I don't understand why you've being so aggressive — T Clark

I forgot to respond to this. I don't think I've been aggressive. If you look at all my posts here you'll see I've been polite. I have argued forcefully, that's all. If I'm wrong about that please let me know; I don't want to come across as aggressive.

The differentiation of Being and things is also explicit in Heidegger:

The formidable task that Heidegger sets himself in Being and Time is to respond to the question ‘What is Being’? This ‘Question of Being’ has a long heritage in the Western philosophical tradition, but for Heidegger, to merely ask what is Being? is problematic, as that emphasis tends to objectify Being as a ‘thing' – that is to say, it separates off ‘Being’ (whatever it is) from the questioner of Being. ” — Heidegger's Ways of Being


Bolds added. I see the effort to equate being with the simply existent as an attempt to short-circuit the whole question of 'the meaning of being'. — Wayfarer

He also differentiated notions of existence.

Existentiell and existential are key terms in Martin Heidegger's early philosophy. Existentiell refers to the aspects of the world which are identifiable as particular delimited questions or issues, whereas existential refers to Being as such, which permeates all things, so to speak, and can not be delimited in such a way as to be susceptible to factual knowledge. In general it can be said that "existentiell" refers to a "what", a materially describable reality, whereas "existential" refers to structures inherent in any possible world. In other words, the term "existentiell" refers to an ontic determination, whereas "existential" refers to an ontological determination.[1]

From here

You say "The differentiation of Being and things is also explicit in Heidegger. Note you didn't say that "the differentiation of beings and things is also explicit in Heidegger". You could have correctly said 'the differentiation of existence and existents is also explicit in Heidegger". I keep pointing this out to you ad nauseum and you always just ignore it, presumably because it doesn't suit you to acknowledge a counterpoint you cannot address reasonably.

All things that are, conceptually speaking, are be-ings just as long as they continue to be. There are sentient beings and insentient beings, just as there are sentient existents and insentient existents or sentient things and insentient things.

Myths are an essential element of Jung's concept. Thinking about them near Kant reminds me of how staunchly Kant opposed superstition.(exept, of course, the mystery of his personal belief) The interest Jung took in Alchemy would be close to dark magic from that perspective.

One of things I find interesting in Jung is that some portion of the 'scientific method' has a parent people are uncomfortable talking about.

One of things I find interesting in Jung is that some portion of the 'scientific method' has a parent people are uncomfortable talking about. — Paine

Yes, astronomy may have begun as astrology, and chemistry as alchemy. But that would not seem to be surprising or anything to feel uncomfortable about.

Unless you believed that those beginnings implied influences that were deemed demonic afterwards.

The problem is that his use is often not in fact reasonable in context. I've demonstrated this in my posts. You might be interested in reading them.

Aristotle, Aquinas, Heidegger, and many others use the term to mean anything that is, i.e., anything that can be said to be. Nobody has to follow them in this usage, of course, but Wayfarer actually attempts to correct people who use the word in this traditional way, by saying that, actually, only sentient individuals are beings.

Can you see the problem? Can you see that if you say to Aristotle "hey, actually only sentient individuals are beings", you're not making a philosophical point, but just refusing to use Aristotle's terminology and expressing your refusal in a misleadingly substantive statement? — Jamal

Yes, I think this is worth pointing out clearly like this. It's confusing otherwise.

Unless you believed that those beginnings implied influences that were deemed demonic afterwards. — Paine

:ok: Fair enough, although that would not seem to be a likely view of the modern materialist.

:up:

To repeat my point for anyone interested: a being in pre- and non-analytic philosophy is anything that is—anything that can be said to be.

This is not an attack on any worldview or ontological claim; it is information.

The interest Jung took in Alchemy would be close to dark magic from that perspective. — Paine

I don't think so. He was just drawing out the psychology inherent in esotericism. Check out "The Stone Speaks.". It's all about the astrological symbol of Mercury and the image of the Hermit. Fascinating stuff.

To repeat my point for anyone interested: a being in pre- and non-analytic philosophy is anything that is—anything that can be said to be.

This is not an attack on any worldview or ontological claim; it is information. — Jamal

:up:

Is that how Kant would have looked at it? That was my question.

Your observation made by Jung is interesting.

To repeat my point for anyone interested: a being in pre- and non-analytic philosophy is anything that is—anything that can be said to be. — Jamal

Incidentally, the reason I said "pre- and non-analytic" is that in analytic philosophy, being has pretty much been replaced by existence. What is important about this for my purpose here is nothing to do with the fact that the difference between being and existence has been denied, but simply that most analytic philosophers don't talk about being or beings any more, and if they do use the term "beings" they're probably just as likely to use it in the popular modern sense as the traditional sense.

I love it when I reply to myself.

Is that how Kant would have looked at it? That was my question. — Paine

Kant would have to travel to the early 20th Century to understand Jung's interest in alchemy. Spiritualism was really popular throughout the US and Europe. People were fascinated with contacting the dead and using magic.

Jung treated astrology as if it was a blueprint for the psyche. I was reading something by Jung one time and it occurred to me that he was a product of his times. And then he actually said that! It blew my mind that he knew that about himself. How aware are we that the world we see is shaped by our times?

Can you see the problem? Can you see that if you say to Aristotle "hey, actually only sentient individuals are beings", you're not making a philosophical point, but just refusing to use Aristotle's terminology and expressing your refusal in a misleadingly substantive statement? — Jamal

I hadn't been following this discussion closely, but when things got lively, I went back and read the relevant posts, including yours. Words mean different things to different people in different places at different times in different contexts, especially important words like "to be" and related words. If you look at definitions of "being", a person or other living thing is one of them.

Both of you seem to be making reasonable arguments. Your usage is more in line with the way I normally see things in a philosophical context. What I'm not certain about is how Jung fits into all of this. He was included in the OP. I don't know much about his beliefs. He seems like something of a mystic. That made me think that what @Wayfarer was saying was consistent with how Jung saw things. I don't know enough to judge.

When I said you were being aggressive, I didn't mean you were being impolite. I tend to be pretty aggressive sometimes. I'm just not used to seeing that from you. You're supposed to be nicer than I am.

What I'm not certain about is how Jung fits into all of this. He was included in the OP. — T Clark

That's a fair point. I confess I'm not interested in the OP and that I'm carrying on a conversation I've been having with @Wayfarer for many years. I suppose I've derailed the thread. We'll see what @Mikie does about it :razz:

When I said you were being aggressive, I didn't mean you were being impolite. I tend to be pretty aggressive sometimes. I'm just not used to seeing that from you. You're supposed to be nicer than I am. — T Clark

How little you know, TC. I took a break from robust philosophical debate for five or six years, and now I'm back.

Honestly though, I don't see where I've been aggressive. Muscular, perhaps.

I don't think I've been aggressive — Jamal

I agree. It's simply a robust exchange of views. And I acknowledge that my philosophical approach rubs a lot of people up the wrong way.

only sentient individuals are beings. — Jamal

What I said was that 'beings are subjects of experience'. That, of course, is not the only meaning of 'being' or 'to be', which is not and has never been at issue. You and I and the cat on the mat and the tree and the rock are all existents - we all exist. But the cat and you and I are also subjects of experience, and it's a difference that makes a difference.

The starting point of this whole debate was years ago, when I opined that the noun 'ontology' ought not to be understood simply as 'the classification of what exists'. That, I said, was properly the domain of the natural sciences, whereas ontology was originally conceived strictly as 'the meaning of "being"', while noting in passing that a source I had found (no longer extant) said that the etymology of the term 'ontology' was derived from the first-person participle of the verb 'to be' - which is 'I am'. I took that to mean that it refers to an exploration of the meaning of being, in terms different to those accepted by the natural sciences, which naturally pursues science along objective criteria. This is what provoked an (one could only say) hysterical denunciation from a former member here. I was then sent the Charles Kahn article The Greek Verb To Be and the Problem of Being, which, as I already showed, clearly demonstrates that 'ontology' as classically understood embraced a wider range of meanings than the modern notion of 'to exist'. And the fact that this is no longer understood by analytical philosophers is no credit to them, simply a reflection of the zeitgeist.

You could have correctly said 'the differentiation of existence and existents is also explicit in Heidegger". — Janus

Sure. I accept that. I've never claimed any expertise in Heidegger, but 180 brought it up. I know that he placed humans in a priviledged position regarding Dasein and I think he would differentiate sentient beings from things. (I'm reading up on What Is a Thing but I must admit hesitancy about Heidegger due to his nazism.)

Sure. I accept that. I've never claimed any expertise in Heidegger, but 180 brought it up. I know that he placed humans in a priviledged position regarding Dasein and I think he would differentiate sentient beings from things. (I'm reading up on What Is a Thing but I must admit hesitancy about Heidegger due to his nazism.) — Wayfarer

I think his Nazism was a mistake that he soon recognized and he may have been too proud to acknowledge that it was a mistake. That said, his philosophy, being apolitical, is what it is is regardless of his politics.

Heidegger does think that being depends on Dasein, in the sense that it is we who see all things, both sentient and insentient, as be-ings. Note that Dasein means "being there" or "there being", and denotes, at least in Heidegger's usage, the awareness of be-ing, so Dasein is "the being for whom its being is an issue for it": a self-reflective being.

What I said was that 'beings are subjects of experience'. That, of course, is not the only meaning of 'being' or 'to be', which is not and has never been at issue. You and I and the cat on the mat and the tree and the rock are all existents - we all exist. But the cat and you and I are also subjects of experience, and it's a difference that makes a difference. — Wayfarer

Sure, but that's not the issue here.

The starting point of this whole debate was years ago, when I opined that the noun 'ontology' ought not to be understood simply as 'the classification of what exists'. That, I said, was properly the domain of the natural sciences, whereas ontology was originally conceived strictly as 'the meaning of "being"', while noting in passing that a source I had found (no longer extant) said that the etymology of the term 'ontology' was derived from the first-person participle of the verb 'to be' - which is 'I am'. I took that to mean that it refers to an exploration of the meaning of being, in terms different to those accepted by the natural sciences, which naturally pursues science along objective criteria. This is what provoked an (one could only say) hysterical denunciation from a former member here. I was then sent the Charles Kahn article The Greek Verb To Be and the Problem of Being, which, as I already showed, clearly demonstrates that 'ontology' as classically understood embraced a wider range of meanings than the modern notion of 'to exist'. And the fact that this is no longer understood by analytical philosophers is no credit to them, simply a reflection of the zeitgeist. — Wayfarer

I've already agreed that being and existence are different concepts. Again, that doesn't support your attempt to restrict the use of "beings". And I'm aware that ontology is about being rather than existence. Can you explain why you think this is relevant? A being to Aristotle is whatever can be said to be. What is your reason for telling him he is wrong? (As you have told people here many times)

I've tried to explain that our differing uses of the word are independent of metaphysical views.

In the end, I and even the vitriolic ex-member you mentioned—who you'll admit was very well-read—are giving you information. It feels weird to have to argue for it and to be asked to prove it.

WAYFARER: I'm going to the capital of Canada next week!
JAMAL: Cool! Ottawa is nice this time of year
WAYFARER: No, I'm going to Toronto
JAMAL: But the capital of Canada is Ottawa
WAYFARER: Citations please!

Don't know about that. See this.

I've already agreed that being and existence are different concepts. — Jamal

That is only what I tried to argue in the first place!

What is your reason for telling [Aristotle] he is wrong? (As you have told people here many times) — Jamal

I don't think I've done that, anywhere. That snippet you provided about Aristotle claims that his books of the Metaphysics are 'among the most difficult' in the Western corpus, but then, the belief is now that all this is superseded, Aristotelian metaphysics is the preserve of churchmen and academics. It is in that context that I made the point about the difference between the classical and modern understanding of the question of the nature of being. The modern understanding is that this is largely a scientific matter, as some contributors here have already asserted.

I don't recall telling anyone that they're wrong, but I will continue to argue that eliding the distinction between beings and things results in treating humans (and other sentient beings) as objects, and that this is deeply embedded in our way of thinking. (So saying that trees are beings might be a step in the right direction, although it would have major ramifications for the forestry industry!) This is very much one of the themes in The Hidden Self. There is a lot of critical commentary on the 'objectification' of humans by science, which brackets out the fundamentally subjective dimension of existence.

That is only what I tried to argue in the first place! — Wayfarer

Well no, what I have been responding to is your claim that beings are subjects of experience, that things which are not subjects of experience are not beings. The difference between being and existence is an independent issue.

I don't think I've done that, anywhere — Wayfarer

I don't recall telling anyone that they're wrong — Wayfarer

I think you've done it many times. Are you going to force me to go and look? You have said to people, for example, that inanimate things are not beings, in conversations about metaphysics, where "beings" standardly refers to anything which can be said to be.

Don't know about that. See this. — Wayfarer

I am not familiar with the Black Notebooks or the "Rector's Address. If Heidegger did, and continued to, identify his project with antisemitism then I would say that was a personal failing that does not detract from his philosophy.

If there were an antisemitic painter for example, whose paintings had nothing to do with antisemitism, would that have any bearing on their value or lack of value as paintings? I would say not.

In any case, there is no fact of the matter as to whether his philosophy should be considered in that light or not; it is a matter of personal choice.

you have said to people, for example, that inanimate things are not beings, in conversations about metaphysics, where "beings" standardly refers to anything which can be said to be. — Jamal

I will henceforth agree that anything that exists can be called an existent or an existing thing and that of anything that exists that it can be said to be. I'll add that as a caveat in all such discussions. Would that help?

Okay let me try to work out what you're thinking...

Physicalists and such people reduce the difference between sentient individuals (e.g., humans) and non-sentient individuals (e.g., trees) to a difference in degree, rejecting the idea that they are different in kind. In parallel with this, being has been rejected in favour of existence. Therefore to use "beings", which commonly these days refers to subjects of experience rather than inanimate things, to refer to the latter, is to support the physicalist reduction of the difference between subjects and objects.

This seems to me a simple misunderstanding. To say that inanimate things are beings is not in fact to say anything at all about subjectivity, when the word is being used in the traditional philosophical sense.

I will henceforth agree that anything that exists can be called an existent or an existing thing and that of anything that exists can be said to be. I'll add that as a caveat in all such discussions. Would that help? — Wayfarer

Only if you take the next step, the one that follows: accept that traditionally in philosophy, anything that can be said to be is a being.

I've already agreed that being and existence are different concepts. — Jamal

They are different words, obviously. But in common usage the basic concepts to be and to exist seem to be more or less synonymous. 'To exist' does seem to carry the implicit notion of standing out, whereas "to be", perhaps not so much, but this has nothing to do with being, or existing as, a conscious entity, being or existent. :wink:

the word is being — Jamal

Case in point.

They are different words, obviously. But in common usage the basic concepts to be and to exist seem to be more or less synonymous. 'To exist' does seem to carry the implicit notion of standing out, whereas "to be", perhaps not so much, but this has nothing to do with being, or existing as, a conscious entity, being or existent — Janus

There's a difference in pre-modern philosophy, which is what @Wayfarer is getting at. Something like... existence partakes of being, the latter being more fundamental. I only mentioned it because Wayfarer keeps bringing it up.

Physicalists and such people reduce the difference between sentient individuals (e.g., humans) and non-sentient individuals (e.g., trees) to a difference in degree, rejecting the idea that they are different in kind. — Jamal

That is an oversimplification. It is an axiom of materialism that there is only one substance, in the philosophical sense, which is matter (nowadays matter-energy). It is assumed by many whether they consciously articulate it or not. Accordingly, there can be no ontological distinction between things and beings, as an ontological distinction would mean a different kind of being, which materialism can't allow. (For further elaboration I'll refer back to the article linked in this post.)

traditionally in philosophy, anything that can be said to be is a being. — Jamal

That is one I will need a citation for.

Notice in the Brittannica snippet you cited:

"For Aristotle, “being” is whatever is anything whatever. Whenever Aristotle explains the meaning of being, he does so by explaining the sense of the Greek verb to be. Being contains whatever items can be the subjects of true propositions containing the word is, whether…"

The reference here is not to *a* being, but to being. Is there a citation where Aristotle refers to anything inanimate as 'a being'?

The Brittanica article that contains the quote from Aristotle, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Being

is quite a good jumping-off point for the history of the idea in philosophy.

That is one I will need a citation for. — Wayfarer

Still on mobile so it's a hassle.

But I do rather resent being asked for citations. You've been given this information numerous times, often by very knowledgeable people. Is it fair to reject it until they can prove it with quotations? Don't you want to go and check by yourself? I'm not mistaken here, just go and look.

But sure, I might be able to get some stuff together tomorrow.

But I do rather resent being asked for citations. — Jamal

Don't worry about it, then. A sentence would do, anything you can think of where a classical philosophy text refers to inanimate objects as 'beings'.

On searching I found that most sources equate the meaning of 'being' with 'existence'. To be is to exist. So, whatever the historical common or philosophical usages might have been (and we are only talking about English usage here really, since translations from other languages are never precise), the logic of the synonymy between 'existence' and 'being' means that we can legitimately use the term 'a being' to refer to any existent.

Surely it is not an important issue anyway since the difference between sentient and insentient beings is not in question.