Replicability is a type, rather than a token, property. We can never replicate a token observation, only the same type of observation. — Dfpolis
Thus, the consciousness impasse is a representational, not an ontological, issue. — Dfpolis
Since humans are psychophysical organisms who perceive to know and conceptualize to act, physicality and intentionality are dynamically integrated. — Dfpolis
Ignoring this seamless unity, post-Cartesian thought conceives them separately – creating representational problems. The Hard Problem and the mind-body problem both arose in the post-Cartesian era, and precisely because of conceptual dualism. To resolve them, we need only drop the Fundamental Abstraction in studying mind. — Dfpolis
Matter and form are logically distinguishable, but physically inseparable, aspects of bodies – another one-to-many mapping from the physical to the intentional. — Dfpolis
For Aristotle, form and matter are not things, but the foundations for two modes of conceptualization. — Dfpolis
Thus, the concept <apple> is not a thing, but an activity, viz. the actualization of an apple representation’s intelligibility. — Dfpolis
The essence of representation is the potential to be understood. — Dfpolis
Dualism is incompatible with the identity of physically encoded information informing the intellect and the intellect being informed by physically encoded information. — Dfpolis
An agent intellect is necessary because we actually understand what is only represented in brain states. Since neural processing cannot effect awareness, an extra element is required, as Aristotle argued and Chalmers seconds. — Dfpolis
Abstraction is the selective actualization of intelligibility. — Dfpolis
Abstraction is the reductive actualization of intelligibility. — ucarr edit
‘For the sense-organ is in every case receptive of the sensible object without its matter’ — Aristotle
The Hard Problem of consciousness signals the need for a paradigm shift. — Dfpolis
Yes.Yet one could say that the mode of existence of x+1 changes, when x is determined. — Heiko
It depends on how we are thinking of it. If we are considering a few objects, it would be thinking the count of the objects. If we are considering a string of digits, it would be the count represented by that string, even though we cannot imagine exactly that many objects.What would be meant by thinking a number? — Heiko
Yes, that is mathematical Platonism. There is a related kind of extreme realism, which holds that measured values pre-exist measurement. This was promoted by Plato when he speculated that nature is made of numbers, geometric figures, and/or regular polyhedra. Opposed to all of these forms of extreme realism is Aristotle's view that numbers are abstractions based on our experience with counting and measuring operations.I don't know if that is Plato's view. From everything I read, the basic tenet of mathematical Platonism is that numbers are real independently of any mind. — Wayfarer
If we are considering a string of digits, it would be the count represented by that string, even though we cannot imagine exactly that many objects. — Dfpolis
It does not exist in virtue of being written. The string "10^1000" exists. It is not a number, but a symbol capable of eliciting a number concept, specifically, the concept <10^1000>. When no one is thinking <10^1000>, the number 10^1000 does not actually exist. Still, it is capable of being thought and so is a potential number.I'm confused. Does the number 10^1000 exist or not? It is written there, but you won't find or be able to think that many things. "Thinking the count" just shift the question one level higher. — Heiko
Mathematical Platonism requires a different, spiritual, mechanism that has not been observed or experienced — Dfpolis
Some philosophers, called rationalists, claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought. But, the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.
Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something [i.e. number] existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous.
Aristotelians agree with Platonists that the mathematical grasp of necessities is mysterious. What is necessary is true in all possible worlds, but how can perception see into other possible worlds? The scholastics, the Aristotelian Catholic philosophers of the Middle Ages, were so impressed with the mind’s grasp of necessary truths as to conclude that the intellect was immaterial and immortal. If today’s naturalists do not wish to agree with that, there is a challenge for them. ‘Don’t tell me, show me’: build an artificial intelligence system that imitates genuine mathematical insight. There seem to be no promising plans on the drawing board.
The argument about token replicability is intended to meet the objection that first person observations (aka introspection) is not properly scientific because it is private. I am saying that it does not matter if an observation is public or private. It is scientific if it is replicable -- if other observations of the same type produce the same results.The consciousness impasse, the root of The Hard Problem, is a conflation of type replicability with token replicability, the latter being an impossibility. — ucarr
I am not trying to equate conceptualizing with intending (in the sense of committing to) a course of action. I am saying that conceiving courses of action is a causal step in voluntary behavior.The above claim posits conceptualize and intend within an equation. — ucarr
The primary function of the agent intellect is to make what was merely intelligible actually understood. I think the brain does a lot of the processing of data -- holograpically encoding similar stimuli, activating associated contents and so on. Still, as I explained in the article, judgements require awareness of contents, and so involve the agent intellect. So, while association does not require the AI, judgement does.The agent intellect is the self who does introspection: pattern recognition in response to present intelligibility; logical manipulation of information: deduction; inference; interpolation; extrapolation; inferential expansion; information combinatorics, etc. — ucarr
The physical component of awareness is the neurophysiological encoding of the contents we are aware of. The intentional component is the agent intellect by which we become aware of those contents.Key Questions -- Aristotelian awareness contains a physical component: Does agent intellect = self? Does agent intellect as self possess form? Does awareness possess boundaries? — ucarr
That is why "matter" is a terrible translation of hyle. Hyle is defined as "that out of which." It is a potential for new form. So, it could be something extended like bronze or clay, but it can also be axioms that can be formed into theorems, the tendency for a seed to become a mature plant, or the potential of a tree to be a piece of furniture.Form and matter are two modes of organization, viz., matter = extension/extendability; form = context/configurability. — ucarr
Intelligibility is what allows objects to be known. It is an object's capacity to inform a mind. The activity here is thinking of apples. When we stop thinking about apples, the concept no longer exists, but the brain encodes the content of the <apple> concept in our memory. So we "know" it in the sense of being able to think <apple> again without sensing an apple.Herein activity = physical-intentional complex, viz., present intelligibility ⇔ sentience. — ucarr
Yes.Representation = present intelligibility. — ucarr
Exactly.here’s no self who comprehends the present intelligibility of the data. — ucarr
That depends on what you mean by "reductive." If you mean that we reduce the amount of information, we do. I said "selective" because I wanted to make the point that we "shape" our understanding of reality by actively choosing what to look at, and what to ignore.Abstraction is the reductive actualization of intelligibility. — ucarr edit
In a way and in a way not. We can never have exhaustive knowledge on a divine paradigm. We can and do identify with the aspect of the object that is informing us, because the object informing me is identically me being informed by the object. These are two ways of describing the same event -- a case of shared existence.An idea can never hold identity with a thing-in-itself. — ucarr
I am not sure what you mean by "reductive."Key question – Is abstraction, a subtractive process, necessarily a reductive process? — ucarr
Its prime function is knowing. It is because it does not know exhaustively that it produces abstactions. In mystical experience it knows something undefinable, and so not limited by a de-finition.Key question – Can agent intellect generate anything other than abstractions? — ucarr
The physical-conceptual complex of Aristotelian animism is a corrective reversionist paradigm. However, this reversionism is not retrograde because it meshes cleanly and closely with much of scientific understanding evolving henceforth from antiquity. — ucarr
I am suggesting that we add to, rather than replace, the contemporary view.this reversionism is not retrograde ... — ucarr
Basically you're asking, How is it that all humans are homo sapiens yet with such a diversity of appearance? — Wayfarer
That a man is skinny is not due to the formal cause. What it is to be a man is not to be skinny. If the skinny man becomes fat this is not due to the formal cause. He is the same man whether skinny or fat. — Fooloso4
I see you went silent regarding the eternity and material of the heavens. It would have been better to have admitted you were wrong, but better to be silent then attempt to argue your way out. If only you had used such good judgment with the rest of your tendentious arguments. I think it is time for me to once again join the ranks of those here who, for good reason, ignore you. — Fooloso4
"Being able" means that we have the potential to do so. Numbers are actual only while being thought, because they are abstractions and so instruments of thought. Your argument shows that they all have the potential to be thought, not that anyone is actually thinking them.We are able to do what you said for every number that can be written and we know that we can do it. How then are there numbers that do not exist? — Heiko
Numbers are actual only while being thought, because they are abstractions and so instruments of thought. — Dfpolis
I am sure that some make this claim. A claim is not an observation or an experience.Some philosophers, called rationalists, claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought. But, the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies. — Wayfarer
That is not how we know the relevant concepts. In kindergarten or 1st grade, you learned to count pennies, oranges, apples or whatever until you were able to abstract the act of counting or enumeration from what was being counted. So, you learned number concepts from experience. The same with operations such as addition, subtraction, etc. Geometry came from land measurement after the floods of the Nile. The Greeks developed harmonic analysis to work out astronomical epicycles. The idea of a limit came from medieval physicists trying to define instantaneous velocity; vector decomposition from medieval architects working out the forces on their buildings. At a higher level, the examples from which we abstract are number systems, vector spaces and so on that were earlier abstracted from physical systems.How do we know the proofs of mathematics? Through pure reason, I was always taught. — Wayfarer
What is a challenge to physicalism is the existence of conceptual knowledge, and the consciousness required to produce it. Abstraction cannot be a physical act, as many concepts can be founded on one physical representation.As the first passage says, it's challenge to physicalism. — Wayfarer
They have to be for the application of universals to reality to work. The answer is moderate realism, first hinted at by Peter Abelard. There are no actual universals in nature, but there is an objective basis for us forming them. All the instances of a universal idea must be able to elicit that idea. That capacity (intelligibility) is an objective property, but it is not an actual idea.I still believe that Aristotle insists on the reality of universals - that they're more than simply mental constructions of names. — Wayfarer
Possible worlds talk is a terrible basis for approaching modality. Modality needs to be based on actual experience, which is our only means of knowing.What is necessary is true in all possible worlds, but how can perception see into other possible worlds?
I think this is bad history. The arguments for immortality I know are not based on our grasp of necessity.The scholastics, the Aristotelian Catholic philosophers of the Middle Ages, were so impressed with the mind’s grasp of necessary truths as to conclude that the intellect was immaterial and immortal.
You know the difference between thinking of 7, as when you are thinking of the seven dwarfs or the seven days of the week, and not thinking of 7. That is what I mean by thinking of the number 7. Similarly, for all the other numbers.Numbers are actual only while being thought, because they are abstractions and so instruments of thought. — Dfpolis
Sorry, I still do no understand what you mean by thinking a number. We have explored a few different directions and approaches already. I am afraid I simply will not get it. I'll stay with a formal argument:
The set of non-existing numbers has to be empty per definition. They are a contradiction in themselves. — Heiko
You know the difference between thinking of 7, as when you are thinking of the seven dwarfs or the seven days of the week, and not thinking of 7. That is what I mean by thinking of the number 7. Similarly, for all the other numbers. — Dfpolis
The existence of a number does not depend on our being able to imagine the corresponding number of objects. It depends on actively thinking the concept and knowing what the concept intends -- knowing how to recognize an instance were we to encounter one. "How" is by counting to 10^1000. Knowing this does not require actually counting to 10^1000. — Dfpolis
I read the whole section and did not find it. — Metaphysician Undercover
These premises clearly give the conclusion that there is in nature some bodily substance other than the formations we know, prior to them all and more divine than they. (269a 30)
On all these grounds, therefore, we may infer with confidence that there is something beyond the bodies that are about us on this earth, different and separate from them; and that the superior glory of its nature is proportionate to its distance from this world of ours. (269b 14)
Yes, but it is not the number that you can think of that is actual. It is the number you do think of.Mind you, when you have 7 things, you have 6,5,... as well. — Heiko
Consult a good dictionary. "Designating" is appointing, not judging. — Dfpolis
These properties are intrinsic to the organism, not willed by us in an act of designation. — Dfpolis
I see you finally understood the texts I posted from the article I am working on. Matter (stuff) is the principle of individuation of form, and form is the principle of individuation of matter. — Dfpolis
Do you have any text(s) to support this claim? You might mean that he is rejecting Plato's chora, but that is not "prime matter" in the sense used by the Scholastics. — Dfpolis
This is equivocating on "matter." Proximate matter, "this flesh and bones," which is actualized by psyche, is not pure potency. — Dfpolis
These are direct quotes from the text, not my interpretation.
These premises clearly give the conclusion that there is in nature some bodily substance other than the formations we know, prior to them all and more divine than they. (269a 30)
And the concluding sentence of Book 1, part 2:
On all these grounds, therefore, we may infer with confidence that there is something beyond the bodies that are about us on this earth, different and separate from them; and that the superior glory of its nature is proportionate to its distance from this world of ours. (268b 14) — Fooloso4
If no one is thinking them, they remain possible thoughts, but not actual thoughts -- and if they are number concepts, they are possible numbers, but not actual numbers. — Dfpolis
This is not how evolution works. We can say that advantageous properties have a tendency to reproduce and hence become more common, but this does not mean that all surviving properties are advantageous.There is no adaptive advantage ...
Which does not allow for any conclusion whatsoever. The whole consciousness-thingy could be an accident and not a supreme telos. In fact, if conscious thought was a necessary side-result of "biological computational" activity leading to some behaviour the empiric observation would exactly be what it is.... in being aware of a physically determined role, because such awareness is impotent.
None are forms of judgement. They are all acts of will, not intellect. To judge is to see the truth of some connection, not to make an arbitrary decision.We could use "designate", "stipulate", "appoint", or whatever similar word, they're all very similar and also all forms of judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, things do not place themselves in species, nor was that my claim. I said that species are defined by objective commonalities. We decide which commonalities define a category, but, having decided that, whether a new object is an instance of the category is an objective question, with a right and wrong answer.The fact of the matter is, that we appoint things to the category which is their species, they do not just naturally place themselves into these categories, they are appointed to the appropriate categories — Metaphysician Undercover
This is a confused, as it is on the basis of intrinsic properties that an organism fits or does not fit into one of the categories we have defined. If it has 6 legs and a segmented body, it is an insect. If it has scaled wings, it belongs to the order lepidoptera, etc.hese properties are intrinsic to the organism, not willed by us in an act of designation. — Dfpolis
No, I think that this is false. The essential properties of the species are intrinsic to the concept, but all internal properties, are intrinsic to the organism. — Metaphysician Undercover
Nothing can have contradicting properties. Either it has a property, or if does not.And that is also why members of the same species often have contradicting intrinsic properties. — Metaphysician Undercover
We agree. The accidental notes of comprehension are abstracted away in forming our species concept.What is intrinsic to the organism is not necessarily essential to the concept. Those are the accidents. — Metaphysician Undercover
If we have two things with the identical form, they are two (different) in virture of being made out of different instances of stuff. If we take a batch of plastic and make different kinds of things with it, they are not different because they are plastic, but because they have different forms.I'm afraid I do not understand you, because this makes no sense to me. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, the mind distinguishes objects. The question is what aspect of the object does the mind latch on to in telling two objects with the same form, or with the same kind of matter, appart? The distinction is not purely arbitrary, but has an objective basis.I believe it is the human mind which distinguishes one form from another (individuates), so I would need some further explanation to understand what you are proposing. — Metaphysician Undercover
I agree that the notion of prima materia is not well-founded, but potentials not being primary or actual does not mean they are not real. There is a present basis for furture form.By Ch-8-9 he explains why actuality is necessarily prior to potentiality, thus excluding the possibility that prime matter is something real. — Metaphysician Undercover
Of course. It has to be. If that is all you are saying, I think we have been misunderstanding each other.The actuality which is prior to matter must be immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover
A bodily substance is not immaterial.These premises clearly give the conclusion that there is in nature some bodily substance other than the formations we know, prior to them all and more divine than they. (269a 30) — Fooloso4
This is very consistent with what I've been telling you. — Metaphysician Undercover
These premises clearly give the conclusion that there is in nature some bodily substance other than the formations we know, prior to them all and more divine than they. (269a 30)
— Fooloso4
A bodily substance is not immaterial. — Dfpolis
Don't you find abandoning logic irrational? There is no need to ditch excluded middle if we recognize that numbers are concepts and their "existence" is normally potential rather than actual. Still, just as a builder is a builder when he is not actually (but only potentially) building, so a number can "be" a number when it is not actually being thought. Still, there is a difference in mode between potency and act.What I understand of the philosophy of mathematics is, that as the idea of a non-existing number is self-contradictory, we have to ditch the law-of-excluded-middle (tertium non datur), to avoid having to conclude that all numbers exist. — Heiko
Logical scrutiny is of no avail if you have already abandoned logic.they surely follow their ideas with logical scrutiny. — Heiko
To say that older work adheres to the laws of logic is hardly a criticism. Increased comprehension counts in a theory's favor. It is much better to preserve logic while explaining mathematics than to abandon logic while trying to explain it. I already showed that the idea that mathematics is the work of pure reason is historical nonsense. You are pointing out that it also involves logical nonsense.Maybe they give insights into "more initial", "more naive" concepts but the handiwork is not up to par with modern standards. — Heiko
Quite true. Still, it shows that the surviving property is not explained by the evolutionary process, which was the claim I was arguing against. On the other hand, if consciousness is causally potent, then conscious organisms could have a reproductive advantage and be selected by evolution.There is no adaptive advantage ...
This is not how evolution works. We can say that advantageous properties have a tendency to reproduce and hence become more common, but this does not mean that all surviving properties are advantageous. — Heiko
On the contrary, it shows exactly what I said above: that consciousness, whatever its origin, cannot be selected unless it can do something that allows it to be selected.... in being aware of a physically determined role, because such awareness is impotent.
Which does not allow for any conclusion whatsoever. — Heiko
You are attacking a straw man. I did not argue that it was "a supreme telos," or speculate in any way as to the origin of consciousness. I merely accepted consciousness as a contingent fact of nature.The whole consciousness-thingy could be an accident and not a supreme telos. — Heiko
Sadly, we know that it is not "a necessary side-result of 'biological computational.'" If it were, we would necessarily be conscious of all biological computation, and, as I showed in my article, we are not.In fact, if conscious thought was a necessary side-result of "biological computational" activity leading to some behaviour the empiric observation would exactly be what it is. — Heiko
Don't you find abandoning logic irrational? There is no need to ditch excluded middle if we recognize that numbers are concepts and their "existence" is normally potential rather than actual. — Dfpolis
We are left to conclude that actual numbers result from counting and measuring operations. — Dfpolis
Right here. What get's realized? Where are those potentials? Are they really there / do they exist? Are you sure about them?Further, as a rule, when an agent actualizes a potential, — Dfpolis
... in being aware of a physically determined role, because such awareness is impotent.
Which does not allow for any conclusion whatsoever.
— Heiko
On the contrary, it shows exactly what I said above: that consciousness, whatever its origin, cannot be selected unless it can do something that allows it to be selected. — Dfpolis
If you want to argue that it "could be an accident," you need to define "accident" and explain how an intentional effect can instantiate that definition when physics (the presumed source of the "accident") has no intentional effects. — Dfpolis
I don't see the necessity. My computer and the software it is running has no reflection on all the transistors that change state, yet those generate output on the screen which is the effect of those state-changes.Sadly, we know that it is not "a necessary side-result of 'biological computational.'" If it were, we would necessarily be conscious of all biological computation, and, as I showed in my article, we are not. — Dfpolis
These premises clearly give the conclusion that there is in nature some bodily substance other than the formations we know, prior to them all and more divine than they. (269a 30)
— Fooloso4
A bodily substance is not immaterial. — Dfpolis
Sure, easily. A set of 7 sheep has the potential to yield a 7 count, and so actualize the concept <7> in a person counting them. Still, the set of sheep having cardinality 7 is not the counting person having the concept <7>. So, the number can be potential (having a basis in the set of sheep), but not actual if no one thinking the count.Try to tell me what it _is_(contradiction number one) that is "potentially available" (we can predicate those potentialities that cannot exist as they would then be actual countable things) but not "actually there". What are you even talking about? — Heiko
There is a difference between being countABLE (your "readily 'at-hand'"), and actually counted, eliciting an actual number concept in the person counting. Do you deny the difference?In your view the potentials are readily "at-hand" when needed to become numbers but - for some not understandable reason - not the numbers themselves. — Heiko
No, what has changed over time is the meaning of "logic." Classically, logic was the science of correct (salva veritate) thinking. Modern logic is not concerned with thought, but with symbolic manipulation. Its concept of truth is an arbitrary value, not adequacy to reality.Logical calculus has made serious progress over time. We can choose axioms as needed. — Heiko
Which is where you should stop - here the speculation over "potential existing numbers" is completely absent. — Heiko
No, the countability and measureability (potencies) of the natural world were the basis of this conclusion -- reread what preceded this.We are left to conclude that actual numbers result from counting and measuring operations. — Dfpolis
Which is where you should stop - here the speculation over "potential existing numbers" is completely absent. — Heiko
Once more: The countability and measureability of nature. Are you denying that discrete objects can be counted? Or continuous quantities measured? I am not sure what you are objecting to.What get's realized? Where are those potentials? Are they really there? Are you sure about them? Contradiction! Fubar!! — Heiko
Again, I am discussing the claim that consciousness evolved. If you do not think it evolved, you can skip my response to that claim. I am content to say that it is present, but did not evolve.But why would it _need_ to be selected to be present? — Heiko
Of course, but that does not provide a naturalistic explanation. It just says we have no explanation, and I agree: there is no naturalistic explanation, so consciousness is ontologically emergent.Say evolution wants fire for the warmth but not the smoke but yet has to live with it. Things can be perceived in different ways because they have different effects. — Heiko
"Necessary" was your term:I don't see the necessity. — Heiko
if conscious thought was a necessary side-result of "biological computational" activity leading to some behaviour the empiric observation would exactly be what it is. — Heiko
Yes. The difference is that we can completely explain everything we know about computers without assuming they are conscious, but we cannot do so for humans.My computer and the software it is running has no reflection on all the transistors that change state, yet those generate output on the screen which is the effect of those state-changes. — Heiko
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