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If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.
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https://web.stanford.edu/~paulsko/Wittgenstein293.html






'Pain' is not (does not make sense as ) the name of an invisible beetle. It's the name for a situation approached with aspirin and Novocain and hugs.

Can I deny 'Inner Experience' ? Probably not, because I don't know what I am supposed to mean by it.

It's the grammar of 'pain,' yes, that it tends to belong a particular person. — green flag

The grammar is based on the fact that I don't feel someone else's pain. It does not "tend to" and does not "belong" to a person. It is not a possession.

But we don't know from our own experience what it means to be in 'pain.' — green flag

Of course we do. Imagine a tribe where no one feels pain. The would have no idea what you are talking about.

In other words, the concept is conventional and public. — green flag

It is, but only because we experience pain. There would be no conventional and public concept of pain in a tribe where no one experiences pain.

The grammar is based on the fact that I don't feel someone else's pain. — Fooloso4

I'm frankly surprised to hear that claim from you. I thought you were down with Wittgenstein.

It is, but only because we experience pain. There would be no conventional and public concept of pain in a tribe where no one experiences pain. — Fooloso4

I don't think you've understood the beetle and box analogy. Do you believe in demonic possession too ? Phlogiston ? See what I mean ? Talk alone is not a case for the existence of something mysterious.

Imagine a tribe where no one feels pain. The would have no idea what you are talking about. — Fooloso4

I suppose those born blind don't know anything about color ? Let's ask the latest chatbot.

You seem to be hinting at truth apart from language, but to me that's a round square. Statements are true sometimes. Or we take them to be true...to express what is the case, etc. — green flag

Not really. I'm simply saying that it can be appropriate to say one thing, given the evidence available to us, even though that thing is false.

If someone is crying it is appropriate to say that they must be sad. But we're wrong, because they're just acting.

I'm simply saying that it can be appropriate to say one thing, given the evidence available to us, even though that thing is false. — Michael

Oh, well yes. I agree that we can have warranted beliefs that turn out to be incorrect.

OK. How conscious are the latest famous bots ? Do they have selves ? — green flag

You mean like ChatGPT? Not sure. It's a good question. I think probably not, although the matter in the chips that run the program is.

If someone is crying it is appropriate to say that they must be sad. But we're wrong, because they're just acting. — Michael

There are two issues here, though. Imagine a person is not acting and still insists, while smiling and laughing, that they are suffering 'excruciating pain.' If they 'have' to be acting or not understanding English, that just supports my point.

You mean like ChatGPT? Not sure. It's a good question. I think probably not, although the matter in the chips that run the program is. — bert1

Yes. OK, so the matter but not the bot.

Imagine a person is not acting and still insists, while smiling and laughing, that they are suffering 'excruciating pain.' If they 'have' to be acting or not understanding English, that just supports my point. — green flag

I don't see how it supports your point. As I said before, nobody would ever learn to associate the word "pain" with the feeling that causes them to smile and laugh. If anything our common use of the word "pain" supports my assumption that other people feel the same thing I do, and is how I am able to talk about and understand their private experiences. Even though they're radically private, they're not radically different.

Although I admit it might not be evidence that they feel the same thing I do; it's only evidence that what they feel causes them to react in the same way as me.

From The Blue Book (Witt)
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What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'."—Well, let's assume the child is a genius and itself invents a name for the sensation! —But then, of course, he couldn't make himself understood when he used the word.—So does he understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to anyone?—But what does it mean to say that he has 'named his pain'?—How has he done this naming of pain?! And whatever he did, what was its purpose?—When one says "He gave a name to his sensation" one forgets that a great deal of stagesetting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed. 258. Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign "S" and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation.——I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated.—But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition.—How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation—and so, as it were, point to it inwardly.—But what is this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign.—Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the sensation.—But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'. Are the rules of the private language impressions of rules?— The balance on which impressions are weighed is not the impression of a balance.. "Well, I believe that this is the sensation S again."
...
What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation? For "sensation" is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands.—And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S", he has something—and that is all that can be said. "Has" and "something" also belong to our common language.—So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound.—But such a sound is an expression only as it occurs in a particular language-game, which should now be described.

As I said before, nobody would ever learn to associate the word "pain" with the feeling that causes them to smile and laugh. — Michael

Wait a minute, though. So they learn what 'pain' means from other people ? But haven't you been saying (basically) that it's a label on something immaterial and internal ? That it refers to some state of an immaterial ghost ?
But how could a parent ever check if the child was labelling states of that ghost correctly ? The whole theory of the ghost as the ground of meaning is like the idea of phlogiston or the ether. It plays no real role. 'Pain' is a mark or noise that a little talking primate might make to be comforted or medicated. We should imagine how meaning could evolve and develop on the outside, between cooperating members of a group, and then 'into' the personality.

Wait a minute, though. So they learn what 'pain' means from other people ? But haven't you been saying (basically) that it's label on something internal ? That it refers to a state of an immaterial ghost ?
But how could a parent ever check if the child was labelling states of the ghost correctly ? The whole theory of the ghost as the ground of meaning is like the idea of phlogiston or the ether. It plays no real role. 'Pain' is a mark or noise that a little primate might make to be comforted or medicated. — green flag

I burn my hand. I feel pain. I am told by my parents that I must be in pain. I learn to associate the word "pain" with the feeling.

I don't understand what's difficult to understand about this.

But certainly not in principle. Consciousness is a phenomenon of the brain — Manuel

or it's a facet of matter in general. We don't know that consciousness is limited to brains. We don't know what causes it. Often when this is mentioned, the response is that we know that you can be made unconscious by various actions. Actually all we know is that we don't remember things from that period. Neuroscience says a lot about cognitive functions and their connection to neurons and glial cells and...so on. But that there is awareness/experiencing... is still unexplained.

I burn my hand. I feel pain. I am told by my parents that I must be in pain. I learn to associate the word "pain" with the feeling.

I don't understand what's difficult to understand about this. — Michael

Bornblind people can tell you that an object can't be all red and all blue at the same time. We live in the age where chatbots are becoming able to explain jokes.

Saussure's structuralism is decades old now. I'm not saying anyone has a final answer, but the interpretation of meaning in terms of attaching labels to secret immateriality (Locke?) has been pretty well debunked, it seems to me. It's hard to see, given the motte and bailey entanglement. I'd say read Ryle's The Concept of Mind and see if you don't change your mind.

'Pain' is not the name of a beetle. It's the name for a situation approached with aspirin and Novocain and hugs. — green flag

It is the name of something felt, the name of something that leads us to reach for aspirin and Novocain.

I'm frankly surprised to hear that claim from you. I thought you were down with Wittgenstein. — green flag

He is not proposing a theory of pain. He asks us to look at what actually happens. This is why I said that a concerned parent has a better idea of what pain is than someone whose concern is conceptual.

You won't like me saying this, but I don't think you've understood the beetle analogy. — green flag

Unlike the beetle in a box we do not know what pain is only from our own experience. Why would anyone not confused by philosophical confusion think otherwise?

I suppose those born blind don't know anything about color ? — green flag

If everyone in the tribe was blind what would they know about color?

Bornblind people can tell you that an object can't be all red and all blue at the same time. — green flag

OK? I can tell you that a particle can't be both positively charged and negatively charged. It doesn't mean that I know what either of those things mean. They are quite literally meaningless terms for me. I just know of them, and that, whatever they are, they're incompatible, because that's what I've been told.

Repetition of facts isn't real understanding.

If everyone in the tribe was blind what would they know about color? — Fooloso4

Assuming a tribe could survive without eyesight (maybe they live in a system of caves), I don't see why they should have a problem learning about the color concepts in the English language. They could understand that a man got a ticket for running a red light.

We can also use aliens without noses here. They could infer that one character in a play was frowning because another farted.

The latest chatbots know more about color than either of us.

It doesn't mean that I know what either of those things mean. They are with literally meaningless terms for me. I just know of them, and that, whatever they are, they're contradictory. — Michael

I'd say that learning about what they mean would be learning more structural facts like the one you do know. I started a thread on the being of meaning because I think it's deep endless question. If structuralism is true (which I think it mostly is), then meaning is not concentrated in a single term. Nor is it directly Present to some Inner Eye or intuition. The idea of 'mental experiences...which are the same for all' is arguably the foundational myth or superstition of philosophy. It's a generalization of platonism , probably a necessary theory or stepping stone. The assumption was that one could work from the inside out. But we primates are trained from the outside in. 'I' am mostly inherited software. Monkey hear monkey say. I am thrown into the world and learn how to join the dance which will outlive as it preceded me.

How conscious are the latest famous bots ? Do they have selves ? — green flag

Let's ask:

Q: Are you, ChatGPT, conscious? Are you a self?

A: As an artificial intelligence language model, I am not conscious in the same way that humans are, nor do I have a sense of self. I am a collection of algorithms and data structures that process input and generate output based on that input. While I can simulate conversation and provide helpful responses, I do not have the ability to experience consciousness or self-awareness.

Also discussed extensively in Pierre Normand's thread on GPT4.

To quote my favourite book (Dune):

Think you of the fact that a deaf person cannot hear. Then, what deafness may we not all possess? What senses do we lack that we cannot see and cannot hear another world all around us?

It's not unreasonable to assume that there is some organism in the universe that has some sense that we don't.

How would you go about learning what it's like to have such a sense? Is being told that apples are X and bananas are Y going to help you know what it means to be X or Y, and what it's like to experience X-ness and Y-ness?

I certainly don't think it would help me. I'd just know to repeat the supposed fact that apples are X and bananas are Y, which I think is all that ever happens in the case of the blind describing colour. They're told facts about colour by the sighted and repeat them. Much like me repeating facts about science that I don't actually understand at all.

Real understanding requires actually having such a sense.

Or to give a more grounded example, I don't know what it feels like to lose a child because I've never lost one (or had one). I've seen (on TV at least) people who have lost a child, and the public expression of their grief, but the claim that I therefore know how they feel is ridiculous, because I don't. And I never will unless I lose a child.

It's not unreasonable to assume that there is some organism in the world that has some sense that we don't. — Michael

Yeah, you sometimes wonder what it would be like to be a bat.

:cool: :rofl:

OK, science geeks, how do we determine whether an AI is conscious? What do we do? What tests do we give it?

OK, science geeks, how do we determine whether an AI is conscious? — RogueAI

If you ran a simulation of kidney function on your cloud computer network, would you expect it to produce urine?

I would not. Bernardo uses that analogy a lot.

Of course neuroscience or even its crude implementation falls short of understanding the true nature of consciousness. I think you’ve hit the nail on the head there. (No pun intended)

Your opening post clarifies the distinction between the mind body dualism.

For me the whole thing is holistic, despite the clever words we may use such as quantum consciousness etc.

Artificial intelligence (slightly off topic here) will always fall short as machines are silicon based whereas we as humans are biological entities and carbon based.

( 6 ) What it feels like to be in a reflexive, ongoing, intentional, historicising, projective, story telling and unitary affective state. What is it like.

I imagine much of the dispute regarding whether neuroscience and its philosophical analysis suffices for an explanation concerns whether ( 6 ) should be included in the list. — fdrake

What is awkwardly referred to as 'what it is like' is actually just describing 'being'. It is what 'being' refers to, when we use the term 'human being'. The human being is the subject who makes judgements, conducts scientific experiments, devises hypotheses and so on. But at the same time, the subject is never within the frame, so to speak, on the obvious grounds of not being among the objects of analysis. This was the basic thrust of Husserl's critique of naturalism, and one of the reasons phenomenology is most often cited as the basis for an alternative approach to objective analysis.

First of all we not only analyze first person experience.... — Nickolasgaspar

Mental is just a label we place on properties produced by specific physical processes in the brain. — Nickolasgaspar

You have a blind spot in respect of the issue at hand. 'Facing up to the hard problem of consciousness' is not trivial or redundant, but a statement about the inherent limitations of objective, third-person science with respect to the nature of first-person experience.

There's some scientific validation of the fact that this really is a hard problem. As it is relevant to the topic, I'll quote at length from The neural binding problem(s), Jerome Feldman. There's a section on 'the subjective unity of perception' which begins as follows:

There are intractable problems in all branches of science; for Neuroscience a major one is the mystery of subjective personal experience. This is one instance of the famous mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996) concerning the relation of our subjective experience (aka qualia) to neural function. Different visual features (color, size, shape, motion, etc.) are computed by largely distinct neural circuits, but we experience an integrated whole. This is closely related to the problem known as the illusion of a stable visual world (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008).

The reference to Chalmers is to the 'facing up to the hard problem' paper. He continues:

There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, high-resolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008). The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information. The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry. ....

Traditionally, the Neural Binding Problem concerns instantaneous perception and does not consider integration over saccades (rapid movement of the eye between fixation points). But in both cases the hard problem is explaining why we experience the world the way we do. As is well known, current science has nothing to say about subjective (phenomenal) experience and this discrepancy between science and experience is also called the “explanatory gap” and “the hard problem” (Chalmers 1996). There is continuing effort to elucidate the neural correlates of conscious experience; these often invoke some version of temporal synchrony as discussed above.

There is a plausible functional story for the stable world illusion. First of all, we do have a (top-down) sense of the space around us that we cannot currently see, based on memory and other sense data—primarily hearing, touch, and smell. Also, since we are heavily visual, it is adaptive to use vision as broadly as possible. Our illusion of a full field, high resolution image depends on peripheral vision—to see this, just block part of your peripheral field with one hand. Immediately, you lose the illusion that you are seeing the blocked sector. When we also consider change blindness, a simple and plausible story emerges. Our visual system (somehow) relies on the fact that the periphery is very sensitive to change. As long as no change is detected it is safe to assume that nothing is significantly altered in the parts of the visual field not currently attended.

But this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003).

So, contrary to all of the journal articles that you continue to cite, the subjective unity of perception, which is a major aspect of the 'hard problem', remains unexplained, and indeed inexplicable, according to this paper, which essentially provides scientific validation for the argument made in Chalmer's original article.

Essentially your approach is both 'scientistic' and positivist. You claim that if something cannot be made subject to scientific analysis, then it amounts to 'special pleading' or 'making excuses' or 'introducing red herrings'. But many of the philosophical objections to scientism - which is basically the belief that all that can be known, can be known by means of science - are cogent and well documented. If you spent a bit more time reading philosophy, and a bit less evangalising neuroscientific reductionism, you might begin to appreciate that.

:up:

not reading is what got you here in the first place Bert.