There are many theories that try to explain consciousness starting from non-consciousness. E.g.: identity theory, functionalism, computationalism, and others are even stranger, like Joscha Bach's virtualism. These seem to explain consciousness without mentioning the emergence from non-conscious to conscious, sometimes giving me the impression that they can be explained without this phenomenon, be it weak or strong. — Eugen

Of course the various forms of panpsychism attempt to do percisely that. Experience does not emerge mysteriously from non experiential matter. Consciousness does not pop into existence de novo. It is a particular form of mind or experience which has evolved from more primitive mental precursor states.

"Consciousness flickers; and even at its brightest, there is a small focal
region of clear illumination, and a large penumbral region of experience
which tells of intense experience in dim apprehension. The simplicity of
clear consciousness is no measure of the complexity of complete experience.
Also this character of our existence suggests that consciousness is the
crown of experience, only occasionally attained, not its necessary base.
(p. 267)
Whitehead is saying that unconscious experience is the ground of consciousness;
therefore, the unconscious is a necessary presupposition"

Who says? — Eugen

Everyone who knows what they're talking about on this topic. Make your case, Eugen, If you say different.

Question for 180 Proof: Are you taking as axiomatic that consciousness is a process ? — Art48

No. It's a working assumption in cognitive neuroscience (and philosophies of mind which are constrained by experimental findings) in the absence of any grounds (other than folk psychology) for assuming its an entity (pace Descartes et al).

Isn't that the basis of the reification criticism?

Eugen's OP questions about "emergence of consciousness from non-consciousness" assumes, in effect, entity-A emerges from entity-NotA. This incoherent assumption is the target of my "reification criticism" – incoherent because it presupposes substance dualism.

Even though I found the OP questions to be incoherent, I recommended process-conscioussness models and thought-experiments which neither explain nor describe the broader topic in terms of entity-consciousness; apparently, however, Eugen cannot follow those demonstrations because he is, wittingly or not, committed to entity-consciousness and, therefore, the pseudo-problem with "emergence" that he raises.
.

After all, if consciousness is not a process but in fact an entity in its own right, then the reification criticism is unjustified, is it not?

Rhetorical, no?

I'd believe whether consciousness is a process or an entity is an open question. Agree?

Of course not. Reread above.

@180 Proof Previously you have said you are an emergentist wrt consciousness. Have you changed your mind? If so, what precipitated the change?

If I wrote that, the statement was a mistake (or misread) whenever that was. I'll search my post history to see if I can find out why you think so, bert. (Maybe you have an incriminating post of mine handy?) I've never been a substance dualist (i.e. mind/body cartesian or forms/appearances platonist).

@180 Proof Ill see if i can find it. I could be wrong. I asked 'strong or weak?' You 'said jury's out' or something.

I know you've never been a substance dualist, but emergence typically applies to properties, not entities, in the discourse. And properties can refer to actions as well. So if consciousness is the action or function of modelling the world and making predictions, then the capacity to do that is the corresponding emergent property.

Is this the statenent you're referring to?

Unlike you, bert, folk psychological terms like "awareness" or "consciousness" are neither fundamental nor a priori in my understand of myself, others or nature; such concepts refer to emergent properties or processes. — 180 Proof

:chin:

Yes, this is sloppily written.

To answer you're previous question about my position on 'emergence of consciousness': no, my conception of 'consciousness' in relation to the brain-environment has not changed significantly in the last two decades; I've just not expressed my position clearly enough on some occasions (especially when read out of context of the discussion within which it was expressed).

That wasn't the one I was thinking of actually. I can't find it now, odd. No matter. You most often speak as if you a are a kind of functionalist, broadly, that consciousness is something that brains do.

assumes, in effect, entity-A emerges from entity-NotA. — 180 Proof

It's time to expose some bullshit here.

Eugen's OP questions about "emergence of consciousness from non-consciousness" assumes, in effect, entity-A emerges from entity-NotA. — 180 Proof

-
1. My question wasn't assuming emergence was true. My question was totally different, but this guy simply cannot comprehend the fact that some people are genuinely curious and ask questions because they simply want to find an answer. Guys, my question DOES NOT imply anything. If you're on this OP, please answer my question without assuming I believe this or that.
2.

Eugen's OP questions about "emergence of consciousness from non-consciousness" assumes, in effect, entity-A emerges from entity-NotA. — 180 Proof

- No, it doesn't assume that, this is why I mentioned weak and strong emergence. Weak emergence means water emerges from H and O, without having extra-properties.

because it presupposes substance dualism. — 180 Proof

3. Because your philosophy is poor and you're closed-minded, and because your only purpose is to defend materialism. You even spent months trying to convince me Spinoza was a materialist.

Make your case, Eugen, — 180 Proof

I don't have a case, I only have questions. Are you capable to understand that some people don't ask questions in order to find answers and not to defend their crappy views like you do?

I did not intend for it to annoy you — universeness

I know you didn't and I wasn't offended. Still, it was a crappy move.

it's woo woo! — universeness

The problem is that the more I say it, the more I imagine a gay orgy between de Grasse, Sean Caroll and Dennett where they're moaning wooo wooo wooo wooo. I simply don't want that in my head.
Besides, woo is apparently the most humoristic thing that physicalist nerds have ever invented, it would be unfair to take advantage of their wonderful term.

Would you not question the rationality of a 'static reality' being the source of human consciousness?
Do you propose this static reality entity, is concentrated somewhere in the universe, or omnipresent? — universeness

I genuinely find your questions interesting, but I'm afraid this OP has departed from its origins too much.
I would like to know your opinion about my initial questions. Thank you!

:clap: :rofl: Well, thanks for making my point, lil troll, and confirming you're not worth any more of my time.

Yeah, a non-reductive physicalist functionalist-enactivist :smirk: (if there's such a hybrid).

Well, thanks for making my point, lil troll, and confirming you're not worth any more of my time. — 180 Proof

1. I'm trying to be as empathic and sincere with you. so PLEASE don't get upset and don't take it personally. You've got two issues: one is psychological and the other comes from your poor philosophy. You're paranoid - you look at every question as having a hidden substrate, an anti-materialistic assumption, so instead of answering the question and giving arguments, you start assuming this and that and after 1-2 exchanges you're enetinrg ''it's time to defend materialism" mode. And when you're like this and your philosophy is also bad, things like conflating Spinoza with materialism and saying emergence entails dualism happen.
Now, I still hope you're able to be rational. So I still believe you could be helpful. Bear with me please...


2. You think that emergence can be avoided (weak or strong). And your argument was that as long as you consider consciousness a process, and processes non-emergent, then emergence disappears. So far, so good...
The problem is that I mention two types of emergence: weak (where properties are entirely reducible from their fundamental constituents - monism) and strong (properties cannot be reduced entirely to their constituents - dualism). So I guess you're definitely saying that strong emergence can be avoided. And I'd totally agree. Functionalism and identity theory reject strong emergence, but there's still weak emergence here.
Water is a weakly emergent process from H and O. I am not postulating any kind of dualism here, water is matter, and water emerges from non-water. Now the question remains if we could reach consciousness from non-consciousness as we reach water from non-water, WITHOUT weak emergence.

Yeah, a non-reductive physicalist functionalist-enactivist :smirk: (if there's such a hybrid). — 180 Proof

There is now! I'll see if I can work out what that means.

Q1. Is it possible to build a theory that starts with fundamental non-consciousness and reaches consciousness without going through the classic weak emergent or strong emergent? — Eugen

Not on my understanding of the concepts of emergence. Even if we say that activities don't emerge, we can just rephrase to make the properties those activities depend on emergence. So if consciousness is something a brain does, then the capacity of a brain to do that thing would be an emergent property of the matter comprising the brain. To my mind, @180 Proof is an emergentist at least with regard to the properties necessary for a system to realise consciousness, but we may have different understandings of what emergence is.

Q2. Does any of the above theories (virtualism, computationalism, functionalism, etc.) manage to bypass emergence (weak or strong)?

I don't think so. It seems to me there are broadly three basic categories that theories of consciousness usually fall into:

Eliminativism (nothing is conscious)
Emergentism (some things, relatively late in the universe, are conscious)
Panpsychism (everything is conscious)

Most physicalist theories are either emergentist or eliminativist. But it depends on what concept of consciousness they are starting with. Some people are eliminativists regarding concepts of consciousness that they (usually wrongly) suspect of being fuzzy woo woo concepts, but emergentists with regard to what they think of as more modern scientific concepts of consciousness (usually defined in functionalist terms to begin with).

Some panpsychists call themselves physicalists (Galen Strawson) arguing that physical nature, properly conceived, has consciousness built in as a fundamental feature. It's just another physical property of the world.

Idealism I suppose is a kind of panpsychism.

o my mind, 180 Proof is an emergentist at least with regard to the properties necessary for a system to realise consciousness, but we may have different understandings of what emergence is. — bert1

Agree.

Question for 180 Proof: Are you taking as axiomatic that consciousness is a process ? — Art48

No. It's a working assumption in cognitive neuroscience (and philosophies of mind which are constrained by experimental findings) in the absence of any grounds (other than folk psychology) for assuming its an entity (pace Descartes et al).

I'd believe whether consciousness is a process or an entity is an open question. Agree?
Of course not. Reread above. — 180 Proof

Reread. So, you're saying it's a working assumption that consciousness is a process, and that a working assumption has made whether consciousness is a process or an entity a closed question?

Let's suppose I can't. Then what is your point? — Art48

My point is to establish that what you offer, is a bare bones posit, with very little or no flesh.
I don't see why your 'entity' manifest as some independent substance, deserves any more credence as a possible source of human consciousness, than positing that a theistic god is the source.

That lack of a full and complete explanation proves a hypothesis invalid? — Art48

No, it just condemns it, to never progress beyond that of pure speculation. Perhaps there is enough anecdotal evidence to label the existence of an 'independent substance' as a source for human consciousness as a SCIENTIFIC hypothesis. I am content to label it a philosophical hypothesis, but do you think there is the potential for future evidence in support of this philosophical hypothesis, that would elevate it to becoming a scientific theory?

Careful. Can you solve the hard problem of consciousness? — Art48

I appreciate your note of caution, and no, I cant.

If not, then you lack a full and complete explanation of how consciousness arises from brain activity, correct? — Art48

Correct! The current evidence is not 'full and complete,' BUT, there is a far larger preponderance of significant evidence, (mostly from the neuroscience field) that, for me, and many others, warrants assigning a much higher level of credence, to the proposal that "consciousness is what the brain does" and consciousness emerged from very large variety combining in every way possible, and is therefore procedural. But you are correct that the popular high credence level, assigned by humans to a particular hypothesis, does not, in itself, add to the probability that it is true. Theists prove that all the time, as they have a lot of supporters world wide, for a concept that may well be utter fantasy.

One of the points against "consciousness is what the brain does" is that correlation doesn't prove causation. — Art48

Quantum entanglement is a correlation. Do you accept that quantum entanglement really happens?

For example, imagine a mousetrap of the old kind: a wooden base, a spring connected to a hammer, cheese bait that triggers the hammer. Also imagine the mouse trap is conscious. It experiences anticipation when triggered, and peace after catching a mouse. There are physical correlates: the spring has more potential energy when set (anticipation) and less potential energy (peace) after it’s been triggered. Spring potential energy might perfectly correlate with feelings of anticipation and peace, but would not explain how a mouse trap could experience those feelings. — Art48

What a bizarre scenario to suggest, A conscious mousetrap!!!
How about a conscious planet such as Mother Earth, sometime referred to as a living planet as opposed to a planet CONTAINING life. Do you consider GAIA real? Is the planet Earth alive via your independent substance? Is Venus alive? It is certainly animated and active.
Would your mousetrap, or planet Earth/Venus not have to demonstrate a list of abilities, for humans to consider it to be inherently alive? Or would you be satisfied with an evidence level, such as something akin to inter-planetary morphic resonance, which we cannot yet detect, or understand the workings of?
What is your own 'standard of proof,' that allows you to increase the credence level you assign to a particular proposal?

Even if we had a perfect correlation, such as "firing of these specific synapses in this specific part of the brain corresponds with tasting vanilla and only with tasting vanilla" that would fail to explain why the synapses firing is experienced as vanilla. — Art48

I am sure you would agree that answering why questions is the most difficult task in science.
Why does the universe exist at all? is not a question a hard working research scientist is keen to try to answer, leading to such exclamations as "aw shut up and calculate."
I assume the answer to why a certain brain state in a particular brain correlates to and corresponds to the taste of vanilla in one brain and the exact same setting in another brain corresponds to a taste like coconut or almond to the person involved. Such could be dependent on other signal inputs at the time, skewing the predicted/expected outcome of 'vanilla' for that particular brain setting. I am of course merely speculating. I don't want this 'cross contamination from other sensory inputs,' speculation to be considered as my 'hypothesis' or my 'theory.' :halo:

I genuinely find your questions interesting, but I'm afraid this OP has departed from its origins too much.
I would like to know your opinion about my initial questions. Thank you! — Eugen

Ok, I will do my best to comply with your request:

There are many theories that try to explain consciousness starting from non-consciousness. E.g.: identity theory, functionalism, computationalism, and others are even stranger, like Joscha Bach's virtualism. These seem to explain consciousness without mentioning the emergence from non-conscious to conscious, sometimes giving me the impression that they can be explained without this phenomenon, be it weak or strong. — Eugen

Do you consider an 'impression' that something is plausible, to be convincing enough that it CAN be done? I don't think consciousness can be explained, without the concept of emergence. The only alternative that makes any sense to me, would be the suggestion that the source of consciousness is eternal, and did not 'emerge.' Do you think there could have been an aspect, of whatever started THIS universe, that was aware of its own existence? That proposal seems so irrational to me.
Surely if such an independent substance/entity exists then the question is, why is it hidden from us?
If it is the source of all intent and purpose that exists in the universe, then why is it so undetectable?
It's the source of my and your consciousness, but it is INDEPENDENT of us, and it cannot (so far) be detected by us. What a useless crappy substance! Don't you agree?

Q1. Is it possible to build a theory that starts with fundamental non-consciousness and reaches consciousness without going through the classic weak emergent or strong emergent? — Eugen

Sure, its called god did it, and I think it's BS. Apart from god did it, there are less annoying ideas such as an entity in the form of an independent substance, and even more fringe ideas such as enformationism or DIMP (a DIMentionless Point source that exists 'outside' of our universe but does act as an input/output port for such phenomena as consciousness).

Q2. Does any of the above theories (virtualism, computationalism, functionalism, etc.) manage to bypass emergence (weak or strong)? — Eugen

Not in a way that convinces me personally. Is my standard of proof, that enables me to adjust the credence level I assign to a particular posit, superior to yours, no, probably not. We can only continue to plant our flag of support where we choose to and debate how wise our choices are, as we do, on threads on sites like this one. Most of us are genuinely seeking truth, yes?

One of the points against "consciousness is what the brain does" is that correlation doesn't prove causation. — Art48
Quantum entanglement is a correlation. Do you accept that quantum entanglement really happens? — universeness

Yes, it happens. How is that relevant to the question of if correlation proves causation or not?

What a bizarre scenario to suggest, A conscious mousetrap!!! — universeness

In the mousetrap thought experiment, there is a perfect correlation between potential energy and the feelings of anticipation and peace. It was meant to illustrate that correlation doesn't prove causation. It also illustrates how correlation might utterly fail to explain a phenomena, as I also note in the next response.

Even if we had a perfect correlation, such as "firing of these specific synapses in this specific part of the brain corresponds with tasting vanilla and only with tasting vanilla" that would fail to explain why the synapses firing is experienced as vanilla. — Art48
I am sure you would agree that answering why questions is the most difficult task in science. — universeness

The point is, again, correlation and causation. To use another example (which you may also find bizarre), suppose a woman in Germany using her toaster corresponds perfectly with headaches I experience. The correlation leaves entirely unexplained how her using a toaster thousands of miles away, could cause my headache. Now, substitute "certain of my synapses firing" for "toaster" and "the taste of vanilla" for "headache". Is the taste of vanilla any better explained than my headaches?

Correlation does not proves causation. We may one day perfectly understand how consciousness corresponds to physical, chemical, and biological brain processes, but how such processes can possibly cause consciousness might remain as mysterious as today. (Of course, this is not to say we shouldn't study how brain processes impact consciousness.)

P.S. Leibniz's Mill makes points similar to my own.

Thank you very much for your answer!

Do you consider an 'impression' that something is plausible, to be convincing enough that it CAN be done? — universeness

In order to be as certain as possible in regard to a thing, I sometimes become very doubtful of my own logic. When this happens, I go on TPF and open an OP :lol:

Do you think there could have been an aspect, of whatever started THIS universe, that was aware of its own existence? — universeness

Even if that's the case, our consciousness is still emergent. I don't know if reality is self-aware.

why is it hidden from us? — universeness

It's not hidden, it's actually the only thing we can be sure of.

then why is it so undetectable? — universeness

If you're talking about consciousness, it is not undetectable.

It's the source of my and your consciousness, but it is INDEPENDENT of us, and it cannot (so far) be detected by us. What a useless crappy substance! Don't you agree? — universeness

No, I don't.

Most of us are genuinely seeking truth, yes? — universeness

I do, I don't know about everyone, but I'm sure some do and some are just looking for confirmation bias.

Guys, thank you so much for your answers!

Unless wants to add something, I consider this thread closed.

Thank you again!

Not at all. You're free to raise the question, just that to do so without grounds makes it an idle question. By all means ask whatever you want.

https://www.hindawi.com/journals/complexity/2022/9956885/ — Pantagruel

This is an interesting paper - thanks!

This is an interesting paper - thanks! — SophistiCat

:up:

Yes, it happens. How is that relevant to the question of if correlation proves causation or not? — Art48

If you accept quantum entanglement really happens, then does it matter if it happens via what we define as 'correlation' or what we define as 'causation?' The full details of the process/mechanism that causes quantum entanglement remains elusive, but it's real so I don't care much about the use of cautionary (but warranted) terms such as correlation instead of causation, until we know more of the details involved.
To me 'correlation' is merely a diluted form of 'causation.' They both indicate a relationship between variable properties of two or more 'connected' entities.

From the difference between correlation and causation:
Correlation refers to the relationship between two statistical variables. The two variables are then dependent on each other and change together. A positive correlation of two variables, therefore, means that an increase in A also leads to an increase in B. The association is undirected. It is therefore also true in the reverse case and an increase in variable B also changes the slope of A to the same extent.

Causation, on the other hand, describes a cause-effect relationship between two variables. Causation between A and B, therefore, means that the increase in A is also the cause of the increase in B.

Correlation provides no evidence at all, that the source of consciousness may be an entity manifest as an independent substance.

You are correct, I did find your toaster/headache example bizarre, and if investigated, then I would bet real money on 'no correlation' at all being found. I think it would turn out that the headaches were stress related, based on a person being irrationally annoyed (perhaps due to a childhood experience during a school trip to Germany) that women in Germany use annoyingly noisy toasters. :lol: and every time they recall the memory, they get a headache! aw! :flower:

Do you think there could have been an aspect, of whatever started THIS universe, that was aware of its own existence?
— universeness

Even if that's the case, our consciousness is still emergent. I don't know if reality is self-aware. — Eugen

I don't understand the logic of your conclusion here. If the big bang singularity was conscious, then we 'inherited' our consciousness from that property of the singularity. It did not emerge from 13.8 billion years of very large variety, combining in every way possible, via random happenstance. I think there is 0 evidence, that the origin of our universe was self-aware. All consciousness in the universe comes from lifeforms. Those who suggest otherwise have the burden of proof. They must provide a coherent list of properties, that an entity/independent substance/esoteric/god must demonstrate, to be labelled conscious, and then demonstrate that their targeted entity has the required properties.
What would a tree or a planet, have to demonstrate, for example, to convince YOU, that it is alive and conscious?

why is it hidden from us?
— universeness
It's not hidden, it's actually the only thing we can be sure of.
then why is it so undetectable?
— universeness
If you're talking about consciousness, it is not undetectable. — Eugen

I am referring to the SOURCE of consciousness being hidden and undetectable. If the source is already known to you then why did you author this thread?

Thank you for answering! Because it is not related to the topic directly, I will answer you in private.

Ok.

I don't see how it is possible to "bypass" emergence, of any kind.

Just as liquid can arise in a specific combination of molecules, which lack liquidity individually, so does consciousness arise in a specific configuration of matter, while the separate parts of matter constituting a brain are not themselves conscious.

It's a fact about the world as well as a fact of our cognitive makeup, that we cannot understand how this could be possible. Too bad for our understanding.

Perhaps consciousness is something that networked cooperative/competitive brains do. I think was already implicit, but perhaps emphasizing sociality is helpful. Is the metaphor of the thin client helpful here ? What about cloud computing ? If we approach consciousness as language or software, something not in but between bodies, does that help ? I believe this is implicit in the theme of enaction.

Maybe the opening poster will benefit from a step away from the usual egocentric veil-of-ideas Cartesianism (I don't mean 'egocentric' ethically but just in terms of a focus on [oxymoronic?] individual consciousness.)