Have you looked at Braver's Groundless Grounds ? — plaque flag
For both Heidegger and Wittgenstein, then, the source of the intelligibility of the world is the average public practices through which alone there can be any understanding at all. What is shared is not a conceptual scheme, i.e., not a belief system that can be made explicit and justified. Not that we share a belief system that is always implicit and arbitrary. That is just the Sartrean version of the same mistake. What we share is simply our average comportment. Once a practice has been explained by appealing to what one does, no more basic explanation is possible. As Wittgenstein puts it in On Certainty: "Giving grounds [must] come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.
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This view is entirely antithetical to the philosophical ideal of total clarity and ultimate intelligibility. Philosophers seek an ultimate ground. When they discover there is none, even modern philosophers ... seem to think that they have fallen into an abyss -- that the lack of an ultimate ground has catastrophic consequences for human activity.
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There is, however, something that average everyday intelligibility obscures, viz., that it is merely average everyday intelligibility. It takes for granted that the everyday for-the-sake-of-whichs and the equipment that serves them are based upon God's goodness, human nature, or at least solid good sense. This is what Heidegger called "the perhaps necessary appearance of foundation." One cannot help thinking that the right (healthy, civilized, rational, natural, etc.) way to sit, for example, is on chairs, at tables, etc., not on the floor. Our way seems to make intrinsic sense -- a sense not captured in saying, "This is what we in the West happen to do." What gets covered up in everyday understanding is not some deep intelligibility as the tradition has always held; it is that the ultimate "ground" of intelligibility is simply shared practices. There is no right interpretation. Average intelligibility is not inferior intelligibility; it simply obscures its own groundlessness. This is the last stage of the hermeneutics of suspicion. The only deep interpretation left is that there is no deep interpretation. — Dreyfus
I think Heidegger's "being-in-the-world" as a unitary mode of being is revolutionary. — Arne
Wittgenstein has some similarities, especially in terms of “average everydayness,” but I see little similarity with Heidegger’s conception of being-in-the-world. — Mikie
that "being in the world" in the sense of a subject confronted with objects, or a mind and body in objective space, was a derivative or secondary mode of thinking about ourselves — Kevin
Did he with the Being stuff generalize Kierkegaard into a more glamorously negative cryptotheology ? For me the key stuff is human historicity in language, which Gadamer ran with, along with lifeworld centrality and the unbreakable unit of world-self-language-others that makes philosophy possible. — plaque flag
Exactly. We can thank Dreyfus , and to a certain extent Gadamer, for a god-awful misreading of Heidegger that turns him into a Kierkegaardian existentialist. — Joshs
I don't see how the thought of being in something is not dualistic. The thought of simply being is not dualistic, but when it 'in-the-world' is posited it becomes so. — Janus
:up:Traditional approaches posited a unitary a priori subject with self-identically persisting faculties of mind surveying external objects across a divide. — Joshs
Things are beings-in-themselves that appear before a subject. — Joshs
:up:To ‘be’ is to be a crossing or intersection between past and present. — Joshs
To ‘be’ is to be a crossing or intersection between past and present.
— Joshs
:up:
Perhaps comment on the future too here ? — plaque flag
Can you explain this in your own words? — Fooloso4
The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. — Joshs
“Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. — Joshs
What we have been is also the very language and conceptuality which we 'are' by default ... — plaque flag
and which we must use (there are no other tools) in order to critique this past itself, — plaque flag
this past that leaps ahead, governing our self-interpretation today and what is possible for us tomorrow. — plaque flag
In what sense is what I have been the language and conceptuality I am? If I was dropped on my head as a baby is what happened language and conceptuality? If was neglected and malnourished and ate lead paint how is that language and conceptuality? — Fooloso4
If this was my past then I would not have this tool. My ability to develop language would not have developed. And yet, without being able to critique my past I would still have a past. — Fooloso4
I think this happens to some degree but what was need not determine what we will be. If our past governs our self-interpretation then what is to be gained by trying to educate and improve ourselves? — Fooloso4
Just to be clear, Heidegger and my creative misreading are both using temporal terms with different intensities of metaphoricity. — plaque flag
You are leaving out the autonomy project. — plaque flag
I don't see how a deliberate misreading can make anything clear. Does he use temporal terms metaphorically? — Fooloso4
Haven't you read the guy ? — plaque flag
Dasein is time. — plaque flag
For Heidegger subjects and objects don’t inhere in themselves, have no internality or subsistence. To ‘be’ is to be a crossing or intersection between past and present. Being is one part memory and one part present. It is between these two as a becoming , a transit , a difference. Dasein, as Being-in-the-World, is a worlding’, not the appearing of things before a subject but an enacting of world in which to be is to be displaced into what discloses itself. — Joshs
Does he say that? Why not Being and Dasein? I would have to read it in context before saying more. — Fooloso4
I don't recall reading anything that would make me think he was talking metaphorically. — Fooloso4
How does this fit with the past governing our self-interpretation? — Fooloso4
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