Well, certainly I can accept that the word "future" has sense to you, as it does to me, but one can dispute that the word has reference — sime

I think it quite straightforward that it refers to the future.

So in your view, what makes a proposition future-contingent?

Suppose that a person looks at the sky and says

A. "There are ominous dark-clouds in the sky"
B. "In five minutes it will rain"

What makes B a future-referring proposition, in contrast to A that is merely a present observation?

Isn't the difference accounted for by the attitude of the person towards each case? In which case, isn't it fair to suggest that B isn't objectively speaking, a future-contingent proposition?

What makes B a future-referring proposition, in contrast to A that is merely a present observation? — sime

The fact that they mean different things, with the first referring to the present and the second referring to the future.

The fact that they mean different things, with the first referring to the present and the second referring to the future. — Michael

Well yes, one might take it to be analytically true that a prediction is future-referring, meaning that skepticism regarding the future-contingency of a prediction is ruled out a priori as a matter of linguistic convention. But in that case, the future-contingency of the prediction cannot mean anything about the world in itself, and only speaks of present linguistic conventions, speaker attitudes and so on.

When we speak of "failed predictions", we interpret past utterances as referring to the present. Relative to this convention, it might be considered to be analytically true a posteriori that a past utterance is present referring. But to say that past utterances are present referring, is again not to speak of reality but of linguistic convention.

As a matter of interest, do you consider ChatGPT's responses as future-referring?

Well yes, one might take it to be analytically true that a prediction is future-referring. — sime

Then what else is to be said?

But in that case, the future-contingency of the prediction cannot mean anything about the world in itself — sime

Not sure what you’re saying here. Is it just that predictions don’t talk about the world as it presently is? That is, as you say, analytically true. Not sure how that entails that they don’t talk about the world as it will be in the future.

As a matter of interest, do you consider ChatGPT's responses as future-referring? — sime

If it says something about the future then yes.

But doesn't the fact that the bornblind can talk about color support the thesis that meaning is public ? They don't need an 'internal' referent for 'red.' Meaning looks to be 'out there' with stopsigns and handshakes. — plaque flag

I don't know how often blind people use colour terms.

If they have never seen colour I can't think of a context they would use them in unless someone has told them how to use a colour term contextually. "They have probably heard people say thing like red means stop and green means go".

So they may understand the context in which colour terms are applied.

When we are using a term we might not be referring to anything concrete but referring to a concept Like "gods and ghosts" or The Afterlife.
I think the network of meaning could all be derived from within our head in conjunction with experiences.

The public aspect of language may be the rules of application but whether what is being said refers to something is an open question. But my issue is whether mental terms like memory and beliefs etc refer to the same thing between individuals.

Eliminative materialists go to the extreme of saying that don't refer to anything or only refer to brain activity. Such as "love" just mean Oxytocin levels.

I don't know how often blind people use colour terms. — Andrew4Handel

You might like this: https://hub.jhu.edu/2021/08/17/blind-people-understand-color/

The public aspect of language may be the rules of application but whether what is being said refers to something is an open question. But my issue is whether mental terms like memory and beliefs etc refer to the same thing between individuals. — Andrew4Handel

You have your finger on the issue. Immaterial private referents are problematic. Bots are better at English now than children are, than most adults are perhaps. Do they 'really' 'understand'? As I see it, we mostly don't know that we don't know what we are talking about -- beyond an undeniable foggy goodenough vagueness of course. Making this darkness visible, digging out the question, getting some sunshine on it, seems like a good start.

Eliminative materialists go to the extreme of saying that don't refer to anything or only refer to brain activity. Such as "love" just mean Oxytocin levels. — Andrew4Handel

A more reasonable approach is to include everything in the same inferential nexus. A drug or injury may disable a certain kind of love. As I see it, there's nothing that's purely internal or purely external. (I claim that we can't really make sense of such talk...that it's confused.) All entities 'live' in the same 'system,' else they could not make sense for/to us.

Immaterial private referents are problematic. — plaque flag

Assume for the sake of argument that first person experience isn’t immaterial or private. Assume that it is reducible to the physical. The feeling of pain is identical to a particular kind of brain activity. Is this a problem? Can the word “pain” refer to this particular kind of brain activity?

This is the motte-bailey issue I've been trying to point out. I have no objection at all to a blurry continuum that runs from more physical to more mental. We can publicly establish that reports of pain (public speech acts) are correlated with a particular kind of brain activity. We can imagine a kind of pain stuff (somewhat indeterminate) as a disposition to make such reports and grimace. No problem.

Can the word “pain” refer to this particular kind of brain activity? — Michael

I don't think that would quite work. The grammar of 'pain' would allow for anomalies like reports of pain that were not accompanied by the expected brain activity.

We can think of how reports of pain are treated differently than reports of seeing so-and-so commit a crime. I have more authority (am less likely to be challenged) when it comes to 'internal' things. This is maybe why they are 'internal' : they are relatively incorrigible. I say look to social norms for meaning.

The grammar of 'pain' would allow for anomalies like reports of pain that were not accompanied by the expected brain activity. — plaque flag

That’s true of every word in every circumstance. I can report that it’s raining when it isn’t.

That’s true of every word in every circumstance. I can report that it’s raining when it isn’t. — Michael

People can lie, but that's not the issue. To be sure, the grammar of the word 'pain' could change, but currently (as far as I can make out) it's more about behavioral dispositions than brain states. "My leg hurts terribly when I stand or walk on it, so let's climb a mountain." See Brandom's inferentialism for more on the meaning of concepts as (roughly) the inferences they license or forbid.

Time matters here. We do not have static concepts tied to platonic essences that hover in eternity. We keep track of one another. You hold me to what I've said and the implications thereof, as I do you. We make predictions and excuses and arguments. How is all of this structured ? How is pain used to explain and excuse? I say find the big picture and work inward. I don't think we can construct the situation from 'atoms.'

To be sure, the grammar of the word 'pain' could change, but currently (as far as I can make out) it's more about behavioral dispositions than brain states. — plaque flag

If that were true then we wouldn’t ask people if they’re in pain. Or for related feelings, whether or not they’re happy or sad or have a secret crush.

I can understand not believing in non-physical mental phenomena and “raw” sense data. I can’t understand this devotion to the idea that words can only refer to some publicly verifiable activity.

As I mentioned in the other discussion, I take aspirin because I’m in pain. It just isn’t the case that taking aspirin is being in pain. If it were that simple then I’d just never take aspirin and live a pain-free life.

If that disagrees with Wittgenstein then Wittgenstein is so self-evidently wrong that I struggle to believe that anyone believes him. I can only assume that you’re all just pulling a prank on me.

If that were true then we wouldn’t ask people if they’re in pain. — Michael

Why not ?

I can’t understand this devotion to the idea that words can only refer to some publicly verifiable activity. — Michael

I don't have a finished theory of reference. I just think immaterial references don't make sense, for the same kind of reason I don't believe that 2 has a square root. The absurdity of such a concept has been demonstrated to my satisfaction.

I take aspirin because I’m in pain. It’s not the case that taking aspirin is being in pain. — Michael

Yes. I agree.

"I have a headache, so I'm going to take some aspirin."

"He went to the doctor, because his back was killing him"

That's within the inferential nexus. That's roughly how we learn to use "headache" and "pain" -- in terms of what implications are thereby licensed. Or that's a theory that seems reasonable to me. We can talk about quarks and confusion in the same way. Imagine meaning living 'between' these signs as norms governing their interaction in inferences. 'Internal' entities need not refer to immateriality.


"He hired a tutor, because he was confused."
"She called to check on her father, because she had a weird feeling."

I just think immaterial references don't make sense — plaque flag

We’re assuming brain states here, not immaterial stuff.

That's roughly how we learn to use "headache" and "pain" -- in terms of what implications are thereby licensed — plaque flag

People have headaches even if there’s no aspirin. We invented painkillers because of pain.

Why not ? — plaque flag

Because we wouldn’t need to. We’d just look to their behaviour. But behaviour isn’t enough. There really is stuff going on in people’s heads that we don’t know about, and when we ask about things like pain we’re asking them to tell us about this stuff going on in their heads.

We’re assuming brain states here, not immaterial stuff. — Michael

If you want to pretend that 'pain' has a different grammar than it does, we can try to play that game and see what happens.

If you want to pretend that 'pain' has a different grammar than it does, we can try to play that game and see what happens. — plaque flag

I’m suggesting that we assume that what we think of as first person experience/consciousness is reducible to brain activity. I wasn’t assuming anything about the grammar of “pain” at this point.

But behaviour isn’t enough. There really is stuff going on in people’s heads that we don’t know about, and when we ask about things like pain we’re asking them to tell us about this stuff going on in their heads. — Michael

It's not too outlandish to think technology will become powerful enough to know our socalled insides better than we do. "Hold on a moment: let me see if I'm in pain." <Looks at his phone>

We already see how people fail (in others' eyes) to know their own motives or level of ability.

I suggest approaching the self more as a normative entity than a ghost full of hidden states.

It's not too outlandish to think technology will become powerful enough to know our socalled insides better than we do. — plaque flag

Yes, that’s implied by my assumption here that consciousness is identical to a particular kind of brain activity.

I’m suggesting that we assume that what we think of as first person experience/consciousness is reducible to brain activity. — Michael

I don't see how that can be done. Norms might be primordial or irreducible. They are the foundation of sense. We can't 'think away' language.

Yes, that’s implied by my assumption here that consciousness is identical to a particular kind of brain activity. — Michael

I don't think the self makes sense as a present-at-hand object (it's never just a body.) It's temporally stretched, socially constituted. It's more of a dance than a pair of legs.

I don't think the self makes sense as a present-at-hand object. It's temporally stretched, socially constituted. It's more of a dance than a dancer. — plaque flag

I’m sorry but I don’t do well with metaphor.

What I will say is that I don’t need a second person for me to be conscious. It is both logically and physically possible for me to be the last man alive.

What I will say is that I don’t need a second person for me to be conscious. It is both logically and physically possible for me to be the last man alive. — Michael

Yes, I believe that your hardware (your brain, etc.) carries an independent copy of the tribal software. You can end up as the last man alive. But you have already absorbed the tradition of thinking of yourself as a self, as a unified voice responsible for its claims and other deeds. What Descartes takes for granted is all the software that's talking to 'itself' as a [unified] self. Even 'it thinks' is too much, for that unity is not purely given but inherited. Whence the thinker ? Why thoughts and not just signs ? Why not a random emission of words ? Attributed to no one ? Semantic chaos ?

So assume in some post-apocalyptic wasteland the only thing to survive is a newborn baby. Given that it has no sense of self and no language it isn’t conscious and can’t feel pain or be hungry?

So assume in some post-apocalyptic wasteland the only thing to survive is a newborn baby. Given that it has no sense of self and no language it isn’t conscious and can’t feel pain or be hungry? — Michael

I think that we can apply such concepts, and I think we can do that now with pigs being treated badly in processing plants. The baby could be hungry or in pain, yes. Why not ? So could the pig. "We should stop creating pork this way, because pigs suffer, because it's wrong to cause unnecessary suffering." What does it mean to attribute pain ? How does such an attribution relate to other assertions ? Does immateriality add anything?

I think that we can apply such concepts, and I think we can do that now with pigs being treated badly in processing plants. The baby could be hungry or in pain, yes. Why not ? So could the pig. "We should stop creating pork this way, because pigs suffer, because it's wrong to cause unnecessary suffering." — plaque flag

And when we say that the baby is in pain or scared or hungry, what are we referring to? What does it mean for it to feel something?

What does it mean to attribute pain ? — plaque flag

I’ve given my answer. Pain is a type of experience that occurs irrespective of any overt expression recognisable by other people.

Does immateriality add anything? — plaque flag

I’m not sure what you’re asking here. If experience really is immaterial then the claim that experience is immaterial is true. But again, at this point I’m not really arguing this point. I’m happy to say that consciousness and experience is reducible to brain activity.

Wikipedia says:

"The private language argument argues that a language understandable by only a single individual is incoherent"

Well, it clearly is possible for only one person to understand language because dying and dead languages tend to have one last speaker left alive.

There's a bit more to it.

-but then if we didn't have language we wouldn't be the kind of creatures who worried about being closed off. Maybe it follows that the conditions that lead us to think we are closed off--a rich inner life that owes its existence to the essentially social fact of language--are precisely those that allow us not to be. — Jamal

But most animals if not all of them don't have language and can form bonds without out it. They certainly don't seem to have a form of communication to express complex internal states.

My feeling of being closed off is knowing that others have a rich inner life inaccessible to me and knowing I have a rich inner life I can't share.

Or something like that.

One can feel lonely around other people it seems maybe because one's internal world is not compatible with what others are expressing externally.