In philosophy one must not imitate mathematics by starting from a definition–except perhaps as a mere attempt. For since the definitions are dissections of given concepts, the concepts, though still confused, precede the definitions; and the incomplete exposition precedes the complete one. Thus once we have drawn some characteristics from a still uncompleted dissection, we can infer from them various details in advance, before we have reached the complete exposition, i.e., the definition. In a word, in philosophy the definition, as involving rigorous distinctness, must conclude rather than begin the work. — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B758
[…] I can never be sure that the distinct presentation of a concept given to me (as still confused) has been developed comprehensively, unless I know that it is adequate to the object. However, the object's concept, as it is given, may contain many obscure presentations that we pass over in dissecting the concept, although we always use them in applying it; and hence the comprehensiveness of my concept's dissection is always doubtful … — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B756
one must not imitate mathematics by starting from a definition — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B758
So what do you think? Is “define your terms!” always or often or ever a legitimate imperative? — Jamal
Definitions therefore are poor substitutes for a skill, namely the ability to use terms successfully, an ability that does not rest on definitions but on shared meaning. — Jamal
:up:In this circumstance, our ability to flexibly use terms is superior to our ability to comprehensively define them. — Jamal
the word “explication” derives from the Latin for “unfold,” and I think this is a good way of thinking about what philosophy does. — Jamal
:up:Concepts are open — Jamal
Although I seemed to be starting out by “defining my terms,” in the way that some people in philosophical discussions demand, what I was really doing was explicating a concept that we’re all familiar with, and I was not aiming for comprehensiveness. I was beginning an analysis of a term which we already understand and know how to use; or, to put it differently, I was beginning to describe what we look for in a definition. It may have been a useful exercise, but not because you didn’t already know what a definition is, and not because there’s a likelihood we would end up talking past each other without it. — Jamal
So what do you think? Is “define your terms!” always or often or ever a legitimate imperative? — Jamal
People who get stuck on specific definitions are often irritating pedants and seem to miss the point. — Tom Storm
In philosophy one must not imitate mathematics by starting from a definition ...
... In a word, in philosophy the definition, as involving rigorous distinctness, must conclude rather than begin the work. — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B758
I just wanna provide pushback on this linear definition->theorem->proof characterisation of mathematics. As Lakatos highlights in Proofs and Refutations, the concept of "Eulerian polyhedron" was redefined repeatedly over mathematical history to avoid cases which obviously weren't Eulerian polygons. Even in mathematics, a definition is an attempt to explicate a concept, which can be revised if it is insufficient. — fdrake
Mathematical definitions can never err. For since the concept is first given through the definition, it contains exactly just what the definition wants us to think through the concept. But although there cannot occur in the concept anything incorrect in content, sometimes–although only rarely–there may still be a defect in the form (the guise) of the concept, viz., as regards its precision. — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B759
Skill looks like the right focus here. Inspired by Brandom and others, I think of applying concepts as a skilled labor, mostly inarticulate cando knowhow, manifesting sensitivity to and respect for the discursive norms we are always already thrown into, which make asking for definitions or after their value possible to begin with.
In my view, it's helpful to emphasize the larger context in which definitions matter. We make and evaluate claims about the world, including what we should do within in it, as part of a community. I claim that it's only because they are used in claims that concepts matter. — plaque flag
From a 'Hegelian' perspective, concepts are always in flux, slowly drifting. We change the object being clarified (language) as we use it to articulate its own character. — plaque flag
Beautiful metaphor ! Making It Explicit. If we named global Geistware Shakespeare, we can name the philosophical module Hegel, in honor of someone who made making it explicit explicit to itself. 'Hegel' is that part of spirit (cultural software) which articulates the character of articulation itself. — plaque flag
The reminds me of discussions of genesis versus structure. That concepts are open make genesis possible. As individuals we can get lucky with a new metaphor which gets adopted becomes relatively literal, hardens like cooling wax. Or we can add to the machinery of metacognition by seeing that maybe the inferential relationships of claims are what make concepts within such claims meaningful, etc. — plaque flag
The first is one I've expressed here often - many, I would say most, of the frustrating, fruitless discussions we have here on the forum start out with disagreements about the meaning of words and then never make any progress toward actually dealing with any interesting philosophical issues. — T Clark
I don't disagree that discussions where we work out among ourselves what particular terms mean are valuable. I have started a few discussions for that purpose - What does "mysticism" mean; What does "consciousness" mean; What does "real" mean. They were among the more satisfying discussions I've participated in. — T Clark
On the other hand, I often start discussions about specific issues I want to examine, often something to do with metaphysics. In my OPs I often make it clear exactly what I intend the meaning of specific words are for the purposes of that particular discussion. Then I obnoxiously and legalistically defend that position, sometimes asking moderators to help. I do that because I want to talk about a specific concept or subject and I don't want to argue about what "metaphysics" really means. If I don't make those kinds of requirements, the thread will just turn into an argument about something I'm not interested in. — T Clark
“Mathematical definitions never err,” he’s wrong? — Jamal
But although there cannot occur in the concept anything incorrect in content, sometimes–although only rarely–there may still be a defect in the form (the guise) of the concept, viz., as regards its precision — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B759
So, in general, I think that we most of the time, have a decent idea or notion of what we want to communicate. The failure of communication has more to do with the ideas behind the words, than the words themselves. So, I'm inclined to agree that philosophy shouldn't be primarily about definitions, though these can help. — Manuel
Examples are looked down upon by several philosophers, but they’re often what allow me to first get ahold of a concept, — Jamal
Note the lower textual location in B only, this in reference to understanding, whereas the other quotes with higher textual locations, refer to pure reason’s dogmatic use, and is found in both editions.
Of course definitions have a place, if only in justifications for a method. — Mww
How is deciding the meaning of a concept like define related to deciding such legitimacy ? — plaque flag
It's the same thing? — Jamal
People who get stuck on specific definitions are often irritating pedants and seem to miss the point. — Tom Storm
I think (?) inferentialism would say yes, but of course we have to think of all possible inferences involving 'define.' — plaque flag
A definition is a statement that specifies the correct use of a term. — Jamal
I hope you don't mind if I jump in here, — Jamal
One thing I can't do well is games, like chess and poker. — Jamal
telling oneself and others that one is borderline innumerate might just reinforce a psychological block that stands in the way of your mathematical genius. — Jamal
Like music, it demands constant practice to stay on the horse, and without that it becomes very difficult to get back on. — Jamal
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