunity to see for yourself. You would probably want that even if I wrote my account of it.

4. Having answered all three questions, would you like to revise your answer to any of them?

5. Why? — Ludwig V

The point for me is that:
1. "knowledge" claim is a principled based or procedural form of certainty. And principles/procedures can validate our "knowledge" claim to the extant they are reliable.
2. we can't meaningfully set validation epistemic procedures arbitrarily high.
Condition one makes "knowledge" claims legitimate. Condition two makes knowledge" claims fallible.

1. "knowledge" claim is a principled based or procedural form of certainty. And principles/procedures can validate our "knowledge" claim to the extant they are reliable. — neomac

I think I accept that. A lot depends on what you mean by "certain". On some interpretations, that might conflict with reliability, or least, the standard of reliability needs to be compatbile with the standard of certainty.

My feeling is that the question of reliability is indeed important, and that's what justifies the J clause and indeed the infuriating (so some) vagueness about what it means.

Given a choice between the two, I would prefer truth to reliability, but that conflicts with the idea of a definition. But then, I don't think that definition is as all-important as many people seem to think. We seem to manage quite well without water-tight definitions for many of the words we use.

Condition one makes "knowledge" claims legitimate. Condition two makes knowledge" claims fallible. — neomac

It depends a bit on what you mean by "fallible". I prefer to call knowledge claims "defeasible" because I think that if a knowledge claim fails, in the sense if the proposition that is (claimed) to be known is false, the claim to knowledge loses any legitimacy and must be withdrawn. The same applies to any assertion we make, so it isn't as radical as one might think.

Well, it was a good thing I checked. What the Gorgias says is rather different from my account of it. You will find that at 463 he characterizes rhetoric as "flattery" and then as "experience and a knack". He contrasts those things with skill or art (techne (and not episteme as I thought. Many examples of techne are discussed. The skill of kubernetike ("navigation" in my translation - which calls the navigator "pilot") apparently includes knowing its limits, in which respect it is contrasted with rhetoric. But then, Socrates calls swimming an episteme at the beginning of the same speech.

See what you make of it.

I took the following formula and made a first attempt at extending it:

cookery is flattery disguised as medicine (465b)

A knack is flattery disguised as techne.

Sophistry is flattery disguised as philosophy.

Rhetoric is flattery disguised as logos.

Opinion is flattery disguised as knowledge.

Pleasure is flattery disguised as good.

Socrates then puts it "like a geometer". (465b):

as self-adornment is to gymnastic, so is sophistry to legislation; and as cookery is to medicine, so is rhetoric to justice. (465c)

opinion : knowledge :: pleasure : good

It is in light of the good that the difference between opinion and knowledge can be seen.

"reliability" instead of "certainty", "defeasible" instead of "fallible".
What's the difference in both cases?

Something reliable can fail once or twice and still be classed as reliable. But if something certain turns out wrong, it is no longer certain.

I prefer "defeasible" because "fallible knowledge" can be taken to mean that If I claim to know something on good grounds but it still turns out false, it is nonetheless knowledge. So I'm anxious to insist that knowledge doesn't fail - people do. So a claim to knowledge that p must be withdrawn if p turns out to be false.

It is in light of the good that the difference between opinion and knowledge can be seen. — Fooloso4

Yes, that is persuasive. Opinion is like knowledge, but deceptive and turn out not to be knowledge. Something pleasurable can be deceptive and turn out not to be good.

I say it is only persuasive because someone who wants to resist the conclusion will simply question the comparisons, and I'm not sure there are compelling reasons to say they are valid.

The underlying assumption is that things are and are known in light of the good, and to know something is to know why it is best that it be as it is.

The problem is, we lack knowledge of the good. We remain in the world of opinion. In the cave. Socratic skepticism is zetetic.

A follow up to my last post.

Nihilism is the concept of reason separated from the concept of the good. — Stanley Rosen

For Plato philosophical inquiry is not value free. We do not seek to know for the sake of knowledge. We seek to know because it is good to know. The examined life is the life in pursuit of the good life. The pursuit of the good life is guided by the inquiry into the good itself.

It is Socrates interest in the human good that guides his inquiry into the good as the cause of what is.

I'm afraid I don't know what to make of these two messages.

Some of it I understand and agree with, though I'm not sure I'm interpreting it in the same way as you are.
Some of it I don't understand.

It seems as if you are a platonist. Is that fair?

I feel I want to ask you where you are going with this?

It seems as if you are a platonist. Is that fair? — Ludwig V

No. I make a distinction between Plato and Platonism. By Plato I mean the dialogues. As I think you pointed out, Plato never speaks in the dialogues.In the Seventh Letter he says:

There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be. (341c)

I feel I want to ask you where you are going with this? — Ludwig V

I'm not going anywhere. I can't find my car. I thought I knew where it was but I was wrong!

Seriously, I'm just trying to put some things together from the dialogues around the question of the difference between knowledge and opinion or belief.

One thing I was trying to make clear is that the centrality of the question of the good is not about claims such as this is the best possible world. In the Phaedo Socrates "second sailing" (99d) is a shift from Anaxagoras' claim that Mind orders all things, to the way Socrates mind orders or make sense of things. A second sailing is when the ship cannot move because the wind fails and one must take to the oars. it is in line with this that the good comes into play. Concerns for knowledge is not separate from concerns for the knower.

But I have taken the ship off course.

Something reliable can fail once or twice and still be classed as reliable. But if something certain turns out wrong, it is no longer certain. — Ludwig V

I get your point. Still it depends on what we are certain about. We can also be certain that something is reliable. So if that something turns out to be wrong that doesn't mean it's unreliable, or no longer certain.

I prefer "defeasible" because "fallible knowledge" can be taken to mean that If I claim to know something on good grounds but it still turns out false, it is nonetheless knowledge. So I'm anxious to insist that knowledge doesn't fail - people do. So a claim to knowledge that p must be withdrawn if p turns out to be false. — Ludwig V

I substantially agree but what I find more interesting to notice is the following: while the falsity of p implies that "I know that p" is false, the epistemic "withdrawal" from a belief that "turns out" to be false (as opposed to "unjustified") might correspond to different epistemic conditions: e.g. "I don't know that p", "I know that non-p", "I believe that non-p", "I don't believe that p", or "I doubt that p". Yet only "I know that non-p" would make sense to say to me in that case. In other words, knowledge claims defeated out of falsify are not just "withdrawn" but "replaced" by other knowledge claims.

I substantially agree but what I find more interesting to notice is the following: while the falsity of p implies that "I know that p" is false, the epistemic "withdrawal" from a belief that "turns out" to be false (as opposed to "unjustified") might correspond to different epistemic conditions: e.g. "I don't know that p", "I know that non-p", "I believe that non-p", "I don't believe that p", or "I doubt that p". Yet only "I know that non-p" would make sense to say to me in that case. In other words, knowledge claims defeated out of falsify are not just "withdrawn" but "replaced" by other knowledge claims. — neomac

I think you are on to something here. I hadn't thought of it. The difference between "I don't know that p" and "I know that not-p" is particularly relevant here. And you are right, of course, that only "I know that not-p" is the contradictory of "I know that p". The relationship of those two to the other three is clearly complicated. In this example, it seems plausible to say that Al doesn't know that p and that he doesn't know that not-p. I'm inclined to say that he believes that p. I would also say that "I doubt that p" implies "I don't believe that p" and "I don't know that p".

But all of that gets more complicated if you consider "s/he knows that p" etc.