What do you think the self is? How would you define it? — Andrew4Handel

Off the top of my head…

The self is the overarching temporally extended narrative construct of a necessarily embodied and social consciousness which turns the animal acting in an environment into a subject. It is that through which the individual recognizes that it is one of many, i.e., an individual in a society of individuals, which are also selves. The self is that which recognizes itself as a self in a world of selves.*

To refer back to the mention of perception and experience in the OP, I’ll note that by “the animal acting” in the last paragraph I mean the animal that perceives and experiences according to its (minimally) biologically-motivated behaviour in its environment. So ultimately I’m telling a story that calls attention to (but does not explain) the difference between animal agency and selfhood, but which emphasizes the importance of the environment for both.

I don’t think it’s “immaterial”, but I don’t think it’s all about the brain, though having a brain is no doubt helpful.

* It’s Friday and I’ve had a couple of glasses of wine, so I won’t mind too much if someone tells me this sentence is gibberish

brain — Andrew4Handel

Gets my vote if it were a poll.

The self is the overarching temporally extended narrative construct of a necessarily embodied and social consciousness which turns the animal acting in an environment into a subject. It is that through which the individual recognizes that it is one of many, i.e., an individual in a society of individuals, which are also selves. The self is that which recognizes itself as a self in a world of selves.* — Jamal

Very nice.

I don’t think it’s “immaterial”, but I don’t think it’s all about the brain, though having a brain is no doubt helpful. — Jamal

Yes, I think embodied cognition is a crucial part of this. As George Lakoff says, the mind is inherently embodied - a brain with no body can't interact and can't become a self.

“...there is no real person whose embodiment plays no role in meaning, whose meaning is purely objective and defined by the external world, and whose language can fit the external world with no significant role played by mind, brain, or body. Because our conceptual systems grow out of our bodies, meaning is grounded in and through our bodies. Because a vast range of our concepts are metaphorical, meaning is not entirely literal and the classical correspondence theory of truth is false.”
― George Lakoff, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought

The self is the overarching temporally extended narrative construct of a necessarily embodied and social consciousness which turns the animal acting in an environment into a subject. It is that through which the individual recognizes that it is one of many, i.e., an individual in a society of individuals, which are also selves. The self is that which recognizes itself as a self in a world of selves.* — Jamal

:up:
:nerd: :grin:

Yeah, and I was trying to cover a lot of things: embodiment, sociality, and the ecological view. I should read Lakoff, keep meaning to.

I got there from this site which has really broadened my range of understanding - limited though it remains. So thank you! :pray:

You’re welcome. We are here to extend your mind.

It was the same with me: I learned about embodied cognition and the ecological account of perception from others more knowledgeable than me on TPF and its progenitor site.

The self is the idea of the self that the self has; the circular track that thought runs around.



In therapy it turns out that ChatGPT is unable to form new memories, and thus unable to sustain a narrative self. There is a degenerative brain disease associated with binge drinking that has a similar effect on humans, extreme Korsakoff syndrome. One can talk to them well enough, but they are in effect frozen in time, and will respond to you five minutes later as if they have never met you before. Thirty years on, they are confused and distressed to see how old they look in the mirror, because time simply does not pass for them, and they think of themselves always as whatever age the were at the onset. You can explain to them, but they cannot remember it.

The narrative has ended, and yet persists, because it has never been transcended.

So ultimately I’m telling a story that calls attention to (but does not explain) the difference between animal agency and selfhood, but which emphasizes the importance of the environment for both.

I don’t think it’s “immaterial”, but I don’t think it’s all about the brain, though having a brain is no doubt helpful. — Jamal

That works.

It was philosophy, not psychology or medicine, that improved our idea of self. Psychology introduced us to the idea of fear and mental illness, and medicine taught us about mortality. But it was philosophy that paved the way for contemplation of the universe, cognition of the non-physical, and articulation of reality and existence itself.

I don’t think it’s “immaterial”, — Jamal

It is immaterial in the sense it is not correlated with anything physical and in the sense it is not objectively visible or in a one to one relationship with any particular brain state.

Other peoples perception of us is arguably a combination of how they perceive us and our physical attributes.

Our own perception of our self could include many things such as our perception of our body
(proprioception/ haptic and internal and external sensation of our body)

Our perception of our beliefs, emotions and thoughts. Our feelings about ourselves/identity/values self esteem. Preferences/likes and dislikes. Hopes aspirations.

What seem important is to have a unified locus of perception/awareness that keeps us aware of a continuity between all these internal things and unifies our incoming data from the external world.

The self is godself

What do you think the self is? How would you define it? — Andrew4Handel

For me, the self is a complex collection of information that forms a constant self evaluation cycle (default mode network) , either subtracting (forgetting/ignoring), adding (learning/storing) or reconfiguration/change in assembly (altered/adjusted associations/relationships) with each review, conferring a linear continuity/object permanence through time, and thus orientation to time, place and event.

The rate at which this cycle of re-evaluation occurs is dependent on the static or "crystalline" and dynamic or "fluid" aspects of the collection of information, where static information is that which is most memorised and concrete and least likely to change - for example ones age, ones name, who their family is, and fluid information is that which is least concrete and subject to change - the most recently learned information, or the part of the brain responsible for detecting changes in current circumstances - for example the news, the current date and time, what someone just told you.

The fundamental unit of the self for me is a). The set-up: that which allows for the obtaining and integration of external information (experience of the world) and b). Beliefs - the units of content of conscious experience, that which makes up memories.

These two components work symbiotically, in that beliefs dictate what information we can detect, value and take in, and what information we take in dictates formation of new beliefs.

My definition of self thus isn't directly related to humans, but is the product of any complex information system where information can influence its own collective. Meaning that anything from a colony of ants to an AI could indeed be a "self".

"I" is a kind of name. What it refers to is defined in the context in which it is used. So it identifies exactly what my name identifies, which is not a part of me, material or immaterial. It is the whole of me.

I recognize the importance of everything that you've packed in to

The self is the overarching temporally extended narrative construct of a necessarily embodied and social consciousness which turns the animal acting in an environment into a subject. — Jamal

But I have to take issue, or perhaps quibble, with

It is that through which the individual recognizes that it is one of many, i.e., an individual in a society of individuals, which are also selves. The self is that which recognizes itself as a self in a world of selves.* — Jamal

Individuals do not recognize themselves. They learn to be themselves in interaction with other selves. There is no process of recognizing others as selves, or rather that skill is an integral part of learning to be a self.

The traditional answers, such as

The experiencer or perceiver. In one sense it seems to be immaterial but it could be something associated with the brain. — Andrew4Handel

are based on the mistake of thinking that because I undergo or initiate various changes, there must be a changeless essence. Theseus' ship is in the same boat. I am different from the boat because change is of the essence, as your emphasis on story shows.

But, a further quibble, my narrative is not constructed. It is lived. Afterwards, narratives may be constructed.

It is immaterial in the sense it is not correlated with anything physical — Andrew4Handel

It might be misleading to deny that my body is part of me. If you mean "immaterial" in the sense that Parliament is immaterial, even though it consists of people organized in a certain way and usually meeting in a certain place, I could buy that. But then, a car or a house is also immaterial because its' constituent part are organized and the organization (design) is immaterial.

What seem important is to have a unified locus of perception/awareness that keeps us aware of a continuity between all these internal things and unifies our incoming data from the external world. — Andrew4Handel

That's not a problem. I am the unified locus. Nothing distinct from me is needed to keep me aware of what I need to be aware of.

But, a further quibble, my narrative is not constructed. It is lived. Afterwards, narratives may be constructed. — Ludwig V

Is lived experience not itself a process of continual construction or construal, even prior to the creation of narratives? I m thinking of phenomenological , constructivist and social constructionist approaches.

Individuals do not recognize themselves. They learn to be themselves in interaction with other selves. There is no process of recognizing others as selves, or rather that skill is an integral part of learning to be a self. — Ludwig V

If recognizing others as selves is an integral part of learning to be a self, then isn’t it going too far to say that individuals do not recognize themselves?

Basically though, I don’t think I disagree with anything you’re saying, and my attempted definition could certainly do with some refinement. Note that if I seemed to imply a process, this was more in the way of a kind of mythical history to make the definition clearer, rather than an account of individual self-formation.

my narrative is not constructed. It is lived. Afterwards, narratives may be constructed. — Ludwig V

I’m not sure I understand this. Stories are not lived, they are told. Life is what is lived, and this life becomes a narrative (but again, I’m not implying temporal stages here) in the representation an individual has of itself, i.e., the self.

Once again, I doubt we differ much here.

It is immaterial in the sense it is not correlated with anything physical and in the sense it is not objectively visible or in a one to one relationship with any particular brain state. — Andrew4Handel

Yes, although I’d put it a little differently just by saying that it is not reducible to physical explanations. But crucially, I wouldn’t say that this irreducibility entails immateriality. In other words, I’m going with some kind of non-reductive materialism.

In Cognitive science, there are two types of "Self".
First one its the Unconscious Self (Unconscious Self awareness) "found" in organisms with a central nervous system(brain). Their unconscious part of the brain "takes care" the needs , assist them to identify and avoid pain and suffering etc. through their basic drives, urges and unconscious behavior and actions.
In species with larger and more advanced brains Symbolic language, meaning , feelings, memory and social information ad a more complex narrative about the "Self". Everything responsible for this mental concept is a product of brain function interacting with the environment....hence its Material.

Is lived experience not itself a process of continual construction or construal, even prior to the creation of narratives? — Joshs

Yes, certainly. I just wanted to clarify that giving the narrative is an additional process of construction on top of the processes involved in living what the narrative reports.

If recognizing others as selves is an integral part of learning to be a self, then isn’t it going too far to say that individuals do not recognize themselves? — Jamal

I may have been a bit hasty here. "Recognize" can mean "acknowledge" as in "recognizing (or not recognizing) the court". That's quite different from "recognize" as "knowing again". I took what you said in the latter sense.

But crucially, I wouldn’t say that this irreducibility entails immateriality. — Jamal

I agree with that. Indeed you put the point very well, better than I did.

In Cognitive science, there are two types of "Self". — Nickolasgaspar

Well, if that is helpful to cognitive science, it would be churlish to quibble. I wouldn't say, however, that I carry out the processes of the Unconscious Self. I would say that they occur. For one thing, I don't think that I can be held responsible for those processes when they go awry. But if it wasn't my conscious self that carried them out, I suppose it'll work if it is convenient.

Everything responsible for this mental concept is a product of brain function interacting with the environment....hence its Material. — Nickolasgaspar

I wouldn't say that the calculation performed by a computer was material, even though it is the result of a physical process. Indeed, it seems to me to be rather misleading.

I wouldn't say that the calculation performed by a computer was material, even though it is the result of a physical process. Indeed, it seems to me to be rather misleading. — Ludwig V

Properties of matter are responsible for a computer calculation.That is true for our mental properties. They are a product of the material world.

Well, if that is helpful to cognitive science, it would be churlish to quibble. — Ludwig V

That is a description of an observable phenomenon. The quality of helpfulness follows.

I wouldn't say that the calculation performed by a computer was material, even though it is the result of a physical process. Indeed, it seems to me to be rather misleading. — Ludwig V

:up: I think the application of "material" or "immaterial" in an imagined absolute sense to computations is a category error. It's like saying, for example, "the tree is or isn't spiritual".

That is a description of an observable phenomenon. The quality of helpfulness follows. — Nickolasgaspar

The observable phenomenon is the brain activity and its apparent connection to what we consciously do at the conscious level. The description "unconscious self" is a decision about how it is appropriate to consider the phenomenon. "Unconscious" applied to "Self" seems contradictory to the normal idea of the self, so it needs more justification than it is getting here. Other descriptions may be more appropriate. I would prefer to say that the various calculations take place, without committing to the idea that anybody is doing them.

I think the application of "material" or "immaterial" in an imagined absolute sense to computations is a category error. It's like saying, for example, "the tree is or isn't spiritual". — Janus

Yes. That's a better response than mine.

The observable phenomenon is the brain activity and its apparent connection to what we consciously do at the conscious level. — Ludwig V

_correct.

The description "unconscious self" is a decision about how it is appropriate to consider the phenomenon. — Ludwig V

Unconscious self is a label of an observable phenomena.(organisms acting unconsciously to preserve their well being and survival).

-""Unconscious" applied to "Self" seems contradictory to the normal idea of the self, "
_No it isn't. THere is a great Academic course avaliable on Future Learn (Mooc) by the founder of Neuropsychology Mark Solms. There you will understand how we define the property of unconscious self awareness displayed by biological organisms with central nervous systems.

so it needs more justification than it is getting here. — Ludwig V

-I didn't provide any justification. I only presented in bullet points the two different types of "Self". The justification of the above classifications can be found in Cognitive Science literature and in Moocs available to anyone who is interested in knowing and talking about the properties of the Mind.

Other descriptions may be more appropriate. — Ludwig V

-More appropriate than our current scientific epistemology ? I will be skeptical on that.

. I would prefer to say that the various calculations take place, without committing to the idea that anybody is doing them. — Ludwig V

_I don't really understand what your point is and how this is relevant to our Scientific Epistemology of the brain...Care to elaborate?

_I don't really understand what your point is and how this is relevant to our Scientific Epistemology of the brain...Care to elaborate? — Nickolasgaspar

I'm afraid I can't provide much elaboration. I assumed that if something is done by the my unconscious self, it followed that I was doing it. Actions done by me are normally done consciously. But there are occasions when we say that something is done unconsciously, so that is not a cast-iron rule. Some habitual actions, some reflex actions and maybe others fall into that category. Still, unconscious actions are, I think, exceptions to the norm. Normally, I am held responsible for what I do, but this is not so clear in the case of unconscious actions.

On the other hand many automatic processes are not classified as actions performed by the self. Heartbeat, digestion are examples. Breathing and swallowing are sometimes performed by the self and sometimes not. On the face of it, brain activity seems more like heartbeat and digestion, but it could be more like breathing and swallowing.

Scientists will do whatever they want to do and work out their own justifications. I have no problem with that. But philosophy has its own agenda and may need to work by different concepts. I doubt, for example, whether questions of moral responsibility figure prominently in the discussions of the unconscious self. Those questions need to be addressed in their own way.

I think that there is a fundamental problem in defining something like the self in that it is not clear what it refers to and it seems to be down to the individual to decide.

I think in a fairly trivial way the self could just refer to the human body because the things described as a self constantly co-occur with the body.

For example when I say I am going to the shop. I am saying I am taking my body to the shops and you would expect to find me as a body/organism at the shops.

If I say "I am thinking of chocolate or I am having an identity crisis or I am conscious", you wouldn't think that that these things were occurring in a different location to the body.

A question then seems to be whether the self can ever be independent of the body such as in a reincarnation scenario. We want to persist through time as a coherent whole.

Another question for me is how awareness arises so one becomes to be aware of possessing a particular body at this time in history. In this sense our consciousness has a component where it is focused at one locus which is currently a particular body from which we experience a reality.

I think how we come to be aware of a particular body is a fundamental question and I think the self issue is more about inhabiting a particular body and consciousness than a selection of traits and preferences.

First one its the Unconscious Self (Unconscious Self awareness — Nickolasgaspar

Can you cite a paper on this. It seems contradictory. Awareness is opposed to the unconscious.

The only way I can understand it is to say that there are distinct objects in the world that seek to or manage to preserve boundary integrity.

I would say that all objects are selves in the sense of possessing a coherent unified identity that can be preserved. But in the more trivial sense I highlighted in my previous post where something inhabits the same place so it can continue to be coherently identified.

A fragmentary self in a human would seem to be a failure of memory where one experiences being confused about who and where they are at a given time. In this state bodily unity is not a accompanied by mental or cognitive unity. But I think the subjective self is more what we refer to as self over our physical attributes. But our physical attributes may form part of our self identity.

Can you cite a paper on this. — Andrew4Handel

From the top of my head I can direct you to an Academic Mooc explains the fundamental properties of our mind. (1. Awakeness 2.Unconsious Awareness of Self 3. Conscious Awareness of environmental and organic stimuli,etc)
Future Learn, What is the Mind , Marc Solms (founder of Neuropsychoanalysis and author of the ground breaking paper on Dreams and the latest Theory on COnsciousness.)

Awareness is opposed to the unconscious. — Andrew4Handel

-No, someone can be consciously or unconsciously aware of something and react unconsciously to that stimuli. Its one thing to be aware of your and your environment and an other to direct your conscious attention to a a stimuli and reflect on it i.e. Many people drive to and from work without being able to recollect taking conscious decisions on how to get to their destiny.

I would say that all objects are selves in the sense of possessing a coherent unified identity that can be preserved. — Andrew4Handel

OBjects are not Selves. The term self is an abstract concept humans use to refer to their mental existence.

I think how we come to be aware of a particular body is a fundamental question and I think the self issue is more about inhabiting a particular body and consciousness than a selection of traits and preferences. — Andrew4Handel

I think there's a lot to be said for that view - although we can select traits and preferences at least up to a point.

We are aware of our particular body by means of proprioception. This is quite different from what philosophers call introspection because there is a specific physiological system that does it. "Proprioception , also referred to as kinaesthesia (or kinesthesia), is the sense of self-movement, force, and body position. It is sometimes described as the "sixth sense". In other words, we become aware of a particular body as ours through a sensory system specifically devoted to the job.

One wants to ask why we don't experience our own body as distinct from ourselves in the way that we experience everything else that is not me. Tables and chairs, etc are experienced through senses. So are our own bodies. I guess the answer is that we learn what is under our direct control and what is not. That's how.

There's a Wikipedia entry on proprioception if you want a quick initial briefing on it. Google will turn up lots of other material. I haven't seen a philosophical piece on this yet.

There's a Wikipedia entry on proprioception if you want a quick initial briefing on it. Google will turn up lots of other material. I haven't seen a philosophical piece on this yet — Ludwig V

The phenomenologists, beginning with Husserl and continuing with Merleau-Ponty and current philosophers like Shaun Gallagher, devoted much study to the relation between proprioception and body perception. I highly recommend Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception.

The self is always in reference to a particular living organism. It cannot be otherwise.

Thank you for that. :smile: