So, why speak about propositional knowledge at all then, why not speak about more or less justified propositional belief instead, thus dissolving all the attendant paradoxes, and saving us from going over and over this same old boring ground ad nauseum? — Janus
What works, what is useful, what is pragmatic; or just that it's what we do? I'm not sure that the use of "pragmatic" isn't a bit too teleological, giving the impression of serving an 'ends' that isn't there. — Banno
Do you want it to reflect current use in ordinary language? That is what dictionary definitions do, so the obvious thing would be to consult a good English dictionary — SophistiCat
So what is the perfect definition of knowledge? — Cidat
:up:there has to be a point when justifications come to an end and "it's just what we do" kicks in. — Ludwig V
As you say, we can't limit ourselves to infallible claims. — green flag
Knowlege is experience, through which meanings are gained though fallible. — boagie
Thus, in all cases, the criterion of being true within the JTB definition is either redundant, or, it makes the definition quite useless. — Ø implies everything
The most common definition is "Justified True Belief" — Cidat
This makes sense, because it costs to doubt. Smooth operation is paused. I have to stop and make sure, 'waste time' questioning this or that, when I could be steaming ahead. Then there's the cost of feeding a complex nervous system, of calculating a massive model when a cheap model might be the better deal, all things considered. — green flag
It passes on information with an endorsement and a source, so there is some reason to trust it. — Ludwig V
Good points ! We are like wicked children, who question what they are told, because it feels good. But we are also anguished adults, truly troubled about whether X is right and whether Y could be true. — green flag
Well, I am neither wicked nor anguished. I guess I'm just opinionated and stubborn. — T Clark
I don't see how the third person is relevant here. — Ø implies everything
I say that Sally knows P if
(1) Sally believes P
(2) Sally can justify her belief in P (according to current norms)
(3) I also believe P — green flag
At what point does the criterion of truth become necessary? — Ø implies everything
I'm afraid that doesn't quite cut it, because if P is false, (1), (2), and (3) will still be true and hence it will still be true (on your definition) that Sally knows that P. — Ludwig V
There are many examples of people committing to what they want to be true, rather than what they know to be true — Dfpolis
our neural representation of an object is its action on us — Dfpolis
Belief is an act of will: committing to the truth of some proposition. — Dfpolis
Donald Trump in his claims that he had the largest crowd at his inauguration and that he won the 2020 election. Also, all who chose to believe him, knowing that there was no basis for doing so other than their own desire that it be so. People who know, but will not believe, that they have insufficient funds to buy what they want, and act on this commitment by buying it because they want it.Let's have a few then... — Isaac
The object acts to scatter light into our eyes, activating its rods and cones. Some of these activate the optic nerves which convey the information through the ganglion axons to the optic chiasm where information from both eyes is combined. The signals then pass to the lateral geniculate thalami. Other neurons connect to primary visual cortex for processing, extracting features such as edges and colors. Thence, information is conveyed to the visual association cortex for integration with prior experience.How does that work? Take me through the neurological processes you envisage bringing this about. Let's say you see a tree. We have some photons hitting the retina...what then? — Isaac
Belief is an act of will: committing to the truth of some proposition. — Dfpolis
Hmm. That's a pretty broad notion of "will", there. I believe I'm a tad hungry, but I'm not willing myself to be hungry. Quite the opposite, since i need to drop a kilo or so. — Banno
But, it is. I may pretend, to myself, that I am not hungry, even though I know that I am. Such a pretense is committing to, believing, the false proposition that I am not really hungry.Nor is an act of will involved in my committing to the proposition "I am hungry". It's more a recognition of a fact. — Banno
As I have defined these acts, no contradiction is involved. Descartes knew he was in his chamber, but chose to suspend his belief in it. In watching a movie or play, we enter a state aptly described as "a willing suspension of disbelief."It appears to be contradictory to say "I know such-and-such, but I don't believe it". — Banno
Agreed. But, if knowledge were a type of belief, we could not know without believing. Believing would be a necessary condition to have knowledge. That we can continue to know while suspending belief shows that belief is not a necessary condition for knowing.When one suspends belief, as in the Descartes example you give, one does not thereby commit to the alternative being true. — Banno
If you think about it, this knowledge depends on a chain of action that can be traced back to the city acting on a subject's senses. If your knowledge is true, that sort of action is in you indirectly. If that action were not in you, at least indirectly, you might have an unjustified belief, but it would not be knowledge.And Present ineligibility looks a but fraught. I know stuff that is not present to me... that Paris is in France, for example which is on the other side of the world from here. — Banno
One can be justified in believing something even if it is false. The criterion of truth prevents that weakness from being passed on to knowledge. — Ludwig V
If you read my first comment on this thread, you'll see how adding the criterion of truth introduces a different, more damaging weakness, in the event one has a skeptical account of truth. — Ø implies everything
Whether we are dealing with the former or latter depends on the relationship between truth and justification, according to the user of the definition. Either, a justified proposition is always true (1), or it is not always true (2). In the latter case, justification may have the capacity, if sufficiently strong, to prove a proposition true (2a), or it may never have this capacity (2b). In the event of 2b, justification like plays the role of increasing the probability of a proposition being true; it's simply that this probability will never reach 1. — Ø implies everything
It is true that, in a sense, the most that I can convey is that I (the speaker) also believe that P. But the truth condition is also a commitment to abandon my claim if p should turn out to be false.I'm afraid that doesn't quite cut it, because if P is false, (1), (2), and (3) will still be true and hence it will still be true (on your definition) that Sally knows that P. — Ludwig V
Belief is an act of will: committing to the truth of some proposition. — Dfpolis
So I shall start with that. There are a couple of points from your second post at the end.Belief is an act of will: committing to the truth of some proposition. — Dfpolis
the consequent changes of neural state, which are our visual representation of the object, — Dfpolis
That we can continue to know while suspending belief shows that belief is not a necessary condition for knowing. — Dfpolis
modal musings, — Banno
Thank you for commenting.I’m not a fan of the concept of “the will”. I don’t understand what it means. It seems to be an attempt to sweep up into one category all the various beginnings of action. But our actions are very various and have many different beginnings. Moreover, while it seems reasonable to suppose there is a beginning to most beliefs, it isn’t clear to me that that all actions have the same beginning or that the beginning can be called an action of the same kind as cooking a meal or starting the car. — Ludwig V
I distinguish accepting from recognizing. Acceptance is the result of a choice, in which not accepting is a possible result. In recognition, there is no alternative. There may be a prior choice to attend to or ignore information, but once we attend to it, we are aware of it, which is no different from recognizing it. So, if you say that believing is accepting, we agree. If you say it is recognizing, you are speaking of what I am calling "knowing."Coming to believe that p is often simply accepting or recognizing that p is true. — Ludwig V
Advancing evidence that supports a conclusion is not taking a partial view, unless one ignores evidence against the conclusion. I agree: many people align their beliefs with their knowledge, however painful they may find it.But you are taking a partial view here. There are also many examples of people accepting a situation that they very much do not want to be true. — Ludwig V
Yes, because such acts describe knowing p or q. Suppose that I find out that the perihelion of Mercury precesses at a rate that is incompatible with Newtonian mechanics. I can decide to maintain a prior belief in Newtonian mechanics, or say it is inadequate. My commitment will affect my subsequent acts. Some may be private, in how I think about nature. Some may be public, in my teaching or work.“Deciding to believe” would be a misdescription when I find out that p or notice that q. — Ludwig V
My distinction between knowing and believing allows us to understand what he did. He knew he was in his chamber, writing, but chose to believe he might not be. The same applies to what you describe in your next paragraph.Descartes is astonishingly casual in introducing his suspension of belief, and I’m not at all sure that I really understand it. Clearly, he did not suspend his belief that he was holding a pen and writing on paper. We have the evidence of the text he wrote. — Ludwig V
I make this very point in my paper in discussing David M. Armstrong's proprioception theory of consciousness (p. 98). Still, I hope to be forgiven for using conventional language in order to simplfy the discussion. I cannot address every point in a single post, a single article, or even a single book.No brain state is our visual representation of the object. We can't see it, and if we did, we would not know what we are looking at. — Ludwig V
You are quite right. I overreached for another example.Suspending belief isn't the same as ceasing belief. I'm required to suspend disbelief while hearing or reading or watching a fictional story. — Ludwig V
Thus, if you know that John knows P, you also know P, because if P were false, then John does not know P, which means you do not know that John knows P, which contradicts the premise. — Ø implies everything
Going from JTB to JB does not make knowledge into belief, by definition of JB as "justified belief", in which a belief is merely an emotional conviction, whereas "justified" (not "justifiable") is an emotional conviction that the belief is correctly supported. — Ø implies everything
There are theists who exemplify the state of feeling that one's conviction is true, yet simultaneously not feeling that it is justified. That is, these theist have, in their own eyes and others', unjustified beliefs. — Ø implies everything
I am calling this power (which is not a thing) "will." — Dfpolis
My preferred language is to call the neural modification induced by the action of the object on our senses a "presentation." — Dfpolis
He knew he was in his chamber, writing, but chose to believe he might not be. — Dfpolis
I thought I dispensed with that misunderstanding. I pointed to multiple motivating factors from which action stems. Still, given multiple conceptual possibilities (lines of action), one needs to be actualized. That actualization is a specific kind of intentional act. Do you disagree? It would violate the principle of parsimony to posit multiple powers doing the same sort of actualization (committing to a line of action).Your belief that all actions of whatever kind stem from a single power is a distortion through over-simplification. Your description of how we need to balance our values shows that there are different kinds of action which stem from different needs and wants and desires - and habits and customs. — Ludwig V
I already said that.Your description of how we need to balance our values shows that there are different kinds of action which stem from different needs and wants and desires - and habits and customs. — Ludwig V
Because objects act on the senses to inform the nervous system, thereby presenting themselves for possible attention. When we choose to attend (focus awareness on) to them, we actualize their intelligibility, knowing them.I find it hard to see why you want to call something a presentation when it is never presented to anyone or anything. — Ludwig V
Thinking he was not would be alarming. Thinking he might not be -- not so much.If Descartes thought he might not be in his chamber writing, one might have expected him to be rather alarmed and to stop writing while he worked where he was and what he was doing. But he never stops believing that he is in his chamber writing. — Ludwig V
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