OK, fair enough. :cool:

It's just that the other posters here presumably don't have much of a grasp of non-dualism — Wayfarer

Whoever has a solid grasp of it, please, explain away. :lol:

I gather it's like the Trinity. Not anything to do with number.

Human experience is mediated by abstract thought. Consequently, we understand the world in dualistic terms. It is possible to let that whole machinery go, and you seemed to be claiming that if we did that we would experience nothing at all. So I asked you about whether you think animals experience nothing at all. — Janus

I think we're merely capable of more abstract thought than animals, because of our relatively large cerebral cortex. You'll need to be clearer about what "machinery" it's possible to let go of. I've already agreed that people can have a hyperactive default mode network or 'monkey mind' and that deactivating it can reduce any anxiety produced by the hyperactivity.

So I too can develop a giant ego like Leary and crew? No thank you.
— praxis

Your unexamined attitudes are a laugh! You don't know what you are missing. — Janus

I'm glad that your imagination has a good sense of humor. I do wish that Leary and his contemporaries had more thoroughly examined their attitudes toward it. Perhaps without their deluded visions of grandeur, it may not have turned out to be classified as a Schedule I substance.

Animals, I imagine, live in the eternal present, in a non-dual state of awareness. — Janus

We all live in the present, actually, though that present is often lost in thought, and all that thought may have a tendency to cause undo anxiety. Animals may suffer maladaptive anxiety nevertheless, though not caused by overthinking. The good news is that we can think our way out of it, unlike animals.

I asked if you see things in your dreams, not if you see dreams.

You asked where a visual representation of a tree appears and I suggested that it appears where all visual representations appear. — praxis

If you are interested, and find it strange when someone might not admit that they see in their dreams, I recommend you read a book called "Dreaming" by Norman Malcolm. In this book, he argues that it is a conceptual confusion to think one judges, reasons, feels, or sees in a dream. Malcolm is a great elucidator of Wittgenstein's later philosophy and uses to its fullest extent to challenge this notion of some mental phenomenon occurs in sleep.

think you are being too harsh on Descartes. He had an intense interest in the sciences, was not a sceptic but used scepticism as a means of philosophical enquiry. — RussellA

I do agree that a healthy dose of skepticism in life is extreme valuable, unfortunately, Descartes takes it too far where I would label it radical skepticism. To doubt whether there is a world or it is just a dream is taking it too far where the only way he saw to rescue the world is to rely on all loving God that would not deceive.

Searle wrote about Direct Realism and the problem with hallucinations — RussellA

I appreciate and admire John Searle's ability to critique philosophical theories, and I often find I am in agreement with is final positions. However, John's desire to theorize moves him away from some of the fundamental points Wittgenstein was trying to make in Philosophical Investigations. For example, I have concerns with his distinction between the ontological subjective, and ontological objective. I feel the weight of the private language argument more than he does.

True, most of my knowledge comes from the public realm, the Moon Landing, Disney Land, The Large Hadron Collider, Australia etc, ie, Russell's Knowledge by Description. — RussellA

Depending on circumstance on how one uses "I see a tree" and "I know I see a tree" these don't mean the same thing. Furthermore, this starts us down the path where Wittgenstein's in "On Certainty" explores Moore's misuse of "I know" in "I know I have two hands." In summary, both sentences do not make sense,"I know I have two hands" or "I do not know I have two hands", only but in extreme rare circumstances.

Perhaps illusion would be a better word than hallucination, in that illusions are far more common than hallucinations. For example, I perceive someone 5m away as being taller than the same person 10m away. — RussellA

I have always was puzzled why Bertrand Russel in "Problem of Philosophy" had this expectation that the must be "the height", "the color", or "the shape" of a table. He never presented any argument on why this is the case, but used it as a spring board to start his skepticism of what we can know and cannot know.

I am sure it is true hallucinations is a rare event, but perhaps a lot of philosophy is based on trying to solve inconsistencies in a theory, such as Frege's puzzles and Russell's paradox. — RussellA

Good point, I just think philosophy tends to start real well rooted in what we all experience, but goes off the deep end when they loose site of the world and get mesmerized by the Eternal Platonic Realm of Ideas. This is where I part ways with Bertrand Russel when he said in "The Problems of Philosophy", "Thus, utility does not belong to philosophy." Maybe if utility was consider a little more, more consensus would be achieved, like in science.

I gather it's like the Trinity. Not anything to do with number. — Banno

:lol:

The beauty of it is that if you can project sufficient authority you can say pretty much anything and the faithful will hang on your every word and hold it as precious truth.

I think we're merely capable of more abstract thought than animals, because of our relatively large cerebral cortex. You'll need to be clearer about what "machinery" it's possible to let go of. I've already agreed that people can have a hyperactive default mode network or 'monkey mind' and that deactivating it can reduce any anxiety produced by the hyperactivity. — praxis

Do you think abstract thought is possible without language? It is possible to slow down the internal dialogue, and my own experience shows me that in order to do that I must already be calmer; I doubt it is possible to shut it down completely. It is also possible to avoid being carried away by thought, but it is far from easy.

Does the anxiety cause the hyperactivity or vice versa? Probably a "feedback" process, but who knows where it starts?

I do wish that Leary and his contemporaries had more thoroughly examined their attitudes toward it. Perhaps without their deluded visions of grandeur, it may not have turned out to be classified as a Schedule I substance — praxis

Leary alarmed the authorities with his revolutionary rhetoric. I don't see it as egomania or "visions of grandeur", but more like childish over-enthusiasm. I can't think of any of his contemporaries who got nearly as carried away and/or caused nearly as much alarm as Leary. Your view of Leary ( and unnamed contemporaries) seems over the top to me.

We all live in the present, actually, though that present is often lost in thought, and all that thought may have a tendency to cause undo anxiety. Animals may suffer maladaptive anxiety nevertheless, though not caused by overthinking. The good news is that we can think our way out of it, unlike animals. — praxis

Of course by definition we all live in the present, but that is trivially true: we don't all experience living in the present. Perhaps you could give an example of a situation that could be characterized as an animal that is suffering maladaptive anxiety due to a situation not caused by humans. That would perhaps help me to see what I might not be seeing about what you're saying now.

@Richard B

It will take a while to work through your subtle ideas, though I will do what I can. A proper answer would involve a better understanding of Searle's Thinking about the Real World, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein's On Certainty, Russell's Problems of Philosophy and how all these relate to the question posed in the OP, "who perceives what?". The "who" being the Direct Realist and the Indirect Realist. The "what" being do they directly perceive the world or indirectly perceive the world by means of a representation of the world in their mind.

Do you think abstract thought is possible without language? — Janus

I'm tempted to say that all thought is abstract, especially in light of this 'non-dual' awareness that you mention. Are there really separate things or is it just that our minds separate things? If our minds didn't separate things then we wouldn't be able to 'see' anything, right?

For example, if I spoke to you in a language that you've never heard of before you wouldn't be able to pick out any words. It would just be continuous gibberish. You couldn't 'see' any words even though you possess the concepts of language, words, letters, etc. Similarly, if you didn't know anything about trees or plant life in general, if you lacked those concepts, the first time you saw a tree you wouldn't know what you were looking at. It would be one thing until you analyzed it and broke it down into distinct parts. Your concept of 'tree' could become more robust the more you learned about trees.

Animals form concepts the same way and manipulate them in order to fulfill their needs, without language, or rather without language like ours.

That only I can imagine the music in my head. It's not 'an appearance' for anyone, not even me.

'Phenomenon:1. a fact or situation that is observed to exist or happen, especially one whose cause or explanation is in question. "glaciers are interesting natural phenomena".' — Wayfarer

But the word is "Phenomenal":
2.perceptible by the senses or through immediate experience.

We have immediate experience of internal imaginings as much as we do the external world.

Lets not get caught up in vocabulary. My claim is that thinking is the voluntary generation of immediate experience, and that this is the foundation of the sense of self. The blog post looks interesting and very relevant, I will read it when I have more time.

:up:

To my way of thinking abstraction is generalization, and a generalized concept requires symbolic language. It also seems obvious that things must stand out for animals; they can re-cognize things; which I think means that they can give attention to those things which matter to them.

The more abstract ideas we build up around things the stronger our grasp of them becomes. Our conceptual "grip" becomes firmer. I also think that things have their perceptual boundaries—surfaces that reflect light, and I think that in one way or another these light-illuminated edge boundaries make things to potentially stand out for all percipients.

This makes for the world to seem to be constituted by separate things, but I think this is a light-generated illusion. On the other hand I don't think the world is an amorphous mass, I don't doubt the world is a field of differential intensities that is neither one nor many; hence non-dualism.

Indirect Realism is incoherent.

The use of the word "indirect" commits us to this idea that there is no resemblance between our "idea/sense data of a tree" and the "material object tree." That we directly perceive the idea/sense data but indirectly perceive the tree.

First, let us recall how we are taught the word "resemblance". Maybe it was done by showing two objects and our teacher says, "See, these two objects resemble each other, while those two objects do not resemble each". With each new encounter we use the word and show that we judge similar to our teachers and thus demonstrate that we understand.

Is the indirect realist use of word "resemble" coherent? This is what indirect realist is asking: see how these objects do not resemble each other:
1. The idea/sense data that is not accessible to us since it is a private object.
2. The tree itself is hidden under the veil of our experience since it is indirectly perceived

So, in principle, both objects are not available to compare on whether they are resembling each other; so, the use of the word "resemblance" in this theory is incoherent. And thus, indirect realism is incoherent.

Hume has a nice quote from Enquiry

"It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: How shall this question be determined? by experience surely...But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never any thing present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is , therefore, without any foundation in reason."

So, indirect realism have is "without foundation in reason" according to Hume. However, I argue that the situation is even more dire because the theory is just incoherent due to the use of "resemblance"

So, indirect realism is "without foundation in reason" according to Hume. — Richard B

I would argue the opposite, that Direct Realism is "without foundation in reason" according to Hume.

Hume wrote: i) "The mind has never any thing present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects" and ii) "The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation of reason".

Item i) is not the position of the Direct Realist, where things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence. This is more the position of the Indirect Realist, where our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation, a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world. Knowledge is always via some means, and our ideas of the world are interpretations of sensory input derived from an external world that is real.

Item ii) reconfirms Hume's position that the mind only has knowledge of its perceptions, and that it is not possible to know just from these perceptions their cause in the world, a position again in agreement with that of the Indirect Realist.

In modern terms, Hume's position has been described as realist, anti-realist and projective.

For Hume, Realism about the external world is vindicated, defensible, endorsed or justified, not supported by reason but from our propensity to believe in our senses and experience through inference about what we observe rather than from direct knowledge of what we observe.

Anti-realist is a term coined by Michael Dummett against realism which he saw as a "colourless reductionism". An external reality is assumed rather than hypothetical, and the truth of a statement rests on its demonstrability through internal logic rather than any correspondence to an external, independent reality, A position not that of Direct Realism.

Projective may be a) feature projection, the attribution of features of minds to other objects and has "spatial connotations" of throwing forward features of the mind, something 'in here', onto something 'out there' in the world or b) explanatory projection, where there is an "appearance whose explanation lies not in the world being the way that it seems but because of the mentality of the thinker". A belief in causal necessity is a feature of both feature and explanatory projection, in that as genuine causal necessity is not possible as this would require acquaintance with some a priori knowledge of the object's causal consequences, this motivates a projective explanation of how we can determine a necessary connection that we cannot detect. Hume should be read as a realist about causal power, in that unknowable but real causal powers exist in nature. This means that although perceptions cannot be necessarily connected to their causes in the world, this bundle of casually related perceptions becomes the foundation for the self of the perceiver. Hume rejects that one idea is tied to another, necessarily conjoined, since that would mean we knew something prior to experience. But rather the source of our knowledge of necessary connections arises out of the observation of constant conjunction of certain impressions across many instances. People know of necessity through rigorous custom or habit and not from any immediate or direct knowledge. None of this is that of Direct Realism, whose position is that things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

Although the terms Direct Realism and Indirect Realism may not have been used at his time of writing, Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding indicates a support for Indirect Realism rather than Direct Realism.

The use of the word "indirect" commits us to this idea that there is no resemblance between our "idea/sense data of a tree" and the "material object tree." — Richard B

The Indirect Realist is not saying that there is no resemblance between what they perceive in their sense data and the cause of that perception, they are saying that they cannot know whether there is or isn't a resemblance between what they perceive in their sense data and the cause of that perception.

An effect is always overdetermined by sufficient causes

The problem is the same for both the Direct and Indirect Realist, given the effect, the perception in our sense data of a tree, how can one know the cause of that perception, how can one know the cause of that perception is a tree or not. The Indirect Realist argues that it is not possible to know the cause, whilst the Direct Realist argues that it is possible to know the cause.

I think that the term "sense data" should be treated more as a metaphor than literally, as Searle said "Give it a name, call it a “sense datum”.

The fundamental problem is that any effect is always overdetermined by sufficient causes. For example, when seeing a broken window, I cannot know the single cause, a stone, branch, or bird, when visiting the scene of a crime, the detective cannot know just from what they see the criminal responsible, when reading a post on the Forum, I cannot know just from the post whether the author was a 20 year old from Peru or a 80 year old from New Zealand. Similarly I cannot know just from my perception of a tree the cause of that perception, as the effect is overdetermined by more than one sufficient cause.

The mind has evolved to equate effect with cause, such that when perceiving the colour green, the mind assumes that the cause was the colour green, when perceiving a tree, the cause was a tree. As Searle wrote "The relation of perception to the experience is one of identity. It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain".

The Indirect Realist accepts that the mind equates effect with cause, in that the relation of effect to perceived cause is one of identity, the Direct Realist doesn't.

"I perceive the tree" does not commit anyone to the realist position, or for that matter any other metaphysical position. Also, neither does saying "I directly perceive the tree" commit us; so as long we understand "directly" is being used in contrasting circumstances where we perceive the tree "indirectly", say in a mirror. Neither indirect or direct realism is needed to metaphysically explain, "I perceive a tree".

The Indirect Realist is not saying that there is no resemblance between what they perceive in their sense data and the cause of that perception, they are saying that they cannot know whether there is or isn't a resemblance between what they perceive in their sense data and the cause of that perception. — RussellA

What I am attempting to argue is that it does not even make sense to say "that they cannot know whether there is or isn't a resemblance between...." because the position is incoherent. My philosophical position is utilizing Wittgenstein's concept of a grammatical fiction (see Philosophical Investigation section 304 to 307). We learn words like "perceive" and "resemblance" from our fellow human beings and looking at trees and tables aids in this endeavor, not by introspection of "sense data of trees" and "sense data of tables" (PI, "What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word "to remember".)

Lastly, some say that science supports the indirect realism position. I find this odd. When we asked scientist to study why tree leaves have the color green, they did not start by studying the brain because all we can perceive "directly" is our sense data of the green leaves. The scientist studies the light and its behavior reflecting off the leaf; they study the chemical make-up of the leaf; and they study how these chemicals reacted to the light. Let me assure you the scientist perceives the the lab, instruments, and reagents they might use to determine how leaves are green; the lab, instruments, and reagents are not inferred experiences, internal representations, or replicas.

"I perceive the tree" does not commit anyone to the realist position, or for that matter any other metaphysical position. Also, neither does saying "I directly perceive the tree" commit us; so as long we understand "directly" is being used in contrasting circumstances where we perceive the tree "indirectly", say in a mirror. Neither indirect or direct realism is needed to metaphysically explain, "I perceive a tree". — Richard B

Nice.

I wonder what to make of "The tree has three branches"? That seems to involve a tree, and not a perception-of-tree. It's different to "I perceive that the tree has three branches". It must be, as one might be wrong while the other is correct.

What do you think?

I say "The tree has three branches" is about the tree, and not about anyone's perceptions, direct or otherwise.

Neither indirect or direct realism is needed to metaphysically explain, "I perceive a tree" — Richard B

I agree that I don't need to be a philosopher in order to prune a tree. But this is what sets a human using their reason and intellect apart from an animal using their instinct. A pigeon may instinctively peck at grain thrown on the ground, whilst a human invents philosophy to ponder the question, am I looking at this tree directly or indirectly.

I agree that neither indirect or direct realism is needed to explain, "I perceive a tree", though I do disagree that neither indirect or direct realism is needed to metaphysically explain, "I perceive a tree". How else can indirect and direct realism be considered other than metaphysically.

However, reason and intellect are needed to be able to successfully prune a tree, rather than just hacking away at its branches causing irreparable damage. I would recommend the book Philosophy for Gardeners: Ideas and paradoxes to ponder in the garden by Kate Collyns, where she explores ideas and considers the big questions from working in the garden. She describes growers by their nature as philosophers, existentialists who try to live and work by their own rules in a garden, stoics who put up with slug damage again and again, and try to work in harmony with nature and practical quantum scientists who witness incredible processes going on in plant cells beneath the ground.

What I am attempting to argue is that it does not even make sense to say "that they cannot know whether there is or isn't a resemblance between...." because the position is incoherent — Richard B

The problem is, how can I know if there is the resemblance between my perception and the cause of my perception if all I know is my perception. I agree that knowing an effect one may be able to indirectly discover its cause, but is there a philosophical explanation that knowing an effect one has direct knowledge to its cause, taking into account the problem of over determination of sufficient causes ?

. My philosophical position is utilizing Wittgenstein's concept of a grammatical fiction (see Philosophical Investigation section 304 to 307). — Richard B

Mine also. As with Wittgenstein, there is no doubt in my mind that I perceive a tree, you perceive a tree, and everyone else perceives a tree. As Wittgenstein says, the problem begins when someone says "I perceive a tree". What do these words mean ?

We learn words like "perceive" and "resemblance" from our fellow human beings and looking at trees and tables aids in this endeavor, not by introspection of "sense data of trees" and "sense data of tables" — Richard B

I agree. The meaning of words are fixed in performative public situations.

When we asked scientist to study why tree leaves have the color green, they did not start by studying the brain because all we can perceive "directly" is our sense data of the green leaves — Richard B

When a scientist starts to study why leaves are green, the first thing they use is their brain.
I agree they don't need to study their own brain, but they do need to use their own brain. If they didn't use their own brain, they wouldn't be able to do any studying. And using their brain means they are using their own perceptions of the world around them. One cannot get away from the fact that even scientists start from the position of perceiving the world around them.

Let me assure you the scientist perceives the the lab, instruments, and reagents they might use to determine how leaves are green; the lab, instruments, and reagents are not inferred experiences, internal representations, or replicas. — Richard B

You say that for a scientist the laboratory is not an inferred experience. But this statement in itself is making an inference.

But this is the whole debate, how do we know whether or not the scientist's perception of the laboratory is or isn't an inferred experience. The indirect Realist is arguing that what the scientist perceives as a laboratory is an inferred experience. The Direct Realist is arguing that what the scientist perceives as a laboratory isn't an inferred experience.

You included a reference to Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in a previous post. Hume wrote:

"But philosophers, who carry their scrutiny a little farther, immediately perceive, that, even in the most familiar events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual, and that we only learn by experience the frequent Conjunction of objects, without being ever able to comprehend any thing like Connection between them."

"When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only, that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion, which is somewhat extraordinary; but which seems founded on sufficient evidence."

The question is, when the scientist perceives an event in their laboratory, as Hume asks, can this only ever be an inference ?

. My philosophical position is utilizing Wittgenstein's concept of a grammatical fiction (see Philosophical Investigation section 304 to 307).
— @Richard B
Mine also. — RussellA

But see 308 and 309.

The process is taken as granted, trapping the fly in the bottle of thinking in terms of juxtaposing the "internal" process against the "external" world. But "I am in the process of feeling a pain" is just feeling a pain. and "I am in the process of seeing a tree" is just seeing a tree.

Again, "The tree has three branches" is very different from "I perceive the tree to have three branches". Idealism is the conflation of the two.

The tree has three branches" is very different from "I perceive the tree to have three branches". Idealism is the conflation of the two. — Banno

That is conflating various forms of Idealism. Kantian Idealism is not going to conflate that. Perhaps Berkeleyianism. In fact, Kantianism would insist on that division.

Folk hereabout can't even agree that Kant was or wasn't an idealist. I don't see how making use of such historical quibbling is helpful. Better to address the actual argument.

"The tree has three branches" is very different from "I perceive the tree to have three branches".

Folk hereabout can't even agree that Kant was or wasn't an idealist. I don't see how making use of such historical quibbling is helpful. Better to address the actual argument. — Banno

I was addressing a point you made, and declaring it not accurate. But if we are strictly saying Berekley's version of Idealism = idealism, then that would only be accurate. I am refuting that this is the only form though.

"The tree has three branches" is very different from "I perceive the tree to have three branches". — Banno

Correct. And would be very close to what an indirect realist would say, perhaps, or a Kantian.

Ok, so to this:

That is conflating various forms of Idealism. — schopenhauer1

The argument can probably be modifide to meet any form of idealism you want to discuss. I took that as fairly obvious.

"The tree has three branches" is very different from "I perceive the tree to have three branches"
"The tree has three branches" is very different from "I believe the tree to have three branches"
"The tree has three branches" is very different from "I will the tree to have three branches"
"The tree has three branches" is very different from " the tree-in-itself has three branches"

and so on.

if we are strictly saying Berekley's version of Idealism — schopenhauer1

Rather, I'm saying that arguing about accounts of historical sources is replacing thinking about the problem.

And would be very close to what an indirect realist would say, perhaps, or a Kantian. — schopenhauer1

Or an arborist, or a child; the practical and the innocent. It takes doing philosophy to muddle such simple language games.

Or an arborist, or a child; the practical and the innocent. It takes doing philosophy to muddle such simple language games. — Banno

I mean, I agree to an extent sure. Here is a language game people often conflate:

1) Consciousness is CAUSED by X [place any physical system here].
2) Consciousness IS X [place any physical system here].