Ok you jump from the underlying ontology of matter...to reality. From a intrinsic feature of the cosmos to an abstract concept . Reality is an observer dependent term which is defined by our ability to interact and verify with things in existence. A fundamental nature of reality will never change our descriptions and narratives on how reality interacts with us and vice versa.We don't even really know what 'matter' is. Could be quantum fields or vibrating 10 dimensional strings. Or maybe everything in physics is a kind of analogy, limited by human cognition and technology. Maybe we can't get at what reality fundamentally is. — Marchesk
Instead of using the term Brain (material structure) Manuel used the word "matter"....and the conversation rolled down the hill reaching "quantum levels" rendering the conversation irrelevant to the biological property of consciousness.think there are historical reasons that lead us to conclude that consciousness is a property of matter. But it also depends on what you think matter (or more broadly "the physical) encompasses. — Manuel
t turns out it is helpful for organisms who don't acquire nutrients, protection and mates through root in the ground, thorns/toxic substances and airborne pollen......to be able to be aware of their needs and environment and to be conscious of which action and behavior in order to will allow them to acquire food, shelter, avoid preditors and find mates. — Nickolasgaspar
This is why I opened my post by saying "it depends on the definition".Why should we accept that definition for machine consciousness? It's not the same thing as qualia. You just created an arbitrary definition and assigned it to 'consciousness'. It doesn't answer the question of whether a machine can have qualia. — Marchesk
A fundamental nature of reality will never change our descriptions and narratives on how reality interacts with us and vice versa. — Nickolasgaspar
If you want to criticize something, you first have to demonstrate that you understand it. — Wayfarer
Well if nature is fundamentally physical — Marchesk
I find this kind if thinking really insulting. Neuroscientists are clever enough people, their intellectual capabilities should not be in question. — Isaac
And subjective experience is necessary for that? How do organisms without nervous systems survive? Are all living nervous systems conscious? — Marchesk
It doesn't seem objectively unreasonable to me that physical processing should give rise to a rich inner life. It seems clear to me that it can and it does. Note I said "clear," not "obvious" or "established." I certainly could be wrong. I look for reasons why it should seem unreasonable to others and I can come up with two answers. 1) Cognitive scientists seem to be a long way from identifying the neurological mechanisms that manifest as experience. I'm not really sure how true that is, but I don't think it's a good reason. 2) People just can't imagine how something so spectacular, important, and intimate as what it is like to be us could just be something mechanical. — T Clark
And of course the mind, and in particular experience, isn't just something mechanical, just the operation of the nervous system, any more than life is just chemistry. The mind emerges out of neurology. The mind operates according to different rules than our nervous system. We call the study of the mind "psychology." I don't have any problem conceiving of that, even though I don't understand the mechanisms by which it could happen. — T Clark
If there are other reasons for rejecting a neurological basis for phenomenal consciousness, you haven't provided it. You've only really found fault with reasons why scientists say there is one. Your argument is primarily a matter of language, not science.
As for the function issue, we're not really talking about brain function, we're talking about mind function. I'm positing that not neurological function but neurological mechanism and process are the basis of mind function.
I think most would agree that phenomenal consciousness is a valuable mental resource and capability.
An accurate simulation of the organ and its function should also simulate its by product. — Nickolasgaspar
Now ,we can rule out panpsychism or consciousness in structures without similar biological gear, because such structures lack sensory systems(no input) or a central processing units capable to process drives and urges (which are non existent),emotions, capability to store info (memory), to recognize pattern, to use symbolic language, to reason, etc etc. — Nickolasgaspar
You are confusing different properties of mind with Consciousness. Consciousness, according to Neuroscience is the third basic mental property.I think consciousness is awareness/intelligence from the point of view of ones individual identity — Benj96
You are confusing different properties of mind with Consciousness. — Nickolasgaspar
But I don't see a principle by which sensory inputs and processing units couldn't be created by people, in a non-biological creation. Again, I don't think it's plausible, but I don't think it's impossible either. — Manuel
-That is not panpsychism though. Matter is capable for many things under specific conditions but we don't go around talking about i.e. Pancombustism, or Panflatulencism or Panphotosynthesism.As for panpsychism, the reason I don't think some formulation can't be ruled out, is that there is obviously something about matter that when so-combined, leads to experience. Granted, it's in brains that such combinations arise. But even so, if matter did not contain the possibility of consciousness as a potential, then experience couldn't happen even in brains. — Manuel
That is not panpsychism though. Matter is capable for many things under specific conditions but we don't go around talking about i.e. Pancombustism, or Panflatulencism or Panphotosynthesism.
Actually this is a great point you made, because this is the WHOLE argument of our current Scientific Paradigm. — Nickolasgaspar
Science's paradigm states that we don't observe Advance Properties "floating" free in Nature. We constantly verify the need of Physical Structures with functions for such properties to emerge.
This is how we demarcate Supernatural from scientific claims, When Kastrup or Sheldrake or Hoffmann etc project high level features in nature independent of physical low level mechanisms we quickly understand that we deal with a pseudo scientific story. — Nickolasgaspar
You are confusing different properties of mind with Consciousness. Consciousness, according to Neuroscience is the third basic mental property.
Consciousness is the brain's ability to connect stimuli with the rest of our mind properties allowing the emergence of content in our experiences. — Nickolasgaspar
Thanks for interesting post. — bert1
This perhaps is related to arguments from ignorance. I've been told that's what I'm doing several times, and that might be right. Maybe I just haven't read enough neuroscience. Maybe I lack faith in the scientific method which, after all, is easily the best method we have had so far in our history at arriving at reliable/true/useful theories about the world. — bert1
Having said all that, the issues seem to me to be conceptual rather than empirical. Sometimes scientists need philosophers to help them out a bit with the concepts (yeah that's patronising, I don't care. — bert1
I classify phenomenal consciousness as a mental process. That's the kind of a thing I say it is. The category I say it belongs in. One of the characteristics of a mental processes is that they are behaviors or at least that they manifest themselves to us as behaviors.
If it's not a mental process, what kind of a thing is it? What category does it fit in? — T Clark
That may be true of some, but I don't think it's true of many philosophers. People like Brian Cox and Dawkins make much of this point - going on and on about how the wonders of the natural world are not diminished by their physical basis. I think it basically a straw man, no serious woo-mongers actually make this point. — bert1
One example of an important conceptual matter is the idea that consciousness does not, conceptually, seem to admit of borderline cases. — bert1
OK, so you're a non-reductionist about the mind. That's obviously fine but it creates a problem. If mind isn't just the operation of a nervous system, what is it? A simple unsophisticalted identification (the simplest way to be a physicalist) between neural activity and consciousness is no longer an option. One option is to take a hierarchical systems approach, saying that whole systems and sub-systems have properties unique to each 'level' and these have upward and downward causation powers, and that various components of mind, including consciousness, is somehow captured with these concepts. I think apokrisis thinks something along these lines (no doubt I have got it wrong somewhat wrong). — bert1
As a panpsychist I go much further, and assert that any behaviour at all, including the behaviour of atoms, is valuable for the mind of the atom. Everything happens because of consciousness. I've been toying with the idea that all causation is actually psychological. — bert1
The joke I don't get tired of repeating is taken from Churchill: "Panpsychism is the worst theory of consciousness apart from all the others." — bert1
At an elegant dinner party, Lady Astor once leaned across the table to remark, “If you were my husband, Winston, I’d poison your coffee.”
“And if you were my wife, I’d beat the shit out of you,” came Churchill’s unhesitating retort. — Michael O'Donaghue - The Churchill Wit
This comes back to a question I asked Isaac:
I classify phenomenal consciousness as a mental process. That's the kind of a thing I say it is. The category I say it belongs in. One of the characteristics of a mental processes is that they are behaviors or at least that they manifest themselves to us as behaviors.
If it's not a mental process, what kind of a thing is it? What category does it fit in? — T Clark — T Clark
That others may share your opinions does not mean that they are more than opinions. Neuroscience is in its infancy. Our understanding of what matter is and what it is capable of continues to develop. — Fooloso4
This is a really good point. I hadn't thought of it in this way before. — T Clark
This is your argument to dismiss Systematic Knowledge of specialized authorities????( 35 years of advances in rapid pace). — Nickolasgaspar
The ultimate nature of matter is irrelevant to the field of Neuroscience. — Nickolasgaspar
Different properties of Mind have distinct causal mechanisms in our brain. — Nickolasgaspar
...to post your ignorant critique against their Systematic Knowledge — Nickolasgaspar
.Since you don't accept any type of Epistemology — Nickolasgaspar
I never do philosophy on the vague foundations of "all opinions are equal". — Nickolasgaspar
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