I'm not an expert on Kastrup's neo-idealism, but it makes sense to me --- because I don't interpret his position as contradictory Idealism versus Realism. Instead, I frame it as complementary Idealism within Realism or Realism within Idealism, depending on the context. Perhaps he does"want it both ways". But that's what philosophers do : look for orderly patterns in a disorderly world.I agree with this. Kastrup has taken an old song and is having a lot of success playing it to a new tune. His replacement ontology seems to want it both ways: everything is mental, but there's an "outside" world where evolution somehow still works. How are there any random events in an idealistic reality? — RogueAI
it's hard to deny that there are both "inside" ideas (concepts) and "outside" objects (percepts). — Gnomon
Up until quite recently, 'realism' in philosophy meant 'realism with respect to universals' i.e. some form of Platonic or Aristotelian realism. Today's realism, 'realism with respect to mind-independent objects of perception', is a very recent arrival. — Wayfarer
We drop 'mindindepent' as confusing. We grasp language in terms of embodied enacted social norms which are out there in the world as patterns in our doings. — plaque flag
The fear of slipping into “vitalism” — the idea that living things are alive because of some non-physical vital force — arises only because we have so much difficulty reckoning with the presence of ideas in the world rather than merely in our heads. I mean potent, shaping ideas. After all, the mathematical relations we apprehend in the physical world are neither forces nor physical things; they are purely conceptual. Yet we can reasonably say that such relations — for example, those given by the equation F=Gm1m2/r2, representing Newton’s law of universal gravitation — in some sense govern material reality. The relations tell us, within the range of their practical applicability, something about the form of physical interactions. We do not try to make an additional, vital force out of the fact that a mathematical idea, as a principle of form, is “binding” upon an actual force. — Steve Talbott, Evolution and the Purposes of Life
in the world i.e. constituents of reality. 'The ligatures of reason', is how I put it. — Wayfarer
As Aristotelians and Thomists use the term, intellect is that faculty by which we grasp abstract concepts (like the concepts man and mortal), put them together into judgments (like the judgment that all men are mortal), and reason logically from one judgment to another (as when we reason from all men are mortal and Socrates is a man to the conclusion that Socrates is mortal). It is to be distinguished from imagination, the faculty by which we form mental images (such as a visual mental image of what your mother looks like, an auditory mental image of what your favorite song sounds like, a gustatory mental image of what pizza tastes like, and so forth); and from sensation, the faculty by which we perceive the goings on in the external material world and the internal world of the body (such as a visual experience of the computer in front of you, the auditory experience of the cars passing by on the street outside your window, the awareness you have of the position of your legs, etc.).
That intellectual activity -- thought in the strictest sense of the term -- is irreducible to sensation and imagination is a thesis that unites Platonists, Aristotelians, and rationalists of either the ancient Parmenidean sort or the modern Cartesian sort. — Ed Feser
Yes. I focus on this issue, this apparently addictive prejudice that isolated subjectivity makes sense.That is an inevitable consequence of the philosophy of the individual, the hallmark of modernity. — Wayfarer
That intellectual activity -- thought in the strictest sense of the term -- is irreducible to sensation and imagination is a thesis that unites Platonists, Aristotelians, and rationalists of either the ancient Parmenidean sort or the modern Cartesian sort. — Ed Feser
As Aristotelians and Thomists use the term, intellect is that faculty by which we grasp abstract concepts (like the concepts man and mortal), put them together into judgments (like the judgment that all men are mortal), and reason logically from one judgment to another (as when we reason from all men are mortal and Socrates is a man to the conclusion that Socrates is mortal). — Ed Feser
...Wittgenstein... — plaque flag
hat is because, I say, there is a normative dimension that had collapsed in Western philosophy — Wayfarer
I think Wittgenstein was nominalist — Wayfarer
The truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it is in very truth; and just in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject, or self-becoming, self-development.
...reason is purposive activity — plaque flag
I'm not denying that philosophers can engage in a sophisticated defense of dualism, but it's a tough position to play. — plaque flag
Thanks, but. Since I'm not educated in the technicalities of academic philosophy, for me, "Realism" means naive realism. In the Enformationism thesis, I distinguish between Realism & Idealism in my own idiosyncratic ways, relative to the various roles of Information in the world. More specifically, the distinction is relative to, what Murray Gell-Mann labeled IGUSES (information gathering and utilizing systems). Humans being the exemplars of those knowledge gatherers. The contents of human minds are Ideal (in the sense of subjective concepts), and everything else is more or less Real. From that perspective Universals are merely memes in human minds. Whether they exist elsewhere is debatable. But we like to think that mathematical Principles and physical Laws are somehow Real, since evidence for them is found consistently in Nature. :smile:↪Gnomon
Up until quite recently, 'realism' in philosophy meant 'realism with respect to universals' i.e. some form of Platonic or Aristotelian realism. Today's realism, 'realism with respect to mind-independent objects of perception', is a very recent arrival. — Wayfarer
The world, through us, comes to make its own nature or character more and more explicit. It comes to know itself. We are god's spies, god's eyes, god's authors. — plaque flag
The contents of human minds are Ideal (in the sense of subjective concepts), and everything else is more or less Real. From that perspective Universals are merely memes in human minds. Whether they exist elsewhere is debatable. But we like to think that mathematical Principles and physical Laws are somehow Real, since evidence for them is found consistently in Nature. :smile: — Gnomon
Because the substance of the past is radically different from the substance of the future, substance dualism is justified, and it is the best option for understanding the nature of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I see it, anything we can make any sense of is for just that reason 'part' of the same inferential nexus — plaque flag
We can abstract (yank out) entities from their context. — plaque flag
Therefore the "unity" you refer to, is nothing but a false premise, — Metaphysician Undercover
This renders formal logic as inapplicable to a wide aspect of reality, — Metaphysician Undercover
(the freely willed choice for example) — Metaphysician Undercover
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