That Phosphorus and Hesperus are the same is a better example for your purposes. But again, when we find out that Hesperus is Phosphorus, did we really find out something more than a novel use for the words "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus"?
That is, is sense any more than use? — Banno
the sense is the thought expressed by the sentence, and for Frege this is completely objective, public, shared. — Srap Tasmaner
That is the problem which Witt though insurmountable. — creativesoul
Following a rule rather than stating it says nothing at all about what's 'beneath' language. — creativesoul
My cat has drawn mental correlations between the sound of certain plastic bags and treats, much like Pavlov's dog with the bell and food. The symbol is the sound, the treats are the symbolized, my cat is the agent capable of drawing correlations between the two. The sound has meaning to the cat, via the cat's own attribution by virtue of drawing correlations. The sound of the bag cannot be said to stand in for the food... — creativesoul
Indeed. There is most certainly a way of understanding language(and of showing that much) by way of using it. I fail to see the relevance that that has to whether or not some symbolism and thus some meaning is prior to language. — creativesoul
There is a way of understanding language that is not stated in philosophy forums, but shown in the ordinary act of talking.
The rope Wayfarer mentioned. — Banno
....the key paragraph 6.522 in the Tractatus:
“There are indeed things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.”
In other words, there is a categorically different kind of truth from that which we can state in empirically or logically verifiable propositions. These different truths fall on the other side of the demarcation line of the principle of verification.
Wittgenstein’s intention in asserting this is precisely to protect matters of value from being disparaged or debunked by scientifically-minded people such as the Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle. He put his view beyond doubt in this sequence of paragraphs:
“6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value – and if there were, it would be of no value. If there is value which is of value, it must lie outside of all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise this would again be accidental. It must lie outside the world.”
In other words, all worldly actions and events are contingent (‘accidental’), but matters of value are necessarily so, for they are ‘higher’ or too important to be accidental, and so must be outside the world of empirical propositions:
“6.42 Hence also there can be no ethical propositions. Propositions cannot express anything higher.
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental.”
(‘Transcendental’ here is not to be confused with ‘transcendent’. ‘Transcendental’ is used here in a technical philosophical sense to mean that which is incapable of being experienced by any of the senses – and is therefore beyond the reach of science, which deals in what can be observed.)
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