Only insofar as they serve the purposes of evolutionary theory, which is to survive and reproduce, and no further. — Wayfarer

Once minds such as ours originate, they themselves become the possibility of memetic and technological evolution, till all three work together toward an exponential increase in human knowledge power. We are now at the dawn of yet another technological revolution, on the verge of creating beings like ourselves in many ways, in some surprisingly human ways simply better than us. We are creating little gods in our own image, and I don't see why they won't become big gods. I understand that people are ecstatic or disgusted about this or just scared. But I don't see any definite gulf between it and us in the long run. If there was ever a time to think reconsider doubts about Darwin, it may be now.

But, prior to our development of design, and the coining of the word ‘design’, there were no instances of design in the cosmos, right? — Wayfarer

God or the demiurge was a designer, right? So we are already used to projecting our own creativity beyond us. Evolution was hard to personify, of course, but someone or other found the metaphor useful and applied it. Now it sticks. The blind watchmaker. Pretty clever really.

Once minds such as ours originate, they themselves become the possibility of memetic and technological evolution, till all three work together toward an exponential increase in human knowledge power. — plaque flag

That is a completely different matter from evolution by natural selection. As is well known, ideas of evolution were found in many cultures prior to Darwin, but it was the idea of natural selection that distinguished Darwin’s discoveries. And even then, it was quickly applied to (some would say, misappropriated by) those with other agendas, to promote agendas like eugenics. Evolution is one of those marvellously flexible words that can be applied to almost any sense of things improving or changing for the better.

God or the demiurge was a designer, right? — plaque flag

Plato’s demiurge was a designer, but God was not described in those terms until the early modern age. That is one of the points of Karen Armstrong’s Case for God, which said that by depicting ‘nature’s laws’ as ‘the handiwork of God’, early modern science laid the groundwork for the kind of atheist polemics that are the speciality of Dawkins.

Yes. Those on the Dawkins forum - the very first forum I joined - constantly used this defence against his many howlers, notwithstanding that his books are in the ‘Religion’ section of shops all over the world. — Wayfarer

So you are still not providing arguments, you're just trashing Dawkins and now it's his fault that some bookshops put his work in the 'Religion' section. Is that not a source of amusement rather than scorn?

If the apparent design in nature is only apparent, and not actual, that must be the implication, mustn’t it? — Wayfarer

I guess so. Can you demonstrate that there is design in nature and by extension a designer?

...now it's his fault that some bookshops put his work in the 'Religion' section. — Tom Storm

That is by design!

Can you demonstrate that there is design in nature? — Tom Storm

I myself don't think it needs to be demonstrated, but that if I need to demonstrate it, then probably nothing I could say would be effective.

Can you demonstrate that there is design in nature?
— Tom Storm

I myself don't think it needs to be demonstrated, but that if I need to demonstrate it, then probably nothing I could say would be effective. — Wayfarer

Ok. That's surely an outlier position, but let's get back to this later.

You seem to have argued essentially that you don't like Darwinism because it is unsatisfying to you aesthetically and is used to render meaning an arbitrary phenomenon. You are uncomfortable with that because there is an abundance of significant classical literature (and more modern work) which argues otherwise. This material and the perennialist tradition resonates with you. The application of Darwinism and scientism has robbed our contemporary understanding of reality of enchantment and transcendent purpose, along with the possibility of intelligibility and truth (the evolutionary argument against naturalism).

You then argue that representatives of Darwinism, like Dawkins or Dennett, are inadequate scholars and bungled representatives of a nihilistic era. They are stunted in their conception of being and ignorant of the important questions of philosophy.

But other than citing writers who deride forms of Darwinism or elevate models of higher consciousness and ultimate meaning, what can you demonstrate?

Evolution has the appearance of design. What reasons do you have for concluding that evolution has a goal or a designer, if this is what you are suggesting? I'm not aware of you making the argument and forgive me if you have earlier. Cut and paste if this helps.

I myself don't think it needs to be demonstrated, but that if I need to demonstrate it, then probably nothing I could say would be effective. — Wayfarer

Does this not strike you as slightly messianic? Do you not think others feel the same way about their own cherished beliefs? Yet here you are deriding as 'evil' world views which others may hold to be just as self-evident and foundational as you hold yours to be.

As ever with these arguments, they just come down to you claiming to have some insight into the way things are that others lack.

It's not that other lack the insight, it's not that they fail to understand. It's that they disagree. They differ from you in what they find plausible, important, useful...

It's difference, not evil, not failure, not inadequacy... Just difference.

You seem to have argued essentially that you don't like Darwinism — Tom Storm

I reject neo-darwinian materialism as a philosophical attitude, personified by Daniel Dennett, who has published books in its defence. There are many other schools of evolutionary thought which are not nearly so extreme nor so ideological, although I’m also critical of ‘scientific naturalism’. To me, the fact that humans can wonder about their purpose in the abstract is itself an indication of their ability to transcend their biological origins. And the fact that such wondering is itself regarded as being suspiciously close to fundamentalism, says something.

What reasons do you have for concluding that evolution has a goal or a designer, if this is what you are suggesting? — Tom Storm

I said that I’m not atheist, but I’m also not particularly theist. It’s more that I reject the specifically modernistic idea that life arises by chance or by fortuitous origins, that it’s a kind of cosmic crapshoot. I’m not going to defend any obviously ID-related position. It’s more that today’s culture, in rejecting traditional religious accounts, have also rejected a great deal of philosophical reflection on life’s meaning and purpose with it - throwing the baby out with the bathwater, as the saying has it. And that’s because in our religious history, having the wrong ideas about such things could get you burned at the stake. This has left a deep shadow in Western culture.

My philosophy, as I’ve explained at length elsewhere, is that in sentient rational beings, the Universe comes to know itself. (That’s why I provided that link to Julian Huxley who also said that, this is not something unique to me.) Religious ideas are metaphors for that realisation, although obviously some more so than others. I have a book on my shelf, ‘You Are the Eyes of the World’, by the Dzogchen master LonChenPa. I think the East has a more explicit understanding of it, but it is nevertheless a theme or idea found in many world cultures (‘You are the world’ was both a globally-released pop song to save starving Africans, and a book by Krishnamurti.) And in the animal world, every single creature is more or less engaged in that undertaking. Check out that Steve Talbott essay I posted upthread.

It's only that design in nature seems obvious to me, but obviously there are those who don't agree, and I can't think of a way to make the case. I don't say that it means there is a designer, but I'm also sceptical of the idea that the order of nature can be explained purely in terms of naturalistic principles. I suppose what I believe is that whilst science explores, understands and can exploit the order of nature to great advantage, it still has a rather dim idea of the nature of the order. Like, we can see the laws of motion, but why we have those laws is not itself a scientific question, but a metaphysical one.

Thank you. I enjoy these kinds of discussions, perhaps because I'm from outside philosophy. You are an engaging and informed interlocutor.

It's only that design in nature seems obvious to me, but obviously there are those who don't agree, and I can't think of a way to make the case. — Wayfarer

Agree. It is more of a faith based position it seems to me. BTW, I am not saying there is no design in nature, I merely say it can't be demonstrated.

I have no insight about Life but I am satisfied that human lives are random events, with no capital 'm' meaning, only more modest meanings we inherit though culture and/or make for ourselves.

I guess so. Can you demonstrate that there is design in nature and by extension a designer? — Tom Storm

I'll have a crack at it, if you don't mind.

Why are there no humanoids running around? Why aren't fish or frogs or what have you currently growing limbs and evolving into birds or..small mammals or whatever.

If the first being without limbs was inclined to grow limbs. Why aren't we growing fifth limbs? Or extra digits at least.

Why has no scientist ever been able to recreate the conditions for biological life from non-biological sources? They tried simulating striking a chemically identical "primordial soup" with simulated lightning by electricity. Nope. Nothing. These aren't absolute proofs in and of themselves by any means sure, however, makes you think.

I'm all for leaving well enough alone believe me I firmly believe some things men are not meant to know but for sake of discussion.

What other form of life has a unique non-DNA (an old argument being men were never meant to learn science due to wars/bio-engineering/risk of destroying the planet slowly by pollution or instantly by war) form of identification ie. fingerprints? See now that's the real thinking point.

There may be such entities. I don't think it torpedoes it though.

Thanks for expanding, but I'm still not quite clear on your position. Is experience material in your view ? Why is the subject familiar with experience as opposed to simply familiar with the world ? I guess I'm a direct realist in some kind of postHegelian sense. So for me there's no image between us and the world. — plaque flag

Sure, experience is material, or physical. I distinguish here an epistemic claim with a metaphysical one. Everything we are familiar or acquainted with is through experience, this is an "idealist" claim. The metaphysical side is that everything is physical stuff.

One is top down (the epistemic claim), the other bottom up (the metaphysical claim). I think that we have an idea of the world, which is provided by the world. So, there is mediation, but it's also a direct realism, I don't understand indirect realism, despite looking at examples or definitions.

It's only that... — Wayfarer

But it's not 'only' that. You described one of the alternatives as "evil". You regularly frame disagreement as your interlocutors "not understanding" something about the argument (rather than just disagreeing with it). It's this certainty, and righteousness I was wanting to explore. Retreating to an "only..." just pretends all that didn't happen, but it's in black and white, some examples literally a few posts above this one.

I'm wondering where that self-confidence comes from.

Can you demonstrate that there is design in nature?
— Tom Storm
I myself don't think it needs to be demonstrated, but that if I need to demonstrate it, then probably nothing I could say would be effective. — Wayfarer
Ok. That's surely an outlier position, but let's get back to this later. — Tom Storm

Design Intent is not an object to be demonstrated empirically. But the designer's unique signature patterns (e.g. characteristic brush strokes by Michelangelo) can be recognized intuitively or implicitly by those who look for them. In physical Nature, some call those consistent patterns : "Laws". Einstein was indeed an "outlier" in his sense of design in nature, where other physicists saw only complexity & randomness. :smile:


Design in Nature : How the Constructal Law Governs Evolution in Biology, Physics, Technology, and Social Organizations
https://www.amazon.com/Design-Nature-Constructal-Technology-Organizations/dp/0307744345

Constructal Law :
In this groundbreaking book, Adrian Bejan takes the recurring patterns in nature—trees, tributaries, air passages, neural networks, and lightning bolts—and reveals how a single principle of physics, the constructal law, accounts for the evolution of these and many other designs in our world.
... Google Books

THE GRAND DESIGN as intuited by Einstein

Evolution is one of those marvellously flexible words that can be applied to almost any sense of things improving or changing for the better. — Wayfarer

Usually an increase in complexity is involved. Technology is more complex than ever before, which helps us find yet more technology. Artificial intelligence is becoming exponentially better, and it will presumably begin (if it hasn't already) be used in the development of yet more artificial intelligence.

The greatness of Darwin is explaining how something complex can arise from something simple. This is perhaps 'the' general of form of the wonderful, which also touches on climbing the entropy gradient.

My philosophy, as I’ve explained at length elsewhere, is that in sentient rational beings, the Universe comes to know itself. — Wayfarer

Darwin is to biology as Hegel is to philosophy. In Darwin, biological evolution finds an eye with which to look at itself. I'm not saying that evolution sought this ability, but a supremely social and symbolic creature indeed emerged that could grasp the structure of its own genesis from primeval slime. (In Hegel we see philosophy (an immortal graveleaping Conversation ) that reaching the point where it could grasp its own nature --- or that's one interpretation that sets up the analogy I was making.)

the kind of atheist polemics that are the speciality of Dawkins. — Wayfarer

As I see it, a scientist whose work is particularly threatened by religion's attempt to hamper it is even more justified than most in putting on the philosophers' or citizens' cap and speaking out. To be sure, science is also sometimes attacked or misappropriated by atheistic ideologies, so it's at all just religion, even if that is what Dawkins tends to focus on. Personally I'm more interested in Dawkins as a biologist, so I don't keep up with his polemics, because I can read Peter Gay on the philosophes, etc.

Here's Jefferson:
It does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are 20 gods or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.

Everything we are familiar or acquainted with is through experience, this is an "idealist" claim. The metaphysical side is that everything is physical stuff. — Manuel

This sounds like dualism ? Do we only know 'physical' stuff through 'experience' stuff in your view ?

I have no insight about Life but I am satisfied that human lives are random events, with no capital 'm' meaning, only more modest meanings we inherit though culture and/or make for ourselves. — Tom Storm

It seems to me that any postulated origin will have to be taken as a brute fact, until it is replaced and explained by an earlier postulated origin. I don't see how there won't always be a 'just because' or 'it's our best guess' at the end of a series of answers to a battery of childish/profound why questions.

I mean, I'd say here with Russell, that we do not know enough about the external world (or physical stuff) to say if its nature is like or unlike "mental stuff" or the world of mind.

Yes, I think the case is that we know discover the world through experience, I literally can't think of another way, it all leads back to experience and how we interpret data.

But I wouldn't go as far as to say that an object, say, a planet, is literally made up of ideas. These things are discovered through experience but are made up by matter. Just like brain activity is made up of physical stuff, that leads to experience, I wouldn't say that the brain is made of experience, although we discover things about it using consciousness.

Again, these things may not be as different as our ordinary intuitions imply.

Yes, I think the case is that we know discover the world through experience, I literally can't think of another way, it all leads back to experience and how we interpret data. — Manuel

Seems appropriate. But at some point experience becomes language and visa versa. Experience ends up being understood through language and I struggle to understand to what extent I 'process' through language.

But I wouldn't go as far as to say that an object, say, a planet, is literally made up of ideas. — Manuel

But hypothetically without preconceptions, ideas or language, what exactly is a planet? It seems to me to be an act of constructionism, not merely raw experience. There are understandings, if you like and then we seem to order, contextualize, name.

Seems appropriate. But at some point experience becomes language and visa versa. Experience ends up being understood through language and I struggle to understand to what extent I 'process' through language. — Tom Storm

There is an intimate relation between language and thought, that much is crucial. And a great deal of our language capacity is unconscious and inaccessible to experience. Nevertheless, absent that layer of experience, there could be language going on in a hypothetical Martian, but it'll stay stuck in the relevant organ. So explicitness in experience is important.

I just want to avoid the po-mo orientation in which everything is language and nothing is ever complete. But, I see your point.

But hypothetically without preconceptions, ideas or language, what exactly is a planet? It seems to me to be an act of constructionism, not merely raw experience. There are understandings, if you like and then we seem to order, contextualize, name. — Tom Storm

I can't do a hypothetical if you ask of me to do away with the only things I have that I can use to relate to an object.

Yes, a planet is a construct - in large part. But if you do away with ideas, preconceptions, language, I wouldn't even be guessing.

But based on what I do have, it seems more reasonable to me to say that a planet is made of non-conscious matter, than to say it is made of ideas, which requires a subject. When things become this abstract, one is poking in the dark.

But based on what I do have, it seems more reasonable to me to say that a planet is made of non-conscious matter, than to say it is made of ideas, which requires a subject. When things become this abstract, one is poking in the dark. — Manuel

I hear you. It's a wicked problem. Even the notion of consciousness is something I'm pretty sure we couldn't conceive of without language.

I just want to avoid the po-mo orientation in which everything is language and nothing is ever complete. — Manuel

But I can't help but find this account compelling. I'm a reluctant post-modernist by osmosis and age. For me nothing is ever complete and I can't imagine myself or my world without language.

It struck me listening to Chomsky recently, in his lambasting of postmodern relativism, that he seems to invoke a structural version of Platonism as a foundational grounding to avoid relativism. In other words, humans seem to have innate limitations or capacities inherent in our cognitive apparatus (is this neo-Kantian?). Not everything is possible or endlessly open if we have such limitations. I wonder also if this is an analogue for some kind of notion of human nature. Thoughts?

I hear you. It's a wicked problem. Even the notion of consciousness is something I'm pretty sure we couldn't conceive of without language. — Tom Storm

We would need something within experience to be able to point out that we have experience in an explicit manner. Otherwise, we are stuck with analyzing behavior. Thus we postulate other mammals to have experience, though they lack language, based on how they behave.

It struck me listening to Chomsky recently, in his lambasting of postmodern relativism, that he seems to invoke a structural version of Platonism as a foundational grounding to avoid relativism. In other words, humans seem to have innate limitations or capacities inherent in our cognitive apparatus (is this neo-Kantian?). Not everything is possible or endlessly open if we have such limitations. I wonder also if this is an analogue for some kind of notion of human nature. Thoughts? — Tom Storm

It's a long story. The short version is that he was influenced or found enlightening the arguments given by Ralph Cudworth, a 17th century Cambridge Platonist, who essentially articulated Kant's arguments in almost the exact same words, almost 100 years before Kant published his Critique.

Difference among these two being, Cudworth give a much richer account of innate ideas, Kant seems to deny them, arguing that we have certain "filters" that are innate, but not ideas per se.

You could put it in your manner and he might agree, though he would put less emphasis on Plato per se. I think he'd simply say that, we are biological creatures like any other - albeit with unique properties (like language). For us to be able to have any nature, we have to be constrained to give shape to our experience.

If we had no constraints, we would have no nature, we would be kind of like lumps of malleable clay. Just like a dog will never understand how to use a laptop, or a dolphin never be able to learn how to drive, there are things we will never understand. Otherwise, we are not natural creatures.

Then you can add the philosophy.

he seems to invoke a structural version of Platonism as a foundational grounding to avoid relativism. — Tom Storm

You aren't the first to point this out, and I think you are correct to do so, and that it's significant. As you probably know, his linguistics is more like physics than what came before ---nice fancy symbolic grammars.

We might talk of the issue in terms of attributing this to hardware (biology) and that to software (culture). Note that biology is inherited in the singular body, so egoistic / personalistic / Cartesian leanings will try to put as much Geist in biology as they can. Or so I would expect.

As far as I can tell, you are what I'd call a dualist. I prefer a phenomenological direct realism. The world and language and us and linguistic norms (semantic-inferential) are all 'given' at the same time. I claim they can't be separated, that to do so results in nonsense (which doesn't mean it's obviovusly nonsense given our human frailties and tendency toward motivated reasoning.)The scientific image is within and a nice part of our encompassing lifeworld, which is not mediated for us by internal images or a veil of sensations. The self is not 'in' the brain but something more like a social convention, a dazzingly selfreferential and selfmodifying 'dance' that primates like us have evolved to be able to engage in. Along these lines, ideas are not immaterial but more like equivalence classes of moves in a symbolic game with and in which we cooperate and compete and even largely are, given what might be called the virtuality of the self as a bearer of responsibility for claims and deeds.

I claim that theses presented by a being that takes itself to be doing philosophy, which is to say conforming to a selftranscending and even universally binding logic, implicit assumes while possibly explicity denying a massive framework all too often left ignored and unappropriated. For instance, did Descartes bother to explain rational norms ? Why would an isolated ghost bother to justify its claims ? How could such a ghost question all of the semantic norms that make such questioning possible ? Small wonder that God is quickly smuggled in.

It seems to me to be an act of constructionism, not merely raw experience. — Tom Storm

I'd even claim that the concept of raw experience is itself a philosophical construction, a meme that caught on, perhaps because it was a good crowbar to use against theological tyranny. It mixes well with individualism.

I'd even claim that the concept of raw experience is itself a philosophical construction — plaque flag

:up: I can see that.

You could put it in your manner and he might agree, though he would put less emphasis on Plato per se. I think he'd simply say that, we are biological creatures like any other - albeit with unique properties (like language). For us to be able to have any nature, we have to be constrained to give shape to our experience — Manuel

Interesting. Thanks for the clarification.

Difference among these two being, Cudworth give a much richer account of innate ideas, Kant seems to deny them, arguing that we have certain "filters" that are innate, but not ideas per se. — Manuel

A useful distinction.

Sure, I could be called a property dualist, though I think it can be misleading to think of experience and non-experience as separate metaphysical things.

God was used back then by almost everybody, Descartes had no special claim in relation to others in using God as an explanation.

As for the rest - It's a bit complex, I could perhaps follow some of it, maybe word things differently in other areas, such as the self.

As for the ghost, Ryle had it wrong, and Chomsky right, so far as I can see. What Newton got rid of was the machine. The ghost remained, and is still here.

What Newton got rid of was the machine. The ghost remained, and is still here. — Manuel

To me that's like keeping left but not right, up but not down.