Yep. I was asking what those grounds actually are, in this case. I'm aware they will only ever be those grounds which 'seem to one to be grounds' but I haven't had any such grounds yet.
Saying "it seems to me" only tells me that there exist such grounds (in a rational person), it doesn't tell me what they are. — Isaac
. It seems clear to me that many of our perceptions have specific, enduring sources, and that specificity grounds our property concepts. — Dfpolis
Since when does "it seems to me" constitute grounds? — Isaac
The answer to the first question is Yes. — Ludwig V
First, you assume that "justify" means "conclusively justify". That's not obvious and not universally accepted. I waver somewhat on this. — Ludwig V
I don't see how to make sense of this.
If we decide that something is true on the basis of some observation, and subsequent observations show that it is not true, then we were wrong.
Our observations do not generally change what is true, but what is believed. — Banno
It conveys that I have evaluated his justification and believe (but do not know) that his justification is, indeed, a justification, but not necessarily a sufficient justification. — Ludwig V
"He is justified in believing that p" does not convey that I have proof that he has a proof. It does not convey that p is true, only that it might be true. — Ludwig V
I am interested in statements. — Ludwig V
If we change it to He is sufficiently justified in believing that p, then it does convey that I have proof that he has proof. That then also conveys that p is true. Thus, the truth criterion is, in cases of sufficient justification, redundant. — Ø implies everything
Is there even one standard for "sufficient justification"? — Pantagruel
I'm not clear what you mean by substantive-performative knowledge. — Ludwig V
You are committing a fallacy of Ambiguity. You are using "truth" as an ideal (absolute)... — Nickolasgaspar
What is that, if not an absolute definition of truth?...truth and knowledge are observer relative evaluations, limited by our current observations. — Nickolasgaspar
So our observations can not change the (Ultimate) unknown truth.... — Nickolasgaspar
In real life ONLY claims and Arguments can be true or not. — Nickolasgaspar
"He is sufficiently justified in believing that p" conveys that you believe he has sufficient proof and that you are not convinced that p is true, (...) — Ludwig V
...If it is unvalid...But not truth. The assumptions and the conclusions can be true, but not the argument. — Banno
Never accused you for an argument. I don't even know what you are arguing about because your responses are short and irrelevant to my points.Do not attribute to me arguments I have not made — Banno
I will need to revisit my critique on you. I am sure I address something different. I give you the benefit of the doubt and I will return by quoting my critique on your specific statement.I have written extensively on this forum about the logic of truth, defending Davidson and Tarski and attempting to articulate their approach with WIttgensien's meaning as use. If you wish to continue such discussions, have a look at what I have actually said. — Banno
As the diagnostician, empirical-situational and implementable in some way. Instrumental knowledge. — Pantagruel
As a proposition, the sentence does not convey that I am convinced of anything. As a statement, one could argue that the omission hints at a lack of personal conviction. However, any such argument would be based on subjective experience; i.e. how a person subjectively reads into the omission of details. Personally, I would disagree, but as said, this is subjective. — Ø implies everything
I want to be sure we are on the same page...because it doesn't feel that we are now. — Nickolasgaspar
My point is that truth and knowledge are observer relative evaluations, limited by our current observations. — Nickolasgaspar
First, there is a sense in which knowledge is observer-relative but truth isn't. Both knowing and believing something can be represented as a relation between someone and a proposition: Nick knows that Paris is in France; Banno believes that apples are a fruit. But truth does not have this relational characteristic. It's true that Paris is in France and that apples are fruit. Statements of truth differ from statements of knowledge or belief in this important regard: Knowledge and belief are always relative to the one who knows or believes. Truth has no such constraint. — Banno
- Of course it is fixed to an observer, any evaluated quality is. Without an observer you don't have an evaluation to begin with...or the actual statement to evaluate.And second, truth is not always fixed by observation. Specific things can be true, or false, regardless of their having been observed. Now to be sure we might only know that something is true as a result of making an observation. The observation can serve as the justification for our claim to know or believe what is observed. But the observation does not generally fix the truth vale. — Banno
I don't think folk can provide a definition of truth, at least not one beyond the simple T-sentence: "P" is true IFF P. This is so because of the special place attributing truth to a statement has in language.Do you agree with the definition that Truth is an evaluation term of a specific quality? if not pls provide your definition — Nickolasgaspar
idealistic thought — Nickolasgaspar
I don't think folk can provide a definition of truth, at least not one beyond the simple T-sentence: "P" is true IFF P. This is so because of the special place attributing truth to a statement has in language. — Banno
- truth is the evaluation of a specific quality of a statement while a belief is the result after we accept/ being convinced by that specific quality of the statement (to be true).But if, as it seems from the remainder of your post, "evaluation" is to be understood as a relation between a statement and someone, then as explained, that's not truth, but belief. — Banno
Of course it changed. The claim for Geocentrism is no longer accepted as true. What also changed was our available data (knowledge) which in turn changed the truth value of that specific claim.So folk apparently used to believe geocentrism. Now they believe heliocentrism, or something more complex still. While the belief has changed, the truth hasn't. Our evaluation changed, but the truth didn't. — Banno
Of course it changed. — Nickolasgaspar
Νο obviously I don't. Evaluations of truth aren't defined by the ideal of absolute knowledge but by whatever facts you currently have access to. — Nickolasgaspar
-The facts/data available to us changed.Advances in technology improve our observations which in turn allow us to gather more data .Hang on. The fact changed? So the fact was that the Sun went around the earth, and now the Earth goes around the sun? — Banno
Hindsight, sure. Unfortunately our evaluation on the quality of Truth is limited by our ability to observe the whole picture.I put it to you that the Earth ahs always gone around the sun, that this was true even when we believed that the Sun went around the Earth, and that the fact, the truth, has not changed. — Banno
Again you are confusing the act of accepting/believing in a claim because it is true with the abstract ideal value of truth.That our evaluation of the truth of a statement is not the very same as the truth of a statement. That belief is different to truth. — Banno
Again you are confusing the act of accepting/believing in a claim because it is true with the abstract ideal value of truth. — Nickolasgaspar
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