There are pages and pages of this, but I have other sources aside from the SEP if you need — Jamal

These are all relevant citations, but I'm afraid that they don't prove the contention that no distinction is made in philosophy between 'beings' and 'things'.

The plural neuter form of the participle, ta onta, occurs frequently to indicate things, things that are, beings (but we have tended to avoid the translation 'beings') — Early Greek Philosophy, Volume I: Introductory and Reference Materials

I don't know the reason for the general avoidance of "beings" in translations of Aristotle. — Jamal

Probably for the reasons that I have given.

The natural scientist studies them as things that are subject to the laws of nature, as things that move and undergo change. That is, the natural scientist studies things qua movable (i.e., in so far as they are subject to change). The mathematician studies things qua countable and measurable. The metaphysician, on the other hand, studies them in a more general and abstract way — SEP: Aristotle’s Metaphysics

Note the distinction here between 'things' subject to the laws of nature and 'beings' in a more general sense. What has been translated as 'substantia' in Latin, and thence 'substance' in English, was 'ouisia' in Aristotle. So the metaphysican studies 'the being' of things, how they 'come to be'. (This is the substance of The Greek Verb to Be and the Meaning of Being by Kahn, although he mainly concentrates on Aristotle's predecessors.)

The correlatives form, therefore, a complex structure that is reproduced throughout the ladder and in each one of the beings, from God to a stone, to ontologically explain the continuity among all beings. In each one of them, the chain of the whole of creation is reproduced. — SEP: Ramon Llull

This is a reference to 'the Great Chain of Being'. In that chain, each step represents an ontological level or plane of being. Minerals and inorganic matter at the bottom is, in this scheme, the least real, then ascending through vegetable, animal, human, angels, and God.



This is generally considered archaic in modern philosophy. According to materialism only the bottom rung (matter-energy) is considered real, with everything else derived from it by some unexplained power (usually generally designated under the heading of 'evolution'). My general view is that the whole notion the vertical dimension of Being was abandoned in the advent of modernity, which is why the distinctions of different levels of being, and the distinction between things and beings, is no longer intelligible.

These are all relevant citations, but I'm afraid that they don't prove the contention that no distinction is made in philosophy between 'beings' and 'things'. — Wayfarer

I agree. I have not been arguing for that position. I have been demonstrating that "beings" is commonly used in philosophy to mean that which can be said to be, or that which is, therefore that you are not justified in saying that beings, to be beings, must be subjects of experience.

Probably for the reasons that I have given. — Wayfarer

Yes, in the very same sentence I said it was probably because your favoured sense of "beings" is now widespread.

Note the distinction here between 'things' subject to the laws of nature and 'beings' in a more general sense. What has been translated as 'substantia' in Latin, and thence 'substance' in English, was 'ouisia' in Aristotle. So the metaphysican studies 'the being' of things, how they 'come to be'. (This is the substance of The Greek Verb to Be and the Meaning of Being by Kahn, although he mainly concentrates on Aristotle's predecessors.) — Wayfarer

Agreed. I don't see how that affects my point though.

This is generally considered archaic in modern philosophy. According to materialism only the bottom rung is considered real, with everything else derived from it by some unexplained power. My general view is that the whole notion the vertical dimension of Being was abandoned in the advent of modernity, which is why the distinctions of different levels of being, and the distinction between things and beings, is no longer intelligible. — Wayfarer

I see where you're coming from, but my point still stands (and stands well-supported now I think).

It was just a matter of time before the Great Chain was unleashed. Should we want to be chained up?

I see where you're coming from, but my point still stands (and stands well-supported now I think). — Jamal

Well, we'll just have to agree to disagree on that, but it's been good discussion.
I think the materials you cited locate the source of the debate, which is in the rejection of 'levels of being', don't you think?

(I'm going to be scarce for a few days due to work stuff.)

The Great Chain of Being and Jacob's Ladder are analogous (although the former is reputedly of Greek origin (Plato and Aristotle), while the latter is Hebraic, so the metaphor is one of ascending, not of being chained up.

If you say so.

I'm only repeating what are uncontroversial facts in the history of ideas, so my saying so has little to do with it.

Well, we'll just have to agree to disagree on that, but it's been good discussion. — Wayfarer

I've enjoyed it too, but your position simply can't be maintained. You asked for citations and I provided them. Are you saying that the quotations do not show that it's normal, standard, conventional, and traditional that "beings" in philosophy are whatever can be said to be?

Or are you saying that the authors of the quoted articles are misusing the term? Or are you instead saying that those quotations are a misrepresentative selection?

You asked for citations and I provided them. Are you saying that the quotations do not show that it's normal, standard, conventional, and traditional that "beings" in philosophy are whatever can be said to be? — Jamal

None of them directly refer to inanimate things as beings. They're discussions of 'the nature of being' in which context everything is subsumed under the heading 'beings', in the sense of 'things that exist'. But none of them equivocate 'beings' and 'inanimate things'. In fact you even acknowledge it:

I don't know the reason for the general avoidance of "beings" in translations of Aristotle. — Jamal

I'm saying that this is the reason!. And even supporting it with another of your citations about 'the great chain of being' which provides the basis for the ancient and medieval distinction between non-living and living of various degrees (vegetative, animal, human). You won't find anything in there to support the contention of rocks being conscious. (It is of course a truism that the whole idea of the great chain of being is now considered thoroughly obsolete in modern philosophy, but there's where the distinction originates.)

Please consider the quote in the original post again:

Without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists as such only in so far as it is consciously reflected and consciously expressed by a psyche. Consciousness is a precondition of being. — Carl Jung

My question was an attempt to spell out why Jung would say this. I was attempting to interpret the OP. As I asked already, does Jung mean by this that consciousness is a pre-condition for the existence of rocks? I think that it is clearly an absurd suggestion. So what does he mean 'consciousness is a pre-condition of being'? I was trying to elucidate the philosophical implication of the term human being in response to the use of 'being' in this quotation. And so far, I don't think any light has been cast on that whatever.

(Now, I really do have to log out for at least the working day, I have major work commitments. And I'm really not being stubborn, but I refuse to admit to an error that I haven't made.)

None of them directly refer to inanimate things as beings — Wayfarer

That is patently untrue. I suggest you read them again. Those that don't name inanimate beings explicitly--and there are two or three which do--directly entail that meaning.

You won't find anything in there to support the contention of rocks being conscious. — Wayfarer

This demonstrates that you are still misunderstanding my point, quite radically. I don't know why you think I was trying to show that rocks are conscious, or that I was trying to show that philosophers thought so. Or is that not what you are saying?

I refuse to admit to an error that I haven't made — Wayfarer

I have led the horse to water--you're the horse in this metaphor--in a golden carriage furnished with soft bedding and silks, carried on the backs of my loyal servants, to a crystal-clear pond of the sweetest purest water in the land, and still you do not drink!

Well, it's been fun trying.

Without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists as such only in so far as it is consciously reflected and consciously expressed by a psyche. Consciousness is a precondition of being. — Carl Jung


My question was an attempt to spell out why Jung would say this. I was attempting to interpret the OP. As I asked already, does Jung mean by this that consciousness is a pre-condition for the existence of rocks? I think that it is clearly an absurd suggestion. — Wayfarer

I think what you say is clearly an absurd suggestion is precisely what Jung means. Without consciousness to disclose it, being would be "blind", hidden; nothing would appear. That's why he states the caveat "practically speaking".

RE: Consciousness is a Precondition of Being
SUBTOPIC: What is "Consciousness?" 'vs' What is "Being?"
※→ T Clark, 180 Proof, Wayfarer, et al,

Consciousness

• Consciousness is a compound topic with interconnections of the science behind billions of neurons, and the input, storage, and retrieval of patterns that contain intelligence that have come to be considered consciousness. It constitutes metaphysical interpretations that is (not yet) understood.
  
• Surveillance in near-real-time of the neurons → bio-electrical signals (modulation of those impulses). We can inject stimuli (either as modulated or carrier-only signals) and test neuronal fibers and determine the performance characteristics. Of the many observations and manipulations of the brain that we can explain, independent consciousness patterns cannot be reconstructed to form the original stimulation. And there is the threshold of metaphysics.

Being

• Being is a descriptor for existence. Existence does not require embedded consciousness. Being does not require self-awareness.

Most Respectfully,
R

Straw poll: who else participating in this thread accepts that rocks are beings? — Wayfarer

Philosophically speaking, they are.

Seeing as you sourced ChatGPT, I asked it for the philosophical definition of "being":

"Being is a philosophical term that is often used to describe the state or quality of existing or existing in a particular way. It is a broad concept that encompasses everything that exists, both tangible and intangible. Being involves the physical and the metaphysical, the natural and the spiritual, and the present and the future. Being can also refer to a philosophical state or condition of something or someone, such as the state of being alive, being conscious, or having a particular identity."

Or read:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontic

As I asked already, does Jung mean by this that consciousness is a pre-condition for the existence of rocks? — Wayfarer

Yes.

Rocks are part of the world, right? So no world, no rocks.

Rocks are not conscious, but they are still “things” — they are still beings in that sense. They have existence, they “are.” They show up in the world for a human being to perceive and label “r-o-c-k.”

“Beings” are things. “Beings” is not reserved strictly for sentient beings. It can be, sure, but that’s not the common usage in ontology.

:up:

:100: Unfortunately, @Wayfarer seems acutely alleergic to contrary evidence.

In philosophy I'd say 'things that exist = beings.' — bert1

:up:

“Beings” are things. “Beings” is not reserved strictly for sentient beings. It can be, sure, but that’s not the common usage in ontology. — Mikie

Yes, e.g. from the link above the terms are used interchangeably:

"In more nuance, it means that which concerns particular, individuated beings rather than their modes of being; the present, actual thing in relation to the virtual, generalized dimension which makes that thing what it "is"."

A counter-intuituive use it can be argued, but that's philosophy.

As I asked already, does Jung mean by this that consciousness is a pre-condition for the existence of rocks?
— Wayfarer

Yes.

Rocks are part of the world, right? So no world, no rocks. — Mikie

So you agree then that the world is created by consciousness.

I was not referring to 'being' as a verb, as already stated a number of times, but of the distinction between beings (as a general noun) and things (as a general noun). I'm not denyinig that 'existent things are' or 'all things exist' or anything of the kind nor that anything that is, is existent, or 'has being', or that philosophers often discuss 'being in general', meaning 'everything that exists'.

But as for the simple distinction between beings and things, I was returned this result:

Q: What is the difference between things and beings?

A: Things refer to inanimate objects, physical entities, or concepts that lack life or consciousness. They can include tangible objects such as rocks, buildings, and machines, as well as intangible concepts such as ideas, theories, and laws.

On the other hand, beings refer to living entities, whether they are animals, humans, or other organisms, that possess consciousness and the ability to think, feel, and act. Beings can experience emotions, make choices, and interact with the world around them.

In summary, the main difference between things and beings is that things are inanimate and lack life and consciousness, while beings are living entities that possess consciousness and the ability to think, feel, and act. — ChatGPT

Which I take to be the regular meanings of the terms - 'language being use', and all that. And the further claim that this distinction in common language reflects an intuition which maybe no longer so obvious in current culture (and is being completely ignored in the foregoing discussion).

Without consciousness to disclose it, being would be "blind", hidden; nothing would appear. That's why he states the caveat "practically speaking". — Janus

:up: Agree. So - can you see how I am trying to relate this to the designation of humans as 'beings'? i.e. that the human psyche is indispensable to the disclosure of being. So would such a state of 'blindness', to press the metaphor, even be 'a state of being'? Would one refer to 'the state of being' of the early universe? I think not.

As also evidenced in this passage:

What is more, most of the natural sciences try to represent the results of their investigations as though these had come into existence without man’s intervention, in such a way that the collaboration of the psyche – an indispensable factor – remains invisible. (An exception to this is modern physics, which recognizes that the observed is not independent of the observer.) So in this respect, too, science conveys a picture of the world from which a real human psyche appears to be excluded – the very antithesis of the “humanities.” — Carl Jung, The Hidden Self

Two questions about this: in what sense is the psyche (what Aristotle would call 'the soul') an 'indispensable factor', and why does he cite 'modern physics' as an exception?

language being use — Wayfarer

Except, apparently, when the use is by authors on the SEP or on that Wikipedia page that @Baden cited (and later quoted). Could there perhaps be two uses, one in philosophy and one in popular culture and everyday life?

Sure. All I’ve said all along is that in common speech, beings are differentiated from things. But then I’ve used that to argue for there being a real distinction which is what seemed to trigger the whole debate. The meta-question, if you like, is what is the source of that controversy. Why does it matter that beings are or are not different from things?

Even in philosophy "a being" usually refers to a person of some kind. It's the capitalized Being that Wayf has mistakenly read to mean consciousness. The occasional off the wall misreading of this it that philosopher gets thrown in.

As I asked already, does Jung mean by this that consciousness is a pre-condition for the existence of rocks?
— Wayfarer

Yes.

Rocks are part of the world, right? So no world, no rocks.
— Mikie

So you agree then that the world is created by consciousness. — Wayfarer

Depends on what we mean by “world,” of course. If we restrict world to linguistic, perceptual or abstract entities, then sure. But he says consciousness is a precondition of “being.” If by ‘being’ he means the world of aforementioned entities, then sure. But I’m not convinced of this.

I think he’s taking an idealist view, basically.

ChatGPT — Wayfarer

We’re citing ChatGBT now? Have you really been reduced to this? :wink:

Now that I think about it, perhaps this is a better thread to discuss being: What is Being?

That seems to be the only interesting part of his claim.

If we restrict world to linguistic, perceptual or abstract entities, then sure. But he says consciousness is a precondition of “being.” If by ‘being’ he means the world of aforementioned entities, then sure. But I’m not convinced of this.

I think he’s taking an idealist view, basically. — Mikie

Finally. This is all I was getting at.

Even in philosophy "a being" usually refers to a person of some kind — frank

No, that’s not true, unless you mean “a human being.”

All I’ve said all along is that in common speech, beings are differentiated from things. But then I’ve used that to argue for there being a real distinction which is what seemed to trigger the whole debate. The meta-question, if you like, is what is the source of that controversy. Why does it matter that beings are or are not different from things? — Wayfarer

I just want to note, in case there is any doubt about it, that this has nothing to do with why I have been telling you that "beings" in philosophy refers to whatever can be said to be; it is not why @Baden, @Mikie and others have told you the same; and it is not why philosophers use it like that. The term is neutral on the difference between subjects of experience and (other) things, and is most often associated with some kind of assertion of difference. For example, Aristotle distinguishes between rational and non-rational beings, and between living and non-living beings.

Or take part of that quotation about Heidegger:

If we look around at beings in general—from particles to planets, ants to apes—it is human beings alone who are able to encounter the question of what it means to be.

(I bolded that part because you missed it last time around)

Here you can see that the philosophical use of "beings"—the one that I've demonstrated is conventional—is consistent with an assertion of a fundamental ontological difference.

The reason is that saying of individuals/particulars/things that they are is not saying much at all.* It's a starting point. It is precisely because "beings" does not say anything about the properties of or differences between the individuals referred to that it is used.

"Beings" is how philosophers refer to those individuals (I want to use "things" here but I fear you would get the wrong idea) that can be said to be, including those which are animate and inanimate. The only other way of doing this very useful thing is to say "things that are," which has the same meaning; or many philosophers would bring in existence these days, because they have collapsed the difference—if you want to avoid that issue you'll avoid "existents" or "entities".

* Of course, from another angle, when enquiring into the meaning of being, it's saying a lot, and precisely what it's saying is the issue

No, that’s not true, unless you mean “a human being.” — Jamal

Or divine being. I don't know of any cases where "a being" isn't a person.

Or divine being. — frank

Yep, good point.

I don't know of any cases where "a being" isn't a person. — frank

See my quotations from the SEP. It's the philosophical standard.*

In philosophy there are human beings, divine beings, non-living beings, inanimate beings, possible beings, and so on. You agreed with me on this a page or two ago.

*EDIT: I mean it's the philosophical standard to use it to refer to things that are, whether they are persons or not

Oh. Ok. I didn't see that post. I could probably do a long list of philosophical citations where "a being" means a person. I guess it comes down to context.