I'm not talking about formal logic. I'm talking about largely tacit norms that govern what follows from what as a way to understand meaning. — plaque flag

You referred to an "inferential nexus". The "largely tacit norms that govern" the use of this term "inferential", generally dictate that "Inference" refers to what is deduced from the application of reason. "Deduced" implies according to strict formal rules.

he master-idea of semantic inferentialism is to look instead to inference, rather than representation, as the basic concept of semantics. — plaque flag

This is a deceptive use of "inference", which is outside the "largely tacit norms". It is a use manufactured for sake of sophistry. To say that the meaning which one derives from a word or a sentence is an "inference", rather than simply an "association" or "relation", implies that there is some form of logic behind this derivation of meaning, when in reality there need not be any logic involved at all. Obviously, that is a very misleading use of "inference" which leaves no separation between the consequences of emotional feelings and the results of reasoning, suggesting that emotions produce inferences.

That to me is an unclear and uncertain concept. Selves are normative entities. I'll give you that. We are held responsible. But that's all the 'freedom' I'm confident about at the moment. — plaque flag

I see you want your cake back, after you've already eaten it, plaque flag. You give "inference" the most vague of meaning, by allowing that the basic semantic association of a words is "inference", then you complain about free will being "an unclear and uncertain concept". If you do not want to delve into the world of unclear and uncertain concepts, then restrict your use of "inference" please, so that the vague associations and relations of emotions are not classified as equal to what is inferred from formal logic, as "inferential".

And since there is no substance to the non-dimensional boundary which separates past from future, all substance is either of the past or of the future. Because the substance of the past is radically different from the substance of the future, substance dualism is justified, and it is the best option for understanding the nature of reality.

Interesting. I've never heard the argument that past and future are different substances. Substance is generally supposed to be able to undergo change though, so doesn't that presuppose that it exists through time? And if past and future are substances, can they change? If they change it seems like they might require a second time dimension to exist in which such a change can occur. But, since what is past is always changing, it would appear that the past does change, although maybe it can do so without changing the underlying substance.

This would seem to assume that the past and the future are actually different though, which eternalists deny, and that the past and future actually exist, which presentists deny, so I suppose people might disagree based on the premise, although I don't. It seems to me that past events exist at the time when they occured and future events are, as you say, different from past ones.

Video games occasionally have procedurally generated worlds that are generated dynamically on-the-fly in response to the player's actions. These games demonstrate that the unknown past and the future can be considered as being metaphysically identical for all empirical intents and purposes. This parsimonious viewpoint has the advantage of treating causality in a temporally symmetric fashion, with both forward and backward causation.

I compared naturalism to idealism, not "dualism". — 180 Proof

I know; I did not claim that you did either. Instead, I just disagreed with your belief that naturalism is the most common-sensical notion by claiming that dualism is instead the most common-sensical notion among laypeople nowadays. By brining up dualism as the most common-sensical nowadays however, I then had to contend with it as well in my comment. That is why I asserted the common-sensicality of idealism in comparison to both naturalism and dualism; the latter being the contender I myself added to the mix.

Also, I did not mention "common sense as a factor in theory creation". — 180 Proof

Well, it is implied:

I think naturalism is more cogent because, as a speculative paradigm, it is more consistent with common sense (i.e. practical, or embodied, participation in nature) than idealism. I find naturalism parsimonious because it does not additionally assume that 'ideas transcend (i.e. constitute) nature' as idealism (re: ideality) does — 180 Proof

Parsimony and consistency with common sense are non-factors as far as a realist notion of truth is concerned. As far as building a practical theory is concerned however, parsimony and common sense are definitely factors. I assumed the latter context because the alternative would be assuming that you believe common sense and parsimony are prerequisites for real/absolute truth, which is demonstrably false.

"Personally, I advocate for using the standard definitions. If the above paragraph is a correct description of your views, I would then refer to your view as epistemologically motivated ontological idealism. One must separate the contents of an axiom from its motivation, lest they be confused."

I have never heard of that term, but, yes, that seems to fit nicely! — Bob Ross

I have not heard the term epistemologically motivated ontological idealism outside of my own usage either, just to let you know that it isn't (necessarily) an established term. I think it is a practical term though.

Oh, I see. Have you looked into a priori knowledge? — Bob Ross

Yes, I study a lot of formal logic.

Perhaps I am misunderstanding, but to me “causality” has been reserved for ‘interaction’ in a physical sense in the literature; (...) — Bob Ross

That could be, but I am not so bothered by it. I see no issue redefining terms so long as the new definition is explicated and clear. Furthermore, I do not think physicality is a criterium for causality in any mainstream (philosophical or otherwise) definitions in the literature. Instead, the mostly physicalist application of the term is likely just because causality is typically of more interest to physicalists and because idealists are not that common/well-known. Thus, I'd say causality merely has physicalist connotations, but is definitionally not reserved for that domain of reality.

It seems you are talking about epistemological idealism. I do not see how what you say necessitates the sole existence of the mental. Instead, it only seems like you're arguing for the fact that we cannot know (of) anything but the mental. I find the latter to be trivial; thus, it is the former I am interested in exploring.

How are there any random events in an idealistic reality? — RogueAI

How is randomness incompatible with an idealistic reality?

How is randomness incompatible with an idealistic reality? — Ø implies everything

In an idealistic reality, isn't everything a dream? A creation of one super-mind, or a collection of minds? Are there random events in dreams? How would that work?

In an idealistic reality, isn't everything a dream? A creation of one super-mind, or a collection of minds? Are there random events in dreams? How would that work? — RogueAI

I have some thoughts on random versus determined events that are a bit too tied up in my theory to be laid out here.

But I can respond to your comment with another question: how is physicalism any more welcoming of randomness than idealism?

But I can respond to your comment with another question: how is physicalism any more welcoming of randomness than idealism? — Ø implies everything

I don't see how it would be. WOuldn't a random causal chain have to end with an uncaused cause?

Depends on what you call uncaused. Is the potential for something a cause?

Depends on what you call uncaused. Is the potential for something a cause? — Ø implies everything

...I would think so. Are you thinking of the book Something from Nothing? Good book, but I think the underlying rules constitute something, What do you think?

I am not familiar with the book you mention. However, if you think potentiality is a cause, then randomness does not imply any uncaused event.

Interesting. I've never heard the argument that past and future are different substances. Substance is generally supposed to be able to undergo change though, so doesn't that presuppose that it exists through time? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Our understanding of change is based in empirical observations which are always of past time, observations are memories. We have no observations of the future yet we have observations of the past, so we produce an understanding of change based on these memories, which are our observations of the past. it might appear, and you might think, that these observations are made at the present, but they are not, they are always in the past, always existing as memories. So our understanding of change, and consequently the associated understanding of time is restricted to past time, and this is the type of "change" which substance is said to undergo.

On the other hand, our understanding of future events, future changes, and future time, is merely a logical projection. We take our memories, our observations of the past, and apply a premise of continuity, and project into the future. But this is really insufficient, because that supposed continuity is a determinist principle which denies the possibility of free will, and real change.

Notice I've introduced a new concept "real change". This type of change is inconsistent with the determinist premise of continuity, and it allows for the reality of free will. When we allow that there are real possibilities for change, at any given moment in the passing of time, we must deny that the continuity of substance, as time passes, is necessary. Then "substance" as it is in the past, according to empirical observations, is inconsistent with whatever it is in the future.

Here's an example. Suppose that a free will act could annihilate a substance at any moment of passing time. This act of annihilation could be chosen at any passing moment. If this were the case, then the substance could have no real temporal extension into the future, because it could be annihilated at any moment. if it could be annihilated at any chosen moment, then it is impossible that it has any actual existence in the future of any moment at all, even if it isn't annihilated at any moment, because the possibility of it being annihilated is always there.

This is the way we ought to look at the possibility of real change. Anything which might be changed by a free will act, cannot have any temporal extension into the future. If the free will act can end its existence as it is, at any moment of passing time, then its existence as it is, cannot have any extension into the future. So if it's possible that you could smash a glass at any moment of passing time, it is impossible that the glass has any real existence in the future of any moment of passing time.

The contents of human minds are Ideal (in the sense of subjective concepts), and everything else is more or less Real. From that perspective Universals are merely memes in human minds. Whether they exist elsewhere is debatable. But we like to think that mathematical Principles and physical Laws are somehow Real, since evidence for them is found consistently in Nature. :smile: — Gnomon

To me, that is the major subject of philosophy. It is the domain of the a priori, but it's not as if there's evidence for them, so much as that we rely on them to decide what constitutes evidence. — Wayfarer

Yes. Aristotle studied both Physics and Metaphysics as different aspects of comprehensive "Nature". Today, empirical scientists claim the royal realm of Reality, and leave the plebeian domain of Ideality to feckless philosophers & "soft" scientists. IMHO though, theoretical scientists, like Einstein, are actually philosophers, who serve the needs of noble empiricists by converting their sensory swine into savory pork for the plate. (Please pardon the tongue-in-cheek metaphors)

In physical Reality, everything is Particular, except that rational minds somehow "see" General (holistic) patterns, known as "Universals" & "Principles". And the most innovative philosopher/scientists refer to those Ideal (unreal) Universals in order to "decide what constitutes evidence". Physical evidence -- to be meaningful -- must fit the metaphysical pattern of Laws & Principles & Universals.

Ontology, as the study of Being, could divide Existence into a> Real things and b> Ideal concepts about things. Knowledge of reality is necessarily a posteriori sense experience, but where does a priori (non-sense) knowledge come from? Aristotle seemed to assume that humans are born with an innate sense of Reason*1, that fills-in the gaps between instances, to imagine the invisible logical structural patterns of reality (wholes & holons).

The theory of a posteriori knowledge presumes a "blank slate" to write upon, while the hypothesis of a priori information assumes that Reason is the (god-given or Darwin-bestowed?) innate writing instrument in the human mind. Reason perceives Logical patterns and conceives abstract representations on the immaterial chalkboard of the mind.

Imperial empirical Science daintily uses its forks & knives to slice & dice Ontology into easily digested chunks of physical information. Yet, Philosophy greedily gulps down un-pre-masticated lumps (holons) of metaphysical information, leaving it to innate intuitive Reason to digest into relevant meanings. Scientists assume, without hard evidence, that there are a priori innate Laws that the instances of evidence are supposed to add-up to. But where did those rules-for-Reason come from? And why do philosophers also assume the existence of such Ideal Forms, to serve as axioms by which to reason? :nerd:


*1. a priori :
I'm not sure exactly where Aristotle thought the pre-existence (or from the beginning) of universals & principles might originate. Since he seemed skeptical of a literal Ideal realm, could a priori be the Mind of God? Or is it just an innate skill, that today we might say was an evolutionary adaptation?

The question of the nature of the a priori is a major topic in philosophy. I believe it was Quine who called the whole notion into question, saying that there is no clear boundary between what we can know a priori and what we can know based on experience. Rather, all of our knowledge is interconnected, and any belief can potentially be revised in light of new evidence. My problem with that is, well, pure maths, for starters. And all the many discoveries that have been made through reasoning from evidence. Sure, those discoveries need to be tested against empirical fact, but many of them were made well in advance of such validation. Empiricism and naturalism have an innate bias against the idea of innate knowledge (irony alert!) Whereas, I believe that the a priori reflects innate structures within the mind that are operative in the exercise of reason. I also idly speculate that the realm of necessary facts is somehow connected to an intuitive understanding of what must always be the case, in order for the world to be as it is.

This is an interesting matter which has range of implications and uses.

Empiricism and naturalism have an innate bias against the idea of innate knowledge (irony alert! — Wayfarer

Which is why the case of math is so interesting. Is it your contention that humans have an innate knowledge of the divine?

Whereas, I believe that the a priori reflects innate structures within the mind that are operative in the exercise of reason. — Wayfarer

Does this make you a Kantian?

I also idly speculate that the realm of necessary facts is somehow connected to an intuitive understanding of what must always be the case, in order for the world to be as it is. — Wayfarer

Interesting, can you say some more to clarify this point? Are you saying, for instance, that space/time is part of human's innate cognitive apparatus - it constructs our understanding of reality?

In physical Reality, everything is Particular, except that rational minds somehow "see" General (holistic) patterns, known as "Universals" & "Principles". — Gnomon

I suggest that we drop the ocular metaphor and talk about dancing. In other words, we perform 'universals' in the way we trade marks and noises. This 'seeing' of 'form' (this metaphorical interpretation of our situation) has its pros and cons. It's helped us trick ourselves into believing in ghosts.

But where did those rules-for-Reason come from? — Gnomon

I suggest they evolved and continue to evolve among / between social animals. We can only look at our own intellectual history. We've invented new ways of thinking, left old ways behind. The complexity of our culture has increased. We have more concepts than before.

If one insists that X installed such concepts in us, without being able to provide details, where X is more mysterious than we are ourselves, then this allusion to X is a sentimental antiexplanation, a hiding-from rather than an addressing-of our lack of clarity about of our nature. Or so I claim.

I believe it was Quine who called the whole notion into question, saying that there is no clear boundary between what we can know a priori and what we can know based on experience. Rather, all of our knowledge is interconnected, and any belief can potentially be revised in light of new evidence. — Wayfarer

:up:

My problem with that is, well, pure maths, for starters. — Wayfarer

Pure maths has been revised. I suggest looking into the great ideological civil war of mathematics.

I don't deny that basic arithmetic is going be to extremely stable from now on, but there was a time before zero, a time before negative numbers. Math tends to be built so that useful ideas are preserved with any extension. Platonism sometimes seem to merely assume its own conclusion.

In set theoretical terms there are an infinite number of ways to construct the natural numbers. Which one is Real ? How would we know ? All that matters is structure. See Benacerraf’s What Numbers Could Not Be. Along these lines, there are many constructions of the real numbers, but real analysis is independent of such constructions, appealing only to a structure which they all share (in order to be considered as such a 'construction'), to a system of interdependent roles (not unlike Saussure's linguistic system of differences without positive elements.)

knowledge of the divine? — Tom Storm

Why 'divine'? Everyone does that when this idea comes up. Why is it associated with religious philosophy? That's the really interesting meta-question. ('Divine' is related to the Sanskrit (proto-European) 'deva' or god.)

I've explained numerous times that my particular epiphany about Platonic mathematics was a very simple one: the objects of mathematics are not compounded and are not subject to change. For the ancients, this signified that intelligible objects have qualities and attributes which were not found in the corruptible objects of sense, all of which are conversely composed ot parts and subject to decay. But I don't think that in itself is a specifically religious idea. More a philosophical insight, or 'quasi-religious' in the sense that Spinoza was. I suppose it is associated with rationalism in philosophy, and Western, specifically anglo-american, philosophy is overwhelmingly empiricist in outlook - all knowledge from experience, rejection of innate ideas. That's what is behind a lot of the animus in respect of platonic realism.

Just now watched a CTT interview with Paul Davies on the 'unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics'. Davies is much more open to the 'mysterious convergence' kind of view (as opposed to the 'happenstance' or 'brute fact' kind of view). He acknowledges he's in the minority but I think he's on the mark.

I also idly speculate that the realm of necessary facts is somehow connected to an intuitive understanding of what must always be the case, in order for the world to be as it is.
— Wayfarer

Interesting, can you say some more to clarify this point? Are you saying, for instance, that space/time is part of human's innate cognitive apparatus - it constructs our understanding of reality? — Tom Storm

This is the kind of topic which no respectable professional philosopher would touch with a barge pole. They concentrate more on minutae. . But the intuitive view I am developing is that the rational order of the mind, and the rational order we perceive in the universe, is the same order, basically. That somehow, the relationship of ideas and causal relationships are connected. That's because the order we perceive is imposed by the mind - this is once again Charles Pinter, Mind and the Cosmic Order. But because of our sense of separation of observer from observed, we can't perceive that, and then wonder where the order comes from, or why it exists.(Schopenhauer: 'materialism is the philosophy of the subject who forgets himself'.)

The other idea that is converging with this one, is that the domain of a priori truths is the domain of logical necessity. Would it be possible for a world to exist where, say, the law of identity did not obtain? Or basic ratios and constants didn't hold? :chin:

Platonism sometimes seem to merely assume its own conclusion. — plaque flag

Have I ever discussed this article with you - The Indispensability Argument in Mathematics? It makes reference to a 1963 paper by Paul Benacerraf which is apparently canonical. The maths experts on this forum generally know it and judge it accordingly. But some of the statements made illustrate what I see as the basic philosophical point, to wit:

Standard readings of mathematical claims entail the existence of mathematical objects. But, our best epistemic theories seem to deny that knowledge of mathematical objects is possible.

Why is this? Because apparently our 'best epistemic theories' include the assumption that

human beings [are] physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.

Whereas,

Some philosophers, called rationalists, claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought.

The basic drift of the remainder of the article is this:

The indispensability argument in the philosophy of mathematics is an attempt to justify our mathematical beliefs about abstract objects, while avoiding any appeal to rational insight. Its most significant proponent was Willard van Orman Quine.

What am I not seeing here? Why would it be that one of the purportedly major 20th c philosophers wants to 'avoid any appeal to rational insight?'

Why would it be that one of the purportedly major 20th c philosophers wants to 'avoid any appeal to rational insight?' — Wayfarer

The problem with such appeals is that they don't explain much, if anything. In-sight is a mere metaphor. An organ is simply postulated (as an 'eye') along with a realm or dimension that only that 'eye' can see. This metaphor gets something right. We tend to agree more of arithmetical issues than on other issues, but it's a bit of a ghost story. While some philosophers might dislike ghost stories because they dislike religion, others merely object to shirking the conceptual labor required. What's needed is an explanation that connects to the rest of our knowledge. I claim that, more or less explicitly, we strive for systematic / compact / cohesive knowledge.

Another point is that mathematical objects do indeed exist. They are deeply involved in our inferences, so it's basically confused to deny them. The issue becomes clarifying how they exist. Personally I expect such clarification to go one forever, as for all of our concepts. We perform them together, in a self-referential and self-critical way that allows for an increase of that performance's complexity.

The issue becomes clarifying how they exist. — plaque flag

That's right. But the problem is, in the current lexicon, 'existence' is a univocal term - something either exists or it doesn't. There is no scope for different kinds of existence, or I don't think so, anyway. But don't you think the requirement for there to be an argument for the indispensability mathematics says something? What makes it necessary to defend mathematical insight? Don't you think this is an ideological argument?

That's right. But in the current lexicon, 'existence' is a univocal term - something either exists or it doesn't. — Wayfarer

But you are among philosophers here, no? That 'existence' is not univocal is stressed in the intro of Being and Time. If memory serves, Austin had a party with showing how complex our use of 'real' was. Then there's Wittgenstein, Derrida, Foucault, etc. Or consider Braver's synoptic narrative in A Thing of This World.

But don't you think the requirement for there to be an argument for the indispensability mathematics says something? What makes it necessary to defend mathematical insight? Don't you think this is an ideological argument? — Wayfarer

All claims, and all tacit assumptions, one we've dug 'em out, stand before the divinized tribunal of reason. Socrates is and always will be an annoying asshole who refuses to take things for granted, who delights in finding out the confusion in every pontification.

Some Kant quotes that seem relevant:

The difference between truth and dream… is not decided through the quality of the representations that are referred to objects, for they are the same in both, but through their connection according to rules that determine the combination of representations in the concept of an object, and how far they can or cannot stand together in one experience.

Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition without damaging itself and drawing upon itself a disadvantageous suspicion. For there is nothing so important because of its utility, nothing so holy, that it may be exempted from this searching review and inspection, which knows no respect for persons [i.e. no person bears more authority than any other—GW]. On this freedom rests the very existence of reason, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never anything more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his veto, without holding back. (A738f/B766f, translation modified)

We are, as philosophers, Reason's 'infinite' self-critique.

That 'existence' is not univocal is stressed in the intro of Being and Time. — plaque flag

Take your point. Obviously different kinds of existence are considered in philosophy, but on the whole, naturalism and popular philosophy tends towards a flat ontological structure, rejecting the kind of Aristotelian distinctions between different kinds of being, doesn't it?

(Still feel as though the point I was labouring has somewhat slipped the net here.)

On the same theme - what is your take on the notion that reason requires some kind of guarantor for it to operate. The logical absolutes; identify, non-contraction and excluded middle seem to make reason and math and this conversation possible. Muslims and Christians will, of course, argue that God is the guarantor. More complex thinkers will find other metaphysical justifications, variations of Platonism. How do you account for it?

I tend to hold that such absolutes are probably how human minds are cognitively arranged in order to make sense of reality. Do they map to 'reality'; do they operate outside of a human perspective?

(Still feel as though the point I was labouring has somewhat slipped the net here.) — Wayfarer

Could be.

Standard readings of mathematical claims entail the existence of mathematical objects. But, our best epistemic theories seem to deny that knowledge of mathematical objects is possible.

Why is this? Because apparently our 'best epistemic theories' include the assumption that

human beings [are] physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.

Whereas,

Some philosophers, called rationalists, claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought.

The basic drift of the remainder of the article is this:

The indispensability argument in the philosophy of mathematics is an attempt to justify our mathematical beliefs about abstract objects, while avoiding any appeal to rational insight. Its most significant proponent was Willard van Orman Quine. — Wayfarer

Nicely crystalized.

Obviously different kinds of existence are considered in philosophy, but on the whole, naturalism and popular philosophy tends towards a flat ontological structure, rejecting the kind of Aristotelian distinctions between different kinds of being, doesn't it? — Wayfarer

I think you can find some bad philosophy like that out there, yes. But it's mostly among those who don't care enough to catch up with the conversation. I'm not saying anyone ever catches up completely, and the conversation won't stop and wait for them either.

FWIW, I also dislike crude scientistic positions that think marriages and promises [ and scientific norms ] are less Real than protons and porcupines. We both see that 'the subject' has to be explained with everything else. In other words, an explanation of the world has to explain its own engendering and legitimacy.

On the same theme - what is your take on the notion that reason requires some kind of guarantor for it to operate. The logical absolutes; identify, non-contraction and excluded middle seem to make reason and math and this conversation possible. — Tom Storm

This to me is the genius of Kant and Hegel as interpreted by Brandom (pragmatic rationalism). We live and move and have our being in a normativity, in a social space in which we all keep score on one another.

(1) Look at which inferences are treated as valid.
(2) Look at [ discursive] selves as avatars held responsible for their claims.
(3) Claims are semantic atoms, not concepts. (We can talk about this if you want.)

Logical 'absolutes' (which are still just norms and in that sense relative) are roughly the most fundamental norms that we'd expect every discursive culture to adopt and articulate. They are perhaps like the incest taboo.

Selves also are almost logical absolutes. The tradition of a ghost in the machine of the body, which is held responsible for telling a coherent story, seems unavoidable. A culture without selves like this would be like a culture without wheels or fire. It's a technology so basic we think it came from god.