See for example . Or consider a Koch snowflake, in which an infinite line is confined within a finite area. Is that a limit on infinity? I don't think so; it's more that there are other ways to set such things out than talk of limits, ways that lead to more interesting paths. Saying that something is finite is fine provided we know what we are counting.

The issue then becomes what "limit" might mean, in regard to space-time. And it's not going to be the same now as it was for Kant.
This by way of showing that there is nothing in the antinomies themselves. — Banno

I suppose the "antinomies" are merely polar opposite positions that we could take in philosophical arguments. As you implied, Kant was not concerned with the antinomies per se, but with the conflict that arises from such black-vs-white opinions. That's also why Aristotle advised us to aim at the Golden Mean, instead of "either of two abstract things that are as different from each other as possible".

I'm just guessing that what Kant meant by "limitation" on space-time was implicit in his use of "Transcendence" to describe our philosophical speculations beyond the boundaries of space-time into infinity-eternity --- both of which are merely abstract ideas. And that's the topic of this thread : Is it acceptable for philosophers & cosmologists to make conjectures about anything not directly perceptible by the physical senses? If not, then they are wasting everybody's time with literal non-sense : "passing wind". In that case, this whole forum could be characterized as nothing but a collective fart.

Whereas Locke & Hume proposed a "blank slate" model of the human mind, Kant argued that "the blank slate model of the mind is insufficient to explain the beliefs about objects that we have; some components of our beliefs must be brought by the mind to experience"*1. Empiricism implies "garbage-in, garbage-out" (GIGO), with nothing contributed by the information processor. Yet, Steven Pinker studied the tabula rasa question, and concluded that the human brain is born with innate categories, into which sensory inputs are sorted.

Pinker is an advocate of the Computational Theory of Mind*2. The result of that computing & processing is not GIGO, but novel ideas that add a personal perspective (qualia ; beliefs) to the objective facts. To filter out the garbage requires Judgement & Wisdom. Which is the whole point of Philosophy, is it not? Empiricism collects raw facts, while Rationalism selects & cooks those facts*3, sometimes combining antinomies of sweet & sour. :smile:



*1. Empiricism vs Transcendence :
Since the human mind is strictly limited to the senses for its input, Berkeley argued, it has no independent means by which to verify the accuracy of the match between sensations and the properties that objects possess in themselves. . . . Hence, while Kant is sympathetic with many parts of empiricism, ultimately it cannot be a satisfactory account of our experience of the world.
___Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
https://iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/

*2. Computation of Mind :
In philosophy of mind, the computational theory of mind (CTM), also known as computationalism, is a family of views that hold that the human mind is an information processing system and that cognition and consciousness together are a form of computation. . . . The computational theory of mind asserts that not only cognition, but also phenomenal consciousness or qualia, are computational
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind


*3. The main difference between Rationalism And Empiricism is that rationalism is the knowledge that is derived from reason and logic while on the other hand empiricism is the knowledge that is derived from experience and experimentation. Rationalism is about intuition while empiricism is about visual concepts.
https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/rationalism-vs-empiricism/

It's not merely a grammatical matter... — Janus
Underestimating grammar's capacity to mislead is the source of metaphysics, don't you think? — Banno

Perhaps. But overestimating the proper scope of Physics might also have bad consequences. Blocking access to metaphysical ideas would turn Philosophy into Empirical Physics --- and by what authority?. Would Physical Philosophy be a desirable alternative to the current unverifiable & unregulated metaphysical speculations of Philosophers & Cosmologists?

Grammar is merely the structure of language, while Semantics is the content. So you could equate Grammar with Empirical Physics, and Semantics with Theoretical Metaphysics. Universal Grammar is a constraint on language, while the meaning of our words is malleable and subject to personal interpretation in variable applications. But somehow we manage to communicate, despite the cacophany.

Should we take away the freedom of poets to interpret the world? Should we legislate against Metaphysics, as the Marxists attempted to do? Or should we continue to openly debate Transcendent ideas, in the free market of ideas, as philosophers have always done? Let's not over or under-estimate, but aim for the Golden Mean. :smile:


Grammar refers to the structure of language: how words are used in speech and how groups of words are put together in patterns. Semantics refers to the literal meaning of the words we use. Both concepts are connected to the use of language, but are different aspects of language function.

Universal Grammar is usually defined as the “system of categories, mechanisms and constraints shared by all human languages and considered to be innate”

"Language allows us to transcend time and space by talking about abstractions, to accumulate shared knowledge, and with writing to store it outside of individual minds"
"The Origins of Us: Evolutionary Emergence and the Omega Point Cosmology (The Science and Philosophy of Information Book 1)" by Alex M. Vikoulov

Thanks.

Wittgenstein taught philosophers a somewhat different way of using the word "grammar", roughly as a single term for both semantic and grammatical rules, but also including some other less obvious aspects. It's the term he used for the rules of how language is used.

Given that his approach was to replace looking at the meaning of words with looking at their use, "grammar" has some significance.

It's this, somewhat specialised use that I was using, and given things said elsewhere I think @Janus understood this.

So the point being made is the capacity of the way we use language in one situation to mislead us in another. Janus points to reification as an example, while I was pointing out that, the mere fact that we can negate any proposition tells us nothing about how things are.

And that's pretty much my response to your thoughts - the mere fact that we can set out a proposition and it's negation – be it about the cat being on the mat or the universe having a beginning – is uninformative.

So what makes them informative? Well, when they have a use. So this view is more sympathetic to Hossenfelder, that if a theory can't be checked against the world, can't be made use of, then it amounts to little.

As for Kant, there's been some developments in philosophy over the last two hundred years. You wouldn't think so looking around here, but that's part of the oddity of these fora.

I'm not seeing the relevance to the question as to whether the cosmos is infinitely large or finite in extent.

Janus points to reification as an example, while I was pointing out that, the mere fact that we can negate any proposition tells us nothing about how things are. — Banno

None of our imaginative speculations tell us how things are. It is even questionable that scientific theories or mathematical discoveries do. The fact that our thinking is dualistic tells us something about how we think, about its limitations, is all. Do you think the Koch snowflake tells us anything about the nature of the cosmos?

I'm not seeing the relevance to the question as to whether the cosmos is infinitely large or finite in extent. — Janus

The significance is no more than recognising that the question remains unanswered, indeed, unanswerable.

Introducing things-in-themselves and transcendence remains unhelpful.

The significance is no more than recognising that the question remains unanswered, indeed, unanswerable. — Banno

Which is exactly the point of Kant's antinomies as I understand it; to indicate the aporias that inevitably attend upon dualistic thinking. Kant referred to the "transcendental illusion". His project was aimed to draw a distinction between the transcendental, that which is beyond human experience and judgement, and the transcendent; that which is (unjustifiably) posited to, not be merely imagined or imaginable, but to actually exist.

Kant introduced the idea of things in themselves only to denote the hidden nature of empirical things, their super-sensory attributes we can know nothing about. That doesn't help us to know anything about the ultimate nature of things (obviously) but it shows the limitation of human experience, judgement and thought.

It seems obvious that you find all this unhelpful, but that fact indicates more about you than it does about the value of Kant's philosophy.

Nice of you to make the discussion about me, again.

We've done this before. Kant invents a thing about which we can say nothing, as if it were an explanation.

I'll stick to the stuff about which we can say things.

I think that's roughly Hossenfelder's approach, and in line with Wittgenstein.

So I don't seem to be alone.

To proceed, can we find a novel way to approach these issues?

It's not just about you; we all have our presuppositions, preferences and prejudices.

As I see it Kant doesn't offer the thing-in-itself as an explanation of anything, other than to point out that if something appears it seems to follows that there must be something which appears. and we seem to have no reason to believe that that which appears is the exactly the same as its appearance, or even anything at all like it.

Some people have found this helpful, and that says something about them, but if you do not, that's fine and it also says something about you.

I can't think of any novel way to approach these ideas. Maybe try Hilary Lawson's Closure, or Zizek, but I don't expect you will find them useful. I look forward to being pleasantly surprised.

So what makes them informative? Well, when they have a use. So this view is mote sympathetic to Hossenfelder, that if a theory can't be checked against the world, can't be made use of, then it amounts to little. — Banno

Hossenfelder is/was an empirical scientist, and she insists that "Physicists must stop doing metaphysics"*1. Ironically, the same warning could apply to this forum : Philosophers should stop pretending to do Physics. Science is the search for practical knowledge that has a pragmatic "use" in the real world (e.g. food & clothing). But philosophy, by definition, is a search for abstract "wisdom" (e.g. to mature our minds). So, the "use" (purpose) of Wisdom is Discernment or Judgment : "ability to reach intelligent conclusions".

Both approaches (exploring outer & inner worlds) can be "informative" and useful, but Science is supposed to use its information to navigate the Real world of Nature, and Philosophy uses its wisdom to negotiate the Ideal world of human Culture. Is natural information (facts) more "informative" than inter-personal information (beliefs & values)? Is putting a man on Mars a practical "use" of Science? Is the Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence (SETI) a pragmatic "use" of scientific knowledge, or is it feckless Philosophy? Is Cosmology "informative" or merely a vain attempt to see the world from a divine perspective? :wink:

*1. "Don't confuse science with philosophy".
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mCZh4VE0k-0

As for Kant, there's been some developments in philosophy over the last two hundred years. You wouldn't think so looking around here, but that's part of the oddity of these fora. — Banno

Yes, but this thread applies Kant's 400 year old antinomies to 21st century Cosmology : Philosophical Science and/or Metaphysical Physics? And the jam-fingered people quantum-tunneling through the imaginary wall between pragmatic physics & idealistic metaphysics are the professional physicists that Hossenfelder shakes her mommy-finger at*1.

Hence, the topic of this thread*2. Should we try to prohibit (legislate) Theoretical Scientists from practicing Theoretical Philosophy, or vice-versa*3? Is it even possible to completely separate Natural Philosophy from General Philosophy : separation of powers ; non-overlapping magisteria? 2500 years ago Aristotle divided his encyclopedia of Nature into observational (physics) and theoretical (metaphysics) volumes. And we are still trying pretend that human knowledge must be either utilitarian or irrational, with no middle ground? :nerd:


*2. Transcendental Cosmology :
What are your thoughts on existential Transcendence? Is it irrational to imagine the unknowable "What-If" beyond the partly known "What-Is"? Should we "fall-down & prostrate"? or just "shut-up & calculate"? Or is it reasonable for speculative Philosophers & holistic Cosmologists daring to venture into the "Great Beyond" where pragmatic Scientists "fear to tread"? ___original post

*3. Einstein's Quest to 'Know God's Thoughts'
"In 1925, Einstein went on a walk with a young student named Esther Salaman. As they wandered, he shared his core guiding intellectual principle: "I want to know how God created this world. I'm not interested in this or that phenomenon, in the spectrum of this or that element. I want to know His thoughts; the rest are just details."
The phrase "God's thoughts" is a delightfully apt metaphor for the ultimate goal of modern physics,"
https://www.livescience.com/65628-theory-of-everything-millennia-away.html

As I see it Kant doesn't offer the thing-in-itself as an explanation of anything, other than to point out that if something appears it seems to follows that there must be something which appears. and we seem to have no reason to believe that that which appears is the exactly the same as its appearance, or even anything at all like it. — Janus

...and no reason to think that it might be other than it appears. Kant is just using language badly.

I don't mind Zizek.

As I see it Kant doesn't offer the thing-in-itself as an explanation of anything, other than to point out that if something appears it seems to follows that there must be something which appears. and we seem to have no reason to believe that that which appears is the exactly the same as its appearance, or even anything at all like it. — Janus

...and no reason to think that it might be other than it appears. Kant is just using language badly. — Banno

Hoffman sheds new light on the old ding an sich question : evolution, via conditional survival, has taught us to treat "appearances" as-if they are the real thing. If you follow his evidence and reasoning, it should make sense. But, if you judge it by common sense, it may sound like non-sense. :smile:

The Evolutionary Argument Against Reality :
The cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman uses evolutionary game theory to show that our perceptions of an independent reality must be illusions.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-evolutionary-argument-against-reality-20160421/

...and no reason to think that it might be other than it appears. Kant is just using language badly.

I don't mind Zizek. — Banno

Right, we have no reason to think that it is or is not how it appears, or even that it might be one or the other. Precisely Kant's point; and nothing to do with bad language use.

Zizek is an avowed Kantian (and Hegelian). It's very warm and fuzzy that you don't mind him, but I would be surprised if you agreed with him about Kant (or Hegel).

Hoffman — Gnomon

Yeah. I'm reading that. Not so impressed.

There's a trend for engineers and physicist to move in to philosophy. What I've noticed is that they at first suppose that they have the answer to an age-old philosophical issue; they present this to the community, and are taken aback that it is not just accepted. Often, what happens is that they have only a superficial grasp of the issue, and so are not seeing the full breadth of the issue.

I'll have more to say when I finish Hoffman.

Back to . I don't think that it is helpful for either to put limitations on their domains. The intersection of cosmology and epistemology is quite interesting. But there is a tendency for physicist to underplay the conceptual problems involved.

Take a look at Philosophical Plumbing. If Midgley were around, she would eviscerate Hoffman.

Right, we have no reason to think that it is or is not how it appears, or even that it might be one or the other. Precisely Kant's point; and nothing to do with bad language use. — Janus

Yeah, but we can move (have moved...) on. That very differentiation of how things appear as against how they are can be seen as a misapprehension of how language works. That's the lesson of Wittgenstein, Austin, and so on.

Zizek is an avowed Kantian (and Hegelian) — Janus

Of course. He makes use of Hegel, and is quite amusing (snuffle, pull t-shirt, whip nose on forefinger.) That's so much more interesting than talking about Hegel.

SO are you about to commend Evald Ilyenkov’s Cosmology: The Point Of Madness Of Dialectical Materialism to ? That might be fun. I really can't imagine what he would do with it.

I'll have more to say when I finish Hoffman. — Banno

I'm looking forward to this.

when and if...

Seems to me that Hoffman's recent work might be an edifice built on top of Searle's 'the bad argument.'

Yeah, But I don't see his argument against reality. Certainly in the stuff I've read, he is assuming reality, but saying that the really, really real is the wave functions or some such shit. As if a wave function were more real than a tree. It's the scientistic presumption that their description is the correct one.

...and I saw what you did there. Not saying any more.

Yeah, but we can move (have moved...) on. That very differentiation of how things appear as against how they are can be seen as a misapprehension of how language works. That's the lesson of Wittgenstein, Austin, and so on. — Banno

You may think that you have moved on (not sure who you think the "we" are), but many would disagree with you; some may say we have moved backwards rather than "on" (forwards).

Seeing that differentiation "as a misapprehension of how language works" seems implausible and simplistic to me. I doubt Wittgenstein would agree with your interpretation of him.

I'm not familiar with Evald Ilyenkov’s Cosmology: The Point Of Madness Of Dialectical Materialism, so I don't think I'll be recommending it.

Of course. He makes use of Hegel, and is quite amusing (snuffle, pull t-shirt, whip nose on forefinger.) That's so much more interesting than talking about Hegel. — Banno

Ah, so you see him as using Hegel as a prop for stand-up comedy or some such? I agree he is a very amusing talker, but if you want to know what he thinks about Kant and Hegel you need to read his books.

not sure who you think the "we" are — Janus

I suspect that precious few academic philosophers nowadays would count themselves Kantian. If you want a more sophisticated counterargument, you might first produce a more sophisticated argument. That is, it's not clear what is being posited here, by the OP or by your good self.

...you see him as using Hegel as a prop for stand-up comedy or some such? — Janus

Ha! Yes, that's the way.

I have read a couple of his books.

I suspect that precious few academic philosophers nowadays would count themselves Kantian. If you want a more sophisticated counterargument, you might first produce a more sophisticated argument. That is, it's not clear what is being posited here, by the OP or by your good self. — Banno

I don't have a lot of time for academic philosophers; too much peer pressure at work. I doubt that many "sophisticated" philosophers (outside the 'analytic' tradition at least) do not recognize the enormous influence of Kant on modern philosophy.

In any case, these kinds of things can be looked at from so many angles, that it comes down to personal preferences: there is no fact of the matter as to whether Kantian style thinking is useful or not.

I have read a couple of his books. — Banno

It'd be interesting to know which ones you've read.

Yawn.

Brilliant rebuttal as usual! :roll:

Well, you see, there was nothing to rebut...

I just don't need to go fishing with you. If you have a case, something we haven't been over in our myriad previous conversations, let's see it. Otherwise, I see no point in continuing.

You're full of shit, Banno. Sometimes I think you are just a troll.

What do you want? Another bout of pointless disagreement? Let me know what the issue is we are supposedly discussing.

Or are you just here for the abuse?

Go back to the beginning. you said

every idea contains the seeds of its own negation, — Janus

I pointed out that this is no more than saying that we can put a negation in front of any proposition. It's grammar masquerading as profundity.

You insist that there is more, but what? Your

Kant's antinomies are based on metaphysical speculations. It's not merely a grammatical matter; the grammar reflects what is imaginable. Any speculative idea may be true or false, or at least so we might think. Scientific theories themselves are never proven; they can, and often do, turn out to be wrong. — Janus

is utterly hollow. You keep saying nothing of consequence, as if it were relevant.

Cheers. I'm done.

it — Janus

it — Janus

it — Janus

'It' has sure done a lot of 'appearing' to you for something which is other than it appears.

Hoffman
— Gnomon
Yeah. I'm reading that. Not so impressed. — Banno

Digression, but the question I have for Hoffman is, if everything you think is a result of evolutionary adaptation, doesn't that include his theory of evolutionary adaptation?