"if suppose origin of argument is god and suppose causal order the same logical order, In that case, we have to deny the possibility from the universe." — Ali Hosein

Hi Ali and welcome. It would be good if you could edit your post to include a more accurate English version of the quotation, because the quotation you have here, which I’m guessing is a translation of a translation, is not very clear.

Spinoza‘s philosophy. — Ali Hosein

@180 Proof is a master on Spinoza's works and I believe he can answer your question.

Yes, i'm Sorry i don't access to original english text of Copleston books.thank you for your comment.

Ok, well maybe somebody here can help answer the question anyway.

Copelston's summary of Spinoza, like most other summaries in his A History of Philosophy, is both outdated and shoe-horned into a permissible, Jesuitical (Thomist) format. Besides, I haven't read Fr. Copelston since high school in the late 1970s so my guess at what @Ali Hosein's quotation means and how to answer his question are as good as yours.

I own this one in English.

I think I found the paragraph you're talking about. Is it from the last paragraph of Chapter X?

Two points can profitably be noted at once. First, if we propose to start with the infinite divine substance, and if the affirmation of the existence of this substance is not to be regarded as an hypothesis, it has to be shown that the definition of the divine essence or substance involves its existence. In other words, Spinoza is committed to using the ontological argument in some form or other. Otherwise God would not be prior in the order of ideas. Secondly, if we propose to start with God and to proceed to finite things, assimilating causal dependence to logical dependence, we must rule out contingency in the universe. It does not follow, of course, that the finite mind is capable of deducing the existence of particular finite things. Nor did Spinoza think that it was. But if the causal dependence of all things on God is akin to logical dependence, there is no place for free creation, nor for contingency in the world of material things, nor for human freedom. Any contingency which there may seem to be is only apparent. And if we think that some of our actions are free, this is only because we are ignorant of their determining causes

If so, maybe that's enough context for your @180 Proof - I don't know Spinoza worth squat. I'd be only guessing based on the meanings of the words there.

I'm not sure if plush forums pings you if I edited your tag, so I'm replying directly here to ping you. (mods feel free to delete this post)

YES. exactly. this is Copleston quotation.thank you very much.

it has to be shown that the definition of the divine essence or substance involves its existence — Copleston

Without reference to Spinoza in particular, let's recall that substance in philosophy has a meaning nearer to 'being' or 'subject', whereas 'substance' in everyday speech has the connotation of matter ('substance - a material with uniform properties') . I think, however, the phrase 'the divine subject' conveys the gist of the idea more accurately than 'the divine substance'.

Part of the definition of the divine being is that He IS - (compare Exodus 3:14 'I AM THAT I AM') - in other words, God is 'necessary being'. So the very possibility of the idea of God implies the reality of God - which is the ontological argument as Copleston says.

Note this passage:

The notion of necessary being, applied to God and withheld from man, indicates that God and man differ not merely in the characteristics which they possess but more fundamentally, in their modes of being, or in the fact that they exist in different senses of the word 'exist'. ...

Paul Tillich...emphasises the distinction to the extent of using different terms to refer to the reality of God and of man respectively. Human beings and other created things exist; God, on the other hand, does not exist, but IS. This is the most recent way of formulating a discrimination which has been classically expressed in the history of Christian thought by the idea of the necessary being of God in contrast to the contingent being of man and of the created order.

There are, however, two importantly different concepts which have been expressed by the phrase ‘necessary being’. ‘Necessity’, in a philosophical context, usually means logical necessity, and gives rise in theology to the concept of a being such that it is logically impossible that this being should not exist.' — Cambridge Dictionary of Theology

assimilating causal dependence to logical dependence

I interpret this phrase to mean that, as God is the sole real substance (or subject), then causal relations are subordinate to logical dependence. What we see as contingent is in reality strictly determined by God's omnipotence of which logical necessity is a manifestation.

I think nowadays it is customary to say that logical necessity and physical causation are not bound in such a way, and in fact are not even necessarily connected, although I'm not sure about that.

Thanks. I'll consider that Copelston quote after I've had some sleep (it's just after 4am here).

These Brits who decide to join the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church just can't stop talking/writing, about God (and themselves) it seems. Newman, Chesterton, Lewis, Copleston, just go on and on. It's as if they have something to prove.

Well, they are good Christian soldiers in the war against humanism, which like Communism seeks world domination...

I think I found the paragraph you're talking about. Is it from the last paragraph of Chapter X?

"Two points can profitably be noted at once. First, if we propose to start with the infinite divine substance, and if the affirmation of the existence of this substance is not to be regarded as an hypothesis, it has to be shown that the definition of the divine essence or substance involves its existence. In other words, Spinoza is committed to using the ontological argument in some form or other. Otherwise God would not be prior in the order of ideas. Secondly, if we propose to start with God and to proceed to finite things, assimilating causal dependence to logical dependence, we must rule out contingency in the universe. It does not follow, of course, that the finite mind is capable of deducing the existence of particular finite things. Nor did Spinoza think that it was. But if the causal dependence of all things on God is akin to logical dependence, there is no place for free creation, nor for contingency in the world of material things, nor for human freedom. Any contingency which there may seem to be is only apparent. And if we think that some of our actions are free, this is only because we are ignorant of their determining causes." [ ... ] — Moliere

This really helps me consider the OP question in its proper context of Copelston's interpretation of Spinoza rather than from reading Spinoza's texts themselves. :up:

What is the difference between logical order and causal order? — Ali Hosein

Given the above passage from Fr. Copelston's A History of Philosophy, he seems to interpret Spinoza as arguing that the "causal order", as you put it, is dependent on the "logical order" which is independent of all – not caused by any – other ideas. The "causal order" is a hierarchical sequence of dependent ideas whereas the "logical order" is the independent idea of the totality of ideas.

That's the most charitable surmise I can make of Copelston's interpretation of Spinoza. I think one has to study Spinoza directly in order to better comprehend the nuances and depths of his conceptions which are not nearly as Anselmian (i.e. of Catholic scholasticism) as Copelston's mention of "the ontological argument" might suggest.

I woke up a little early, and realized I had a copy of the book. I'm glad the forum's collective resources did something! See, we're not just goofing off. (we're helping others goof off too)

:smirk:

I think one has to study Spinoza directly in order to better comprehend the nuances and depths of his conceptions which are not nearly as Anselmian (i.e. of Catholic scholasticism) as Copelston's mention of "the ontological argument" might suggest. — 180 Proof

In my reading of Spinoza, I was continually struck by how it opposed the views of Anselm.

Thinking of God is not something you could not conceive of without a lot of help but was rather the first thing that came to mind. Too easy because this God had all of the prejudices anyone had.

In my reading of Spinoza, I was continually struck by how it opposed the views of Anselm. — Paine

:up:

I think one has to study Spinoza directly in order to better comprehend the nuances and depths of his conceptions which are not nearly as Anselmian (i.e. of Catholic scholasticism) as Copelston's mention of "the ontological argument" might suggest. — 180 Proof

I agree. :100:

I interpret this phrase to mean that, as God is the sole real substance (or subject), then causal relations are subordinate to logical dependence. What we see as contingent is in reality strictly determined by God's omnipotence of which logical necessity is a manifestation.

I think nowadays it is customary to say that logical necessity and physical causation are not bound in such a way, and in fact are not even necessarily connected, although I'm not sure about that. — Wayfarer

The conflation of substance with subject is completely alien to Spinoza, and I can't think of anywhere else it could be found. The closest I can think of would be Whitehead, but then he rejects the notion of substance and posits process as fundamental instead, so that won't fit either.

Since Spinoza was a strict determinist, there seems to be a sense in which it could be said that everything that happens follows necessarily from God's/ Nature's nature. But that would not amount to an equation of logical and causal necessity as far as I can see at a cursory glance. And again I am not aware of any philosophy wherein the two are equated.

That is what I took this to mean:

assimilating causal dependence to logical dependence

The problem is that logic cannot be coherntly thought to be subordinate to God.

In other words God cannot logically be omnipotent, and in Spinoza's system is as subject to necessity as nature is. Spinoza"s god is not conscious and does not possess free will.

thank you very much.

I have reached a conclusion from your friends' answers and reviewing Copleston's explanation several times in this regard, which I wanted to share with you:
If the definition of necessity is as follows: the existence of something (proposition or object or any being in general) is completely dependent on another (proposition or object or any being in general) so that if one exists, the other must exist and the absence of one It is equal to the absence of another.

While in a causal relationship, the cause can be potentially, for example, parents who are the cause of the child's birth, potentially exist regardless of whether the child is born as an effect of the cause or not.

Now, if we assume that the relationship of logical necessity is the same as the causal relationship, the existence of parents becomes an actual cause for the existence of a child, that is, if there is a parent, then there is definitely a child, the absence of one is equal to the absence of the other.

As I said, Copleston believes that Spinoza has turned God from a potential cause of the universe into an actual cause.

what is your opinion?
@Janus
@Wayfarer
@180 Proof
@Paine
@Moliere


*My native language is not English and I apologize for the language problems in my sentences.

That’s ok you’re asking good questions but I’ll leave others to tackle that one.

As I said, Copleston believes that Spinoza has turned God from a potential cause of the universe into an actual cause. — Ali Hosein

According to this reading, Fr. Copleston misunderstands Spinoza.

A simple analogy: God/substance (independent idea) is like the ocean and the universe/infinite mode (dependent idea) is like an ocean wave; thus, "the universe" is not an effect of an ontologically separate "cause" in the manner of a "creation / cosmological" argument. As I've pointed out

The "causal order" is a hierarchical sequence of dependent ideas whereas the "logical order" is the independent idea of the totality of ideas. — 180 Proof

"Potential cause" and "actual cause" are Aristotlean notions which do not belong to Spinoza's philosophy, though they might seem relevant because Copleston misreads Spinoza in a Thomistic manner which implies a transcendent divinity (à la "first cause").

Well, they are good Christian soldiers in the war against humanism, which like Communism seeks world domination... — Tom Storm

Yes, but I wonder if they feel they must demonstrate, somehow, that conversion to Catholicism has made them better advocates (or apologists) for God than Anglicans can be. Justifying their Papism, in other words. I'm a cynical fellow.

the conflation of substance with subject is completely alien to Spinoza, and I can't think of anywhere else it could be found. — Janus

What is the direct translation of ‘res’ in ‘res cogitans’ (Descartes)?

What is the direct translation of ‘res’ in ‘res cogitans’ (Descartes)? — Wayfarer

Do you mean as opposed to indirect translation? :wink:

As far as I know it means "thing" or "being"; so you have res extensa: extended thing or being and res cogitans: thinking thing or being.

Nice summation!

As far as I know it means "thing" or "being"; — Janus

It emphatically does not mean, 'being'. It means a thing, matter, or object., and is also the root of 'reality'. So in answer to the question, how did the meaning of the Aristotelian ousia (the original root of 'substance') become conflated with matter, or 'thinking stuff' - there's your answer. It is at the root of almost everything said or thought about this question, here and everywhere else.

I think you are placing too much significance on the etymology; many "general idea" (as opposed to "specific object") words have multiple usages, and translation is never an exact science.

The more common original usages seem to be legal, where for example 'matter' has a different meaning than 'matter as substance'. Descartes apparently intended it to mean substance, but he obviously didn't conceive of substance just as matter, because he also conceived of mind as a substance. It is arguable that Spinoza thought of substance (deus sive natura) as being and its modes as beings.

It is not inconsistent with general usage to think of a thing as a being. This is shown by the perceived need to distinguish living beings from non-living beings, sentient beings from insentient beings.

The word has many usages, just as 'thing' and 'matter' do:


being
1 of 4
noun
be·​ing ˈbē(-i)ŋ
Synonyms of being
1
a
: the quality or state of having existence
a social movement that came into being in the 1960s
artistic form comes into being only when two elements are successfully fused—
Carlos Lynes
b(1)
: something that is conceivable and hence capable of existing
(2)
: something that actually exists
(3)
: the totality of existing things
c
: conscious existence : life
2
: the qualities that constitute an existent thing : essence
I knew it was true in the core of my being.
especially : personality
3
: a living thing
sentient beings
a mythical being
especially : person
a very sexual being

From here

I was referring to Descartes' use of the term 'res' in 'res cogitans'. The Latin term 'res' is translated as thing or object. You claimed not to be able to see where the conflation of 'substance' in the sense meant by 'ousia' in Aristotelian philosophy, and 'substance' in the everyday meaning of 'material with uniform properties' originated. I'm saying that it originated with Cartesian dualism.

It is not inconsistent with general usage to think of a thing as a being. — Janus

Inanimate objects are not referred to as 'beings', and beings are not referred to as 'things'. It is precisely the tendency to reify beings as things which is at the basis of modern materialism.

Inanimate objects are not referred to as 'beings' — Wayfarer

Once again :grin:, I’ll butt in to correct you on this. They have been referred to as beings in philosophy since the Ancient Greeks.