Well, I am in that boat, but only reluctantly so. I have been able to derive things from the empty set of assumptions, and as such, I might be able to derive ontological idealism
I think it might be possible via realizing restrictions on causality
All knowledge is directly derived from the mental (by definition of the mental), and in order to know that we can know of the non-mental is to know that there is a completely reliable mapping between the mental and non-mental. However, any such knowledge would be mediated by the mental. How can we know of a mapping if we do not have access to both the domain and its image?
If, by "Idealism" you mean the rejection of Realism, all Either/Or logical arguments will go round in circles. You can't have overhead mental Ideality without its substrate of material Reality. And a Reality without sentient beings will have no Ideas. Reality knows itself via Ideality : the ability to abstract Concepts from Percepts ; to generalize Universals from Particulars ; to synthesize personal Meanings from impersonal Things. Reality & Ideality go together like matter & aether.What are some good ontological/logical arguments for ontological idealism? — Ø implies everything
Quite right, but the OP asks for arguments for ontological, not epistemological, idealism. Are you objecting to "ideality" as prior to – independent of – "non-ideality" and thereby also rejecting the premise of the OP?You can't have overhead mental Ideality without its substrate of material Reality. — Gnomon
Arguments for or against Idealism are complicated by the several definitions of the term, and variations within those definitions*1 *2. Since I have no formal training in philosophy, I'll have to stick to naive Idealism (the map is not the territory) and naive Realism (there is something out there that our senses are reporting). The objective aspect of both is our shared myths of reality : a> religious stories about an extrasensory spirit realm, and b> scientific reports about the invisible structure of the material world. From Kant to Quant we have been admonished that "Reality is not what you think it is"*3Ontological objective idealism has less weaknesses and unlikely to be undermined rather than subjective idealism which again leads to solipsism — invicta
This sounds like a complication. An object is an idea regardless of the subjects experience? Why postulate an object which can (perhaps) never be encountered by a subject and also claim its ontological status beforehand? — Manuel
Why can't idealism be monist? One could speak of the different aspects of the mental. — Manuel
There is a sense in which the self is an illusion, or rather, a fiction, in Hume's phrase. But beyond our own conditions of having selves, to extend that to objects and attribute to them this aspect of "self", is not warranted, regardless of ones ontology. — Manuel
In my kind of style of epistemological idealism, I do not conceptualize the world that way: I do not concede that the senses are of something independent of them. — Bob Ross
Objective idealism is not postulating an object that can (perhaps) never be encountered by a subject. It is saying that there is an all-experiencing subject (often equated with God), who thus gives rise to all of reality — Ø implies everything
I think naturalism is more cogent because, as a speculative paradigm, it is more consistent with common sense (i.e. practical, or embodied, participation in nature) than idealism. I find naturalism parsimonious because it does not additionally assume that 'ideas transcend (i.e. constitute) nature' as idealism (re: ideality) does. As ontologies, however, both naturalism & idealism are monistic (though, as I discern it, 'idealism conflates epistemology with ontology', implying fallaciously that 'all there is is what we (can) know').I wonder, why do you find idealism conceptually unparsimonious, and why do you find naturalism more cogent? — Ø implies everything
Could it also be seen as saying that the ideas, forms and principles that comprise the fundamental elements of reason are invariant, and so are grasped by all minds in the same way? — Wayfarer
What do you mean by “empty set of assumptions”? — Bob Ross
What do you mean by “realizing restrictions on causality”? Idealism eliminates the possibility of causality: there is no physical interaction analogous to a physicalist worldview. — Bob Ross
I see. Would you say your style of epistemological idealism is really just ontological idealism, but based on epistemological grounds instead of ontological grounds? That is, on a first-order level, you assert only the mental exist, but on a second-order level, you assert this assertion is not certain, but rather the best assertion; as opposed to a purely ontological idealism, which would assert the sole existence of the mental on all orders.
Personally, I advocate for using the standard definitions. If the above paragraph is a correct description of your views, I would then refer to your view as epistemologically motivated ontological idealism. One must separate the contents of an axiom from its motivation, lest they be confused.
No assumptions; from an absolutely skeptical standpoint. It may seem impossible to derive any propositions from no assumptions, but I believe I have. Nothing significant (yet) though.
In an objective idealism, there can be. If you, in addition to your idealist assumption, assume a regularity in reality (laws of nature), and a distributive awareness (God, mind at large, the simulator(s), etc.), then you can arrive back at science. Now, in such a framework, you'll have causality; and if it is restrictive enough, it will deny the possibility of non-mental objects interacting with your framework's solely mental reality.
I try to prove idealism "via negativa" by demonstrating the incoherence of materialism.What are some good ontological/logical arguments for ontological idealism? — Ø implies everything
Do you mean I equivocate POV (concept) with viewing (perception)?↪HarryHarry Your 'argument' equivocate the word "view", thereby conflating/confusing conception and perception. — 180 Proof
This is not how Aristotle conceived and taught his First Philosophy with respect to his Physics. The word 'metaphysics' literally means 'the book after the book on physics'. It is meant to consist of categorical generalizations about nature derived from studying the many domains and particularities of nature. In other words, one must know nature (i.e. physics) in order to understand the principles / limits of physics (i.e. metaphysics). I'm no Aristotlean (I'm much more of an Epicurean-Spinozist) but I'm sure Plato's best – most renown – pupil didn't put the metaphysical cart before the physical horse. That's clearly a modern idealist's (or p0m0's) mistake. :smirk:Metaphysics by definition is prior to physics. — HarryHarry
(I'm an Epicurean-Spinozist — 180 Proof
Spinoza isn't "an idealist" according to my reading.Wasn't Spinoza an idealist in all but name? — sime
Yes.As for Epicurus, as an empirically minded philosopher, didn't he stress the epistemic primacy,if not ontological primacyof sense-data?
I can't help you with that. :sweat:I'm also not seeing any real points of disagreement between the ontological arguments of Berkleley and Epircurus.
IMO the critiques of physicalism are much more successful than the replacement ontology he offers up in the second half. The replacement ontology relies on this appeal to rare multiple personality disorders that seems like a stretch. — Count Timothy von Icarus
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