we are talking about the single act of looking at a tree

Yes. Where does this visual representation of a tree appear? Who or what is looking at it?

I haven't said anything about sin as vice or the opposite of virtue. I explicitly stated that I was talking about sin in terms of "missing the mark". Missing the mark in this context means being caught up in views and failing to see things in their numinous light. — Janus

I can't help thinking that nothing could be more "caught up in views" than seeing things in their numinous light. Given enough exposure, even the most wonderous spiritual experiences become ordinary and we cease to be caught up in their reverence. The sacred has a nasty habit of becoming mundane, in other words.

The best you can do may be reducing anxiety, and that is a necessary beginning, but you have no warrant for believing it is just the same for others. — Janus

It appears to be the same. I do understand the grasping desire for pleasant experiences to persist and remain unchanging though.

Of course there is always a linguistic overlay to our seeing, but that can be put in abeyance with practice. — Janus

To be clear, you're not talking about seeing visually but a particular kind of brain state. Modern people tend to have a hyperactive default mode network or so-called 'monkey mind'. A common problem with this hyperactivity is that it may cause undue anxiety. Reducing hyperactivity can reduce anxiety, generally speaking. Not to undervalue wonderous numinous light, of course. That's super cool too.

Maybe try some psychedelics to get you started.

So I too can develop a giant ego like Leary and crew? No thank you.

Animals do not deploy dualistic language; do you think they do not see at all?

I think it's counterproductive to conflate vision and abstract thought.

I don't believe animals parse experience in terms of subject/ object. — Janus

They have an internal model of their bodies just as we do, as well as a model for everything else they know, just as we do. They can develop maladaptive responses to situations that cause them undue anxiety, just as we can. We have an advantage in that regard because we can use our reasoning to overcome our conditioning, to some extent at least, as with cognitive behavior therapy for instance.

To see non-dually is to see without the discursive overlay. Distinguishing things is not disabled by that. I can see a tree without thinking in terms of a tree/ not-tree duality. I don't have to separate a tree from its surroundings in order to see it. — Janus

That's an odd thing to say, that you don't have to separate a tree from its surroundings in order to see it. If you mean to say that our minds, and the minds of animals, automatically distinguish things like trees and you don't need to consciously focus on a tree to see it then yeah, that makes sense.

Where does this visual representation of a tree appear? Who or what is looking at it? — NOS4A2

Basically the same place as the visual representations in your dreams. You see things in your dreams, right?

Basically the same place as the visual representations in your dreams. You see things in your dreams, right?

I dream dreams, certainly, but I couldn’t say I see them because my eyes are closed.

I asked if you see things in your dreams, not if you see dreams.

You asked where a visual representation of a tree appears and I suggested that it appears where all visual representations appear.

Fine; I dream things in my dreams. I cannot say I see them.

I suppose it may be possible to take the neural activity of dreams and somehow convert the signals into a visual display. Then you could see recordings of your dreams.

I cannot say I see them. — NOS4A2

Then what can you say you do with the visual components of your dreams? With the auditory components?

What they lack is the ability to consider themselves as subjects, i.e. they're absent rational self-awareness. Yes some can pass the mirror test, but I bet none of them are thinking 'what am I doing here?' or 'what does being an elephant mean, really?' They don’t have the predicament of selfhood. — Wayfarer

Yes, all that seems obvious; since they would need symbolic language to think "what am I doing here?" or "what does being an elephant mean, really?", and we don't think they possess symbolic language.

The question was: if they don't possess symbolic language then they don't conceive of their experience dualistically (meaning they would not "consider themselves as subjects), but does it follow that they would experience nothing, as @praxis claimed?

They don’t have the predicament of selfhood. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure of this. Selfhood (in my perhaps idiosyncratic view) consists in the organism voluntarily generating its own phenomenal experience. This is thinking. When we think, we typically generate the phenomenal experience of a voice, or of images. This cleaves the phenomenal world in two: some phenomenal experience comes from the outside, some comes involuntarily from the inside (pains, emotions), some come from, and are initiated by, the inside. This latter duo, the initiator of its own internal experiences, coupled with those internal experiences themselves, is what we call the self.

While animals do not speak, nothing stops them from generating their own phenomenal experiences, and thus having at least a rudimentary sense of self.

. The sacred has a nasty habit of becoming mundane, in other words. — praxis

It just sounds to me like you lack the experience, because that is not at all in accordance with mine.

I think it's counterproductive to conflate vision and abstract thought. — praxis

Human experience is mediated by abstract thought. Consequently, we understand the world in dualistic terms. It is possible to let that whole machinery go, and you seemed to be claiming that if we did that we would experience nothing at all. So I asked you about whether you think animals experience nothing at all.

So I too can develop a giant ego like Leary and crew? No thank you. — praxis

Your unexamined attitudes are a laugh! You don't know what you are missing.

They have an internal model of their bodies just as we do, as well as a model for everything else they know, just as we do. They can develop maladaptive responses to situations that cause them undue anxiety, just as we can. — praxis

So we must imagine, since we understand things dualistically in terms of model/ reality: of having a model of reality. Models need not be understood in this kind of dualistic fashion. We could instead say that modeling is intrinsic to experience. that experience just is modeling.

I don't know about animals developing maladaptive responses, but they can certainly suffer and be miserable in situations that cause them anxiety; situations mostly created by humans.

That's an odd thing to say, that you don't have to separate a tree from its surroundings in order to see it. If you mean to say that our minds, and the minds of animals, automatically distinguish things like trees and you don't need to consciously focus on a tree to see it then yeah, that makes sense. — praxis

I'd say both animals and humans distinguish things that are of significance to them. Animals are not split off from their experience, caught up in an internal dialogue or monologue that pushes them to seek some illusionary stable dualistic understanding that will answer all their linguistically generated questions once and for all. Animals, I imagine, live in the eternal present, in a non-dual state of awareness.

While animals do not speak, nothing stops them from generating their own phenomenal experiences, and thus having at least a rudimentary sense of self. — hypericin

I'm wondering why you speak in terms of "generating" phenomenal experience. It would seem that phenomenal experience is ongoing for percipients as long as they are alive. What do you think a "rudimentary sense of self" consists in? Just the basic proprioceptive and sensational experience that comes with being alive, or something more than that?

The question was: if they don't possess symbolic language then they don't conceive of their experience dualistically (meaning they would not "consider themselves as subjects), but does it follow that they would experience nothing, as praxis claimed? — Janus

I completely accept that animals are subjects of experience- that they're beings, distinct from objects or things. I thnk the Cartesian view of animals as automata is grotesquely mistaken. But the key indicator of human awareness just is the sense of what is mine, what am I, what I possess, and so on. That is the basic fact that is symbolised by various 'myths of the fall'. We reflect on meaning, on suffering, on loss, in a way that animals cannot. One of my pet peeves is the way modern philosophy blurs that distinction, mainly due to misinterpreting Darwinian evolution as a philosophy, which it isn't (i.e. we're fully determined by evolutionary biology.)

While animals do not speak, nothing stops them from generating their own phenomenal experiences, and thus having at least a rudimentary sense of self. — hypericin

Well, first, I'm not at all certain what 'generating your own phenomenal experience' means. Do you mean, hallucinating?

Animals, I imagine, live in the eternal present, in a non-dual state of awareness. — Janus

I'm sure that's a kind of romantic myth. They're also incapable of wrestling with the meaning of existence, that is the perogative of rational sentient beings. (See Are Humans Special, David Loy.)

The difference is in individual bodies. If we want to explain the difference between the way a man sees and the way a bat sees we explain the body. We don’t need to say they see different things, we need only say that they have different bodies and see differently. — NOS4A2

I never said they see different things. They have a different cognitive framework based on their bodies.

You’re assuming inputs and outputs and the computational theory of mind. Computers and Turing machines may try to mimic human beings but they are not analogous to human beings, I’m afraid. Do you think computers can perceive? — NOS4A2

No, I don't. It was not analogous to mind but rather intended to be analogous for how outputs can be processed as different from their inputs, and not even in a 1-to-1 correspondence.

I'm sure that's a kind of romantic myth. They're also incapable of wrestling with the meaning of existence, that is the perogative of rational sentient beings. (See Are Humans Special, David Loy.) — Wayfarer

I'm not promoting the idea that animals live in some kind of aesthetic rapture, or even that humans who attain non-dual awareness do. I think non-dual awareness is very ordinary, it is just everyday experience. Our experience itself is always already non-dual; it is the rational discursive mind that creates the illusion of a world of subjects and objects. I don't believe animals share that illusion.

I'll have a look at the Loy article, but my response right now to the idea of human exceptionalism is that all animals are special. 'Special' is related to species, and all species are unique. So humans are not special by virtue of being the only special ones, but are ordinary just like the other animals in terms of being special.

We are the only species that possesses symbolic language, and all the cultural creativity that enables, and the suffering and sense of loss and being lost that also comes with self-reflection. Other animals do not have to bear that burden, and in that sense also we are special. But all of that has interest and meaning only for us. We also exploit other animals and each other more than any other animals do.

I'm wondering why you speak in terms of "generating" phenomenal experience. — Janus

Well, first, I'm not at all certain what 'generating your own phenomenal experience' means. Do you mean, hallucinating? — Wayfarer

No, I mean thinking. When you think to yourself, "I'm having a nice day", you are generating the phenomenal experience of a voice in your head saying "I'm having a nice day". Or, you might think visually, and generate the visual phenomenal experience of you sitting outside in a sunny day.

I think non-dual awareness is very ordinary, it is just everyday experience. — Janus

You do wonder, then, why it's origins and traditions lie mostly with renunciates and sannyasins.

You might be referring to the 'ordinary mind' approach of Zen but bear in mind it is situated in Japanese society with high levels of ritual and aesthetic enculturation. It appeals to Westerners because it sounds very approachable but I think the reality is different.

When you think to yourself, "I'm having a nice day", you are generating the phenomenal experience of a voice in your head saying "I'm having a nice day". — hypericin

I don't think of internal mentation as being phenomenal. Phenomena means 'appearance' or 'what appears'.

I don't think of internal mentation as being phenomenal. — Wayfarer

No? I think of it as entirely phenomenal. When you visualize, or play a song in your head, is that not phenomenal?

Then what can you say you do with the visual components of your dreams? With the auditory components?

I’m not sure. I’m asleep. My eyes do not point inward so I am unable to verify what goes on behind them. Supposing that it is possible, my only hope would be to ask others what I am doing, what sorts of movements I am making during this period, however subtle they may be.

You do wonder, then, why it's origins and traditions lie mostly with renunciates and sannyasins.

You might be referring to the 'ordinary mind' approach of Zen but bear in mind it is situated in Japanese society with high levels of ritual and aesthetic enculturation. It appeals to Westerners because it sounds very approachable but I think the reality is different. — Wayfarer

I imagine the ordinary mind of the Japanese is suffused with Japanese culture just as the ordinary mind of a westerner is suffused with western culture.

I'm not suggesting that the practice that must be undertaken to realize (with your whole being and not merely intellectually) that experience is non-dual is easy, and that is why renouncing the workaday life of social commitments and all the stress and confusion that comes with that ( in any culture, but arguably even more so in modern life) would not be a hindrance.

What do you imagine the experience of the "enlightened ones" is like? Ordinary or "satcitananda"; is there a difference; do you imagine it is a state of aesthetic rapture?

No? I think of it as entirely phenomenal. When you visualize, or play a song in your head, is that not phenomenal? — hypericin

I agree; all appearances, images, sensations, impressions; whether "internal" or "external" count as phenomena in my book.

When you visualize, or play a song in your head, is that not phenomenal? — hypericin

No. Phenomena are 'what appears' - sensory input. The stream of consciousness is just that, a stream of consciousness. 'Phenomena' is a hugely overused word nowadays, because it's come to mean, basically, 'everything' - which makes it meaningless, as it doesn't differentiate anything.

What do you imagine the experience of the "enlightened ones" is like? — Janus

I learned in Enlightenment 101 that the state of enlightenment is inconceivable, but let's not get too far into the long grass.

I learned in Enlightenment 101 that the state of enlightenment is inconceivable, but let's not get too far into the long grass. — Wayfarer

The ordinary state of non-dual awareness is "inconceivable", simply because all conceptions are dualistic. The question I asked is along a different trajectory: I was asking whether you imagined enlightenment as being in a constant state of ecstasy, such as might be experienced when tripping, or when having a "mystical" or intense aesthetic experience.

If you want to do philosophy you must be prepared to get into the long grass. On the other hand there is no imperative to do philosophy; philosophy is not spiritual practice, but may be good preparation for it.

No. Phenomena are 'what appears' - sensory input. — Wayfarer

Apart from internality and accuracy, what is qualitatively different about the song you hear and the song you play in your head?

Phenomena' is a hugely overused word nowadays, because it's come to mean, basically, 'everything' - which makes it meaningless, as it doesn't differentiate anything. — Wayfarer

It means the appearance or experience of things, that which has a "what it is like". This applies to internal experiences as much as external.

The stream of consciousness is just that, a stream of consciousness. — Wayfarer

Which of course says nothing at all.

My eyes do not point inward so I am unable to verify what goes on behind them. — NOS4A2

I'm not asking about your eyes, but about your visual experiences.

Apart from internality and accuracy, what is qualitatively different about the song you hear and the song you play in your head? — hypericin

That only I can imagine the music in my head. It's not 'an appearance' for anyone, not even me.

'Phenomenon:1. a fact or situation that is observed to exist or happen, especially one whose cause or explanation is in question. "glaciers are interesting natural phenomena".'

this blog post by Edward Feser differentiating concepts from sensation and imagination might be relevant.

The question I asked is along a different trajectory: I was asking whether you imagined enlightenment as being in a constant state of ecstasy, such as might be experienced when tripping, or when having a "mystical" or intense aesthetic experience. — Janus

I think my response would always be 'defiled' or 'contaminated' by my own preconceptions and expectations. I also think there's considerable danger in envisaging such states in terms of what we consider pleasure or ecstacy. (I actually I recall a remark in the preface to Zen Mind Beginner's Mind where Suzuki roshi remarks that, if you have an enlightenment experience, you may not like it!)

No. Phenomena are 'what appears' - sensory input. The stream of consciousness is just that, a stream of consciousness. 'Phenomena' is a hugely overused word nowadays, because it's come to mean, basically, 'everything' - which makes it meaningless, as it doesn't differentiate anything. — Wayfarer

There is an everyday usage of 'phenomena' which arguably restricts the term to appearances of the external kind. But, as I understand it, the term has a much wider range in phenomenology.

In its most basic form, phenomenology attempts to create conditions for the objective study of topics usually regarded as subjective: consciousness and the content of conscious experiences such as judgements, perceptions, and emotions. Although phenomenology seeks to be scientific, it does not attempt to study consciousness from the perspective of clinical psychology or neurology. Instead, it seeks through systematic reflection to determine the essential properties and structures of experience.

From here

I think my response would always be 'defiled' or 'contaminated' by my own preconceptions and expectations. I also think there's considerable danger in envisaging such states in terms of what we consider pleasure or ecstacy. (I actually I recall a remark in the preface to Zen Mind Beginner's Mind where Suzuki roshi remarks that, if you have an enlightenment experience, you may not like it!) — Wayfarer

All our responses are "defiled" by preconceptions and expectations. As Wittgenstein says "Don't for heaven's sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense."

I don't imagine that non-dual experience (enlightenment) is always pleasant. Pain can be a non-dual experience.Is enlightenment the cessation of all suffering or the cessation of attachment to suffering? The body is always prone to suffer.

I think what Shunryu is referring to is the fear that can be attendant upon losing a sense of self; think "bad trip" as opposed to "good trip" and how quickly we can shift from the first to the second, if we "let go". I have plenty of experience of that dynamic.

I agree that phenomenology uses the term 'phenomena' in a much more specialised way. But I still don't think 'phenomena' is a useful description for whatever mental contents you might have. And in any case, where this all started was in relation to the question 'who is seeing what?' which then leads to the question of the relationship of mind and world. That lead to the discussion of whether animals have that sense (which I don't think they do) and the sense in which it is unique to self-conscious rational sentient beings like us.

As regards 'non-dual experience', I think maybe that ought to be another topic, although I suppose it does have some important light to cast on the question of 'who perceives what'. It's just that the other posters here presumably don't have much of a grasp of non-dualism (which is a very elusive topic anyway). I have some reference material I could locate later but don't particularly want to pursue it further here.