We could both be, for example, just interested in debating each other and are thusly just communicating counter points to each other (and not for the sake of what we think is true pertaining to the subject at hand) for the sake of having a good debate. To clarify, I don’t find any evidence either of us are doing that, but, as far as I am understanding you, it seems as though that kind of conversation wouldn’t be able to function properly (especially on a grand scale)--but I am failing to see how it would degenerate. Fundamentally, I think this is our dispute: — Bob Ross

When the boy cries wolf when there is no wolf, he teaches the world to ignore what he says. When we all ignore what each other says, there is no meaning and nothing to understand. It seems so obvious to me that i struggle to understand what you cannot understand. You do know the story?

"A key miscommunication between us is what the “function of cultural moral norms” refers to. “Function” refers to the primary reason cultural moral norms exist. Clarifying what this feature of our universe ‘is’ should shed light on how to best define “objective moral judgments”.

Assume for a moment that there is a mind-independent feature of our universe that determines the primary reason that culture moral norms exist (what their function empirically is). Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides an objective standard of what is good and bad."

Thank you for elaborating on this, but, to me, I don’t see why a “primary reason” for norms existing would be thereby an objective norm: why is that the case? — Bob Ross

I repeat, "Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides AN objective standard of what is good and bad." How could you argue that was false?

Past and present cultural moral norms are cultural standards for right and wrong. If virtually all past and present cultural moral norms have the function of solving cooperation problems, then solving cooperation problems provides AN objective standard of what is good and bad that is an objective (mind independent) feature of our world.

Note that my claim is silent regarding this standard of good and bad’s imperative obligation. It is also silent if there are other objective (mind independent) standards of good and bad of either the objective feature of the world or imperative obligation varieties.

And my claim is silent regarding the normativity of this objective standard of good and bad. I do argue that this particular definition of good and bad will be normative by Gert’s definition (what all well-informed rational people would advocate). But note that Gert’s definition is silent on imperative obligation. Gert’s definition describes as normative what all rational people would advocate, not what they would be imperatively obligated to do.

You seem to be focused on moral claims that somehow have the objective property of mind-independent imperative obligation. To me this is odd. Perhaps because I have come to the study of morality from the science of morality side. From the science of morality side, the existence of behaviors we are imperatively obligated to do regardless of our needs and preferences is highly unlikely.

The biologist/philosopher Michael Ruse seems to delight in saying, "Morality is an illusion foisted on us by our genes”. Perhaps this makes sense to him because he also is focused on morality as imperative obligations while ignoring morality as an objective feature of the world (as strategies that solve cooperation problems). Morality as an objective feature of the world is definitely not an illusion. It explains, among other things, why such an illusion of imperative obligation is encoded in our genes.

The key to many miscommunications in moral realism discussions may be that one side is assuming the subject is "imperative obligations" and the other side is assuming the subject is "objective features of the world".

Hello Unenlightened,

When the boy cries wolf when there is no wolf, he teaches the world to ignore what he says. When we all ignore what each other says, there is no meaning and nothing to understand. It seems so obvious to me that i struggle to understand what you cannot understand. You do know the story?

I am familiar with the story; however, it isn’t relevant (I would say) to the example I gave. Take our conversation right now: you are saying it is predicated on truth whereas I allow for the possibility of a functioning deception (e.g., that we are not trying to converse about what is true but, rather, just simply enjoying debating each other). The ‘moral’ of the story of the boy who cried wolf is that he demonstrated his lies and thusly no one cares anymore—I am not saying we are both explicating or ‘leaking’ our want to deceive each other. If we both were honest about the fact that we just wanted to debate each other (in the hypothetical scenario I outlined), then, yes, you would be right to say that that conversation is disfunctional (if we are saying we just want to debate but yet acting as though we are searching for the truth).

If the boy who cried wolf masked his narcissistic desire to spook his village with crafty, legitimate reasons for crying (whereof when they approached there was no wolf but everything indicated that the boy was sincere—even though he truly isn’t), then they would have kept showing up. I am not sure if I am explaining this adequately, but hopefully that helps.

Bob

Hello Mark S,

Thank you for your response! I suspect we may be misunderstanding each other, so let me try to explain back to you what I am understanding you to being saying (and please correct me where I am wrong).

You seem to be essentially noting that we can derive objective facts pertaining to what norms societies are setup with (and sustain) and that these judgments (which are guided by the need for cooperation) are an objective standard for morals. Am I understanding you correctly?

I repeat, "Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides AN objective standard of what is good and bad." How could you argue that was false?

I understand that you are not arguing that the objective standard (that you outlined) is absolutely obligatory; however, my problem is, more fundamentally, with your standard even being considered ‘objective morality’. I understand that descriptions of norms are, in fact, objective; but that does not thereby make it ‘objective’ within the ‘moral’ sphere of discourse.

For example, let’s say that a particular society (or even all societies) have a rule “thou shall not kill”. That is an objective fact (in this hypothetical scenario) because it is a description of a norm which exists in that society (or all societies); however, by my lights, it is not thereby an “objective moral judgement”--on the contrary, the depiction that a society decrees “thou shall not kill” is not a prescription itself (it is simply a description of what is currently the case in society). Therefore, it isn’t an objective moral judgment: it seems as though you are advocating that it would be simply in virtue of it being a norm in society. Am I misunderstanding you?

The key to many miscommunications in moral realism discussions may be that one side is assuming the subject is "imperative obligations" and the other side is assuming the subject is "objective features of the world".

I think I followed and agree: I just want to explicate that I am not contending that you have to hold a moral judgment as absolutely obligatory in order to be classified as an “objective moral judgment”. On the contrary, I am questioning how the study of subjects (being objective features of the world) is a source of morality. How does “It is an objective fact that most people think I shouldn’t kill” translate to “I should not kill”?

Bob

Roughly, yes.

If the boy who cried wolf masked his narcissistic desire to spook his village with crafty, legitimate reasons for crying (whereof when they approached there was no wolf but everything indicated that the boy was sincere—even though he truly isn’t), then they would have kept showing up. I am not sure if I am explaining this adequately, but hopefully that helps. — Bob Ross

Indeed so. there is advantage in immorality. Cheats prosper, but always at the expense of the honest. That is why I call it immoral realism as much as moral realism. This is hard for people to understand because decent folk want the world to be fair and reward virtue, but it is not and does not. As long as there is a community of the honest, the charlatan can exploit them; it is only when the charlatans become dominant that there is a collapse, and then the hard lesson has to be learned again that nothing can be done without virtue.

Hello Banno,

I see. I don’t think that is a good use of the term ‘moral realism’ because it fundamentally shifts the focus from the sole purpose of metaethics: whether there are objective moral judgments. One can be a moral cognitivist and hold that there are or are not objective moral judgments: it makes no difference.

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

That is why I call it immoral realism as much as moral realism.

Fair enough: I didn’t fully understand what was meant by “immoral realism” until now.

it is only when the charlatans become dominant that there is a collapse, and then the hard lesson has to be learned again that nothing can be done without virtue.

I can see that, but I am hesitant to say that all forms of insincerity would cause society to crumble in the event that it is dominant. For example, let’s say that 99% of the population were convinced there wasn’t an objective law prohibiting murder, but they realize that the best bet to not get killed (in very unnecessary ways) is to promote and insincerely affirm that there is an objective law prohibiting it. In that case, I don’t see how society would crumble. In other words, dominant pretending isn’t necessarily a highway to destruction.

Bob

For example, let’s say that 99% of the population were convinced there wasn’t an objective law prohibiting murder, but they realize that the best bet to not get killed (in very unnecessary ways) is to promote and insincerely affirm that there is an objective law prohibiting it. In that case, I don’t see how society would crumble. In other words, dominant pretending isn’t necessarily a highway to destruction. — Bob Ross

Yes, you have found an exception..If one were to pretend to believe something that was true, though one believed it false... one would be telling the truth while thinking oneself deceitful. (Not that I really know what an objective law is, mind. It tends to make me think of laws of physics that one obeys without exception, rather than human prescriptions that one can and sometimes does break.)

Hello unenlightened,

Yes, you have found an exception.

But doesn’t this fundamentally break your previously claim? Or am I misunderstanding? As far as I understood, you were claiming society cannot function predominantly on lies, but then you just admitted (as far as I understand) that there are instances where they can. Are you just claiming that most subject-matters need to be predominantly submerged in truth while some minority do not?

If one were to pretend to believe something that was true, though one believed it false... one would be telling the truth while thinking oneself deceitful.

In my scenario, the assumption is that it actually is false and they are pretending it is true (not that it it “was true”); but now it seems as though you are claiming that there is some sort of “objective moral law” which is independent of the inter-subjective cooperation required to survive as a species.

(Not that I really know what an objective law is, mind. It tends to make me think of laws of physics that one obeys without exception, rather than human prescriptions that one can and sometimes does break.)

Well, this is exactly what I would need to know, because if you don’t know what the objective law is then, to me, you don’t have one; so you can’t claim that their pretending of it being true is actually accidentally corresponding to something that is true.

However, I will concede that I generally agree with your definition of “objective morality” if you mean “laws of physics that one obeys without exception”. I just define it as a “description of the faculty of normativity of a being which is involuntary”: mine is just in more philosophical terminology.

Bob

it seems as though you are claiming that there is some sort of “objective moral law” — Bob Ross

the sort of objectivity I am claiming is the objective inequality I mentioned way back – honesty is moral and dishonesty is immoral; similarly killing folks is immoral and keeping them alive is moral. It cannot work the other way around, and thus there is objectivity, without that being the kind of law like gravity that one cannot defy.

I don't think i'm saying anything extraordinary or new here, so I wonder why it is so difficult to grasp. I'll try a quick recap.

1. Humans are heavily socially dependent on each other and have developed language as an aid to cooperation, including education planning and agreements.

2.Humans also make identifications of themselves as individuals, and this can give rise in thinking and planning to a conflict between self- interest and social interest.

3. This conflict manifests as the moral conflict, whereby one has to choose between self-interest and social interest. Because morality is a social judgement, acting in the social interest is moral and acting against it is immoral whenever there is a conflict.

4. Animals without language cannot articulate to themselves the nature of social interest or clearly differentiate it from self-interest, and therefore largely avoid such internal conflict. Here for example, we have the beginning of language, and the beginning of dishonesty.



The dishonesty has to be, as Attenborough says 'very occasionally', because otherwise the warning would not work either as a deception or as a warning. And I would add that it is clearly an intentional deception, and thus the original sin.

I wonder what the "trouble" is if the other monkeys found out about the deceptive monkey. Do they have punishment?

You seem to be essentially noting that we can derive objective facts pertaining to what norms societies are setup with (and sustain) and that these judgments (which are guided by the need for cooperation) are an objective standard for morals. Am I understanding you correctly? — Bob Ross

Not quite. You are missing a critical element: the subject of the objective facts. The subject is the function of cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment).

Assume it is objectively (mind independently) true that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems and cultural moral norms are fallible heuristics for parts of strategies, such as reciprocity strategies, which solve those problems. Knowing the function of cultural moral norms enables us to resolve many disputes about if and when cultural moral norms will fail this function or will fulfil it in a way that is contrary to our values and goals. Therefore, this function provides an objective standard for moral behavior we can use to understand cultural moral norms better and thereby resolve disputes about them.

For example, consider “Do to others as you would have them do to you” as a fallible heuristic for initiating reciprocity. When tastes differ and following it would create rather than solve cooperation problems, the proposed moral standard (solving cooperation problems) provides an understanding that it would be objectively immoral to follow the Golden Rule in this case.

Again, the function of cultural moral norms provides AN objective standard for morality. This objective truth is silent regarding the existence of other moral standards that are either “objective features of the world” (as it is) or “involuntary obligations” (which it is not).

I don't know the answer to that. Loss of grooming privileges? 3 lies and you're out?

One thing I don't quite buy in Dawkins' theory of kin selection and altruism is that I don't see that precisely playing out that way in real life. That is to say, relatives (like children) are only cared for more because of proximity and cultural expectations (that are internalized).

If we take a scenario where you had a close friend that isn't a relative that you knew your whole life and were very close to, it would stand to reason that you would feel a kinship to them way more than a child that way later in life was introduced to you (that you didn't know was even yours). It's not like on seeing that person, you automatically form a kinship. Clearly this is the case of adoptions as well.

I'm perhaps misrepresenting his theory, but the point is that kinship altruism seems to be more altruism of proximity in relations (not due to being related because of the mere fact that they are relatives).

In fact, if someone were socially isolated but had a stuffed animal their whole life, they might form more loyalty and altruism to that object than any relation to a person. It's simply relational attachment and familiarity that tends to form in social animals, not even anything about persons per se.

Hello Unenlightened,

the sort of objectivity I am claiming is the objective inequality I mentioned way back – honesty is moral and dishonesty is immoral; similarly killing folks is immoral and keeping them alive is moral. It cannot work the other way around, and thus there is objectivity, without that being the kind of law like gravity that one cannot defy.

My confusion lies in the fact that you say “honesty is moral and dishonesty is immoral” because it cannot go the other way around in society, but yet you conceded that it can:

Yes, you have found an exception..If one were to pretend to believe something that was true, though one believed it false... one would be telling the truth while thinking oneself deceitful.

If you agree that people lying about there being objective moral standards (such as “thou shall not kill”) would actually sustain society (or at least not burn it to the ground), then you are conceding that it is possible for dishonesty to function as a ‘good’ thing in society. If that is the case, then I am not following what grounds you are claiming ‘lying is wrong’. As of yet, you were claiming that it is wrong because society would crumble if lying were predominant, but that example I gave (that you agreed with) negates that notion: there can be predominant lying which functions just fine in society.

Then I began to infer that you were claiming there is an actual objective standard, which is despite whether the given thing helps society sustain itself, based off of the previous quote I just made of you (i.e., “if one were to pretend to believe something that was true, though one believed it false...one would be telling the truth while thinking oneself deceitful). It was starting to sound like you were claiming there is a standard that goes beyond just a need for particular norms to survive (because you still think lying is wrong despite it having the ability to help one survive even in a grand scale—in the sense of it being predominant).

The dishonesty has to be, as Attenborough says 'very occasionally', because otherwise the warning would not work either as a deception or as a warning. And I would add that it is clearly an intentional deception, and thus the original sin.

I understand what you are claiming with your summary points, but I don’t see any objective morality in it is my problem; and, by your own standards, dishonesty would be able to be frequent in society as long as each person was good at it.

Bob

Hello Mark S,

Not quite. You are missing a critical element: the subject of the objective facts. The subject is the function of cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment).

I am understanding you to be saying here that we are heavily coerced by sociological factors (i.e., “cultural moral norms” as you put it): is that correct? If so, then I don’t see how those are objective themselves as moral jugdments (but I do see how the empirical inquiry of them would be objective): an objective moral judgment is not, to me, just a description of a norm but, rather, a norm which is involuntary.

If the norm is voluntary, then it is contingent on a will which is, by definition, subjective. A descriptive fact that one volunteered (subscribed) to a norm does not thereby make the norm objective.

On the other hand, are you claiming that some cultural norms are involuntary for subjects and that is the objective morals you are wanting to investigate?

Assume it is objectively (mind independently) true that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems and cultural moral norms are fallible heuristics for parts of strategies, such as reciprocity strategies, which solve those problems. Knowing the function of cultural moral norms enables us to resolve many disputes about if and when cultural moral norms will fail this function or will fulfil it in a way that is contrary to our values and goals.

Fair enough, but here’s where I don’t understand:

Therefore, this function provides an objective standard for moral behavior we can use to understand cultural moral norms better and thereby resolve disputes about them.

It seems to me like you are really just arguing that we should commit ourselves to using this guideline of ‘cooperative strageties’ because pretty much any (if not all) rational people would agree—but that doesn’t entail that anything about that is objective morality. It would be inter-subjective at best.

Again, I am operating under the semantic use of an ‘objective moral judgement’ being more than just a description of proclamations which are contingent on wills (in a voluntary sense): would you disagree with that usage of the term?

For example, consider “Do to others as you would have them do to you” as a fallible heuristic for initiating reciprocity. When tastes differ and following it would create rather than solve cooperation problems, the proposed moral standard (solving cooperation problems) provides an understanding that it would be objectively immoral to follow the Golden Rule in this case.

To me, it seems like you are noting that it is useful (from a rational agent’s perspective) to use the Golden Rule; and if it stopped functioning as a useful tool then we ought to disband from it. That is fine to me, but where are the objective morals in that?

Maybe it would help me understand if you gave me an example, if you can, of what you would consider an objective moral judgment. Is the golden rule an example of one to you?

Again, the function of cultural moral norms provides AN objective standard for morality. This objective truth is silent regarding the existence of other moral standards that are either “objective features of the world” (as it is) or “involuntary obligations” (which it is not).

It sounds like, to me, you are just engaging in an inter-subjective agreement with other rational agents, which is not objective morality. If the moral is not an objective feature of the world nor involuntary, then it seems as though you are using the term “objective morality” is a way that sounds like ‘moral anti-realism’ to me.

Bob

If you agree that people lying about there being objective moral standards (such as “thou shall not kill”) would actually sustain society (or at least not burn it to the ground), then you are conceding that it is possible for dishonesty to function as a ‘good’ thing in society. — Bob Ross

Yes. it is possible occasionally that dishonesty can have good consequences, but not that it is 'a good thing'. It is possible that murdering Hitler would have had good consequences, but not that murdering people is a good thing. It is possible that abortion has good consequences sometimes, but it not a a good thing, in the sense that it is worth getting pregnant for.

Again, I am operating under the semantic use of an ‘objective moral judgement’ being more than just a description of proclamations which are contingent on wills (in a voluntary sense): would you disagree with that usage of the term? — Bob Ross

I agree that 'objective moral judgements’ are more than “a description of proclamations which are contingent on wills”. Objective moral judgments are proclamations dependent on the same objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense. The existence of objective moral judgments is not contingent on our wills. Their acceptance as moral obligations IS dependent on our wills since imperative obligation is not a necessary part of what is objectively moral.

Perhaps you are still thinking something like “what is objectively moral is necessarily an imperative obligation”. This idea is “an illusion foisted on us by our genes" (as the philosopher of biology Michael Ruse likes to point out).

This illusion is the origin of the moral realism problem you describe in your OP.

An example of an objective moral judgment is "It is moral to solve cooperation problems; it is immoral to create cooperation problems" which summarizes Morality as Cooperation Strategies. It is objective (mind independent) in that it is the product of the objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense – cooperation problems and the strategies that solve them.

Hello enlightened,

Yes. it is possible occasionally that dishonesty can have good consequences, but not that it is 'a good thing'. It is possible that murdering Hitler would have had good consequences, but not that murdering people is a good thing. It is possible that abortion has good consequences sometimes, but it not a a good thing, in the sense that it is worth getting pregnant for.

I think you may have misunderstood my counter-example or perhaps I didn’t explain it well enough: it isn’t that faking objective moral judgments is sometimes beneficial; rather, I was outlining that 99% of the population didn’t think that there was such a thing as an objective “thou shall not kill”, but they kept promoting it as objective (thusly lying) because they recognize that it would be in their best interest to do so. In that example, lying is predominant and good.

If you are agreeing, then I think this throws a big wrench, at the very least, in your argument that lying is bad—unless, perhaps, you are saying that lying is only good in the case where we would be faking morality?

Bob

Hello Mark S,

Objective moral judgments are proclamations dependent on the same objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense

To me, cultural moral norms are inter-subjective: why do you think they are not inter-subjective? I see it analogous to economic value: the value of a diamond (in terms of currency) is not dependent on my will (particularly) but, rather, on multiple wills. It is not thereby objective, like, for example, the fact that a diamond is made of carbon. It is, likewise, not subjective but, rather, inter-subjective. Why, on the contrary, do you think norms are objective?

Furthermore, what do you mean by “moral sense”? Are you talking about an evolutionary conscience?

The existence of objective moral judgments is not contingent on our wills. Their acceptance as moral obligations IS dependent on our wills since imperative obligation is not a necessary part of what is objectively moral.

I agree with this part: but why are cultural moral norms objective? Could you please walk me through that part? How do they meet the definition of objectivity (i.e., not contingent on wills)?

Perhaps you are still thinking something like “what is objectively moral is necessarily an imperative obligation”. This idea is “an illusion foisted on us by our genes" (as the philosopher of biology Michael Ruse likes to point out).

I see. I think that an objective moral judgment would be, by definition, a true obligation which is stance-independent; however, the truthity of the obligation as being fixated-upon (i.e., consciously decided to follow) would be relative to the subject at hand. I think this is essentially what you are saying in the second quote of you I made hereon: “ The existence of objective moral judgments is not contingent on our wills. Their acceptance as moral obligations IS dependent on our wills”. I agree (if I am understanding you correctly).

"It is moral to solve cooperation problems; it is immoral to create cooperation problems"

I really appreciate you giving an example: thank you! Let me try to dissect it and please correct me where I am wrong. The proposition “It is moral to solve cooperation problems” is directly translatable (by my lights) to “one ought to solve cooperation problems”. How is this proposition independent of our wills (in terms of its truthity). By my lights, the obligation to it is unclear (in an objective sense): could you elaborate on that? In other words, why is “it is moral to solve cooperation problems” itself true despite of anyone’s will.

It is objective (mind independent) in that it is the product of the objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense – cooperation problems and the strategies that solve them.

To me, this doesn’t prove that the obligation (previously expounded) is objective itself but, rather, that we need to cooperate to survive (or something along those lines). It almost seems like you may be arguing on these lines:

P1: One ought to consider what causes cultural moral norms and our moral sense objective moral judgments.

P2: Solving cooperative problems is the cause of cultural moral norms and our moral sense.

C: Therefore, one ought to solve cooperative problems.

Is that syllogism accurate? If so, I don’t see where the objective moral judgment is (besides defining, semantically, “objective moral judgment” in the sense in P1—but that isn’t what objectivity means: it is will-independent and that new definition would not be).

Bob

In metaethics, it is exceedingly common to divide views into two subcamps: anti-realism (i.e., that there are no categorical imperatives) and realism (i.e., that there are categorical imperatives). Although I find this to be an intuitive distinction (as an approximation), I am finding the distinction blurring for me the more precise I analyze my metaethical commitments. — Bob Ross

I feel that the distinction is indeed blurry, however it only seems Hegelian in that respect if I may say so

In terms of meta ethics is where morality does indeed retain its objectivism for right and wrong are both imperative and categorical using kantian terminology (if i was to really get dialectical in the German sense)

The interjection only becomes obvious post fact although admittedly that is not always the case

I was outlining that 99% of the population didn’t think that there was such a thing as an objective “thou shall not kill”, but they kept promoting it as objective (thusly lying) because they recognize that it would be in their best interest to do so. In that example, lying is predominant and good. — Bob Ross

Right. The way everyone pretends that Father Christmas exists. But that's not deceiving anyone is it? I don't think it's a very good foundation for a society, but such conventions are not lies but agreed performances - like the way every bride is beautiful and babies always look just like their parents.

It's like the idea of 'trickle down economics' — no one believes it for a moment, but they recite it...

I've stolen this link from @Wayfarer.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhYw-VlkXTU&t=380s

One of the things it talks about is the possibility of social collapse brought about by the ubiquity of deep-fakes becoming impossible to detect. Worth watching quite carefully, and rather supposing the moral case I have been making.

P1: One ought to consider what causes cultural moral norms and our moral sense objective moral judgments.

P2: Solving cooperative problems is the cause of cultural moral norms and our moral sense.

C: Therefore, one ought to solve cooperative problems.

Is that syllogism accurate? — Bob Ross

Bob,

No, it is not accurate.

How about this version instead as explanation?

P1: Virtually all cultural moral norms and our moral sense’s judgments and motivations are heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for parts of strategies for solving cooperation problems. Game theory shows that a necessary part of cooperation strategies is the punishment of people who create cooperation problems by violating cultural norms that are the heuristics for solving cooperation problems.

P2: Solving cooperation problems is necessary for maintaining or increasing the benefits of cooperation in a society – the principal reason societies exist.

C: Therefore, if you wish to maintain or increase the benefits of living in your society, you ought (instrumentally) to advocate cultural norms that are heuristics for parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems and whose violation deserves punishment. By doing so, you will advocate for an objective morality with no imperative moral oughts.

Would all rational, well-informed people wish to maintain or increase the cooperation benefits of living in their society? Perhaps. If they did, then the proposed objective morality without imperative moral obligations would be normative by Gert's SEP definition.

. . . According to the video China contained AI, and somehow they are bad guys in the presentation while attaining what the researchers want. Worth noting when they want to build international organizations.


You've done a wonderful job of defending moral realism, from my perspective -- for what that's worth. I think for me I'm just more interested in anti-realist ethics. I live in a nihilistic culture, so they seem relevant.

Bob,

Getting back to the moral realism question in your OP:

Is Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) a kind of moral realism? Does it determine mind-independent moral truth values?

Yes, a necessary moral component (a definition of right and wrong) exists for all highly cooperative societies of independent agents. Regardless of anyone’s opinion, that moral component is strategies that solve cooperation problems.

MACS describes that necessary moral component. MACS, therefore, is an expression of moral realism that determines mind-independent moral truth about that necessary component.

Does MACS tell us what we imperatively ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences?

No. It is silent on imperative oughts.

Does MACS answer all our questions about morality and ethics?

No. It only describes the cooperation strategies that are a necessary moral component for all highly cooperative societies. MACS is silent about the goals of this cooperation and the broader aspects of the traditional ethical questions, “What is good?”, “How should I live?”, and “What are my obligations?”.

Hello Invicta,

I appreciate your response!

I feel that the distinction is indeed blurry, however it only seems Hegelian in that respect if I may say so

Interesting, I am not that familiar with hegel (as I found his books incredibly poorly written and hard to comprehend): could you elaborate on what you mean?

In terms of meta ethics is where morality does indeed retain its objectivism for right and wrong are both imperative and categorical using kantian terminology (if i was to really get dialectical in the German sense)

I am not sure what you mean here. Yes, Kant talks about “objective moral judgments” as “categorical imperatives”, but I actually think we mistakenly does so. Also, what do you mean by “meta ethics is where morality does indeed retain its objectivism”?

The interjection only becomes obvious post fact although admittedly that is not always the case

I didn’t quite follow this part: can you please elaborate?

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

Right. The way everyone pretends that Father Christmas exists.

I think this is false: everyone does not pretend Santa (or perhaps you meant Jesus?) exists in an analogous sense to the morality counter-example. It is a faker, more-superficial acting that Santa exists because it is only for the sake of the children. In the sense of the morals, everyone would be acting very serious about it and would not only be faking it for children. When I say “Santa exists” in front of a child and an adult, the adult can look at me and we both acknowledge that that was a lie: we don’t then try to lie to each other about it.

but such conventions are not lies but agreed performances

This could be true in the counter-example if everyone was really bad at faking it, but my example was that they are all skilled deceivers: therefore, it is not an agreed performance, because everyone is convinced the other sincerely believes there are objective moral judgments—but each person knows that they themselves don’t buy it.

One of the things it talks about is the possibility of social collapse brought about by the ubiquity of deep-fakes becoming impossible to detect. Worth watching quite carefully, and rather supposing the moral case I have been making.

That is interesting, but, unfortunately, I do not have time to listen to it right now, so I will have to watch that later. I still don’t see, if I am being honest, how your view has any objective moral judgments in it.

Bob