Aha!

Aha! — Piglet

@Fafner, what does LW have to say about the standard meter being 1 meter long by definition? I don't remember and my copy's in another room.

There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris.--But this is, of course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a metre-rule.--Let us imagine samples of colour being preserved in Paris like the standard metre. We define: "sepia" means the colour of the standard sepia which is there kept hermetically sealed. Then it will make no sense to say of this sample either that it is of this colour or that it is not.

We can put it like this: This sample is an instrument of the language used in ascriptions of colour. In this language-game it is not something that is represented, but is a means of representation.--And just this goes for an element in language-game (48) when we name it by uttering the word "R": this gives this object a role in our language-game; it is now a means of representation.

(PI 50)

And btw, I also very strongly recommend reading Cora Diamond's "How Long is the Standard Meter in Paris?" on this topic (PM me if you want a copy) - in my opinion, one of the best papers on Wittgenstein's philosophy ever written.

So that's what I said at first. Since nothing here rules out doing a definition by cases, I wonder if there isn't some advantage to one approach or the other. It's not just the use of the word "meter" that's at stake here, but the number 1. If the standard was a stick 2 meters long, and a meter was defined as half the length of this stick, how would LW express that?

I read and loved The Realistic Spirit many years ago. (Still have my copy somewhere-- you're welcome to it if you don't have one.)

I don't know, but in this case the method of measuring with the stick will probably be more complicated and cumbersome. Why is that important?

Because my version defines its length as an actual value, not just where we get "meter".

I'm not sure that I understand.

The "one" is there even when LW talks about it. Its length is defined as 1 meter, but it could have been defined as anything. 2 meters. 1.003 meters. He needs to account for the "one" somehow if he can't say, it's 1 meter by definition, which he can't because he says it has no length.

he can't say, it's 1 meter by definition, which he can't because he says it has no length. — Srap Tasmaner

But it's simply not true that the 1 meter stick has no length. It most certainly has a physical length, and can be measured by all sorts of means, including non-arbitrary ones found in nature.

That we decided it was a unit of 1 meter is arbitrary. That it is a definite length (so many hydrogen atoms or Plank lengths) is not arbitrary at all.

You have to keep in mind we're taking about a time when 1 meter was defined as the length of this stick.

(Answered before your edit. Yeah that's how we do it now, I think.)

↪Marchesk You have to keep in mind we're taking about a time when 1 meter was defined as the length of this stick. — Srap Tasmaner

I get that 1 meter is assigned to the length of a particular stick to create a standard. I disagree that the standard stick has no length. It has a physical length. It's extended in space.

You have to distinguish between the method of calculating length (which belongs to the "system of representation") and factual question about the length of this or that object. There's nothing wrong according to Wittgenstein (and this is something that Diamond stresses in the cited paper) in saying that "the meter stick is 1 meter long" (or 2 meters, or whatever number that you wish), as long as you don't confuse the logical role of this proposition with an empirical proposition such as "this table is a meter long", which is what he means by saying that it is or it isn't 1 meter long.

If you wish to define the standard meter as meaning "2 units of 1 meter" then Wittgenstein would say that what you have done is not described the physical length of the stick as an empirical proposition, but you gave a rule for how to use the stick when comparing it with other objects for describing their length.

Put it this way. The stick has a property of being extended in space by so much, such that when we settle on a standard of measurement, it will be so many units in that measurement system.

The spatial extension of the stick (along a certain dimension) determines its length. How we measure it is a separate matter.

But it's simply not true that the 1 meter stick has no length. It most certainly has a physical length, and can be measured by all sorts of means, including non-arbitrary ones found in nature. — Marchesk

Of course it has a physical length, but this claim has to be distinguished from saying what exactly its length is in some unites of measurement.

Agreed. That's why it's not helpful for him to say, there's one thing that's neither a meter long or not a meter long. It is one meter long, not because we measured it, but because we say it is. It's one of those cases where saying it's so makes it so.

Of course it has a physical length, but this claim has to be distinguished from saying what exactly its length is in some unites of measurement. — Fafner

Right. So tying it back into what I've been trying to argue, the concept of length is not something created as part of a language game. It's something we cognate (perceive?) about objects. How we make use of length to measure things is part of language games.

I cannot resist quoting from Wittgenstein again:

"Every rod has a length." That means something like: we call something (or this) "the length of a rod"--but nothing "the length of a sphere." Now can I imagine 'every rod having a length'? Well, I simply imagine a rod. Only this picture, in connection with this proposition, has a quite different role from one used in connection with the proposition "This table has the same length as the one over there". For here I understand what it means to have a picture of the opposite (nor need it be a mental picture).

But the picture attaching to the grammatical proposition could only show, say, what is called "the length of a rod". And what should the opposite picture be? ((Remark about the negation of an a priori proposition.))

PI 251

the concept of length is not something created as part of a language game. It's something we cognate about objects. How we make use of length to measure things is part of language games. — Marchesk

That has an undeniable ring of plausibility to it, but I wonder whether it's an empirical claim or a logical one.

For comparison, I think the war over the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis and color words is still raging. See this wikipedia article. The nutshell would be something like this: many languages do not have separate words for what we call "blue" and "green" (just as an example); can native speakers of those languages distinguish blue from green? Common sense says so, and I tend to agree, but the research goes on.

Agreed. That's why it's not helpful for him to say, there's one thing that's neither a meter long or not a meter long. It is one meter long, not because we measured it, but because we say it is. It's one of those cases where saying it's so makes it so. — Srap Tasmaner

I think that what you say is actually less helpful. Saying that the standard meter is "1 meter long" really says nothing about the use of the stick as a unit of measurement, because it appears like an empirical statement about the length of the stick (analogous to "the table is 1 meter long") which could easily lead into confusion. For this reason Wittgenstein says that its length is neither so that we will not treat the proposition as a description of the stick itself, but rather look at its use in the system of measurement.

I get that. And you could manage by training people to use the stick in a certain way and that's that. But it's far from uncommon to use definitions in a given domain and people are pretty adept at that. I would think for a lot of people, including every scientist who ever lived, just telling them "One meter is defined as the length of this stick" would be all the training they need.

For comparison, I think the war over the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis and color words is still raging. See this wikipedia article. The nutshell would be something like this: many languages do not have separate words for what we call "blue" and "green" (just as an example); can native speakers of those languages distinguish blue from green? Common sense says so, and I tend to agree, but the research goes on. — Srap Tasmaner

Well, to make things more complicated, the use of language probably shapes the brain of those language speakers.

So if Whorf-Sapir is correct, then telling blue from green would be an ability developed by having words that pick out the difference. There was a Radio Lab episode on color making that very argument, and then one on Shakespear coining new terms as an example of one Researcher's claims that language connects different parts of the brain.

I guess that's a point in favor of language is use, but with a neural underpinning.

Right. So tying it back into what I've been trying to argue, the concept of length is not something created as part of a language game. It's something we cognate (perceive?) about objects. How we make use of length to measure things is part of language games. — Marchesk

Of course the concept of 'length' is something the we have created. It really doesn't make sense to 'perceive' a length in an object as an empirical discovery, and for a simple reason: you must already have the concept of length in order to perceive something as having a length, otherwise how could you know that what you are perceiving is 'length' and not some other property? (is it merely an hypothesis that when you are seeing the length of a table, you are not mistaking it for its color? And if this question sounds like nonsense, then the claim that we have 'discovered' empirically that objects have a length is also nonsense.)

but this is not to say that we 'decide' or it is 'up to us' whether this or that object is so and so meters long - once we decide what would count as being '1 meter long' then experience can teach us what things are and what things aren't this length.

Of course the concept of 'length' is something the we have created. It really doesn't make sense to 'perceive' a length in an object as an empirical discovery, and for a simple reason: you must already have the concept of length in order to perceive something as having a length, otherwise how could you know that what you are perceiving is 'length' and not some other property? — Fafner

I would argues this is innate, not something language communities create. Some ability for making sense of perception must exist for language to employ concepts. And meaning would in part be built out of that.

That's why I reference Kant earlier, and how he showed that certain categories of thought were necessary to make sense out of the noise of sense impressions. Empiricism can't get going without that.

Okay, I'll bet you could devise an experiment that would show that dogs can pick out the longest of a set of levers, or the shortest, or whatever. I don't see a concept here, but there's something. What is it?

I'm partial to the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis. Plenty of times I've been trying to think about something but find myself unable to do so (with any kind of clarity, at least) if I've forgotten the word for it. I need to recall the word for it to think about it properly.

And this also explains why I'm partial to meaning-as-use. Having a concept isn't (always) about having some mental image but about having an inner monologue.

"Imbue."

Here's the link for benighted souls that don't get the reference.

I would argues this is innate, not something language communities create. Some ability for making sense of perception must exist for language to employ concepts. And meaning would in part be built out of that. — Marchesk

The same problem arises for innate concepts as well. How do you know that the concept of length is to be applied to the length of the table and not to its color or weight? Do we hear a voice in our heads that tells us that this is how we must think about the table? And besides, is it merely a coincidence that we happen to be born with the 'right' concepts to describe reality? Is it conceivable that someone could be born (as a result of a mutation or whatever) with the WRONG sorts of concepts? Do we have a method for checking this?