What does it mean to understand each of these? What do we expect if something is to be called "understanding"? — Srap Tasmaner

That another dog walked across Lassie's grave, and if I don't go left, I'll be possessed by the spirit of the Zodiac Killer.

Unfortunately, since neither Lassie nor my cloned Neanderthal friend (DNA found mixed in with a frozen mammoth carcass a few months back, angering the ancestral spirits) can communicate that to me, I go right and then the rest is ScyFy B grade movie.

The above, although worthy of a crappy movie plot, illustrates how our language can be filled with all sorts of ideas probably missing from animal communication.

hat is it about (1) meaning-as-use on the one hand, and (2) abstract language features on the other, that makes the two incompatible? This is what I'm trying to get you to articulate. — StreetlightX

I'm thinking of meaning along the lines of how Gerge Lakhoff and Mark Johnson describe metaphors as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another (cross domain mapping), where the domains are based on neural mapping in the brain, wired up to how our perception and motor functions work.

So for example we talk about how we "grasp" new ideas, using our ability to grab objects as a helper for understanding learning a new idea.

Okay, that is not what I expected. Well done?

OK, and what does that have to do with meaning-as-use? This is the last time I'll ask I'm afraid. So far you've yet to present an actual argument - one that doesn't beg the question - and I'm tiring over asking for one.

OK, and what does that have to do with meaning-as-use? — StreetlightX

Meaning as use has it's root in behavior, not cognitive science. I thought I made that clear?

Now if all Witty was arguing is that we assign meaning by how we use words in certain contexts, then no problem. But if he's saying that meaning IS behavior, then that's a problem.

Meaning as use has it's root in behavior, not cognitive science. — Marchesk

Not once in our exchange have you even used the word behaviour, let alone cognitive science. So no, you have in no way made that clear. But again, I see no argument here. I'll excuse myself.

Not once in our exchange have you even used the word behaviour, — StreetlightX

So you weren't ready the rest of the thread? I mentioned behavior many times. Did you miss all the posts on Witty by me and others?

If language is use, how do we distinguish between the kind of communication that animals utilize, and what humans do with words?

When you say language is use, how is language used...is language's primary use for communication or is its primary use as a conveyance for thought? It seems that most of us talk to ourselves all the time, and we only communicate with others some of the time. The conveyance of thought is its primary use and its communicative use is secondary

Perhaps this its the difference between us and animals who may 'talk' to others but they don't seem to talk to themselves at all, at least not in any sort of behavior we can understand.

The conveyance of thought is its primary use and its communicative use is secondary — Cavacava

Agreed. Good point about talking to ourselves. Language is use is something defended by the Wittgenstein followers, although the interpretation may depend on the poster in question. I take it to mean behavior, given the talk of beatles in boxes and the impossibility of private language.

I think some people are thinking of behaviorism when they talk about meaning as use. A hard-core eliminative materialist might think of it that way (ironically).

And other words are just sounds we make in particular social situations, mostly to elicit certain responses from others. — Michael

Great. So then all animals that make sounds in social situations are also using a language.

This is all well and good, but it still doesn't address the realism aspect of language. The things we talk about still occur, or exist, whether we talk about them or not and that is what we mean when we talk about things. If meaning were use, then it would be incorrect to say that we talk about things. What kind of response are you trying to elicit from others when you recall your visit to Rome, or when you describe your mother, or tell them about this philosophy forum? Aren't you trying to elicit a response to the concepts the words create in their head and not just the words themselves? When you say "internet forum", are you just making sounds or do those sounds represent some real thing in the world, like this internet forum? Is an internet forum a use of words, or a real thing that people can go to and share ideas?

Meaning-as-use doesn't entail that words don't refer to things. If I point to a chair then I am referring to a chair, but we don't explain the meaning of a pointing finger by deferring to the chair; we explain the meaning of a pointing finger by deferring to its use.

The word 'chair' is used to refer to some particular chair or chairs or to a generalized imagined instance. So, it would seem that its meaning does depend on its use. But then, its use also depends on its meaning, which shows that although they are codependent they are not one and the same.

The word 'chair' is used to refer to some particular chair or chairs or to a generalized imagined instance. So, it would seem that its meaning does depend on its use. But then, its use also depends on its meaning, which shows that although they are codependent they are not one and the same. — John

Let's say that the way we point to chairs is different to the way we point to everything else. What's the difference between the word "chair" and this particular way of pointing? I wouldn't say there is one. And the point I made above still stands; we don't explain the meaning of the pointing by deferring to the thing(s) pointed to but by its use.

'Chair' can be used in a sentence where it doesn't "point at anything", for example: "What makes a chair a chair?". The use here is very different than "Will you hand me that chair". Are the meanings of 'chair' the same in both examples despite the obviously different uses?

'Chair' can be used in a sentence where it doesn't "point at anything", for example: "What makes a chair a chair?". — John

We can do that with pointing, too. Let's say that if we use this particular way of pointing with one hand and then shake our other hand we are acknowledging that there isn't an actual chair lined up with our pointing finger, and so we are pointing to a hypothetical chair, or chairs in general.

The use here is very different than "Will you hand me that chair". Are the meanings of 'chair' the same in both examples despite the obviously different uses?

This is a misleading question. The sentence "Will you hand me that chair" and the sentence "What makes a chair a chair?" are used differently and so mean different things.

We can do that with pointing, too. Let's say that if we use this particular way of pointing with one hand and then shake our other hand we are acknowledging that there isn't an actual chair lined up with our pointing finger, and so we are pointing to a hypothetical chair, or chairs in general. — Michael

I can't make any sense of this.

This is a misleading question. The sentence "Will you hand me that chair" and the sentence "What makes a chair a chair?" are used differently and so mean different things. — Michael

I was talking about the meaning of the word "chair", not about the meaning of different sentences it is used in.

Now if all Witty was arguing is that we assign meaning by how we use words in certain contexts, then no problem. But if he's saying that meaning IS behavior, then that's a problem. — Marchesk

Here, though, you're surely at a crux where Fafner is right: you are conjuring up an imaginary Wittgenstein in order to make a point of your own. 'Philosophical Investigations' is a complex book and nowhere in it do I remember these 'arguments' that you mention. One thing I'm confident he's saying is that it's difficult to have a clear overview of language, since we only have language to do it with. What you are calling 'meaning' will involve comparing one word with another, or with a group of other words, and asserting that some greater clarity results.

I felt your original question boiled down instead to 'What is a concept?' - but like others I struggle to grasp how that becomes an argument with or about Wittgenstein or meaning-is-use.

Now if all Witty was arguing is that we assign meaning by how we use words in certain contexts, then no problem. But if he's saying that meaning IS behavior, then that's a problem. — Marchesk

I never took Wittgenstein to be forwarding a behaviorist argument And the idea of that would be controversial.

Meaning-as-use doesn't entail that words don't refer to things. If I point to a chair then I am referring to a chair, but we don't explain the meaning of a pointing finger by deferring to the chair; we explain the meaning of a pointing finger by deferring to its use. — Michael

And by referring to something with your words, that is what you mean. Just pointing a finger means one thing - referring. Pointing to a chair means referring to a chair.

Hearing or reading words creates something other than the words in the mind. This association that we develop between the word and what they refer to when we learn our native language is what the words mean.

What about the things we experience that aren't words? What does the yellowness of a banana mean, or it's blackness? What does a grey cloud mean? It seems that things other than words, and how they are used, are imbued with meaning. You don't need language to know what these things mean. You simply need prior experiences with these things to know what they mean. If you never had a prior experience with these things, then you couldn't know what they mean.

This man that never learned a language until late in life understood meaning.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Man_Without_Words
How did he know how to take care of himself long enough to meet someone who understood his dilemma and taught him sign language? How did he or anyone else for that matter, learn a language without first being able to see or hear AND be able to make associations between things they experience (establish meaning)?

Meaning is really just a causal relationship. Why would you say or write anything unless you had what you wanted to say or write about in your head first and what you want to say or write about aren't just other words?

What about the things we experience that aren't words? What does the yellowness of a banana mean, or it's blackness? What does a grey cloud mean? It seems that things other than words and how they are used are imbued with meaning. — Harry Hindu

I'll repeat Wittgenstein again: "the meaning of a word is its use in the language". And to give it greater context, "For a large class of cases--though not for all--in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language."

He's certainly not denying that we can accurately say something like "a grey cloud means that it's going to rain" or "your friendship means a lot to me".

You're creating a straw-man by equivocating.

It seems that things other than words and how they are used are imbued with meaning. — Harry Hindu

Wittgenstein would not disagree. See sections 73-74 from the Investigations that I quoted on p.3, which talk about samples: W' repeatedly makes the point that many different things other than words (such as color samples) can belong to language and be part of the symbolism (see also section 50 about the standard meter in Paris).

What is true though is that for Wittgenstein 'meaning' is not an external relation (e.g. causal) between words and things: if word 'refers' to something then that something belongs to language, or has a symbolic function as much as the word which stands for that thing.

When someone uses the word "mother" when talking about their mother, how is it that your mother pops into your head in some way or another if meaning were how it was used? They were talking about their mother, not yours. So how is it that your mother popped into your head if meaning is how the word is used?

Did we cherry pick my post? I mentioned the "Man with No Words" but neither of you addressed it.

What is true though is that for Wittgenstein 'meaning' is not an external relation (e.g. causal) between words and things: if word 'refers' to something then that something belongs to language, or has a symbolic function as much as the word which stands for that thing. — Fafner

This makes no sense. The meaning of a yellow banana is that is it ripe. It's blackness means it is rotten. We don't need language to know this. We simply need experience with yellow and black bananas.

how is it that your mother pops into your head — Harry Hindu

What does it mean "pops into your head"? Surely she isn't PHYSICALLY in your head like your brain is, so in what sense do you want to say that she is "in" your head?

As a memory - how else? Are you going to address the "Man with No Words"? He has memories to, but had no words to associate with them.

This makes no sense. The meaning of a yellow banana is that is it ripe. It's blackness means it is rotten. We don't need language to know this. — Harry Hindu

If you are using a color of something to represent something else, then the color itself becomes a symbol, you don't even need words for that. I don't see how your example contradicts anything that I said.

It's not necessarily a symbol. To know a banana is ripe is to see it as yellow.