Apparently Socrates got a lot of mileage out of being picky about the definition of justice. You could think of philosophy as an exercise gym and trying to pin down definitions is one of the machines.

If you stand at the door to the gym and claim that defining things is stupid, you probably don't need to go in and work out. Just go home and work in your garden or something.

Interesting current Aeon essay on this topic Meaning Beyond Definition.

Thanks!

I agree, but I’m putting it more strongly: they can help, but they can also positively hinder. — Jamal

Sure, especially if you insist that if the other person is not sticking to your own definition, then that person is not talking about the same subject you have in mind. You (or I) could be wrong, or we could be misleading people.

Though we do need some common point of anchor, otherwise we can't enter into a conversation.

In Socrates' defense he was not looking for definitions but accounts, and this for the sake of inquiry.

For example, in Plato's Republic Socrates defines justice as minding your own business. A deeply ironic definition.

We all have some sense of what justice means. What Socrates is asking is that we go further. The problem is not resolved by definition. Whatever definition is proposed we can always ask whether this is what justice is? Does this determine what is and is not just in a particular case?

I good by the reader should be made to understand what is being said, and often an even larger degree of charity in interpretation too.

The whole point of any discussion is to bridge across the gap from one mind to another. Some gaps are more worthy than others (and such judgements are necessarily subjective).

If someone asks for a definition and/or questions how a term is being used then it is on the author to attempt to offer a different line to bring the reader in or for them to judge the worth of bothering to do so. If everyone understands the core of your idea and position then it can mean either the point was not worth bringing up to begin with or you have exposed something deeply insightful/useful (the latter will be obvious to all).

If someone asks for a definition and/or questions how a term is being used then it is on the author to attempt to offer a different line to bring the reader in or for them to judge the worth of bothering to do so — I like sushi

I think this might be one reason we draw philosophers into a discussion. If I mention "reference" and then nod toward Quine, I'm giving you the basis for my use of the term.

The problem is, if you help me out in this way, I'm prone to ignoring you and creating a wicker man version of you to whom I address all my thoughts on this subject because I've been thinking about it for a long time and I want to put it into words and I hope you don't mind if I'm not even giving any hint that I notice that there's a real person behind your posts.

Is “define your terms!” always or often or ever a legitimate imperative? — Jamal

Count me in the group that thinks it’s often very important. Countless useless digressions could be avoided if we were clearer about what we mean.

This doesn’t necessarily imply we have to come up with a precise, technical term for everything, but there are times when one assumes the other person knows what they mean, and it sets the stage for absurdities.

Two examples: “God” and “capitalism.”

They might be cases of equivocal terms, which I agreed often ought to be defined.

I don't think God is such a concept, but capitalism, yeah I see that.

There seem to be two different definitions of definitions at play. The first is a matter of making clear what one means by a term. The second is to set the boundaries of a concept. Roughly, the first tells us what someone means when she says "X". The second tells us what "X" is. It is often the case that on the road from the former to the latter we hit a road block, an aporia.

I don't think God is such a concept — Jamal

God isn’t equivocal?

So what do you think? Is “define your terms!” always or often or ever a legitimate imperative? — Jamal

It's not so much the particular wording of a definition that is mandatory for communication, but differentiation between various versions of the idea to be communicated. Presumably, Voltaire placed definition first in the process of communication, because the same word can have many shades of meaning. And the point of philosophical dialog is often to shed light on those shades. :smile:

It’s not clear to me whether this situation is the result of a lack of definitions, or an excessive focus on definitions. — Jamal

Maybe it's that you and I have a different approach to philosophy. Now that you've started actively participating in discussions again, it seems to me you focus more specific philosophers and works. In those cases, the context of the discussion can take care of a lot of the potential misunderstandings. I came to philosophy with my own understanding of how the world works, the nature of reality, how discussions should proceed. I also came from a profession where, given an audience which is often non-technical, defining terms was very important.

I think I use the writings of philosophers differently than some others on the forum do. I use them to test my understanding. If I find someone whose ideas resonate with mine, they can help me refine and extend my understanding. That's why Collingwood and Lao Tzu are so important to me. I've always disliked Kant, but more recently I've found that some of his ideas are similar to those of Lao Tzu. His somewhat different approach has been interesting. I think maybe the discussions I start, and often those I join, are more free form and are not tied down to specific works and philosophers. I often avoid those more specific discussions because I don't know enough to participate usefully.

I understand. This looks like stipulative definition, which I was mostly ignoring, treating it as something separate. — Jamal

That makes sense.

Or maybe what you’re referring to is the exception in my main thesis, those times when a term is so ambiguous that you need to prevent confusion with a clear statement that this, not that, is what you mean. — Jamal

I think that's part of it too.

Interesting post, and maybe I’ll reply properly tomorrow, but for now I’ll just mention that thanks to the Aeon article that @Wayfarer linked to above, I’ve downloaded Collingwood’s Essay on Philosophical Method. I’ve read bits of his work before and always liked him.

the Aeon article that Wayfarer linked to above — Jamal

I hadn't seen that link. The article looks interesting. Thanks.

The difference between a definition and a stipulative definition is somewhat collapsible if you stipulate you are referring to X "in its common use" or "according to its dictionary definition" to avoid the impression that your argument rests on a particular interpretation that might be unfamiliar to the reader. And if, to the contrary it does, you stipulate that interpretation. Both seem potentially helpful avenues towards discussion. In the process of explanation, is definition any more than a tool to increase clarity and discursive efficiency such that what and when you define need not be based on any general precept but simply what you want to do in the conversation?

Do you think there is a math brain or a type of person to whom math speaks? — Tom Storm

Genetics are a big part. A little like musical talent. My father grew up in a poor coal mining community in Pennsylvania where almost all the young men went into the mines after high school. He worked after school in his senior year in the mangers for donkeys underground, doing his homework by lantern light. But he escaped his origins and became a professor of business statistics and directed the grad program at the University of Georgia for a while. He had a masters in mathematics, then a PhD in statistics. My degree was in math.

That's interesting. Thank you.

The difference between a definition and a stipulative definition is somewhat collapsible if you stipulate you are referring to X "in its common use" or "according to its dictionary definition" to avoid the impression that your argument rests on a particular interpretation that might be unfamiliar to the reader. And if, to the contrary it does, you stipulate that interpretation. — Baden

According to the way I've put things in the OP, the former is the type of definition necessitated by X's ambiguity, where X is what I referred to as an equivocal term--and I conceded that these definitions are often required to begin a debate--and the latter is stipulative definition proper, which I also admitted was a good thing, whether to define a technical usage or to restrict the discussion to a specific avenue (although I may not have made it so explicit).

The other kind of definition I said was just fine was the kind that we aim for in a discussion, what I called explicative definition. I'm not actually sure if my taxonomy stands up to scrutiny--e.g., maybe all beginning definitions are stipulations--but it was at least the stipulated usage I was trying to adhere to in the OP.

Both seem potentially helpful avenues towards discussion. In the process of explanation, is definition any more than a tool to increase clarity and discursive efficiency such that what and when you define need not be based on any general precept but simply what you want to do in the conversation? — Baden

I am coming round to regretting the clickbait title of this discussion. However, I still feel like defending the thesis: A definition of a philosophical concept might be required at the beginning of a discussion only in the case that the term is equivocal [or a stipulative definition is required].

There is more to be said here but I need to think about it.

Is that what inferentialism entails? That's a bummer.

You're in danger of forcing me to read Brandom. — Jamal

:up:
...like waking up at the wheel of a roaring race car.

Maybe it's that you and I have a different approach to philosophy. Now that you've started actively participating in discussions again, it seems to me you focus more specific philosophers and works. In those cases, the context of the discussion can take care of a lot of the potential misunderstandings. I came to philosophy with my own understanding of how the world works, the nature of reality, how discussions should proceed. I also came from a profession where, given an audience which is often non-technical, defining terms was very important. — T Clark

On the one hand I somewhat disagree with your characterization of my approach. This discussion is a good example: in the OP I quote Kant, but not because I'm interested in how his position on definitions fits with his philosophy in general; it's just because I happened to be reading that passage in Kant and it made me think about the odd division on this forum between those who want definitions up front and those who don't. In my "Magical powers" discussion it was the same thing: reading something in Nietzsche made me think about the idea of the disenchantment of the Enlightenment, and I explored it in my own way while attempting to synthesize various thinkers.

On the other hand I somewhat agree. I am certainly more interested in approaching philosophical questions through the thinking of great thinkers than I am in formulating my own personal system. I do notice that you tend to personalize the issues, as you have done here, and that is indeed very different from my approach. I'm not saying it's bad or uninteresting; it's just very difficult for me to find a way of engaging with it (although I'm doing okay right now).

But the issue here for me is: how does my famous-philosopher-centric approach to philosophy lead me to think the problem with "fruitless discussions" that "never make any progress toward actually dealing with any interesting philosophical issues" is an excessive focus on definitions? Conversely, how does your own approach to philosophy, based on a rich personal history that has allowed you to develop your own unique and coherent philosophy, lead you to think that the problem is actually not enough definition at the start of these discussions? After all, what is right for engineering may be wrong for philosophy.

I think of it a bit like this: in software engineering it may be impossible to accurately estimate the duration of a project if that project is to build something brand new, whereas the construction of yet another e-commerce website or chat application, or in a different field, yet another fan-type cable-stayed bridge--these may be far easier to estimate, because there are standards and precedents and reasonably certain expectations. Where am I going with this? I think I want to say that the latter is the definition-centric one and the former is more like philosophy, where "planning is guessing". That is, in philosophy and innovation, things have to be kept open to a significant degree; or to put it differently, we have to realize that things just are open.

I think I use the writings of philosophers differently than some others on the forum do. I use them to test my understanding. If I find someone whose ideas resonate with mine, they can help me refine and extend my understanding. That's why Collingwood and Lao Tzu are so important to me. I've always disliked Kant, but more recently I've found that some of his ideas are similar to those of Lao Tzu. His somewhat different approach has been interesting. I think maybe the discussions I start, and often those I join, are more free form and are not tied down to specific works and philosophers. I often avoid those more specific discussions because I don't know enough to participate usefully. — T Clark

As I say, I don't think my discussions are tied down to the works of philosophers. In both of the examples I mentioned, nobody else needed to know anything more about the philosophers beyond the quotations, because I was not exploring the wider thought of those thinkers (not that there's anything wrong with that).

I am wondering, , what you made of the article linked.

I would agree that defining philosophical concepts in advance of a discussion carries both the danger of unintentionally obscuring difficulties with those concepts' foundational structures, which may be relevant to the ensuing conversation, and being a deliberate rhetorical means to direct the conversation past such difficulties. But if this is a problem of delimitation, so may be a rigid application of your thesis? Of course, I may be just stretching for an argument here.

But if this is a problem of delimitation, so may be a rigid application of your thesis? — Baden

Hey that’s not fair!

I'm taking the @Banno approach--semi-pointless trouble making. :nerd:

I've said this before, so get ready to yawn. It's the little words that create all the difficulty in philosophy:– words like "I" and "if" and "when", and "thing"and "being" and "exist". People try to avoid the difficulties by making up big words that they think they can control, but then they find all the difficult words creep back into their definitions.

For example in order to know what counts as a definition, one needs to know what counts as a 'count'. And there's no accounting for that, except by making up a story.

When used in a certain way this is a fallacy, the fallacy of persuasive definition, a mark of sophistry rather than philosophy. Even when it’s not fallacious, it forecloses on certain of the range of possible results. — Jamal

That’s interesting. I hadn’t even thought to question Kant on that. I suppose then that when he says in the same section that “Mathematical definitions never err,” he’s wrong?

But here’s the full passage:

Mathematical definitions can never err. For since the concept is first given through the definition, it contains exactly just what the definition wants us to think through the concept. But although there cannot occur in the concept anything incorrect in content, sometimes–although only rarely–there may still be a defect in the form (the guise) of the concept, viz., as regards its precision.
— Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B759

I wonder if that covers it. — Jamal

So, the sophistry of persuasive definition extends right into mathematics as well. Set theory provides a very good example of this.

For example in order to know what counts as a definition, one needs to know what counts as a 'count'. And there's no accounting for that, except by making up a story. — unenlightened

Or, you could do like the mathematicians do, and practise what Jamal calls the fallacy of persuasive definition.

In Socrates' defense he was not looking for definitions but accounts, and this for the sake of inquiry.

For example, in Plato's Republic Socrates defines justice as minding your own business. A deeply ironic definition.

We all have some sense of what justice means. What Socrates is asking is that we go further. The problem is not resolved by definition. Whatever definition is proposed we can always ask whether this is what justice is? Does this determine what is and is not just in a particular case? — Fooloso4

This is the method known as Platonic dialectics. What Plato does is proceed through all proposed definitions for a term, and demonstrates the deficiencies of each. So we are left without any acceptable definition and the true meaning of the term remains unknown, or even in the extreme we might find, like Wittgenstein does, that such a thing as the true meaning, is an impossibility. A good example is Plato's "Theaetetus" where they submit "knowledge" to that method.

Or, you could do like the mathematicians do, and practise what Jamal calls the fallacy of persuasive definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I generally do at about this point in the discussion, is bring out the weapon of mass destruction that is The Meaning of Meaning, by Ogden and Richards. It is the definitive text, and to my mind an object lesson in the futility of trying to define a word and thereby divorcing meaning from context.

When I say 'context', I invite you to imagine not just the words around the word in question, but also the armchair around the philosopher and the ever-collapsing political order in which they are necessarily embedded.

I do notice that you tend to personalize the issues, as you have done here, and that is indeed very different from my approach. I'm not saying it's bad or uninteresting; it's just very difficult for me to find a way of engaging with it (although I'm doing okay right now). — Jamal

This is definitely true. A lot of my understanding of philosophical issues comes from my examination of my own way of knowing and experiencing things. Introspection, intuition, are the most important aspects of knowledge to me. Maybe "interesting" is a better word than "important."

what is right for engineering may be wrong for philosophy. — Jamal

I think my approach is right for engineering and for my philosophy. Two of my favorite quotes which lay out how I see things.

It is not necessary that you leave the house. Remain at your table and listen. Do not even listen, only wait. Do not even wait, be wholly still and alone. The world will present itself to you for its unmasking, it can do no other, in ecstasy it will writhe at your feet. — Kafka

To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men,— that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for always the inmost becomes the outmost—and our first thought is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment. Familiar as the voice of the mind is to each, the highest merit we ascribe to Moses, Plato, and Milton is that they set at naught books and traditions, and spoke not what men, but what they thought. — Emerson - Self Reliance

By "genius," Emerson didn't mean like what Einstein was, he means more the essence of who we are. Both of these quotes describe a kind of philosophical, well, self-reliance. That appeals to me in all my western individualism. On the other hand, Lao Tzu also describes the rejection of tradition and authority in favor of insight.

I think I want to say that the latter is the definition-centric one and the former is more like philosophy, where "planning is guessing". That is, in philosophy and innovation, things have to be kept open to a significant degree; or to put it differently, we have to realize that things just are open. — Jamal

Yes... well...

All in all, I'm not sure that anything we've said makes your and my differing approaches to definitions any clearer to me. On the other hand, laying out my understanding of how philosophy works, how my philosophy works, has been helpful. It's the first time I've expressed it in the way I did here.

I am wondering, ↪T Clark, what you made of the article ↪Wayfarer linked. — Banno

It started out interesting, but then switched from talking about definition in a general or philosophical sense to a poetic one. That lost me, at least from the point of view of this discussion. The need for and use of definitions in poetry is very different from that in philosophy.