I can't comment on the later Heidegger. I will reiterate that his style is direct and clear in the lectures that led up to the writing of Being and Time. — plaque flag

I agree. The same is true of some of the lectures immediately following Being and Time as contained in Basic Problems of Phenomenology.

The most insidious part is that one's lack of understanding never reaches the surface. — Fooloso4

:up:

Now you are talking some Heidegger !

That's why we must dig, my friend. That's why we can't just stare, assuring ourselves that we are neutral and unbiased, for it's not a matter of a feeling in the tummy. It's a matter of us being language, being an enacted system of semantic norms. I am my history (my training, my contingent tribal software) as I come upon and try to make sense of the past in my pursuit of a future. Even that future which I pursue as a possibility has been articulated by me as my living past which leaps ahead, in terms I got from daddy and mommy and peers and PBS. But I can pop my head out in an uncanny moment, recessive violet, and think otherwise, twisting my gnarled inheritance, just a little...

I am thrown projection become aware of myself as such. I consider this theme to also be present in Hegel. (See Braver's A Thing of this World for more on this.)

I agree. The same is true of some of the lectures immediately following Being and Time as contained in Basic Problems of Phenomenology. — Arne

I haven't yet read Basic Problems. It's been on my list forever. Always thought it looked good. But it seems we've both seen how readable the lectures are. They are detailed and thorough and careful. But Being and Time is the famous book, so everyone grabs that. A little Heidegger reader might be better --- maybe 2 volumes, 'early' and 'late'.

The background can be sketched, as simply and clearly as possible. — Fooloso4

This is iffy. It's either a tautology or missing the point. Preverbal competence ! Toolbeing. In the beginning was animal skill. In the beginning was the deed, the handshake, the welltimed fart.

While engaged in hitch-free skilled activity, Dasein has no conscious experience of the items of equipment in use as independent objects (i.e., as the bearers of determinate properties that exist independently of the Dasein-centred context of action in which the equipmental entity is involved). Thus, while engaged in trouble-free hammering, the skilled carpenter has no conscious recognition of the hammer, the nails, or the work-bench, in the way that one would if one simply stood back and thought about them. Tools-in-use become phenomenologically transparent.

Yet language itself is also the hammer. We are mostly anything but clear on the staggering complexity of our tacit semantic norms.

But Being and Time is the famous book, so everyone grabs that. To me it's not the best introduction. A little Heidegger Reader might be better. — plaque flag

His lectures were published at his leisure while Being and Time was rushed. Both the History of the Concept of Time and Basic Problems of Phenomenology were first published in the 1970s. Being and Time was a classic by then.

I'll stick with Freddy's less charitable premonition of Heidi's willful lack of clarity.

This is iffy. It's either a tautology or missing the point. — plaque flag

It is helpful to keep track of the argument. What does any of this have to do with the Josh's statement and my response about simplicity and clarity? You quoted Nietzsche approvingly regarding clarity,
gave @fdrake a thumbs up and said:

Always a fair request, no matter the dense philosopher... — plaque flag

when he asks for the same thing about the same statement. But then tell me I am missing the point?

His lectures were published at his leisure while Being and Time was rushed. Both the History of the Concept of Time and Basic Problems of Phenomenology were first published in the 1970s. Being and Time was a classic by then. — Arne

:up:

Yes, that sounds correct. We were lucky to have had the lectures available.

In case it furthers the conversation, I'll work with this:

It implies that the world is always already primarily given as the common world. It is not the case on the one hand there are first individual subjects which at any given time have their own world; and that the task would then arise of putting together, by virtue of some sort of arrangement, the various particular worlds of individuals and of agreeing how one would have a common world. This is how philosophers imagine these things when they ask about the constitution of the inter-subjective world. We say instead that the first thing that is given is the common world -- the one.

I'd like to project Brandom backwards onto Heidegger (his goes taut to understand this better than any run slept Hegel maybe.) One [ das Man ] is a trumpduck of tribal norms, how bodies ought to do, including how they mouths flap, which is to say semantic norms, which is to say ( swift blazing flag of the regiment) inferential norms, what your contemporaries will let you get away whiff. Note that language is the rattle of teeth and gum, at least minimally if admittedly efficiently embodied incarnate immanent worldly glue. The you of every say dasein is a self-deferential dance of tongues and fingers. Find ye deep in this goo the convention of that famous pineal gremlin held responsible for workplace gropings and trailing a coherent sorry about the lifewhirled, that well gnome wherein of giving a creasy fuck. You can miss agree with me, we say (one says), but don't miss agree with your self, for one is one around here, or we'll refer you chew the soporific ministry of awakening.

This tradition of mouths being tracked for the claims that pour out of them like they was chimneys for half wonder stood spoke leads to weird theologies of penisolate phantoms who may just be lonely gods looking at the inside of a dreambag they can't crawl out of, for there is nothing else. Only the inside of the bag is given, somehow as an inside. Along with this we have thoughts as thin as angels' kin, diaphanous as the dandruff on a virgin's tear.

Do folks hear this chugging along in language ? This letting one think for one ? Song of old lung scents of the onebot ? Yesterday's risky metaphor is tomorrow's obvious truth that must not even can not be questioned, for it is no longer seen as something that was chosen, now mistaken for bottommost foundation, most obviously obvious obviousness.

Goodness. :worry:

Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any previous appropriation of the matter. Idle talk, which everyone can snatch up, not only divests us of the task of genuine understanding, but develops an indifferent intelligibility for which nothing is closed off any longer. — plaque flag

This is the reduction of (the masking or covering up of ) the iffy and uncanny to / with comfortable banalities. Idle talk is gossip that levels, that smooths over, offering an excuse for one to believe that one already knows, for one [das Man] does already know, always. For one is curious and educated and has an industry that makes things easy for one. One is a tourist who has seen it all, eager to rattle off a catalogue of classifications, like a student in anatomy class. One knows that anything worth hearing is easily heard, anything worth saying easily said. One knows that one is a serious and practical and decent das-Man-of-the-world. Was ist das--die Philosophie?

Is Heidegger original here ? No. Not exactly here. But it's part of the quilt, and embodying norms as founded in aconceptual competence / comportment is newish. (?) [ To me sniffing out the origin of the origin of the organ is of finite allure.] One has a thick 'positive' kind of existence as our dummy unquestioning default mode, our foundational anti-Socrates, the part of us that fucking hates philosophy. Turns out that a young Socrates was on the jury that convicted the old Socrates, but he didn't recognize himself with the beard. Time travel stuff.

But then tell me I am missing the point? — Fooloso4

The background can be sketched, as simply and clearly as possible. — Fooloso4

If you mean the background can be sketched as well as it can be sketched, well sure.

If you mean the background can be made simple and clear, you are missing the point. One is the background, and one is terribly complex and not so good at seeing what one is.

"Thought is proper to man alone – not, however, to man only as an isolated individual subject; we have to look at thought as essentially objective." This Hegel quote can be framed in terms of 'material' meaning, patterns in our 'physical' embodied signtrading. Sentences are screwdrivers. Paragraphs are pelicans.

We don't learn to ride a bike from an instruction manual. We climb on and try to stay that way. Conversation requires the mastery of a mountain of tacit norms and receding yet enabling appropriate comportment.

Josh quotes Heidegger and was asked to explain the quote:

“In Being and Time, Being is not something other than time: "Time" is a preliminary name for the truth of Being, and this truth is what prevails as essential in Being and thus is Being itself.”(What is Metaphysics)
— Joshs

What does it mean for time to be the preliminary name for the truth of Being? — Fooloso4

In response he said:

The unitary structure of the three ecstasies, future-present-having been, determines the ‘is’, the essence, the Being of being as this structure of transit. — Joshs

Now the first statement can and should be explained simply and clearly. The second does not do that, and no attempt to clarify it is made.

Instead of offering an explanation you choose obfuscation by introducing a "background". A background to what? The statement in question? Nope:

As Dreyfus might put, there are assumptions too deep for tears, which aren't even articulate, so that 'assumptions' is a metaphor for something 'stupider' like a competence. — plaque flag

Instead of attempting to make Heidegger's statement more understandable, you cover it over, shroud it under a "background". As if, "you can't get there from here".

I speak Joshese. He's saying that Becoming is primal. Being presupposes the Spacious Now, and so the Grand Dramatic Arc from the Eternal Past to the Eternal Future.

The unitary structure of the three ecstasies, future-present-having been, determines the ‘is’, the essence, the Being of being as this structure of transit. — Joshs


Would also be interested in you translating this out of Heideggerese. — fdrake

The being of Dasein or human existence is care. Heidegger's definition of care: "to be already ahead oneself in (the world) as Being-alongside (the entities encountered within the world)" p. 191. This has a very "temporal feel" in it. That's why Heidegger argues that the sense (Sinn) of the being (of human existence) is time or temporality. In a more formal level the temporality can then be expressed as the unitary structure of the three ecstasies, future-present-having been. In B&T, right after the last chapter ("Care as the being of Dasein") of the first division ("Preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein") begins the second and last division entitled "Dasein and temporality".

The unitary structure of the three ecstasies, future-present-having been, determines the ‘is’, the essence, the Being of being as this structure of transit.
— Joshs

Now the first statement can and should be explained simply and clearly. The second does not do that, and no attempt to clarify it is made — Fooloso4

Your definition of ‘simply and clearly’ is circular. If you can understand it, it is simple and clear. If you can’t , it is the fault of the messenger rather than the ability of you as the receiver to comprehend the message. The problem is not fundamentally with how Heidegger’s articulation of temporality is worded, but with the inherent difficulty of the concept he is attempting to convey. It took me not only reading B & T multiple times, but numerous other works of his before I could grasp what temporality was all about. And this wasn’t because Heidegger failed to condense the idea down to a 140 Twitter characters.

Following this quotation, H says:

"Thinking about the beginning of the history of be[ing] that reveals itself in the thinking of the Greeks will show that the Greeks early on experienced the be[ing] of be-ing as the presence of what is presenting itself.
[...]
For εναι means [to] make present. The essence of making present is buried deep in the original name for be [ing]. For us, however, εναι and οσία [(a) being] (as παρ- and ἶὐ ἀπουσία) already say the following: in making present, the present and lasting, unthought and hidden, are at work; time is present. Accordingly, be[ing] as such is born of time. Thus time is referred back to emergence, that is, [to] the truth of be[ing]."

I've been taking this to mean that if being is in any way or commonly thought as "persisting presence," or if it has been, time in some way would seem to be already itself present as the "horizon of the understanding of being" (Being and Time).

He goes to say in Being and Time:

"'Time' has long served as the ontological or rather ontic criterion for naively distinguishing the different regions of beings. 'Temporal' beings (natural processes and historical events) are separated from 'atemporal' beings (spatial and numerical relationships)."

Your definition of ‘simply and clearly’ is circular. — Joshs

If I explain the statement to someone and as a result they can now make sense of it, that is not circular.

Helpful. Thanks.

I will be posting my explanation soon.

Temporality is the unfolding of Being, of what is present and what remains concealed in and through the space or openness of time. It is not simply the linear sequence of moments from what was but no longer is to what is to what will be but is not yet.

In what is present and what is thought there remains something that does not yet come to presence and is not thought. This is why Heidegger returns to the Greeks, to uncover and bring to light possibilities that had at that time remained concealed. Truth, or in Greek aletheia, is to bring out of concealment, to disclose.

The future is present in the sense of possibilities. We are oriented to the future in that we plan and act and hope for what might come to be. Man, or Dasein, is the disclosive being. That is, man plays a role in what comes to be and how it is thought, as well as what is remains concealed from man.

The past remains present insofar as our language and conceptual frameworks were here before us and we think within and strive to think beyond them.

Thanks for that succinct refresher. :up:

The being of Dasein or human existence is care. Heidegger's definition of care: "to be already ahead oneself in (the world) as Being-alongside (the entities encountered within the world)" p. 191. This has a very "temporal feel" in it. That's why Heidegger argues that the sense (Sinn) of the being (of human existence) is time or temporality. In a more formal level the temporality can then be expressed as the unitary structure of the three ecstasies, future-present-having been. In B&T, right after the last chapter ("Care as the being of Dasein") of the first division ("Preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein") begins the second and last division entitled "Dasein and temporality". — waarala

My guy I think this is still Heideggerese.

The past remains present insofar as our language and conceptual frameworks were here before us and we think within and strive to think beyond them. — Fooloso4

I'm just going to provide the obligatory "concepts are seen as present as hand rationalisations of blah blah... the equipmental totality and its circumspective concern are more primordial than the application of the predicative as structure in the disclosive attunement of each existentiell conceptual framework...". , and then move on because that kind of talk isn't productive for the initiated or the uninitiated. Keep up the good work!

that kind of talk isn't productive for the initiated or the uninitiated — fdrake

Are you saying ‘that kind of talk’ represents a failure on Heidegger’s part to express himself clearly?

It has been a long time since I read Heidegger. I am probably also be in need of a refresher.

The past remains present insofar as our language and conceptual frameworks were here before us and we think within and strive to think beyond them. — Fooloso4

:up:

Yes. But (as you'll maybe grant) it's not just language, not just thought. Aconceptual competence. 'Mindless' comportment. The way of a man with a maid hammer, the way of a man with a bicycle.

Temporality is the unfolding of Being, of what is present and what remains concealed in and through the space or openness of time. It is not simply the linear sequence of moments from what was but no longer is to what is to what will be but is not yet.

In what is present and what is thought there remains something that does not yet come to presence and is not thought.

The future is present in the sense of possibilities. We are oriented to the future in that we plan and act and hope for what might come to be. — Fooloso4

You’re certainly not alone in interpreting Heideggerian temporality in those traditional terms.
For instance, Matthew Ratcliffe splits temporality into three separated time positions. Heideggerian Care is ”the way that we are anchored in the past (facticity), situated in the present (fallenness) and forever looking to the future (projection)”

Jan Slaby refers to his model of affect as ‘radical situatedness' and yet shares Ratcliffe's traditional, inauthentic understanding of temporality as causal dispositional state taking place in time, which is to say that, contrary to Heideggerian temporality, for Slaby time is divided into separate phases: the present as what is happening now, the future as what is not yet now, and the past as what is no longer now.

Slaby says factual situatedness

“is situatedness in a place and a time, synchronic and diachronic”. “Affectivity ultimately is time, namely the factual past in the form of sedimented remainders that infuse, burden, and potentially suffocate ongoing comportment.” “ The existential task of affective disclosure is circumscribed by this essential tension: A tension between what is already apprehended, articulated, and made sense of, and what is furthermore “out there,” beyond us, yet weighing on us and determining our situation in unforeseeable ways.”

For Heidegger, temporality is neither a separate past that burdens the present nor a generator of future possibilities as a hypothetical present that has not happened yet. Instead, it encompasses all three temporal ecstasies as the way in which I find myself changed. The future is not what has not yet happened , not empty possibilities in logical space. And the past is not represented memory but a having -been which arrives already changed by what occurs into it.
Putting it differently, the traditional approach is to treat past, present and future as having separate contents and the. line them up in a sequence. We could instead glom them onto each other and say that we have freed ourselves of linear time by making these three contents (past, present, future) simultaneous. But that is not what Heidegger is doing. He is letting the future lead the show. The future isn’t the not-yet , but a kind of scaffolding into which the present emerges. The having-been is already shaped and defined by how this scaffolding produces the present, so that is why Heidegger says the past comes to us via the future.

“The being-possible, which Da-sein always is existentially, is ... distinguished from empty, logical possibility and from the contingency of something objectively present, where this or that can "happen" to it. As a modal category of objective presence, possibility means what is not yet real and not always necessary. It characterizes what is only possible. Ontologically, it is less than reality and necessity. “(Being and Time p.135)

I speak Joshese. — frank

<smile>

It is good to have a Josh-whisperer. Sometimes I think I also speak that dialect, but maybe not always.

I am grinding coffee beans now because I hope to be drinking coffee soon. I never signed up to be born in a world with coffee in it. It was my fate, the hand I was dealt. Not that I'm complaining.

It is good to have Josh-whisperer. Sometimes I think I also speak that dialect, but maybe not always. — plaque flag

Just riff on Hegel and it's usually right.

Just riff on Hegel and it's usually right. — frank

Yes. And that method may have a wider application ! Rorty jokes about us always finding Hegel ahead of us on the path.