What he is proposing is different to negative utilitarianism, which is the minimisation of suffering, and is similar to the way we generally make ethical decisions, by weighing up competing instincts - save that he is prioritising "negative things"?

Aside from the usual problem that his principles are just the result of his subjective feelings, said principles are going to be disagreeable to practically everyone (your everyday person and NUs).

Abstract
This article presents a revised version of negative utilitarianism. Previous versions have relied on a hedonistic theory of value and stated that suffering should be minimized. The traditional rebuttal is that the doctrine in this form morally requires us to end all sentient life. To avoid this, a need-based theory of value is introduced. The frustration of the needs not to suffer and not to have one’s autonomy dwarfed should, prima facie, be decreased. When decreasing the need frustration of some would increase the need frustration of others, the case is deferred and a fuller ethical analysis is conducted. The author’s perceptions on murder, extinction, the right to die, antinatalism, veganism, and abortion are used to reach a reflective equilibrium. The new theory is then applied to consumerism, material growth, and power relations. The main finding is that the burden of proof should be on those who promote the status quo. — Oldphan

Thanks Oldphan! I've seen this around. I'll check it out. You should check out my Profile description. I write a decent amount on antinatalism and pessimism. One of the last arguments I made was of the deontological variety here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/781495

Hello there! Thanks for your reply, a message from the author of the article below : )

"Thank you for your response, Down the Rabbit Hole! The author of the article does not have an account here but he saw your post and asked me to convey this:

“Down the Rabbit Hole, I think that you are right, strictly speaking, about my theory not being a negative utilitarian one, at least in the traditional sense. Thank you for making that point!

As for not being amenable to anyone, may I offer a comment? This article is the second “act” of a trilogy that I started when I recently realized that I am classified – and am – an antinatalist philosopher. In the first “act” I simply described “how I feel”: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180122000317

You are absolutely right in saying that this is my view but I would hesitate on the “only”. I am not convinced that philosophers in ivory towers – like myself – can pontificate about categorical imperatives. Assertive hypotheticals in same cases – I try to do that sometimes – but not universal, categorical. I may be wrong. I often am.

Anyway, this is why in this second “act” I go on to tell “what I think”. In some other thread in some other platform someone asked me to explain this article’s content in a few sentences, and I offered this:

Liberal pronatalists think that sentiocentric negative utilitarianism is an absurd ethical theory because it makes involuntary sentient extinction a moral duty. I add to the theory the consideration of autonomy, after which involuntary sentient extinction is not a moral duty any longer. Voluntary human extinction remains a prima facie (unless proven otherwise) rational obligation. The absurdity in the eyes of liberal pronatalists should be gone and they should admit that the burden of proof is on those who want to procreate, continue excessive consumption, perpetuate material growth, and exploit human workers and nonhuman animals.

So, I do believe that I have presented a more palatable deal for the nice, law-abiding liberal who thinks that children should be had. The third “act” will move beyond this and enter the attack mode. But that is in the future.

Once again, thank you for engaging with Oldphan’s post, hoping to hear your thoughts on my ramblings here, and all the best to you and your endeavors!

Matti”

; )

All the best,
Amanda

Thank you so much @schopenhauer1!

I very much hope that you enjoy Exit Duty Generator, and I look forward to reading the Antinatalist works of yours that you've linked to! : D Since you enjoy the deontological approached to Antinatalism, are you familiar with the work of Julio Cabrera?

All the best,
Amanda

Since you enjoy the deontological approached to Antinatalism, are you familiar with the work of Julio Cabrera? — Oldphan

Yes very much so, just do a search here. I have written extensively on antinatalism and philosophical pessimism.

Thank you for your response.

I have now read through "If You Must Give Them a Gift, Then Give Them the Gift of Nonexistence".

I don't accept Benatar's Axiological Asymmetry; it feels intuitively obvious that a pinprick as one's only negative would be worth it for a life of happiness and pleasure. With respect to the article's Scales of Value in Human Lives, if we are talking an individual's net experience, I would place myself on the same scale as Matti, and would accept The Offer. However, if not the majority, I suspect a large minority of people have a net positive life.

The article's Explanations and Concluding Notes asks: What life quality would be too low for their potential child? How likely is it that it would happen? I feel even the mildest of bad lives are better not brought into being. The question I struggle with is, what probability makes it acceptable/unacceptable to procreate? 60% chance of a good life? 5% chance of a life of chronic suffering? I don't know the answer.

The question I struggle with is, what probability makes it acceptable/unacceptable to procreate? 60% chance of a good life? 5% chance of a life of chronic suffering? I don't know the answer. — Down The Rabbit Hole

That's because you are asking the wrong questions as to antinatalism. It isn't as much utilitarian calculus as it is a violation of deontological principles like overlooking someone's dignity, using them, being aggressively paternalistic, and the like. The procreational decision is a time when one can prevent all unnecessary harm. At that point, barring a utopia of people's individualized choosing (which obviously doesn't exist), choosing anything that creates harm for another is overlooking the inherent worth of that person as they are being used (even if that cause is to have a happy person). It is unique in that no other decision can be so perfectly not harming someone as this. Everything post-birth becomes a hedging and weighing of greater harms with lesser harms, and risks and the like on behalf of others.