I find that an “objective norm” (or “categorical norm”) is a norm (i.e., an obligation) which is necessarily issued by a being’s faculty of normitivity; and it is implicit and involuntary. — Bob Ross
In other words, such a norm (which is objective) is because one exists with a nature that fundamentally has such and not an obligation that they decided to fixate upon. — Bob Ross
Yes. Though I'm hopeful that the point is non-trivial to what you are asking. I pretty much hold this belief with respect to any discussions about determining what is real, so there is a general place I'm coming from in thinking here, though I'm trying to tailor it to the specific topic at hand.
General philosophical categories are frequently like this. They are not like the general category of "cars" because there are concretes to refer to. Here the elements of the set are philosophical positions, which themselves usually operate more like webs than isolated propositions. And as you hold certain parts of a view as true -- the metaphor of nailing them down within a conversation -- usually you can find various ways of interpreting a position as part of one camp or another due to the web-like structure of philosophical positions and how you can interpret them in various ways.
The reverse! We can make distinctions, but upon doing so we are no longer talking generally, but rather are creating a set of understandings that we can think through together.
But after making those distinctions, say you were to go to another group of people who are enthusiastic about philosophy, they won't hold in some general sense. New terms will have to be forged in that group.
But the general notions of realism or nihilism will still be there…
...But upon doing so we usually start holding terms steady. And that's when it seems that we're no longer dealing with some general philosophical categories which have distinct meanings but rather a loose grouping of positions which we can then explore together upon coming to a mutual understanding.
And with what I've said so far I'd expect any particular philosophical position to be difficult to categorize within the general frames.
From "real" to "not-real" -- the reversal is with respect to the judgment of a position as realist or nihilist.
Yes! A rephrase, though -- I don't think I could make the claim in history, because while I'm familiar with the terms I'm not familiar with the contemporary history. However, conceptually, that's what I'm saying. It may be that this was more an idiosyncratic example of a theory which forced me to rethink the categories, but I think I've managed to communicate myself by golly. :)
Well, that's a stretch. As a counterexample, consequentialists claim to make moral judgements without reference to the (or a) categorical imperative...Now a categorical norm, like a categorical imperative, would be one that applies in all cases. That's not the same as being "objective". Something is objective if it is not the result of personal feelings, or something along those lines.
Seems to me also that your use of "categorical imperative" is nonstandard. You speak of a plurality, when there is usually only the one.
Finally, the dissection between meta-ethics and ethics is perhaps not quite so clear as you seem to think, in that deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics signify differences in meta-ethical approach as well as to normative ethics. Each may subscribe to or be implied by differences in metaethics.
Not the point at all. What people want is absolutely to be removed from the equation. Animals take shelter from the storm, or the predator, or the heat or cold, or they die. No recourse to subjective wants explains how a yeast cell absorbs sugar and excretes alcohol. that's just how they work, and this is how humans work, - they shelter or they die. they arrange the environment just as rabbits do or birds do We don't have to invoke the subjective world of these animals at all, any more than we have to invoke the subjective world of a yeast cell.
Life does what is necessary to survive, or it dies. but if it dies, it is no longer life. Therefore life does what is necessary to survive. And human life is no exception. We need to control our environment or we die. And those that are homeless must make a shelter from cardboard and plastic waste as best they can.
Is there a name you might use, by which this faculty is also known?
To say one exists with a nature that fundamentally includes such an objective obligation, as opposed to some other decidable kind, seems to question the need for a faculty to issue it necessarily.
I get what you’re driving at; just trying to see if I can arrange what you say in my terms.
but why ought a person keep surviving? By noting that life either survives or dies, you have not thereby made any moral claims at all. — Bob Ross
Again, if you are going to claim that peoples’ wants are absolutely to be removed from the equation in terms of morals, then you must be able to ground objectively the choice to keep surviving. — Bob Ross
Is the moral realism vs. anti-realism just a good approximate line to draw? Is it clear and cut? Do you think one can hold there are objective moral judgments and that none of them are obligatory to fixate upon? — Bob Ross
I purposely did not note an organ or what not which is responsible for such production — Bob Ross
are you questioning whether there needs to be a biological organ or spiritual substance that produces it? — Bob Ross
Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems as though you are noting that philosophical positions tend to be complex and hard to nail down precise distinctions between views, which I agree with; but, why would this entail that we can’t achieve one—or shouldn’t strive for it? I don’t think that we are barred from making “concrete” distinctions in philosophy, but I would grant it is exceptionally difficult to achieve such due to the nature of the study. — Bob Ross
I agree, but I still think we should strive for it. However, I am starting to view general distinctions in philosophy as not mutually exclusive and exhaustive options (to your point). — Bob Ross
It seems as though we have a lot in common with our views; and that you’re response to my “blurring of the distinction” is that that is what the distinction is (i.e., blurry) by its own nature; but I still think we ought to strive to make clear distinctions (even generally). — Bob Ross
If a person who has consequentialist tendencies claims there are no categorical imperatives, then they are thereby squarely a moral anti-realist (metaethically). — Bob Ross
No, I haven't made any moral claims, and no one has to choose to keep surviving.
But if one should choose not to keep surviving, there is no more choice and no more obligation. There is an inequality between living and dying. And out of this inequality comes necessity and from necessity comes obligation. If you want to die, don't be bothering me about morality, because I am concerned with living, I'm not interested in dying.
Assume we use your definition of moral realism as the reality of “categorical imperatives”, which I take to be imperatives about what we somehow ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences. Then I would argue that moral realism is unlikely to be true.
By wikipedia’s definition, I support moral realism. My realism claim is based on the empirical observation that past and present cultural moral norms (ethical sentences) refer to parts of cooperation strategies (reciprocity strategies for the most part) which are objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.
2) accept the empirical data that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems (which implies a kind of moral realism).
Thus, the most useful definitions of moral realism and other terms in moral philosophy could be based on what we empirically observe about morality.
Perhaps the difficulties you refer to in your opening post are due to a mismatch between your chosen definition of moral realism and the reality of what human morality is?
Cool. I was just thinking…..Enlightenment moral philosophy proposed freedom as a causal “what not”, the necessary condition for production of objective obligations.
If we actually do have objective obligations, we should expect a source sufficient to provide for them, and usually our will is considered that way.
Irrelevant sidebar: there was a guy on PBS in the early 70’s, had a painting technique demonstration broadcast, from upstate Vermont, on Saturday afternoons. His name was Bob Ross.
Oh I think it's OK to strive for impossible goals. Else philosophy would surely disappear! :D
Just noting that as we move from different communities that we sort of have to start rolling the rock from the bottom of the hill again. (EDIT: And sometimes even within the same community!)
Yup! I think we understand one another now!
See, that doesn't work. A consequentialist claims that the worth of an action is found by looking at its consequences. This stands in opposition to the deontologist looking at a moral rule, such as the categorical imperative.
the only valid definition of “objective moral judgments” is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will) — Bob Ross
the only valid definition of “objective moral judgments” is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will)? — Bob Ross
One can choose to be moral or immoral, but one cannot chose what is moral and what is immoral. — unenlightened
My response's point is that your definition of moral realism is less useful than the “objective features of the world” definition based on the above advantages and disadvantages. These are just definitions. We are free to choose, assume, or advocate the most useful.
Do you have a reference for a formal definition of “objective moral judgments” consistent with
A valid definition of objective moral judgments is that they refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.
No such involuntary obligations appear to exist.
Resulting moral antirealism claims based on this definition are confusing if moral judgments refer to objective features of the world.
Offers no objective (mind independent) basis for resolving moral disputes.
Objective features of the world exist that are the basis of moral judgments as summarized by cultural moral norms. Those features are strategies that solve cooperation problems.
Understanding the function of cultural moral norms provides an objective, mind independent basis for resolving disputes about cultural moral norms.
Understanding the function of cultural moral norms explains the origin and function of our innate perception of moral obligations as involuntary.
Also, I don’t understand “this definition fundamentally accepts that everything is ultimately subjective” when the subject is objective features of the world. Science is good at being objective concerning features of the world.
One can choose to be moral or immoral, but one cannot chose what is moral and what is immoral.
so how is there a standard of what is moral which no one gets to choose? — Bob Ross
"Understanding the function of cultural moral norms provides an objective, mind independent basis for resolving disputes about cultural moral norms." - Mark S
Maybe I am just misunderstanding you, but I don’t see how this provides a “mind-independent” basis: it seems as though you are making laws and cultural norms the standard of what is good. — Bob Ross
We are trying to communicate.
Communication depends on honesty.
It is open to us to be dishonest, and only pretend to want to communicate in order to manipulate each other rather than understand each other.
But the moment either one claims that they are not intending to communicate but to manipulate, the meaning of their words is lost, and the discussion is over. Our social relations depend on honesty and -cannot depend on dishonesty.
Social relations presume morals, and the particular morals are necessary features of social relations.
I understand you to be saying (here and elsewhere) that fixating on a cultural moral norm (encoding it as a moral norm in your moral sense in my terms) makes it an objective moral judgment – an involuntary obligation.
A key miscommunication between us is what the “function of cultural moral norms” refers to. “Function” refers to the primary reason cultural moral norms exist. Clarifying what this feature of our universe ‘is’ should shed light on how to best define “objective moral judgments”.
Assume for a moment that there is a mind-independent feature of our universe that determines the primary reason that culture moral norms exist (what their function empirically is). Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides an objective standard of what is good and bad.
The empirical observation of the ultimate source of cultural moral norms carries no innate bindingness. This function’s bindingness may be subjective and the choice to fixate on it to trigger the feeling of bindingness a matter of preference. But the ultimate source of human morality is an objective truth not a subjective one.
So what is the mind-independent function of cultural moral norms? To solve cooperation problems that are innate to our universe.
But could it be normative? By the SEP, normativity sounds likely:
"The term “morality” can be used ... normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people."
I expect rational people would prefer to live in cooperative societies and therefore would be interested in basing their moral system on solutions to problems that block cooperation.
Nowhere in this do I find a moral judgment. You are simply noting that if one wants to communicate, then they must speak the truth most of the time. — Bob Ross
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