Ok, but that has nothing to do with meaning in language. Again, one can grant all you're saying without it being in any way an objection to the use-theory.

With the "Man without Words", when he finally discovered language, he wasn't surprised that there was a new game to play, or that he finally discovered meaning. His surprise was that there are shared symbols for things in the world.

of course it does. Again we are talking about getting at the ideas in the users mind, not getting at the rules. The rules are simply there in order to more accurately represent what you are thinking. Your speach and writing can reflect the logic or illogic of your thoughts. Your thoughts may be inconsistent but the world isnt. In order to say anything meaningful your language must reflect the way the world is in some way.

Again, you can never say or write anything that isnt either just sounds/scribbles or a reference to some state-of-affairs.

Again, all that can be granted - however contentious and however wrong I think it is - without putting into question the use-theory. But my spade is turned. I do not think you know what it is you are objecting to.

I would like to understand that. But..

I'm not trying to be troublesome here, but the standard meter in Paris is not considered to be a representation of the concept of a meter. It's a standard. It's also not intended to represent the length of anything. Unless I'm misunderstanding how "representation" is being used here.

Wasn't he saying that since we can't measure the standard (because that would require a second standard), it's sort of ordained as the standard in practical use. The reality of the standard is not related to a physical object. It's basis is actually in use. He's going beyond meaning as use, here. It's reality in use.

Not too complicated. The same is true of the average abstraction, right?

It doesn't really solve the philosophical problem of meaning to say that there are some 'ideas' in your mind. The fact that something is in your mind as opposed to behavior doesn't magically solve everything. It doesn't explain meaning (or rather, it doesn't tell you what meaning is), because if there is a puzzle about how mere words can represent something, there's equally a puzzle about how 'ideas' in someone's head can do the same thing. Thinking that the mind has some magical ability to simply 'mean' things is an illusion.

I already quoted some passages from Wittgenstein where he gives an argument (especially the sections about the cube picture) against views like yours, but you however completely ignored that argument.

suppose a monkey encounters a yellow banana which happens to be rotten, should we say that the monkey infers that he made a mistake about the banana being ripe, — Fafner

That would entirely depend on whether the monkey has experience with bananas for there to be a good reason, via induction, for him to assume that yellow bananas are correlated to ripeness.

If he has an extensive history of yellow banana implying "ripe," then he'll likely assume that something unusual is going on with the bananas.

If he's just learning the correlation, then he might think he made a mistake or that he's not sure what correlation, if any, there is yet.

I don't see any reason to assume that this would be any different for monkeys than it is for humans . . . so I wonder why you're posing the example in the first place. That's not really clear to me.

or maybe it had the a disjunctive concept that a yellow banana represents either being ripe or rotten? (in which case it didn't made a mistake). Is there a way to decide what the monkey "means" just by knowing its causal history of interactions with bananas?

You can't know (by acquaintance) anyone else's meaning per se, monkey or not. You can only know the behavioral stuff they correlate with the meanings they assign.

the standard meter in Paris is not considered to be a representation of the concept of a meter. It's a standard. It's also not intended to represent the length of anything. Unless I'm misunderstanding how "representation" is being used here. — Mongrel

But the stick does define what a meter is, or at least this is how it was historically (though nowadays it is defined differently, but that's irrelevant - we can just as well talk about the invented example of the 'standard sepia'). And it doesn't really matter whether you say that the meter stick represents the length of something or not, because the main point is that it is an essential instrument in the game of measuring which Wittgenstein has in mind (in which we do in fact represent the length of objects).

Wasn't he saying that since we can't measure the standard (because that would require a second standard), it's sort of ordained as the standard in practical use. The reality of the standard is not related to a physical object. It's basis is actually in use. He's going beyond meaning as use, here. It's reality in use. — Mongrel

This is not what he says - there's no sense in measuring the standard because we chose to define it as a standard (or that it has been 'ordained' as you say), and not the other way round.

And what do you mean by "the reality of the standard is not related to a physical object"?

Again we are talking about getting at the ideas in the users mind, not getting at the rules. — Harry Hindu

There's ideas and there's ideas. When you use the phrase "my grandmother," I can understand you without experiencing the memories you do when you say "my grandmother." And a good thing, because I cannot experience your memories. So there's something else that I can and do get, if I understand you, and that other something is the meaning of the words you speak.

But the stick does define what a meter is, or at least this is how it was historically (though nowadays it is defined differently, but that's irrelevant - we can just as well talk about the invented example of the 'standard sepia'). And it doesn't really matter whether you say that the meter stick represents the length of something or not, because the main point is that it is an essential instrument in the game of measuring which Wittgenstein has in mind. — Fafner

So you're saying we can disregard his use of "means of representation."? Don't you agree he's saying the instrument (whether standard meter or sepia) exists because of its function or role in our language games?

This is important to me because of a chicken/egg situation I see with meaning and use of language.

This is not what he says - there's no sense in measuring the standard because we chose to define it as a standard (or that it has been 'ordained' as you say), and not the other way round. — Fafner

Well we can't measure it without a second standard. Can you explain what he means when he says it is and is not a meter?

And what do you mean by "the reality of the standard is not related to a physical object"? — Fafner

Just that the stick is a standard because we say so. There's nothing in the physicality of the stick that says "I'm a standard."

Well we can't measure it without a second standard. Can you explain what he means when he says it is and is not a meter? — Mongrel

He's being cute. Obviously measuring the standard doesn't make sense. But people can still form the sentence, "The standard meter is one meter in length," so what do we say about that? Is it true or false? It's nether. The law of the excluded middle does not apply here.

"The standard meter is one meter in length," so what do we say about that? Is it true or false? It's nether — Srap Tasmaner

It's true?

Here, though, you're surely at a crux where Fafner is right: you are conjuring up an imaginary Wittgenstein in order to make a point of your own. 'Philosophical Investigations' is a complex book and nowhere in it do I remember these 'arguments' that you mention. One thing I'm confident he's saying is that it's difficult to have a clear overview of language, since we only have language to do it with. What you are calling 'meaning' will involve comparing one word with another, or with a group of other words, and asserting that some greater clarity results. — mcdoodle

This is very strange, because you have other posters in this thread, and other threads, like unenlightened, Michael and Banno arguing along the lines that Witty did in fact mean that. Now possibly I have misunderstood their arguments. But it comes up regularly.

I had a thread a bit back on Wittgenstein's meter, framed as a discussion of examples. Perhaps some might find it useful?

He's being cute. Obviously measuring the standard doesn't make sense. But people can still form the sentence, "The standard meter is one meter in length," so what do we say about that? Is it true or false? It's nether. The law of the excluded middle does not apply here. — Srap Tasmaner

That's the way I took it. The conundrum dissolves when we realize that as a species, we're conjurors.

Thanks!

No, for it to be true you would have to have an effective procedure for determining it to be true (as in mathematics) or some idea what would count as evidence and how you could in theory at least acquire that evidence. Because there's no conceivable way to measure the standard, you're out of luck. The standard does not have a length.

That would entirely depend on whether the monkey has experience with bananas for there to be a good reason, via induction, for him to assume that yellow bananas are correlated to ripeness.

If he has an extensive history of yellow banana implying "ripe," then he'll likely assume that something unusual is going on with the bananas. — Terrapin Station

I think that your story already presupposes that the monkey can understand what 'the banana is ripe' (or that it isn't) mean - but remember, what you are supposed to explain is how the monkey acquires the ability to represent the ripeness of the banana in the first place.

This is because induction requires the ability to form a hypothesis, and then use experience to confirm or disprove it. But to confirm the hypothesis that the ripeness of the banana is correlated with its color by means of repeated observation, you need to know in advance (before you start observing) what it would be for a banana to be either ripe or not ripe (otherwise how could you tell whether your hypothesis was confirmed or not?); but how can you know that from your experience unless you already have some way of symbolically representing the state of the ripeness of the banana?

Hrmmm. I have asserted that the standard meter is nether. My diabolism is showing.

Can't you measure the standard meter by other means? Say the time it takes light to traverse that distance, and then compare that to the time it takes light to go other distances? The speed of light isn't something we made up, so it could serve as an absolute standard, like atomic clocks can be an absolute standard of measuring time.

Can't you measure the standard meter by other means? Say the time it takes light to traverse that distance, and then compare that to the time it takes light to go other distances? The speed of light isn't something we made up, so it could serve as an absolute standard, like atomic clocks can be an absolute standard of measuring time. — Marchesk

Of course you can measure the meter stick by some other units, but in this case it will be no longer treated as a standard of length.

Yeah it's something else now. But if the standard's something else, the thing in Paris is just a stick. (A really nice stick.)

I think that your story already presupposes that the monkey can understand what 'the banana is ripe' (or that it isn't) mean - but remember, what you are supposed to explain is how the monkey acquires the ability to represent the ripeness of the banana in the first place. — Fafner

If that's what you're asking, I had no idea. You weren't at all clear about that.

The monkey has that ability because it has a brain--a brain that's relatively similar in construction to human brains, and this is one of the primary ways that brains work.

Re the rest of your comment, you simply experience the color being such and such way and the banana tasting such and such way. You don't need a "hypothesis" for that, really, at least not at all in a formal way. To connect more than one occasion, you do need memory. Then on subsequent occasions, you notice that the same thing is the case, plus you have occasions where you notice that both the color is different and the taste (and texture) are different.

(I'm still not clear on what, in context, is the point is of going through all of this)

So you're saying we can disregard his use of "means of representation."? — Mongrel

No, that's not what I'm saying. "means of representation" means something like an aid or an instrument of representation, and this is compatible with saying that the stick itself doesn't represent anything.

Don't you agree he's saying the instrument (whether standard meter or sepia) exists because of its function or role in our language games? — Mongrel

If by that you mean "why did we build the standard meter?" then yes, obviously it was created for this particular purpose.

Can you explain what he means when he says it is and is not a meter? — Mongrel

Because we can't measure the stick with itself, or at least not in the sense in which we can measure tables with the stick, so it is senseless to say either that it is a meter or that it isn't a meter long because being or not being a meter long is determined by a procedure of comparison with the stick which we cannot apply to the stick itself.

Yes. I think it's just my non-linear thought processes producing the appearance of a disagreement between us. Looking at the wonderful quote you produced again:

We can put it like this: This sample is an instrument of the language used in ascriptions of colour. In this language-game it is not something that is represented, but is a means of representation.--And just this goes for an element in language-game (48) when we name it by uttering the word "R": this gives this object a role in our language-game; it is now a means of representation. And to say "If it did not exist, it could have no name" is to say as much and as little as: if this thing did not exist, we could not use it in our language-game.--What looks as if it had to exist, is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparison is made. And this may be an important observation; but it is none the less an observation concerning our language-game--our method of representation.

Yep. He's talking about the creative power of language. Duck/rabbit style. We make the stick a standard by comparing stuff to it. See? He's talking about meaning and existence simultaneously.

Because there's no conceivable way to measure the standard, you're out of luck. The standard does not have a length. — Srap Tasmaner

You could measure it with a ruler that has been verified to be a meter in length.

If that's what you're asking, I had no idea. You weren't at all clear about that. — Terrapin Station

I was addressing something that Harry Hindu said (and I assumed that you meant to defend his claim). He said: "the meaning of a yellow banana is that is it ripe. It's blackness means it is rotten. We don't need language to know this", and this is the claim that I was criticizing. Was your story meant to illustrate this or something else?

We make the stick a standard by comparing stuff to it. See? He's talking about meaning and existence simultaneously. — Mongrel

Good point. But the meaning of length itself does not come from using an arbitrary standard, like a stick, or someone's foot. Length is innate to us, like time and space. We don't create the meaning for those things.

My argument is that meaning and language games are built up from fundamental categories of thought that have to exist, or there is no language. Sure, a stick acquires the meaning of standard length by it's use, but length itself does not.

Therefore, meaning can't ONLY be use.

I was addressing something that Harry Hindu said (and I assumed that you meant to defend his claim). He said: "the meaning of a yellow banana is that is it ripe. It's blackness means it is rotten. We don't need language to know this", and this is the claim that I was criticizing. Was your story meant to illustrate this or something else? — Fafner

I wouldn't use the word "meaning" there. I commented on this earlier, although I didn't address that comment to you. I'm fine with saying that the yellow skin implies that it's ripe, although implication there is more of a correlation. I'd agree with him that language isn't necessary to know this, although I'd note that I'm using language in a more narrow sense there. If someone is using "language" so broadly that any mental representation counts as language, then that would be a different issue.

Yep. He's talking about the creative power of language. Duck/rabbit style. We make the stick a standard by comparing stuff to it. See? He's talking about meaning and existence simultaneously. — Mongrel

Yes, but it is a somewhat different issue that has to do with that quote from Plato. I only posted this passage to illustrate one particular idea (that things other than words can belong to language or a symbolic system), but there are some other questions that Wittgenstein wanted to address in this passage.