It's the philosophical standard. — Jamal

Not even just philosophy. Here's the (great) online etymology dictionary.

https://www.etymonline.com/word/being

being (n.)

c. 1300, "existence," in its most comprehensive sense, "condition, state, circumstances; presence, fact of existing," early 14c., existence," from be + -ing. The sense of "that which physically exists, a person or thing" (as in human being) is from late 14c.

I'm left quite baffled by this discussion. I'm pretty sure even the occasional modern use of 'being' as 'living entity/person' is derived post hoc from the adjunct of 'being' to 'human being', by contraction to just 'human' or just 'being'.

What's going on here is the battle between 'being' as entity and 'being' as person is being fought as a proxy for the battle for primacy between phenomenological existence and material matter as the proper subject of ontology.

I could probably do a long list of philosophical citations where "a being" means a person. I guess it comes down to context. — frank

Yes, there are many of those too. When the context is Western metaphysics, the use I've been arguing for seems to be the main one, and it's the minimal, most neutral sense, in line with the grammatical basics: a being is what can be said to be.

I'm left quite baffled by this discussion. I'm pretty sure even the occasional modern use of 'being' as 'living entity/person' is derived post hoc from the adjunct of 'being' to 'human being', by contraction to just 'human' or just 'being'. — Isaac

Yes, that was my conjecture too. I'm also guessing it's been strengthened by popular culture, e.g., "the being from another world." I also noticed, while doing my SEP trawl, that many of the articles on Eastern philosophy use it like this.

If we look around at beings in general—from particles to planets, ants to apes—it is human beings alone who are able to encounter the question of what it means to be - Heidegger. — Jamal

Note that Heidegger singles out 'human beings', because they alone are able to encounter the question of 'what it means to be'. No other beings - particles and planets, ants and apes - are able to do this. To all intents, that is the same distinction I was seeking to make.

What's going on here is the battle between 'being' as entity and 'being' as person is being fought as a proxy for the battle for primacy between phenomenological existence and material matter as the proper subject of ontology. — Isaac

Close. Originally the starting point of the debate was my claim that the term 'ontology' refers to 'the meaning of being', and not to 'the analysis of what exists'. (I'm quite aware, for example, that ontology is used in computer networks for the classification of the various kinds of devices that comprise it. I'm sure, though I don't know for certain, there are many other scientific ontologies as well.)

I claimed that 'ontology' was originally derived from the first-person participle of being - which is 'I am'. This is the claim which a former mod took strong exception to as an 'eccentric' or 'idiosyncratic' definition. Fair enough with respect to the 'first person case', but it is a fact that 'ontology' is derived from the Greek verb 'to be', and, as Charles Kahn's analysis shows, it has a different (and much broader) set of meanings to 'to exist'.

The philosophical point of that, is that the natural sciences, which are concerned with 'what exists', are not concerned with 'the meaning of being' in the philosophical sense. (Which is not a slight to the natural sciences, only a matter of demarcation.)

Yes, there are many of those too. When the context is Western metaphysics, the use I've been arguing for seems to be the main one, and it's the minimal, most neutral sense, in line with the grammatical basics: a being is what can be said to be. — Jamal

Oh. Ok. Thanks

Note that Heidegger singles out 'human beings', because they alone are able to encounter the question of 'what it means to be'. No other beings - particles and planets, ants and apes - are able to do this. To all intents, that is the same distinction I was seeking to make. — Wayfarer

Yes, that was precisely my point. I thought I'd made that clear. To use "beings" to refer to anything which can be said to be, whether animate or not, is consistent with a fundamental difference between human beings and other beings, or between subjects of experience and things that are not subjects of experience.

I explicitly chose that quote for exactly the reason you've pointed out. It supports my central point.

So, what do you think is the philosophical signficance of the fact that 'man alone' is capable of 'encountering the question of being', and that no other beings are able to do that. Do you think this is a significant distinction?

So, what do you think is the philosophical signficance of the fact that 'man alone' is capable of 'encountering the question of being', and that no other beings are able to do that. Do you think this is a significant distinction? — Wayfarer

Absolutely!

Backing up a little, I'm confused by this:

To use "beings" to refer to anything which can be said to be, whether animate or not, is consistent with a fundamental difference between...subjects of experience and things that are not subjects of experience. — Jamal

So, how can using the same word for both 'subjects' and 'non-subjects' be 'consistent with a fundamental difference'. If it's the same word, and refers to both classes, then how can it convey 'a fundamental difference'? Or did you mean to write, 'is consistent with there being no fundamental difference between...'

So, how can using the same word for both 'subjects' and 'non-subjects' be 'consistent with a fundamental difference'. If it's the same word, and refers to both classes, then how can it convey 'a fundamental difference'? Or did you mean to write, 'is consistent with there being no fundamental difference between...' — Wayfarer

No I did write it as I meant to.

Maybe this sums it up: It's consistent with a fundamental difference, but it does not convey any such difference. It's neutral. It is also consistent with there being no fundamental difference.

Does that make sense?

So it all comes back to: there is no appreciable difference between the verbs 'to be' and 'to exist'. Everyone here generally accepts that, but I dissent. I'm quite happy to leave it at that. I will not push the point in future.

So it all comes back to: there is no appreciable difference between the verbs 'to be' and 'to exist'. Everyone here generally accepts that, but I dissent. I'm quite happy to leave it at that. I will not push the point in future. — Wayfarer

But you can say there is a difference between being and existence and also say that anything that can be said to be is a being. Probably many of the philosophers mentioned in my citations would have upheld that difference. For example, I think some philosophers have said that possible beings might or might not exist, i.e., they are, but they don't always exist. Heidegger has a different distinction that I'm not clear about (in line with ontological vs ontic, I'm guessing). Others will have different distinctions again. All of them, however, go along with beings as anything that can be said to be.

I wonder if Platonists would say that the Forms exist. Plato said they were beings, but maybe to say they exist would be to say something more, in a Platonic scheme.

there is no appreciable difference between the verbs 'to be' and 'to exist'. Everyone here generally accepts that, but I dissent — Wayfarer

I forgot to mention: I have not committed myself to that.

I wonder if Platonists would say that the Forms exist. — Jamal

In my lexicon, they don't exist, but they're real - real in the same way that, say, scientific principles and constraints and logical laws are real. In casual speech to say such things as the law of the excluded middle exist is OK, but when you ask 'in what sense does it exist?' you realise it is not a sensable phenomena, but a law of thought. It does not exist qua phenomenon but is real nonetheless, as are countless other such principles, laws, and so on - they are the constituents of rational discourse (something like Popper's world three.) This is why I've become interested in universals and Platonic realism - that there really are universal structures of reason which the mind alone can access, but doesn't create from itself (per Augustine and Intelligible Objects. )

In my lexicon, they don't exist, but they're real - real in the same way that, say, scientific principles and constraints and logical laws are real. — Wayfarer

Yes, this seems similar to existents vs beings.

Otherwise, I have to admit that I didn't enter this discussion in a spirit of metaphysical enquiry; I was just trying to sort out a terminological confusion that was disguising itself as a substantial philosophical difference (I think this is similar to the point that @Isaac made above).

Or is it the other way around: a substantial philosophical difference disguised as a terminological debate? Now I'm confused.

Anyway, my own properly philosophical interests right now are the non-metaphysical metaphysics of Theodor Adorno, which doesn't leave much mental room.

I did find it odd that you rejected precisely the usage that was common in the kind of Western philosophy you seem to have most affinity for: traditional metaphysics. I felt like I could show you this, so that's why I intervened.

Even if the debate has been skating over the real issues, it's still been good. :up:

:clap:

I also noticed, while doing my SEP trawl, that many of the articles on Eastern philosophy use it like this. — Jamal

That's interesting, introducing the possibility, perhaps, of translation issues muddying the water?

The philosophical point of that, is that the natural sciences, which are concerned with 'what exists', are not concerned with 'the meaning of being' in the philosophical sense. — Wayfarer

So, can I assume that, by exclusion, you'd contend that philosophy isn't concerned with the question of what exists? Or, if it is, then the domain for that enquiry is not ontology, but rather... what?

Let’s say the meaning of being, the quest for a unitive insight.

One could make a case that being and experience require each other. For if we lacked the latter, we could not recognize the former. Sure, you can say that things existed before we arose, but we can only speak about them in our terms and our way of understanding. If we remove this, then, it is really difficult to speak about anything, naturally.

Something existent absent anything to confirm its existence is very problematic. We tend to say existence just is. We can say that after the fact.

I agree with such statements with qualifications. For if we never arose, we could not say that planets or rocks existed, for these, as planets and rocks, depend on our concepts. Another creature might bundle together different properties under the concept of existence.

Everything that exists for me is due to consciousness of … I think what you may not have considered what he said was from a phenomenological stance rather than as a ontological or teleological one.

Aristotle has got your back:

It is also worth inquiring how time is related to the soul and why time is thought to exist in everything, on the earth and on the sea and in the heaven. Is it not in view of the fact that it is an attribute or a possession of a motion, by being a number (of a motion), and the fact that all these things are movable? For all of them are in a place, and time is simultaneous with a motion whether with respect to potentiality or with respect to actuality.
One might also raise the problem of whether time would exist not if no soul existed; for, if no one can exist to do the numbering, no thing can be numbered. So if nothing can do the numbering except a soul or the intellect of a soul, no time can exist without the existence of soul, unless it be that which when existing, time exists, that is if a motion can exist without a soul. As for the prior and the posterior, they exist in motion; and they are time qua being numerable.
— Physics, 223a15, translated by HG Apostle

We look for the Nous against the background of where we cannot find it. We stick out like a sore thumb.

I did not know about this quote. I have to read up on Aristotle, a bit embarrassed to admit I know very, very little of his thought.

Thanks for sharing.

Thank you. He still is kicking my ass.

I did not bring him up as a rebuttal to any thesis here but only to note that Aristotle is not keeping the peas from touching the meat the way Kant likes his supper.

One might also raise the problem of whether time would exist not if no soul existed; for, if no one can exist to do the numbering, no thing can be numbered. So if nothing can do the numbering except a soul or the intellect of a soul, no time can exist without the existence of soul.. — Aristotle, Physics, 223a15, translated by HG Apostle

The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time loses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe. So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. (Cosmologist Andrei) Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma

If you want the most radical thesis on time check out The End of Time by Julian Barbour. I've been reading, and trying to understand, it, and it's doing my head in (in a good way).

Yes I've run across that previously. Does look intriguing.

Hah! Yeah - that's one of the reasons I have been hesitant to read him, he's quite difficult to read. There's plenty of good philosophy that is written - if not clearly, then at least much better. But there are exceptions like Aristotle and Kant.

Thankfully not too many. But yeah, he's worth it, probably secondary sources can help with vocab and orientation.

Note that Heidegger singles out 'human beings', because they alone are able to encounter the question of 'what it means to be'. No other beings - particles and planets, ants and apes - are able to do this. To all intents, that is the same distinction I was seeking to make. — Wayfarer

Yet Heidegger uses Dasein, not Sein, to distinguish 'humans' from 'mere beings' (i.e. Seiendes) as pointed out here on p. 2 of this thread. So unless you're disputing the very authority you have appealed to, Wayf, concede the point that the contemporary philosophical "distinction" is between Dasein and beings, n o t "beings and things". :roll:

According to the membership of thephilosophyforum, distinguishing 'beings' from 'things' is an eccentric and idiosyncratic attitude. Somehow I'll just have to find a way to live with it.