How it is achieved?
https://www.inverse.com/mind-body/neurobiology-of-consciousness-study-explained
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-brain-generation-loss-13009/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3722571/
https://www.inverse.com/mind-body/tiny-brain-area-could-enable-consciousness
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-brain-mapping-21146/
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-brain-network-17491/
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-conductor-16352/
https://neurosciencenews.com/brain-organization-consciousness-15132/
https://neurosciencenews.com/l5p-neuron-conscious-awareness-14997/
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-brain-patterns-10756/
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-brain-patterns-10698/
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-neuroscience-7189/
https://neurosciencenews.com/consciousness-time-slices-4034/
https://neurosciencenews.com/how-the-brain-loses-and-regains-consciousness/
https://neurosciencenews.com/math-models-brain-state-22789/
https://neurosciencenews.com/eyes-consciousness-22032/
https://www.cmu.edu/dietrich/news/news-stories/2017/june/brain-decoding-complex-thoughts.html
https://aeon.co/essays/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-is-a-distraction-from-the-real-one
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8121175/ — Nickolasgaspar
But they are given general anesthetic for certain surgeries, and we bury them when they are dead because we don't think they will mind -- are no longer 'conscious.' — green flag
As I see it, the problem is assuming some kind of a dualism and then 'deriving' some limitation of science. — green flag
I’m not convinced by the claim that my first person experience of pain just is some particular arrangement of atoms (and other particles). — Michael
It might be that my first person experience of pain depends on and is caused by such an arrangement of atoms, but it doesn’t then follow that they are one-and-the-same. — Michael
I think this is muddled. It's not consciousness that ceases, but the self. — bert1
Perhaps you are implicitly assuming that I have the same pain beetle in my box, but assumption is parasitic on ordinary criteria for being in pain, such as talking about it or taking aspirin. — green flag
I can be in pain without talking about it or taking aspirin. — Michael
Yes, that's part of the grammar of the word. — green flag
It doesn’t have anything to do with grammar. I can be in pain even if I don’t have a language. It’s not as if pre-linguistic humans never had headaches. — Michael
I really don’t understand this devotion to Wittgenstein and this obsession with language. — Michael
You are assuming that 'pain' is like a label somehow pinned on something simultaneously understood to be radically elusive and ineffable. — green flag
I really don’t understand this devotion to Wittgenstein and this obsession with language. — Michael
Philosophy unravels the knots in our thinking; hence its results must be simple, but its activity is as complicated as the knots that it unravels.
I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again 'I know that that’s a tree', pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: 'This fellow isn’t insane. We are only doing philosophy.
When I’m in pain it’s pretty obvious. — Michael
But that it’s possible isn’t that it’s true, and if it’s not true then it is both the case that I can talk about and understand your pain and the case that your pain is private to you. — Michael
Let me try to paraphrase this. If 'pain' does not refer to different private experiences but rather to the same private experience, then I can sensibly talk about your pain, because it's the same as my pain.
How is this not a version of : if I happen to be right, then I happen to be right ? — green flag
I think this is a motte and bailey situation, where the motte is the ordinary use of 'pain' and the bailey is the dualistic metaphysical version. — green flag
Suppose we create a mechanical brain that we believe is functionally equivalent to a normal working brain. For those who think science can explain consciousness, how would we scientifically determine whether the mechanical brain is conscious or not? — RogueAI
If 'pain' does not refer to different private experiences but rather to the same private experience, then I can sensibly talk about your pain, because it's the same as my pain. — green flag
I don't need to know that something is the case to talk about it, or be right about it. — Michael
So the dead do or do not have consciousness ? — green flag
It does not matter if it is the same or not. What matters is what caused it and how to alleviate it. — Fooloso4
The dead don't exist any more. But as a good panpsychist I think that the rotting corpse is conscious. Just not conscious of very much. — bert1
If you happen to have a brother then I am talking about him, and if he happens to be older than you then what I say is true. — Michael
"You can't know if my red is your red because seeing is private experience." — green flag
Here's what doesn't make sense : "It really hurts to chew broken glass, so he stuffed another handful in his mouth." — green flag
The "ordinary" use of pain is to refer to that private, mental phenomena. — Michael
Ambiguous use of the word "sense" here — Michael
I would like to emphasize that you seem to be quoting my paraphrase of another poster in order to correct me. (?) — green flag
If your pain is radically yours, radically private, then I cannot 'rationally' comment on it at all. — green flag
Perhaps you are implicitly assuming — green flag
What you want to say, — green flag
You are assuming that 'pain' is like a label — green flag
But I insist that we have public criteria for when it's correct to assert someone is in pain. — green flag
But on your view we couldn't say that. Because your view allows for that person's pain to be what we call ecstasy. — green flag
Pain is "radically private" in that when I am in pain it does not hurt someone else. Pain is public in that we know from our own experience what it means to be in pain. — Fooloso4
"Correct" in this sense means "appropriate" or "justified", not "true". — Michael
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