Where do thoughts come from? Are they eternal? Does the Mindscape really exist?

Art48

I first encountered the idea of the mindscape in Infinity and the Mind: The Science and Philosophy of the Infinity by Rudy Rucker. From page 36: “Just as a rock is already in the Universe, whether or not someone is handling it, an idea is already in the Mindscape, whether or not someone is thinking it. A person who does mathematical research, writes stories, or meditates is an explorer of the Mindscape in much the same way that Armstrong, Livingstone, or Cousteau are explorers of the physical features of our Universe. The rocks on the Moon were there before the lunar module landed; and all the possible thoughts are already out there in the Mindscape.” [Bold added.]

Does the mindscape really exist? Let’s suppose it does not and derive some consequences.

If all possible thoughts don’t already exist in the mindscape, then where do thoughts come from? How do thoughts and ideas come into existence? It seems the only possible answer is that a thought or idea doesn’t exist until someone thinks it. The play Macbeth didn’t exist until Shakespeare wrote it, i.e., created it.

Question: once created, are ideas and thoughts eternal? Can an idea cease to exist? Can an idea “die”?

For instance, if the Earth and everyone on it disappeared tomorrow, if all memory of the play Macbeth vanished, would the play still exist in some form or another? Yes or no? Before answering, consider that the basic question is about all ideas and thoughts. If the Big Bang had never occurred, would the thought “two plus two equals four” exist? Yes or no?

It seems that the answer to the two questions must be the same. Otherwise, we’d have the conclusion that some thoughts and ideas are eternal and others are not. I see no way to support that conclusion.

But if thoughts and ideas exist eternally into the future, it seems natural to accept that they exist eternally from the past, which is more or less the idea of the mindscape: all thoughts already exist from all eternity in the mindscape. Otherwise, we have the situation where a mortal man, Shakespeare, creates an idea which will then exists eternally—I can’t prove that isn’t true but I find it difficult to believe that thoughts and ideas are “half-eternal,”, i.e., that they don’t exist until someone creates them but they then exist for all eternity.

Another problem with saying the thinker creates the thought is as follows. Consider “Grog,” the first caveman on Earth who realized that two plus two equals four. Is Grog’s idea now eternal? Suppose some being somewhere in the universe realized millions of years ago that two plus two equals four. So, Grog didn’t really create the idea. Actually, the idea two plus two equals four was created on some distant planet in another galaxy, millions of years in the past. So, some alien creature—perhaps a green slime creature with two heads—created the idea two plus two equals four? That seems difficult to accept.

So, has the thought “two plus two equals four” always existed in the mindscape, or did some unknown alien create it millions of years ago. Given the choice, the mindscape seems the more reasonable conclusion.

But the mindscape does have some unintuitive implications. For instance, Shakespeare didn’t create the play Macbeth. Rather, he discovered it in the mindscape where it had been from all eternity. And Albert Einstein didn’t invent the Theory of Relativity. Rather, he found it lying in the mindscape where it, too, had been from all eternity.

And this post has been lying in the mindscape for all eternity, just waiting for someone to read it.

Hm.

schopenhauer1

But the mindscape does have some unintuitive implications. For instance, Shakespeare didn’t create the play Macbeth. Rather, he discovered it in the mindscape where it had been from all eternity. And Albert Einstein didn’t invent the Theory of Relativity. Rather, he found it lying in the mindscape where it, too, had been from all eternity.

And this post has been lying in the mindscape for all eternity, just waiting for someone to read it. — Art48

Put down the ganja and walk away slowly. Breath heavily and take lots of water. Lay down. The world will stop spinning soon. Dry mouth will continue for several hours.

schopenhauer1

↪Art48

But seriously, fun post. However, several things:
Is direct sensory experience in the mindscape or just abstracted thoughts? In other words is me experiencing stepping in shit part of the mindscape too? And if it is, is it the abstracted aspect or the sensory aspect? What makes something mindscape worthy and others passing detritus?

Plato and Schopenhauer I feel, have this problem in defining what counts as a Form…

Art48

I'd say the sense data is not in the mindscape, but the idea of shit is. The idea coordinates and makes sense of the visual sensation of brown, the tactile squishy sensation, etc. (This is a philosophy of shit as opposed to a shit philosophy. :) )

T Clark

↪Art48

I have a couple of questions about the mindscape hypothesis.

First, is there any way to test this empirically? Another way to say that is to ask if there are any consequences if the hypothesis is correct? If the answer is "no," as I suspect, then this is a metaphysical question and not a matter of fact.

Second, if this is a metaphysical question, does it give us useful guidance into how to study and make sense of the world. Again, I think the answer is probably "no."

[Edit] In a later post I changed my mind on this last sentence. I think there the mindscape metaphysical position my be useful in some situations.

Art48

Is the mindscape hypothesis metaphysical? I think so. That's why I posted in the Metaphysics & Epistemology section. Can metaphysical questions, in particular, the mindscape hypothesis, give us useful guidance into how to study and make sense of the world? I'd have to think about that. Maybe someone else has some thoughts, too.

T Clark

Can metaphysical questions, in particular, the mindscape hypothesis, give us useful guidance into how to study and make sense of the world? — Art48

My answer to that is "yes." For me, the value in metaphysics is that it provides a framework, a foundation, on which to build our factual structures. As an example, a materialist, physicalist metaphysics could provide a good basis for science. Another - an idealist metaphysics may be a good approach for mathematics. The mindscape is an idealist approach. I've heard of sculptors who think what they carve from a block of stone is already in there, they just have to find it. It's a poetic way of seeing things. A recognition that many of our ideas seem to come from nowhere.

Art48

The mindscape is an idealist approach. — T Clark

Agree. The concept of mindscape suggests universal mind, an idealist concept.

180 Proof

Does the mindscape really exist? — Art48

"Really exist'? :chin:

As far as I can discern it (i'm a fan of Rudy Rucker, btw),"the mindscape" is only an idea – like Max Tegmark's 'mathematical universe hypothesis' or George Ellis' 'possibility spaces' – a provocative (platonic) supposition.

Can metaphysical questions, in particular, the mindscape hypothesis, give us useful guidance into how to study and make sense of the world? — Art48

I think (post-Kantian) "metaphysical questions" (mostly) make explicit the limits of reason for "making sense of the world".

Richard B

For instance, if the Earth and everyone on it disappeared tomorrow, if all memory of the play Macbeth vanished, would the play still exist in some form or another? Yes or no? Before answering, consider that the basic question is about all ideas and thoughts. If the Big Bang had never occurred, would the thought “two plus two equals four” exist? Yes or no? — Art48

Does this make any sense? Another way to look at it, if all ideas and thoughts did not exists in the "Mindscape"; would humans be able to think about these ideas at all? If one says, "yes" this is exactly the implication, humans would not be able to think these ideas at all. Can anyone coherently explain how this is so? It reminds me that this problem is similar as the one brought up by Elisabeth of the Palatinate to Descartes with regards to the "Mind-Body" interaction.

Richard B

A person who does mathematical research, writes stories, or meditates is an explorer of the Mindscape in much the same way that Armstrong, Livingstone, or Cousteau are explorers of the physical features of our Universe. The rocks on the Moon were there before the lunar module landed; and all the possible thoughts are already out there in the Mindscape.” — Art48

We first learn of ideas and how to think not by introspection, but by our fellow human beings, learning a rich intellectual tradition handed down from generation to generation. This picture of "Mindscape" would make you think we could isolate ourselves from others, and tap into the "Mindscape" to learn our ideas, and that there is no need to interact with another human being. It starts first by learning of ideas from other humans, not by private introspection into alternate realities. Do we introspect? Of course, with ideas that are learned in a public world taught by our fellow humans.

The contribution from your fellow human beings and the world around us is a better explanation of thoughts/ideas than appealing to introspection of a private world call "Mindscape."

Janus

The contribution from your fellow human beings and the world around us is a better explanation of thoughts/ideas than appealing to introspection of a private world call "Mindscape." — Richard B

If all humans could access the Mindscape, would it qualify as a "private world"?

Banno

↪Richard B

Good stuff.

↪Art48

has rediscovered Popper's World 3, which in turn is yet another version of Plato.

i'm rather taken by Searle's account of how "...counts as..." brings such things about.

SO while the OP is somewhat muddled, there is much that can be said here.

T Clark

We first learn of ideas and how to think not by introspection, but by our fellow human beings, learning a rich intellectual tradition handed down from generation to generation. This picture of "Mindscape" would make you think we could isolate ourselves from others, and tap into the "Mindscape" to learn our ideas, and that there is no need to interact with another human being. It starts first by learning of ideas from other humans, not by private introspection into alternate realities. Do we introspect? Of course, with ideas that are learned in a public world taught by our fellow humans. — Richard B

Learning through interaction with others is certainly an important source of "how we think" although I wouldn't put it in those terms. There is also an important source from a generalized cognitive function; direct observation, and inborn capacity and instinct. I recognize that the contribution of inborn factors is somewhat controversial, but it is not my intention to argue that here.

As to what this "how we think" is, I experience it as a mostly non-verbal conceptual model of the world whose basis is primarily based on empirical factors, both social and non-social, and probably temperament. My brother and I have very different understandings of how the world works, although we were raised in the same manner by the same people. I call this intuition, but others here on the forum disagree with that and think intuition is something else.

T Clark

The concept of mindscape suggests universal mind, an idealist concept. — Art48

It has always seemed to me that this "universal mind" is just another name for God.

T Clark

↪Richard B

Good stuff. — Banno

Although I disagree with some of what you've written, I agree with Banno that you have provided a good view of how thought works—clear and consistent.

Richard B

If all humans could access the Mindscape, would it qualify as a "private world"? — Janus

Do babies enter the Mindscape,? Infants? Children? Adolescents? Adults? A certain IQ level? Cultural background?

How would anyone teach a language to describe this “private world” they so call “accessed”? No one has access to anyone else's “private world” because it is inaccessible. But we got the public world.

Art48

Can anyone coherently explain how this is so? — Richard B

I think it's coherent that we experience thoughts exactly how we experience trees, rocks, and people. In both cases, we experience pre-existent entities. Of course, this doesn't prove the mindscape is true. But it seems coherent.

a private world call "Mindscape." — Richard B

No one said the mindscape is private. Quite the opposite.

Art48has rediscovered Popper's World 3 — Banno

Interesting. I haven't seen that before. Reading Wikipedia now.

It has always seemed to me that this "universal mind" is just another name for God. — T Clark

I'd say that if God exists, then God is universal mind. But there could exist a universal mind that contains all possible thoughts but is not all-good, all-powerful, etc., as so is not God as usually conceived.

Do babies enter the Mindscape,? Infants? Children? Adolescents? Adults? A certain IQ level? Cultural background? — Richard B

Just as there is one "landscape" (i.e., the physical world) where anyone can roam, there is one mindscape where any being capable of thought can roam.

T Clark

I think it's coherent that we experience thoughts exactly how we experience trees, rocks, and people. In both cases, we experience pre-existent entities. Of course, this doesn't prove the mindscape is true. But it seems coherent. — Art48

I certainly am not an qualified to have a definitive opinion, but it is my understanding that this is not consistent with current results from cognitive scientists and cognitive and language psychologists.

But there could exist a universal mind that contains all possible thoughts but is not all-good, all-powerful, etc., as so is not God as usually conceived. — Art48

I agree. It is my understanding that it's not consistent with the beliefs of Christian, Jewish, and Islamic doctrine, but that's not what I'm arguing. I'll change the relevant text in my post.

It has always seemed to me that this "universal mind" is just another name for ~~God~~ a god. — T Clark

L'éléphant

If all possible thoughts don’t already exist in the mindscape, then where do thoughts come from? How do thoughts and ideas come into existence? It seems the only possible answer is that a thought or idea doesn’t exist until someone thinks it. — Art48

This has been argued by philosophers in meaning and objective reality. If you believe in objective reality, then meaning is out there for us to grasp and make sense of. For this to be possible, our mind is equipped with concept formation so that when we encounter something unfamiliar, we can readily make sense of it. We were not bewildered as pre-historic humans that mountains and rivers and trees exist. Our mind has the ability to accommodate new things, and understand them.

Wayfarer

Question: once created, are ideas and thoughts eternal? Can an idea cease to exist? Can an idea “die”? — Art48

There needs to be a degree of rigor in formulating such an idea. Our minds are constantly occupied by a stream of thoughts, some vocalised, some comprising imagery or awareness of sensations and drives. And so on. So when you speak of an 'idea' it has to be something more than simply a passing thought or whatever pops up in your inner dialogue from moment to moment.

Having said that, I'm sure that there are at least some ideas as 'constitutive elements of reason'. There are principles that any sentient rational being might be expected to have discovered - such as the law of the excluded middle and other logical principles. Many fundamental arithmetical principles must be similar - this is the sense in which they are said to be 'true in all possible worlds'. That kind of statement must be logically necessary and true in every conceivable scenario, regardless of the particular circumstance. How far that extends is obviously a vexed question, subject of many unsolveable debates in philosphy of mathematics. But I'm impressed by the Platonist view that there is a vast domain of logical necessity and that it is not a product of, but a discovery made by, the mind.

'Intelligible objects must be independent of particular minds because they are common to all who think. In coming to grasp them, an individual mind does not alter them in any way, it cannot convert them into its exclusive possessions or transform them into parts of itself. Moreover, the mind discovers them rather than forming or constructing them, and its grasp of them can be more or less adequate.' - Cambridge Companion to Augustine.

As to whether there might be a specific play called 'Macbeth' in the absence of humans, I would say obviously not. But I would also say, were there other species of sapient beings in the Universe, they might produce something corresponding to drama, exploring the same themes as those found in Shakespeare. This is the idea behind Joseph Campbell's studies of comparative mythology - that archetypal themes tend to come up again and again in different cultures, even if their specific expressions are culturally-conditioned and hugely diverse.

So there's an interplay between some constitutive elements, and other elements, which might be creative or novel or unpredictable - it's not an all-or-nothing proposition.

(See also Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge.)

Banno

The illicit reification in

↪Art48

's post is pretty clear.

↪Wayfarer

Well expressed, interesting link. Wittgenstein, of course, took a contrary view to Augustin as to how we learn a language, treating it as becoming a participant in the activities of a community. It's not apparent hat this account could not be used here, that those "intelligible objects" are grasped as one becomes acquainted with the way they are used in a community. So learning what "2" is consists in learning how it is used by those around you, and using it within that community.

Wayfarer

↪Banno

Wittgenstein, of course, took a contrary view to Augustin as to how we learn a language, treating it as becoming a participant in the activities of a community. — Banno

It's reductionist, though. And it's also a lot like the empiricist criticisms of mathematics (i.e. Mill) that we become familiar with numerical concepts by using them. But if you're a creature that can't form concepts of numbers, then no amount of experience will imbue you with that ability. We are endowed with reason - of course an Augustine would say that was God-given, whereas we think it is probably a consequence of evolutionary adaptation. But even so, the abilities it provides go well beyond those that can be explained merely in terms of adaptation (hence also my scepticism about Donald Hoffman).

There's a book I've noticed, Jerrold Katz, The Metaphysics of Meaning. (Reviews here and here). This book, and indeed most of Katz' career, was dedicated to critiquing Wittgenstein, Quine, and 'naturalised epistemology' generally. He also studied under Chomsky, but I think the basic drift is Platonist, i.e. meaning has to be anchored in recognition of universals as constitutive elements of reason - not simply conventions or habits of speech.

sime

Well expressed, interesting link. Wittgenstein, of course, took a contrary view to Augustin as to how we learn a language, treating it as becoming a participant in the activities of a community. It's not apparent hat this account could not be used here, that those "intelligible objects" are grasped as one becomes acquainted with the way they are used in a community. So learning what "2" is consists in learning how it is used by those around you, and using it within that community. — Banno

Wittgenstein never said communication was the essence of language , neither did he equate in all cases, truth conditions with community agreement. Sure, in some language games a sign such as "2" might be defined in relation to community responses - a good example is the Github code-repository for the mathematics library of the Lean Programming language that is used automate mathematics; it implements and comprises the meaning of "2" for the community of Lean users. But then there are many other use-cases that don't fall under this definition, such as the isolated platonist who privately identifies "2" with what he is seeing or imagining. If his use-case bears no relation to his community, then he might be said to be playing a single-player "Augustinan" language-game. Perceptual and aesthetic judgements tend to fall into this category.

Recall that Wittgenstein rejected logicism - he rejected the fundamentalism that equivocates arithmetic with analytic tautologies. He is in record of saying "I think I know what Kant meant when he said that 2+5 = 7 is synthetic" . If the propositions of arithmetic are regarded as being synthetic, then it implies that the meaning of such propositions is open to interpretation in each and every case.

Art48

Art48 has rediscovered Popper's World 3 — Banno

There seems to be a difference. The mindscape exists independent of the physical but Popper's World 3 seems to be dependent on it.

The illicit reification in ↪Art48's post is pretty clear. — Banno

How so? "Reification is when you think of or treat something abstract as a physical thing." I'm not suggesting thoughts are physical; merely, that they are pre-existent. And picturing the mindscape as a place is merely metaphor. The claim is all thoughts are pre-existent (just as the trees we encounter when we walk in a forest are pre-existent). "Mindscape" is the phrase for the collection of all thoughts, just like "Black Forest" is a phrase for the collection of all trees in "a large forested mountain range in the state of Baden-Württemberg in southwest Germany, bounded by the Rhine Valley to the west and south and close to the borders with France and Switzerland."

Richard B

Just as there is one "landscape" (i.e., the physical world) where anyone can roam, there is one mindscape where any being capable of thought can roam. — Art48

From Augustine’s Confessions where he gives an account of how he had ‘learnt to speak’:

“I noticed that people would name some object and then turn towards whatever it was that they had named. I watched them and understood that the sound they made when they wanted to indicate that particular thing was the name which they gave to it, and their actions clearly showed what they meant.”

So Augustine was questioning, observing, inferring, concluding, what you would call “thinking”, before he had learned a single word.

Wittgenstein in PI 32 says “Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if the child could already think, only not yet speak.”

This picture of a “Mindscape” being accessible to a child assumes this very same thing. That the child can learn any idea like “cause”, “intention”, “hope”, without learning any language from anyone. That they can dive into their private world and figure out these ideas without any guidance from anyone whatsoever. And even if they wanted to, others have no access to this private world to provide any guidance.

Fooloso4

The claim is all thoughts are pre-existent (just as the trees we encounter when we walk in a forest are pre-existent). — Art48

Reading this after the Heidegger thread that unfortunately has been relegated to the Lounge, I see the potential for a grave risk. Heidegger attempts to avoid political and ethical responsibility and put in its place "heeding the call of Being". We are not the source of our ideas and so our only responsibility is to heed or fail to heed the call of Being. T

Banno

"Reification is when you think of or treat something abstract as a physical thing." — Art48

...as you treat thoughts as a landscape. But more, the use of "exists" in a way that is analogous to it's application to rocks and hills and stuff - that was there before we mapped things out, as it were. Or describing thoughts in terms of the German countryside. The analogy can only go so far.

Wayfarer

Reification is when you think of or treat something abstract as a physical thing." I'm not suggesting thoughts are physical; merely, that they are pre-existent. And picturing the mindscape as a place is merely metaphor. The claim is all thoughts are pre-existent (just as the trees we encounter when we walk in a forest are pre-existent). — Art48

:up: I think what you're groping towards is reflected in some aspects of Platonism, which I've already implicitly stated, but it's worth spelling it out. It revolves around the belief in the reality of the Platonic ideas, or more generally, universals, which are held to explain relations of qualitative identity and resemblance among individuals, classroom examples being the redness common to both rubies and apples, which are in all other respects completely different.

In this connection it's worth reading Bertrand Russell's chapter in The Problems of Philosophy called The World of Universals, from which:

In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we also have acquaintance with what we shall call universals, that is to say, general ideas, such as whiteness, diversity, brotherhood, and so on. Every complete sentence must contain at least one word which stands for a universal, since all verbs have a meaning which is universal.

He then gives these examples:

Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. ...We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation 'north of', which is a constituent part of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.

This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something.

It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ... In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea', which we noted at the same time, also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.

We shall find it convenient only to speak of things existing when they are in time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they exist (not excluding the possibility of their existing at all times). Thus thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist. But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they subsist or have being, where 'being' is opposed to 'existence' as being timeless. — Bertrand Russell

My bolds.

Another place you find discussion of universals in contemporary terms is in Ed Feser's books and blog site. Have a browse of Think, McFly, Think.

I don't think you could call this a 'mindscape' but it shows that a fundamental element of reason, namely predication, is only understandable through a cognitive act. In other words, when we grasp a concept, we're seeing commonalities (and differences) between whole classes of things - and, as Russell says, they not the product of thought, but can only be grasped by reason. And that kind of ability is essential to language, and so to discursive thought generally. That's what I think you're looking for.

Art48

Wayfarer,

Thanks for the extended response. The mindscape idea is that all thoughts are pre-existent; that when we have a thought, we don’t create the thought. Rather, we perceive something pre-existent in the mindscape, just as when we see a tree, we are encountering something pre-existent in the landscape. This view is similar to Mathematical Platonism, which says that mathematical truths exist independently of us. The mindscape extends this idea and says that all possible thoughts exist independently of us.

Russell, apparently, regards thoughts differently, as acts. He writes: “One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's.” Under this view, thoughts are ephemeral; they last only as long as the act continues. And the thought, as an act, belongs only to the thinker, who is doing the thinking. You seem to have the same view when you write “predication, is only understandable through a cognitive act.”

The two views of thoughts are different. I don’t argue that regarding a thought as an act is invalid. But I claim that regarding a thought as a pre-existent entity is equally valid. Once that view is accepted, it seems to me an acceptable step to call the entirety of all thoughts the “mindscape.”

One possible objection with the mindscape concept is that the mindscape might be called “the thought of all thoughts.” The logical problems with “the set of all sets” are well-known; it might be suspected “the thought of all thoughts” has similar problems.

Rather than defend against such a charge, I’ll simply note Rudy Rucker, the author of Infinity and the Mind: The Science and Philosophy of the Infinity, is a Ph.D. mathematician and his book goes into set theory in great detail. Apparently, Dr. Rucker did not believe the mindscape concept has the same problem as the set of all sets concept.

Banno

You're just misusing the word "exists".

You've taken the way we talk about the common stuff around us existing in a place and a time and applied it unjustifiably to Russell's paradox.

Paradoxes are not just like trees and rocks.

Where do thoughts come from? Are they eternal? Does the Mindscape really exist?

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