you haven't shown me anything to make think that I'm wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover
...everything indicates that there is potentiality and actuality. — Metaphysician Undercover
... his "Metaphysics" the need for an actuality which is prior to material objects, as the cause of the first material form. All material objects are preceded in time by the potential for their existence. But a potential requires something actual to actualize it and become an actual material form — Metaphysician Undercover
I do think it is fair to say that Aristotle has no patience for the 'likely stories' and the devices of myth and poetry employed by Plato. — Paine
Right, in the same way that my hallucination most certainly exists. — Metaphysician Undercover
Being convinced that you are right there is nothing you can be shown to make you think you are wrong. — Fooloso4
Which is it? Are energeia and dunamis just concepts? Are you claiming that there is a need for a concept which is prior to another concept? In what way does a concept cause the first material form? — Fooloso4
they are concepts used to describe the world. — Metaphysician Undercover
... experience is knowledge of particulars, but art of universals; and actions and the effects produced are all concerned with the particular ... we consider that knowledge and proficiency belong to art rather than to experience, and we assume that artists are wiser than men of mere experience (which implies that in all cases wisdom depends rather upon knowledge); and this is because the former know the cause, whereas the latter do not. For the experienced know the fact, but not the wherefore; but the artists know the wherefore and the cause. (Metaphysics 981a)
The true form of the thing consists of accidents, — Metaphysician Undercover
man by man
Augustine — Metaphysician Undercover
Thomas Aquinas — Metaphysician Undercover
There is nothing to indicate that the world might be eternal. and everything indicates that there is potentiality and actuality. So that possibility, that the world is eternal and there no potentiality or actuality is easily excluded as unreal. — Metaphysician Undercover
But in fact, as has been said, the ultimate matter and the shape are one and the same, the one potentially, the other actively, so that it is the same to look for what is the cause of oneness or what is the cause of being one.946 For each thing is a one, and what potentially is and what actively is are in a way one. And so there is no other cause here, unless there is something that brought about the movement from potentiality to activity. Things that have no matter, though, are all unconditionally just what is a one. — Metaphysics,1045b20, translated by CDC Reeve
It is evident that even of the things that seem to be substances, most are capacities (dunami), whether the parts of animals (for none of them exists when it has been separated, and whenever they are separated they all exist only as matter) or earth, fire, and air (for none of them is one, but instead they are like a heap, until they are concocted and some one thing comes to be from them). — ibid. 1040b5
Hence, we must first speak about nourishment and reproduction; for the nutritive soul belongs also to the other living things and is the first and most commonly possessed potentiality of the soul, in virtue of which they all have life. Its function in living things, such as are perfect and not mutilated or do not have spontaneous generation, to produce another thing like themselves--an animal to produce an animal, a plant a plant---in order that they may partake of the everlasting and divine in so far as they can; for all desire that, for the sake of that, they do whatever they do in accordance with nature. (But that for the sake of which is twofold--the purpose for which and the beneficiary for whom.) Since, then, they cannot share in the everlasting and divine by continuous existence, because no perishable thing can persist numerically one and the same, they share in them in so far as each can, some more and some less; and what persists is not the thing itself but something like itself, not one in number but one in species. — De Anima, 415a26, translated by DW Hamlyn
But if there is something that is eternal and immovable and separable, it is evident that knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science—not, however, to natural science (for natural science is concerned with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to something prior to both. For natural science is concerned with things that are inseparable but not immovable, while certain parts of mathematics are concerned with things that are immovable and not separable but as in matter. The primary science, by contrast, is concerned with things that are both separable and immovable. Now all causes are necessarily eternal, and these most of all. concavity is without perceptible matter. If, then, all natural things are said the way the snub is (for example, nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and, in general, animal, and leaf, root, bark, and, in general, plant—for the account of none of these is without [reference to] movement, but always includes matter), the way we must inquire into and define the what-it-is in the case of natural things is clear, as is why it belongs to the natural scientist to get a theoretical grasp even on some of the soul, that is, on as much of it as is not without matter. That natural science is a theoretical science, then, is evident from these considerations. Mathematics too is a theoretical one, but whether its objects are immovable and separable is not now clear; however, it is clear that some parts of mathematics get a theoretical grasp on their objects insofar as they are immovable and insofar as they are separable. But if there is something that is eternal and immovable and separable, it is evident that knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science—not, however, to natural science (for natural science is concerned with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to something prior to both. For natural science is concerned with things that are inseparable but not immovable, while certain parts of mathematics are concerned with things that are immovable and not separable but as in matter. The primary science, by contrast, is concerned with things that are both separable and immovable. Now all causes are necessarily eternal, and these most of all. For they are the causes of the divine beings that are perceptible. — Metaphysics, 1026a10
But it is not clear whether you think you are explaining Aristotle or abandoning him. — Fooloso4
.Now, It is clear from the passage I quoted from De Anima, that Aristotle rejects this idea of the mind moving itself through eternal circular motion. He attributes this idea of the mind moving itself to Plato's Timaeus, and he rejects it, for the reasons given in the quoted passage. The description is spatial, and that which is immaterial cannot be described in spatial terms — Metaphysician Undercover
In separation it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal. (But we do not remember because this is unaffected, whereas the passive intellect is perishable, and without this nothing thinks. — Aristotle, De Anima, 430a18, translated by DW Hamlyn
The concept 'dog' does not bark and wag its tail. His concern with ousia is not a concern about a concept but the living being that barks and wags its tail. — Fooloso4
There is something to be a man that is not a man's accidents. — Fooloso4
To understand Aristotle you will have to ignore Aristotle. — Paine
This comment was said to cancel the description of the agent intellect: — Paine
He showed that in each case it is a type of form. But, as he explained, the form of the individual is completely different from the form of the universal. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, he says that anything which is moving in a circle must be composed of matter, and material things are generated, are corruptible, and will corrupt. — Metaphysician Undercover
These premises clearly give the conclusion that there is in nature some bodily substance other than the formations we know, prior to them all and more divine than they.
The primary science, by contrast, is concerned with things that are both separable and immovable. Now all causes are necessarily eternal, and these most of all. For they are the causes of the divine beings that are perceptible.
That the heaven as a whole neither came into being nor admits of destruction, as some assert, but is one and eternal, with no end or beginning of its total duration, containing and embracing in itself the infinity of time, we may convince ourselves not only by the arguments already set forth but also by a consideration of the views of those who differ from us in providing for its generation.
It is the formal cause and not a concept that does the work. The formal cause, what it is to be a man, is what each and every man is. This is by nature not by concept. — Fooloso4
But the universal too seems to some people to be most of all a cause, and the universal most of all a starting-point. So let us turn to that too. For it seems impossible for any of the things said [of something] universally to be substance. For first the substance of each thing is special to it, in that it does not belong to anything else. A universal, by contrast, is something common, since that thing is said to be a universal which naturally belongs to many things. Of which, then, will it be the substance? For it is either the substance of none or of all. And it cannot be the substance of all. — Metaphysics, 1038b9, translated by CDC Reeve
If we get our theoretical grasp on the issue on the basis of these considerations, then, it is evident that nothing that belongs universally to things is substance, and that none of the things that are predicated in common signifies a this something but a such-and-such sort. If not, many other difficulties result, and especially the Third Man. — ibid. 1038b30
If we are abstracting from tangible bodies, then they must in the first place be
made, in part, out of objects of thought. This is what I meant by saying that our usual idea
of abstraction is not tenable. It makes the thinkable things unmysterious only by doing just
the opposite to the visible things. It ends up claiming that our eyes see the invisible and our
hands hold the intangible, because it tells us that when we think one of those invisible and
intangible things, we have extracted it out of a body like a tooth. The idea of abstraction
answers no question, but only goes around in a circle and gets dizzy. Anything it gives us,
we already have; anything we don't already have, it can't give us. — Joe Sachs, The Battle of the Gods and the Giants, page 8
I never canceled the agent intellect. I recognize the agent intellect as an extremely important concept. I just understand it in a way different from you. And that's not at all surprising because the proper way to understand the agent intellect has always been a matter of debate. — Metaphysician Undercover
As we proceed through Bk2 and 3, an explanation is provided. This is the actual/potential division. The way that the soul moves the body is by means of the powers, which are potentials. The potentials are not naturally active, they need to be actualized. So I do not think it is the case that we consider one to be a part of the other, but they exist in this relationship which is the active/potential relationship of hylomorphism, matter/form. — Metaphysician Underground
What we wish to say is clear from the particular cases by induction, and we must not look for a definition of everything, but be able to comprehend the analogy, namely, that as what is building is in relation to what is capable of building, and what is awake is in relation to what is asleep, and what is seeing is in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight, and what has been shaped out of the matter is in relation to the matter, and what has been finished off is to the unfinished. Of the difference exemplified in this analogy let the activity be marked off by the first part, the potentiality by the second. — ibid. Θ 6 1048a35–b6
In separation it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal. (But we do not remember because this is unaffected, whereas the passive intellect is perishable, and without this nothing thinks. — Aristotle, De Anima, 430a18, translated by DW Hamlyn
Since, then, they cannot share in the everlasting and divine by continuous existence, because no perishable thing can persist numerically one and the same, they share in them in so far as each can, some more and some less; and what persists is not the thing itself but something like itself, not one in number but one in species.
That is why, when the vehicle decays, memory and love cease; they were activities not of mind, but of the composite which has perished; mind is, no doubt, something more divine and impassable. — Paine
Thanks, the materials you provide are very informative. I wonder if in the above passage, 'mind' is the translation of 'nous'? — Wayfarer
And again, even if Aristotle is not discussing the immortality of the soul, it is easy to see how this would appear to be so for the medieval commentators, Islamic and Christian — Wayfarer
(I'm very interested in the medieval conception of the rational soul, which seems very much aligned with these types of ideas.) — Wayfarer
I read Aristotle as a challenge to the idea of the person that many of the medieval conceptions of the rational soul are based upon. — Paine
You seem to be putting the active principle outside of the combining of matter and form. — Paine
This proposed separation runs afoul of how actuality and potentiality is used by Aristotle. — Paine
What we wish to say is clear from the particular cases by induction, and we must not look for a definition of everything, but be able to comprehend the analogy, namely, that as what is building is in relation to what is capable of building, and what is awake is in relation to what is asleep, and what is seeing is in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight, and what has been shaped out of the matter is in relation to the matter, and what has been finished off is to the unfinished. Of the difference exemplified in this analogy let the activity be marked off by the first part, the potentiality by the second.
— ibid. Θ 6 1048a35–b6
If we could say exactly what this element is in each case, we would.
There are only potential powers when there are actual ones nearby.
All the instances where the analogy does a job involve situations where the potential is sometimes not activated. This condition does not apply to as quoted above: "Things that have no matter, though, are all unconditionally just what is a one."
This permits Aristotle to speak of an active principle that is immortal to directly activate what is not one:
In separation it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal. (But we do not remember because this is unaffected, whereas the passive intellect is perishable, and without this nothing thinks.
— Aristotle, De Anima, 430a18, translated by DW Hamlyn — Paine
So a material object is a combination of form and matter, and that form is proper and unique to the particular object, complete with accidents — Metaphysician Undercover
Even with my very limited knowledge of Aristotle, I’m sure this isn’t so. I think that a form by it’s nature is a universal, which is then individuated by ‘accidents’. If I’m mistaken, I’ll stand corrected. — Wayfarer
Even with my very limited knowledge of Aristotle, I’m sure this isn’t so. — Wayfarer
(https://www.greenlion.com/PDFs/Sachs_intro.pdf)Lassie is an ousia, and the ousia of Lassie is dog.
... being-what it-is does not have the same meaning as what-it-is-for-it-to-be. Lassie's being a dog is not the same thing as dog, and the latter is what she is.
The formal cause, what it is to be a man, is what each and every man is. This is by nature not by concept. — Fooloso4
On the Heavens, Book 1, part 2:
"These premises clearly give the conclusion that there is in nature some bodily substance other than the formations we know, prior to them all and more divine than they."
Your argument, based on perishable matter, fails to account for this divine substance. — Fooloso4
Book 2, part 1:
"That the heaven as a whole neither came into being nor admits of destruction, as some assert, but is one and eternal, with no end or beginning of its total duration, containing and embracing in itself the infinity of time, we may convince ourselves not only by the arguments already set forth but also by a consideration of the views of those who differ from us in providing for its generation." — Fooloso4
Actually, "Lassie" is not a dog. It's a name of a dog. :smile:Lassie's being a dog is not the same thing as dog, and the latter is what she is. — Fooloso4
Actually, "Lassie" is not a dog. It's a name of a dog. :smile: — Alkis Piskas
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