Here's a video you can watch to see what Bernard Gert actually thought about morality.
https://youtu.be/enVFjAUTfI8
He does give a definition of morality (at 15:28) as "An informal public system applying to all moral agents that has the goal of lessening of harm suffered by those who are protected by this system". — Banno

All,

Nice video by Gert. Except for some quibbles, I agree with his points.

Are any of you wondering how Gert’s morality can be so concrete?

He can be concrete because his subject in the video is what morality ‘is’ – the same subject as Morality As Cooperation Strategies (MACS). I don’t hear him making direct claims about what morality we somehow imperatively ought to follow (the standard focus of traditional moral philosophy).

I hear him talking about what morality we rationally would advocate given what morality ‘is’.

Can we all agree that morality ‘is’ something?

In the video, Gert asserts that

What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.

With the new insights from game theory in the last few decades, it would be more correct to say something like

What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.

This definition of what morality 'is' is empirically true, according to MACS. It explains all past and present cultural moral norms, no matter how diverse, contradictory, and strange.

This definition does not tell us what is morally normative. For that, we can apply GERT's SEP definition of morally normative: “… the term “morality” can be used … normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.”

Gert’s ten moral rules are standard cultural moral norms. Why these moral norms? MACS explains that they are all examples of rules advocating initiating reciprocity strategies. These are highly useful heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for MACS.

What does Gert say about when to not follow them?

He says: Moral Rules Require Impartiality - To be justified in violating a moral rule one must be willing for all to know they can break the rule in the same circumstances.

Fine, but what circumstances are those? MACS suggest that those circumstances are when following the rule will predictably not solve cooperation problems and may create them. And this criterion is just what is empirically observed when cultures condone abandoning moral norms.

I see MACS as illuminating and expanding on Gert’s perspective, not contradicting it.

I am a fan of Gert's approach to morality - starting from what morality 'is' and then, given those circumstances, asking, "What would all rational people advocate as moral for their society?"
It is the same approach I take but starting from what I consider a more solid foundation than Gert's about what morality 'is'.

However, I had not seen the video lecture Banno provided.

In case others also prefer to read philosophical arguments rather than hear them, here are the slides and text I found of this lecture Gert gave elsewhere at about the same time. https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/001.htm

Thanks. :up:

What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal. — Mark S

It's not clear in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of morality. Can you give concrete example to clarify that?

He does give a definition of morality (at 15:28) as "An informal public system applying to all moral agents that has the goal of lessening of harm suffered by those who are protected by this system". — Banno

Are any of you wondering how Gert’s morality can be so concrete?

He can be concrete because his subject in the video is what morality ‘is’ – the same subject as Morality As Cooperation Strategies (MACS). I don’t hear him making direct claims about what morality we somehow imperatively ought to follow (the standard focus of traditional moral philosophy). — Mark S

This formulation departs from the meta-ethical question of "what morality is". Stating that the goal of moral precepts is "lessening of harm" tells us what we imperatively ought to follow: we ought to lessen harm. It is morally good to lessen harm and morally bad to increase it.

As a nonexhaustive moral imperative, "lessen harm" is uncontroversional, but that doesn't make it any less of a moral imperative. Then making it the be-all, end-all of all morality means putting forward a moral theory (known as negative utilitarianism).

It's not clear in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of morality. Can you give concrete example to clarify that? — neomac

I see Gert’s definition of “What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” as a descriptive definition of morality, not a normative one.

He has not justified stating this as a normative (ought) claim as you (and perhaps others here) are interpreting it. As he argues in the SEP, any normative claim would be “what all rational people would put forward” - an argument he has not made.

For example, the definition includes the phrase “by those protected by the system”. Consider the moral norm: “slaves must obey their masters”. If those protected from harm by the system are only the slave masters (which was too often the historical case), then this repulsive moral norm would be included under Gert’s definition of what morality ‘is’. This makes no sense to modern sensibilities as a normative claim but is sensible as a claim about what is descriptively moral.

Also, Gert’s claim that “Morality is an informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” appears to be based on Gert’s carefully considered, armchair observations and intuitions. The modern science of morality says he is close, but not quite right, about what morality ‘is’.

My suggested revision, “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” more accurately reflects what science tells us of morality’s function – the principal reason what we call descriptively moral behavior exists.

That said, I am frustrated by Gert’s ambiguity in his lecture about whether he means the definition to be descriptive (the only way I can make sense of it) or normative (which he has not justified).

Perhaps Gert did intend it as a normative claim. Then I would argue it cannot be justified as “what all rational people would put forward (advocate)”.

This formulation departs from the meta-ethical question of "what morality is". Stating that the goal of moral precepts is "lessening of harm" tells us what we imperatively ought to follow: we ought to lessen harm. It is morally good to lessen harm and morally bad to increase it. — SophistiCat

You did not ask a question, but I will try to clarify what I have said that is relevant.

As you know, what morality descriptively ‘is’ and what morality normatively ‘is’ are separate questions. In traditional moral philosophy, an extreme version of this idea is that “science has nothing to offer moral philosophy”, implying that what is descriptively moral is irrelevant to what is normatively moral.

Gert contradicts this view by claiming that the "lessening of harm" component of what is descriptively moral (a subject within science's what 'is' domain) is also normatively moral by his criterion “what all rational people would put forward”.

My proposed Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) follows Gert’s line of thinking by arguing that past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies that exist because they produced benefits and reduced harm for our ancestors.

Since MACS only describes moral ‘means’ (solving cooperation problems and not creating them), it is complimentary to consequentialism whether those consequences maximize happiness or minimize harm as Gert prefers.

Hence, I see MACS as illuminating and providing a stronger foundation in descriptive morality for Gert’s negative utilitarianism.

:up:

It seems that according to Gert morality has all but nothing to do with irrationality because half the fun of morality is rationalizing our actions. Only the truly batshit crazy harm themselves for no reason. Take something like smoking for instance. A person can smoke for pleasure and fully realize that it is harmful to them. There are countless way to rationalize the behavior however, all so that the addiction can be satisfied and avoid the discomfort of withdrawal.

I quite like the idea that far more harm is done by people acting altruistically than out of self interest — Banno

That part I don’t get at all. Since when is going to war altruistic? People go to war because they’re sociopaths or because their leaders are assholes.

He has not justified stating this as a normative (ought) claim as you (and perhaps others here) are interpreting it. — Mark S

That said, I am frustrated by Gert’s ambiguity in his lecture about whether he means the definition to be descriptive (the only way I can make sense of it) or normative (which he has not justified). — Mark S

To me, Gert’s definition of “morality” is descriptive. What I think Gert takes to be a normative definition of morality is the set of rules and ideals he discussed later in his lecture.

For example, the definition includes the phrase “by those protected by the system”. Consider the moral norm: “slaves must obey their masters”. If those protected from harm by the system are only the slave masters (which was too often the historical case), then this repulsive moral norm would be included under Gert’s definition of what morality ‘is’. This makes no sense to modern sensibilities as a normative claim but is sensible as a claim about what is descriptively moral. — Mark S

Both your descriptive definition of morality and Gert’s descriptive definition of morality can account for the fact that “slaves must obey their masters” can be taken as a moral rule. Can’t they? If so, this example doesn’t show us in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of morality.

My suggested revision, “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” more accurately reflects what science tells us of morality’s function – the principal reason what we call descriptively moral behavior exists. — Mark S

In what sense it’s more accurate about the function of morality? Talking about “cooperation” seems to me a way to suggest that there are different ways in which morality can be implemented depending on the cooperation strategy (which must be specified and be correlated to other factors, e.g. material conditions of existence, demographic dynamics, environmental conditions, technological advancement). But the most general notion of “cooperation” itself can be formulated entirely in Gert’s descriptive moral terminology. So adding it to Gert’s general definition doesn’t bring anything to it. In other words, allusions to cooperation strategies should be part of a lower level wrt Gert’s general descriptive definition of morality and a more oriented toward an empirical investigation.

As you know, what morality descriptively ‘is’ and what morality normatively ‘is’ are separate questions. In traditional moral philosophy, an extreme version of this idea is that “science has nothing to offer moral philosophy”, implying that what is descriptively moral is irrelevant to what is normatively moral.

Gert contradicts this view by claiming that the "lessening of harm" component of what is descriptively moral (a subject within science's what 'is' domain) is also normatively moral by his criterion “what all rational people would put forward”. — Mark S

No, he does not. Nowhere does Gert claim that the imperative of lessening of harm is (a) descriptively moral and (b) scientifically justified.

Also, I disagree that for something to even be recognized as a moral code, it has to be acceptable by all moral agents ("rational people"). That is much too restrictive for a definition. It would mean that any rule that may not be universally endorsed is "not even wrong": it does not belong to the category of things that could be morally right or wrong, and if you use it in such a way, your interlocutors would not understand you. (Or worse yet, one would have to disqualify all dissenters as moral agents!) That is clearly not the case. Rational people can have moral (as opposed to merely definitional) disagreements.

In putting forward the normative definition of morality as "the behavioral code that... all rational persons, under certain specified conditions, would endorse," Gert identifies those who accept it with moral realists, and those who think that no code would meet this definition with moral skeptics. I don't think that is right either. A moral realist is not necessarily committed to the principle that all universal ethical truths are uncontroversial.

To me, Gert’s definition of “morality” is descriptive. What I think Gert takes to be a normative definition of morality is the set of rules and ideals he discussed later in his lecture. — neomac

Right!

Both your descriptive definition of morality and Gert’s descriptive definition of morality can account for the fact that “slaves must obey their masters” can be taken as a moral rule. Can’t they? If so, this example doesn’t show us in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of morality. — neomac

Yes, “slaves must obey their masters” has too often been a cultural moral norm enforced by an ingroup to exploit an outgroup.

The reason that "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of what is descriptively moral is that 1) it adds explanatory power, particularly for marker norms such as “working on the sabbath deserves death” and “homosexuality is evil”, and 2) it directly follows from the ultimate source of morality - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.

Without "increasing the benefits of cooperation" you can’t say you have a definition of what is descriptively moral that explains past and present moral norms. And you can’t link cultural moral norms to their ultimate source - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.

In other words, allusions to cooperation strategies should be part of a lower level wrt Gert’s general descriptive definition of morality and a more oriented toward an empirical investigation. — neomac

As I described above, adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" is necessary for a descriptive definition of moral means that applies (as a claimed empirical truth) to all past and present cultural moral norms. That cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies is the highest level claim we can make about moral 'means'.

No, he does not. Nowhere does Gert claim that the imperative of lessening of harm is (a) descriptively moral and (b) scientifically justified. — SophistiCat

You are correct that Gert does not mention science. My parenthetical “(a subject within science's what 'is' domain)” was meant to be my own clarifying comment. I should not have included it.

Are you thinking “An informal public system applying to all moral agents that has the goal of lessening of harm suffered by those who are protected by this system” can be a definition of what is normative?

This definition includes the phrase “by those protected by the system”. Consider the moral norm: “slaves must obey their masters”. If those protected from harm by the system are only the slave masters (which was too often the historical case), then the exploitation of slaves with the goal of lessening harm to their masters will be consistent with the definition. This makes sense if the definition is what is descriptively moral as I understand Gert to the saying. But thinking it is a definition of what is normative would be offensive to modern ears, right?

Also, I disagree that for something to even be recognized as a moral code, it has to be acceptable by all moral agents ("rational people"). That is much too restrictive for a definition. — SophistiCat

I understand your concern about all rational people advocating for a moral claim as criterion for normativity. I don’t share that concern for the normativity by Gert’s criterion (or something close to it) of Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) regarding moral ‘means’ due to its basis in objective science.

But no problem, you don’t like Gert’s criterion for normativity. What criterion do you prefer?

But perhaps your preference might be better discussed in a fresh thread? I’d like to keep the focus of this thread on Gert’s perspective.

Yes, “slaves must obey their masters” has too often been a cultural moral norm enforced by an ingroup to exploit an outgroup.

The reason that "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of what is descriptively moral is that 1) it adds explanatory power, particularly for marker norms such as “working on the sabbath deserves death” and “homosexuality is evil”, and 2) it directly follows from the ultimate source of morality - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.

Without "increasing the benefits of cooperation" you can’t say you have a definition of what is descriptively moral that explains past and present moral norms. And you can’t link cultural moral norms to their ultimate source - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve. — Mark S

These are just claims, where is the argument to support them?

Consider:
(A) “slaves must obey their masters”
(B) “working on the sabbath deserves death”
(C) “homosexuality is evil”.
(BGD) Gert's definition: “What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal”
(MSD) your definition: “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” (which looks like BGD plus "increasing the benefits of cooperation" clause)
If A, B, C can be explained by both BGD and MSD then how is MSD more accurate than BGD and not just more redundant wrt BGD?
To support your claims you should be able to provide an example X historically considered as moral that BGD does NOT classifies as moral while MSD classifies as moral, AND/OR an example Y historically considered as non-moral that BGD classifies as moral while MSD does NOT classify as moral.
If you can't provide any such cases then your general definition is simply redundant, and the allusion to cooperation strategies (partnership, dominance, marker norms) belongs to a deeper level of analysis or empirical investigation (for comparison take 2 definitions of "human beings" as "rational animals" or as "rational animals with sexual organs").


BTW can you clarify better what "marker norms" means and why it is to be distinguished from dominance and partnership norms?

Consider:
(A) “slaves must obey their masters”
(B) “working on the sabbath deserves death”
(C) “homosexuality is evil”
....
If A, B, C can be explained by both BGD and MSD then how is MSD more accurate than BGD and not just more redundant wrt BGD? — neomac

Humm…

How does Gert’s definition of what is descriptively moral based on “lessening of harms” explain, as you claim:
(A) “slaves must obey their masters”
(B) “working on the sabbath deserves death”
(C) “homosexuality is evil”.

I don’t see that it can. My "Morality As Cooperation Strategies" (MACS) definition of what is descriptively moral does explain them because it includes cooperation strategies. It explains them as marker and domination strategies, strategies for increasing the benefits of cooperation in ingroups at the expense (always for domination norms and sometimes for marker norms) of outgroups.

BTW can you clarify better what "marker norms" means and why it is to be distinguished from dominance and partnership norms? — neomac

I have described marker strategies as:

“Marker moral norms – Markers of membership in and commitment to a more cooperative ingroup. Preferentially cooperating with members of an ingroup can reduce the chances of being exploited and thereby increase the benefits of cooperation. These markers include “eating shrimp is an abomination”, “masturbation is immoral”, and other food and sex taboos.”

I can add that these markers of membership and commitment to an ingroup are parts of indirect reciprocity. By limiting the number of people deemed worthy of cooperating with, the chances of being exploited are reduced and the potential benefits of cooperation increased for members of the ingroup.

As to how marker strategies differ from partnership and domination moral norms, see
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13929/what-if-cultural-moral-norms-track-cooperation-strategies/p1

Briefly, partnership moral norms such as the ten rules proposed by Gert, are ingroup norms where all people are assumed worthy of full moral regard.

Domination moral norms such as "slaves must obey their masters" and "women must be submissive to men" are examples of ingroups (men or slave owners) cooperatively enforcing the exploitation of outgroups (slaves and women).

How does Gert’s definition of what is descriptively moral based on “lessening of harms” explain, as you claim:
(A) “slaves must obey their masters”
(B) “working on the sabbath deserves death”
(C) “homosexuality is evil”.

I don’t see that it can. My "Morality As Cooperation Strategies" (MACS) definition of what is descriptively moral does explain them because it includes cooperation strategies. It explains them as marker and domination strategies, strategies for increasing the benefits of cooperation in ingroups at the expense (always for domination norms and sometimes for marker norms) of outgroups. — Mark S

My points are 2: one is about explanation, the other about generality.
1. Gert's descriptive definition of morality is : What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal”
As I understand it, the definition itself in this formulation doesn't specify any strong rationality requirement nor how wide is the group of the people protected by the moral system. So if A, B, C are forms of lessening the harms of a certain group that is protected by the moral system, then these are moral rules that satisfy the definition offered by Gert. In case A the group would be the masters, in case B the group would be all those who need to rest at least once a week, in case C the group could be e.g. all those (as the politicians) would benefit from a demographic growth through etherosexual mating or by limiting the transmissibility of certain sexual diseases or by limiting naturally repugnant sexual behavior (and religious beliefs might have "irrationally" strengthen this belief)
2. Gert's descriptive definition of morality can account for all moral rules (like A, B, C) your definition can account for then your definition is redundant wrt Gert's definition, because talking about "cooperative strategies" doesn't add anything valuable to the general definition, other then alluding to something that is more specific than required by a minimal general definition (for comparison take 2 definitions of "human beings" as "rational animals" or as "rational animals with sexual organs").

The added “increasing the benefits of cooperation” defines the ‘means’ by which harm is to be lessened - cooperation. That knowledge is needed to accurately encompass what morality descriptively ‘is’. Morality descriptively is NOT simply lessening harm as Gert’s version implies. Morality descriptively is lessening harm by increasing the benefits of cooperation.

I prefer Hegel's definition in the Philosophy of Right. For Hegel, morality is the abstract understanding of "the good," held by rational subjects. Morality is not particular, nor should we try to make it drive particular actions by invoking universal moral laws about how all people should act given X.

He uses the term "ethical life" to describe how one lives morally in a specific role at a specific time. I like this differentiation because it is able to take account of differences in customs and situations. Right action depends on where and when you are and who you are. What is required of a fire fighter is different from what is required of a mechanic during a fire. Duties and responsibilities are key elements in morality and they are particular to an individual.

Part of the goal of ethical life is happiness. This must be the case as a rational subject wouldn't choose that life otherwise.

Rationality drives morality in Hegel, but his theory is also able to account for the fact that what is considered moral by most, presumably rational, people changes dramatically over time. Morality expresses itself as a dynamic historical process , progressing as internal contradictions in a society are resolved. Focusing purely on a universal morality, as opposed to this "ethical life" leads to falling into the is/ought trap.

The ethics of any time are emergent, they don't come from the "rational individual." The society is the substance, the individuals are its accidents. Because human beings are rational, society progresses towards human freedom, but they still act within society.


For a simple example, "all rational people" might not agree on any number of customs where one individual has to do something to show respect in some symbolic way to another. But it might be moral in some situations to avoid needlessly offending someone. Moreover, depending on your specific role, you response to the same situations should be different. A police officer and a priest shouldn't necessarily respond to some situations the same way.

No doubt, some of the customs we take for granted today will one day be seen as cancel worthy in the future by rational people.

Morality descriptively is NOT simply lessening harm as Gert’s version implies. Morality descriptively is lessening harm by increasing the benefits of cooperation. — Mark S

Yet I didn't see how you can prove that the definition you suggest is an improvement. You are simply making claims not proving a point. For example, is it possible to have an informal public system applicable to human beings that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal, but it decreases the benefits of cooperation? If it's not possible, then you definition is just redundant.
Besides the more I think of your definition and the less I find it clear. I think cooperative behavior can be found also in animals. The partnership, dominance and marker proto-rules (or patterns of behavior) can be found also in the animal world. Am I wrong? If so and animals showing cooperative behavior are not moral agents, then cooperative behavior must be conceptually decoupled from morality. Now, if morality increases the benefits of cooperation, there must be something in "morality" that can not be reduced to those patterns of behavior constituting cooperation the increases the benefits from such patterns.

Besides the more I think of your definition and the less I find it clear. I think cooperative behavior can be found also in animals. The partnership, dominance and marker proto-rules (or patterns of behavior) can be found also in the animal world. Am I wrong? If so and animals showing cooperative behavior are not moral agents, then cooperative behavior must be conceptually decoupled from morality. Now, if morality increases the benefits of cooperation, there must be something in "morality" that can not be reduced to those patterns of behavior constituting cooperation the increases the benefits from such patterns. — neomac

I hear you complain that my definition of what is descriptively moral is not normatively moral. Perhaps you are confusing what is descriptively moral with what is normatively moral?

What do you understand descriptively moral and normatively moral to refer to?

I’d like to keep this thread focused on the cultural usefulness of Gert’s approach to normativity and what ‘is’ moral.

But perhaps some contrast with Hegel can usefully illuminate Gert’s approach. I’ll respond specifically to what you have said about Hegel.

For Hegel, morality is the abstract understanding of "the good," held by rational subjects. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The question “What is good?” has no definitive answers, rational or otherwise, so far as I know. Of course, you could simply prefer Hegel’s definition of good and advocate it on that basis. Your preference may not make it culturally useful however because it has no objective basis. Having no objective basis means it is unlikely to be universally shared and therefore less useful than moralities that have a objective basis. Your preference alone is not necessarily a culturally useful basis for a morality.

In contrast, Gert focuses on what he sees morality ‘is’. And then, as I understand him, Gert claims, based on what morality 'is', that lessening harm is objectively moral based on it being what all rational persons would advocate. Gert’s approach (with its stated limits) has the advantage over Hegels in that it is claimed to meet (again as I understand him) his criterion for normativity – what all rational persons would advocate.

The modern science of morality (which studies the origin and function of our moral sense and past and present cultural moral norms) has moved beyond Gert’s understanding of what morality ‘is’. As I argue elsewhere, we can still follow Gert’s general approach using the science-enhanced understanding of what morality ‘is’ to define a morality that all rational people will even more strongly advocate.

Yeah, I only meant to contrast here. The problem with the "objective" frame is that human reasoning is deeply embed in culture.

Think about therapy aimed at my "curing" homosexuality. Presumably rational people embraced that earlier. Generations of rational scholars and philosophers embraced slavery and serfdom because that's the system they were used to.

"How else do we get the crops in, avoid famines, and stave off foreign invasion?" even has a rationalist, pragmatist ring to it, and is arguably true for the earliest states in the chaotic Bronze Age period.

I would argue that there clearly is not an objective morality accessible to all with reason. Appeals to this ahistorical objectivity are thus "ought" claims.

Hegel acknowledges this problem. Roman law legalized slavery and made wives and children property of the male head of household. This represents an internal contradiction that will be resolved historically. It is a contradiction because the state and law itself exists to promote human freedom; that is their raison d'etre. They are intersubjective reason as historical process.

Preferences have to be suitable for grounding morality. Humans must be essentially rational and the world must be rational for an understandable morality to exist. Gert's system also presupposes this, but it leaves our top crucial facts. First, that morality evolves as a historical process. Second, that rationality is instantiated at higher levels of emergence than the individual, in the state and in civil society. Example: game theory and emergent processes in economics.

Morality cannot exist sans culture or sans the preferences of a given people with a given era. It never has.

What do you understand descriptively moral and normatively moral to refer to? — Mark S

As I understand it, Gert's "descriptive" notion of morality tries to capture what would characterize normative systems as "moral" cross-culturally, independently from the geographic or historical latitude, in short rules/ideals protecting a group from harm is what counts as moral [1].
Gert's “normative” notion of morality requires that these rules/ideals be acceptable by all rational agents. He identified 10 rules (and 4 ideals, if I remember correctly) that satisfy this normative constraint (they do not seem to include e.g. rules against cannibalism or prostitution but they seem to exclude rules about human sacrifice or slavery).
Gert’s doesn’t need to talk about cooperation strategies (domination, partnership, marker) because he is not interested in classifying systems that satisfy his descriptive definition of morality. This classificatory task belongs to a lower level of analysis (which I guess would be a preliminary step to morally profile societies of different geographic and historical latitude and correlate such profiles with other social/natural factors).
The reference to cooperative strategies is not only a further classificatory task wrt the general “descriptive” definition of morality offered by Gert, but it suggests a whole different research program, namely one that tries to connect pre-human pro-social behaviour and human morality. Indeed the cooperative behaviour is present in some “natural” form also in certain non-human animals. So morality would be an upgrade of these pro-social animal dispositions. The problem is again if this is just matter of degrees or there is something emergent in the moral dimension. In both cases one might take morality as an improvement of such pro-social animal dispositions, yet one would need to specify in what sense morality constitutes an improvement (e.g. in what sense circumcision - which animals do not have - is a marker rule that improves the benefits of cooperation?)
Conclusion, even if I see why you might be interested in integrating Gert’s definition with a reference to cooperative strategies, I don’t think it would be an improvement, because Gert’s definition belongs to a greater level of abstraction (once again compare “rational animal” and “rational animal with genital organs“) and results from a philosophical investigation about the notion of human morality (independently from its continuity wrt animal behaviour).

[1] notice that the notion of "moral agents" in Gert's descriptive definition of morality risks to make the definition circular.

Gert's “normative” notion of morality requires that these rules/ideals be acceptable by all rational agents. He identified 10 rules (and 4 ideals, if I remember correctly) that satisfy this normative constraint (they do not seem to include e.g. rules against cannibalism or prostitution but they seem to exclude rules about human sacrifice or slavery).

Do you mean include rules about human sacrifice and slavery?

If you really thought human sacrifice meant the difference between famine and a good harvest, isn't human sacrifice rational? There it is merely an information constraint that changes the nature of such a behavior.

We might abhor slavery, but military conscription, a form of temporary bondage, is seen as essential to virtually all states.

Do you mean include rules about human sacrifice and slavery? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I was referring to Gert's 10 rules that all moral agents would follow (it looks like the first 5 should be taken to be the most evident to him): https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm
Plus 5 five ideals (which however are supererogatory): https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/008.htm
As I understand them, they would exclude slavery and human sacrifice at least by default, because all rational human beings would find unacceptable a moral system where human sacrifice or slavery would be permitted. I guess that this conclusion follows from assuming that rational people want to avoid harm by default (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/002.htm, https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/003.htm) and impartiality (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/007.htm). Rational people wouldn’t find acceptable a moral system that would permit anybody to enslave or sacrifice them by default. However there might be ad hoc social rules that may specify under which exceptional circumstances moral rules would need to be rationally integrated with other rules.

If you really thought human sacrifice meant the difference between famine and a good harvest, isn't human sacrifice rational? There it is merely an information constraint that changes the nature of such a behavior.
We might abhor slavery, but military conscription, a form of temporary bondage, is seen as essential to virtually all states. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Two comments:
1. As far as I understand Gert’s normative definition of morality, only a subset of social rules can be considered rationally moral and such rules apply to the default behaviour (which doesn’t exclude exceptions). The acceptability of “human sacrifice” practices can not be dictated by rational moral rules in that sense. Maybe there are religious or pagan social rules that govern human behaviour in exceptional cases but it's not up to morality to determine such cases and their rationality remains to be established depending on the circumstances. On the other side “prostitution” as a free choice is not excluded by default by those 10 moral rules. Other religious or legal rules might however exclude it as an unacceptable behavior.
2. As far as I’m concerned, I wouldn’t be so quick in calling some behaviour “rational” just because it may look functional to the survival of the individual or the community. I don’t know enough relevant details about human sacrifice practices but I’m not sure that human beings adopted or preserved such practices as the result of some conscious effective calculation that would make look their behaviour rational (e.g. addressing the problem of famines which may be more plausible in case the ritual increased the availability of food by reducing the demand of food within the community and/or by allowing cannibalism) and not just an evolutionary unintended consequence of some traditionalist cultural imprint.

This is where I see the "no true Scotsman," 20/20 hindsight problem coming in. It's easy to say now that all sorts of prior norms were irrational. However, if that was the case, that history is filled with generation after generation of human beings embracing irrational norms, why is it that we think we now have the ability to determine such norms? Where did this new found rationality come from?


I'd imagine plenty of current behaviors, e.g., our treatment of psychiatric drugs with massive systemic side effects whose mechanism of action is extremely poorly understood, or the industrial production of conscious animals for consumption will someday fit into the human sacrifice bucket of things future philosophers will say rational people wouldn't agree to. Which of course leaves the question: "then why did people follow those norms?"

This is a problem for "harm" based moralities too. To be sure, we can posit and idealized world where agents agree to follow moral principles before they enter the world, perhaps from behind some "viel of ignorance." And in such a world things would be much better, provided people actually follow the rules. But of course, collective action problems and externalities exist because the logic of some systems is that one agent can benefit from cheating on a norm, while the norm is unlikely to collapse from just a handful of agents cheating, making the cheaters net beneficiaries of cheating.

More to the point, in the real world, people carry out terrorist attacks. One country invades another. The whole point of the military, its duty, is specifically to cause the appropriate amount of harm to any invader to get them to leave.

This is where I see the "no true Scotsman," 20/20 hindsight problem coming in. It's easy to say now that all sorts of prior norms were irrational. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But I'm not denying the possibility of rationally justifying some past practice in certain circumstances, yet such possibility doesn't imply that the rational justification was what led people to adopt that practice. Many behavioral dispositions are acquired by individuals since they were children before any actual pros/cons calculation rationally justifying that behavior could take place. And also in our adult life we may show a significant degree of gregarious behavior that encourages conformity to some common pattern of behavior without there being any conscious calculation of pros/cons at the origin of that collective behavior (which is also what could explain social reluctance to change behavior as soon as circumstances rationally require it). All I'm saying is that we shouldn't confuse rationality with a posteriori rationalizations. Said that, I didn't mean to exclude that certain now morally questionable practices (like the alleged practice of infanticide in ancient Greece) were grounded on plausible reasons and widely accepted for those reasons.

we can posit and idealized world where agents agree to follow moral principles before they enter the world, perhaps from behind some "viel of ignorance." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think this would be a more charitable understanding of what Gert's normative definition of morality might assume. However "idealized" Gert's assumptions are, yet they may explain why we might be inclined to consider those 10 moral rules as plausibly universally acceptable by rational individuals. Besides those practices like infanticide or human sacrifices do not necessarily question Gert's normative definition of morality, instead they simply suggest the existence of extreme social or environmental conditions that would allow individual to exceptionally but rationally derogate to default rational moral rules.

Gert's "descriptive" notion of morality tries to capture what would characterize normative systems as "moral" cross-culturally, independently from the geographic or historical latitude, in short rules/ideals protecting a group from harm is what counts as moral [1]. — neomac

Right, but referring to “normative systems” rather than something like “cultural moralities” could lead to confusion about when a system is normative – “when it would be advocated by all rational people”.

Also, being cross-culturally “moral” does not necessarily imply something is normative. Being cross-culturally moral only suggests that something is a good candidate for what is normative.

I interpret Gert to be saying as a descriptive claim about all cultural morality:

What morality is: “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.”

This only becomes normative if it is what all rational people would advocate as I understand Gert’s arguments.

Gert's “normative” notion of morality requires that these rules/ideals be acceptable by all rational agents. He identified 10 rules (and 4 ideals, if I remember correctly) that satisfy this normative constraint (they do not seem to include e.g. rules against cannibalism or prostitution but they seem to exclude rules about human sacrifice or slavery). — neomac

But Gert is not advocating these 10 rules as moral absolutes. Rather, they are heuristics (usually reliable, but fallible rules of thumb) for the goal of “lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system”. And “human sacrifice or slavery” would violate that moral behavior goal.

Conclusion, even if I see why you might be interested in integrating Gert’s definition with a reference to cooperative strategies, I don’t think it would be an improvement, because Gert’s definition belongs to a greater level of abstraction (once again compare “rational animal” and “rational animal with genital organs“) and results from a philosophical investigation about the notion of human morality (independently from its continuity wrt animal behaviour). — neomac

Am I correct in taking your understanding of

“An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.”

to be the claimed negative-utilitarianism goal of moral behavior?

In this case, I agree that adding the phrase “increasing the benefits of cooperation and” does not make sense.

I have been thinking of Gert’s above claim as a claim about moral ‘’means’ (lessening of harms) not moral ‘ends’ (the negative-utilitarianism goal of moral behavior). Your interpretation seems more likely.

Thanks for persisting in your objection.

Upon reflection, I think this definition might be simply too loose.

If you assume people are generally rational, then it collapses into historicism, i.e., conventional morality at time X was rational given the information constraints of the era. If you don't allow information constraints to play a central role it becomes deontological morality with less punch.

I would like to say things like: "slavery was wrong even though the people of eras that embraced it were constrained by historical conditions."

But I should also like to say, "morality isn't groundless because rationality is part of the essence of man, and so exists at all periods," and that people who embraced their epochs' flawed morality were nonetheless rational.

And as a bonus, I would like a theory that explains the progression of morality and growing 'circles of inclusion," in moral calculus, from the self, to family, to the clan, to the state, to the species, to all life. That is, why humans kill each other vastly lower rates than in the past (or in existent pre-state societies), why freedom has advanced (the end of slavery and serfdom, the emancipation of the Jews and later women). In other words, the icing on the cake would be a teleological explanation.

Interesting topic.

I have a question regarding moral codes: Aren't or shouldn't they be based on some theory or ethics system and/or fundamental principles regarding the nature of ethics ? (I prefer this term in general over "morality", but I use both words "moral" and "ethical" according to language requirements.)
I believe that even normative ethics, which refer to a practical view of the subject, are based on some fundamental principles. A moral code and the principles that are involved in it cannot be built out of opinions or beliefs. These change not only from culture to culture, but within the cultures themselves as well as with time and ever changing conditions in life.

A moral code consists of principles that determine the morality of an action. It doesn't answer the big question of what is considered ethical. And to answer that, one must find the root, the fundamental principle that describes and determines and defines ethics, independently of culture and changing conditions in life. Otherwise, a moral code is reduced to a set of principles that people must just follow. Take for example "The Ten Commandments". "Thou shalt not kill". Why? "Thou shalt not commit adultery". Why? An answer "Because it is bad" can easily create a circularity: "Why i is bad?" -> "Because it is said in the "The Ten Commandments". See what I mean?

So, only when you have a fundamental principle that determines and defines ethics, what is considered ethical etc., only then you can create a moral code based on that fundamental principle. Then, all the "why"s can be easily answered by just referring to the fundamental principle.

Now, what can be such a fundamental principle?

I will be glad to expand my comment and answer this, if what I described makes sense. (Otherwise, it will be useless, of course.)