But without us, these distinctions couldn't be made and what would remain as far as we can tell, is at best a bunch of fields of energy and a worst (from our want of understanding) a "I don't know what" Lockean substance, or a noumenon in the negative sense, in Kant's philosophy. — Manuel

Seems to me we can't say anything at all. But maybe part of the problem is a Cartesian fantasy that we are spirits for whom it makes sense to gaze on the such a Void. To be fair, language and reasoning has a way of 'floating' above bodies, even if it depends on them as hosts.

As to the plausibility of Brandom's reading of Kant, I may have some doubts, but for that Mww is your guy. He knows his Kant better than most scholars, as far as I can see. And he's quite a character to boot. — Manuel

Thanks. But let me stress in the light of a thousand candles that I'm not intrinsically interested in Kant but rather in reality which Kant may indeed help me understand. Pinker gives a nice spiel on 'professional narcissism' which echoes Heidegger's notion of gossip/chatter. It's too easy for us in our vanity to forget to keep one's eye on the matters themselves. Note also how you are tacitly tracking Brandom for getting Kant right, etc. This is even appropriate, since Brandom makes explicit just this kind of endless scorekeeping. These great names and even our little names are avatars tracking still other avatars.

not too frequently that I stumble upon an idea or an argument that makes me revise all or even most of my previous "commitments" — Manuel

I'm not sure where you are getting this all.

Honestly, I think we are too far apart to extend this discussion much further. We seem to come from very different backgrounds with very different notions such that we don't even coincide in what should be basic terminology, methodology and orientation.

We don't agree on what language is or what it even does, what mind-independence implies, I don't follow what you are saying when you speak of dualism or some variety of extreme Cartesianism. We disagree on monism, ghosts, machines and more.

Which is all good, it's good to have different perspectives on these things.

In any case, it does look like the topic has gone a bit astray in terms of your OP.

Note-- Like what? — Gnomon

If you read the remainder you might get Nagel's point.

The upside of Machiavellian dictators & Tyrant gods is that they mandate order --- making the trains run on time --- making it rain for the pious. But the downside is that they surround themselves with yes-men, and kill-off independent thinkers (philosophers), who ask too many questions. — Gnomon

And too often they commit genocide. Who was it that said a society that burns books will eventually burn people? Is gassing to death men, women and children an appropriate price to pay for the trains running on time, I wonder? And as we saw in Stalin's time, even the pious aren't safe from a capricious and jealous god. :razz: Independent thinking isn't the threat. Other people are the threat, as authoritarianism debases itself though paranoia and listlessness. Look at God and Job. An exquisitely Stalinist stunt by a cunt.

Have you read the essay that this is quoted from, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, by Thomas Nagel? I think what he says in that essay is extremely relevant to many of the arguments we see on this forum, including this one, which is why I quoted it. — Wayfarer

I wasn't asking you if you thought it was relevant (I pretty much assumed that), I was asking about the understanding you have of people who differ in opinion from you. I can ask you. I can't ask Nagel.

I've read the article. It's quality can be summed up in one quote...

My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time.

... and says so much about the tension between philosophy and science.

Why the fuck should we pay the slightest attention to what Nagel 'guesses'?

Do you know how much time and effort goes into a piece of psychology research? If I wanted to try and answer a question even on the periphery of whether fear of religion motivates scientism, I would have to spend the best part of a year in discussion with my statistician and post-grads about what sort of experiment might have some statistical power and how to run it. I'd have to deal with ethics committees, grant bodies, faculty staff... Then I'd finally publish the methodology on a pre-print server, have the entire field of research psychology comment on whether they think that methodology will work, yield significant results. Then, finally, I'd actually carry out the experiment, reproduce the results (even if they were negative) and write it up - including letting everyone know exactly what results I got, how I got them, what statistics I used to check their significance, and what model I was using to test them against. Not to mention I'd write any competing interests, any funding I'd got and properly credit my team. Then it would be reviewed by a panel of my peers for errors, and by an editor for it's 'significance' to the field. Finally, after all that, it would be published in a journal and I could quote "Fear of religion does not drive most appeals to scientism"

And you want to claim that Nagel's 'guess' stands as an equally valid counter to that.

It's quality can be summed up in one quote... — Isaac

Cherry-picking a single remark doesn't convey the gist of a 5000 word essay, which I think makes many an important point over and above the oft-quoted 'fear of religion' - particularly about the naturalisation of reason. And it's not an essay in social psychology, but an essay on philosophy and cultural dynamics. And actually, that is relevant, as this is a philosophy forum. Perhaps you might feel more at home and less antagonised on a psychology forum?

t's not an essay in social psychology, but an essay on philosophy — Wayfarer

In what way? What makes it an essay on Philosophy. It makes claims about how humans think (their motives in this case). So what makes that a topic for philosophy? Simply that a philosopher said it?

If Nagel speculated on the speed of light, would that become then a philosophical question?

And in what sense is the argument I put forward about the differences in approach not itself a philosophical question entirely suited to a philosophy forum?

Since we're speculating on motives (and apparently this is a proper topic for philosophy). Here's my counter to Nagel.

Opposition to scientific explanations regarding human mentality (consciousness, motives, reasoning...) is not motivated by a lack of fear, as Nagel guesses, but by a presence of fear. A fear of hard work. It's is difficult to get one's theories approved if one opts to follow an empirical methodology. A pet theory can be quashed irreparably by the weight of statistics. People are afraid that their cherished narratives will be undone by the hard stare of statistical analysis - so they retreat to the safety of their armchairs from which they can pontificate endlessly without fear of any deeply held belief having to ever be challenged, and without fear of their ever having to do the hard slog of proving them to others.

in what sense is the argument I put forward about the differences in approach not itself a philosophical question — Isaac

You said that you would create a questionnaire, consult students, and so on. I expect groups like Pew Research might have surveys on such questions (like this one.) That's the kind of thing psychologists do.

I'm sure Nagel wouldn't speculate on the speed of light, or other questions of the kind, because they are questions for physics.

What makes Thomas Nagel's book The Last Word a philosophy text? Well, Nagel is 'the University Professor of Philosophy and Law Emeritus at New York University,[3] where he taught from 1980 to 2016.[4] His main areas of philosophical interest are legal philosophy, political philosophy, and ethics.[5]' (Wikipedia) He's written a number of books on philosophy in addition to The Last Word. He's one of the few academic philosophers who is well-known outside the academy.

A fear of hard work. — Isaac

Oh, so an ad hominem against philosophers, presumably, and Thomas Nagel, in particular. Too lazy to cut it as a psychologist. Obviously I'm outmatched by such rhetorical firepower.

You said that you would create a questionnaire, consult students, and so on. I expect groups like Pew Research might have surveys on such questions. That's the kind of thing psychologists do. — Wayfarer

The argument (a philosophical one about epistemology) is that this is the approach which is best. the one which yields the most useful, accurate answers. That is not a question that can be settled scientifically, it's a philosophical question.

What makes Thomas Nagel's book The Last Word a philosophy text? Well, Nagel is 'the University Professor of Philosophy and Law Emeritus at New York University,[3] where he taught from 1980 to 2016.[4] His main areas of philosophical interest are legal philosophy, political philosophy, and ethics.[5]' (Wikipedia) He's written a number of books on philosophy in addition to The Last Word. He's one of the few academic philosophers who is well-known outside the academy. — Wayfarer

None of that answers the question. If Nagel (with all those qualifications) speculated on the speed of light, would that make the speed of light a philosophical question, simply because it was addressed by a qualified philosopher? If not, then what is it about that question that puts it outside the realms of philosophical speculation?

(Note, the above is also a philosophical question, suited to a philosophy forum).

Oh, so an ad hominem against philosophers, presumably, and Thomas Nagel, in particular. Too lazy to cut it as a psychologist. Obviously I'm outmatched by such rhetorical firepower. — Wayfarer

Seriously? This started with an accusation that reductionists were just scared of religion. This is apparently not an ad hominem against reductionists, but my counter-suggestion is an ad hominem against philosophers?

In what way is it not and offence for you to claim that reductionists are all just scared of religion, but it is an offence for me to claim that anti-reductionists are just scared of the work required for empirical approaches? They are literally identical in form.. Group X hold the belief they do, not because of intelligent thought, but because of a fear of Y.

The problem of intentionality, meaning, and purpose is a very deep one, although, as Thomas Nagel observed, much of the debate about it is shaped by the fear of religion: — Wayfarer

I had to back-up to find your casual use of the phrase "fear of religion", that provoked some prickly reaction. In response, you gave a link to Nagel's article Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion. I didn't find a specific reference, but I suspect that the "evolutionary naturalism" was Dennett's contra-Chomsky notion of The Evolution of Language*4. Regardless of all that in-fighting among philosophers about the mysterious origins of human language, I found Nagel's article interesting on its own terms. For example, he quoted Charles Peirce to indicate a position that is not religious in practice, but seems to almost deify Nature*1*5.

Nagel's argument sounds amenable to my own information-centric non-religious philosophical worldview. Even though the Enformationism thesis is derived entirely from modern scientific knowledge, not from any traditional religion, I find that some Naturalists are discomfited by the notion "that the relation between mind and the world is something fundamental"*2. I suppose that's because Darwin's mundane-evolution theory left the emergence of Mind from Matter as a mystery to solved later. To this day, we still don't have "an adequate theory of consciousness"*3.

Since the content of Nagel's article is off-topic, I won't discuss it further in this post. Except to say that it may indirectly suggest why some of us, frustrated by the inadequacies of Reductionism, Materialism, and Naturalism, have labeled the ultimate origins of Mind, Consciousness, and Language as a poetic mystery, instead of a topic for scientific analysis. :smile:


*1. Charles Pierce :
The only end of science, as such, is to learn the lesson that the universe has to teach it. In Induction it simply surrenders itself to the force of facts. But it finds . . . that this is not enough. It is driven in desperation to call upon its inward sympathy with nature, its instinct for aid, just as we find Galileo at the dawn of modern science making his appeal to il lume naturale. . . . The value of Facts to it, lies only in this, that they belong to Nature; and nature is something great, and beautiful, and sacred, and eternal, and real,--the object of its worship and its aspiration.
___quoted in Nagel's Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion


*2. Thomas Nagel :
The reason I call this view alarming is that it is hard to know what world picture to associate it with, and difficult to avoid the suspicion that the picture will be religious, or quasi-religious. Rationalism has always had a more religious flavor than empiricism. Even without God, the idea of a natural sympathy between the deepest truths of nature and the deepest layers of the human mind, which can be exploited to allow gradual development of a truer and truer conception of reality, makes us more at home in the universe than is secularly comfortable.The thought that the relation between mind and the world is something fundamental makes many people in this day and age nervous . I believe this is one manifestation of a fear of religion which has large and often pernicious consequences for modern intellectual life.
___ excerpt from Nagel's Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion

*3. Theory of mind and Darwin’s legacy :
Both dualism and materialism are mistaken because they deny consciousness is part of the physical world. ___John Searle
https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1301214110


*4. Dennett and the Evolution of Language :
“To my own surprise, I’ve come to believe that there is an element of truth in the apparently less plausible Platonic story that’s easy to miss, one that seems to be almost completely obscured by the paradox that both Quine and Plato have described. It isn’t that our languages were deliberately invented by particular groups of people, legislators of syndics in the formal sense of these words, sitting around particular tables, at particular times in the past. It seems to me that they’re more like our dogs, our wolfhounds and sheepdogs and dachshunds, our retrievers, and pointers and greyhounds. We didn’t invent them exactly, but our ancestors did repeatedly make deliberate more or less rational choices in the process that made them what they are today, choices among a long series of slightly incrementally different variants, unconsciously shaping the dogs into precisely what their human breeders needed them to be."
https://kingdablog.com/2017/02/21/dennett-and-the-evolution-of-language/

*5. What is naturalist theory of religion?
"Religious naturalism is a perspective that finds religious meaning in the natural world and rejects the notion of a supernatural realm." The term religious in this context is construed in general terms, separate from the traditions, customs, or beliefs of any one of the established religions.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_naturalism

Since the content of Nagel's article is off-topic, I won't discuss it further in this post. Except to say that it may indirectly suggest why some of us, frustrated by the inadequacies of Reductionism, Materialism, and Naturalism, have labeled the ultimate origins of Mind, Consciousness, and Language as a poetic mystery, instead of a topic for scientific analysis.: — Gnomon

Agree with your analysis and glad you found that essay worthwhile. The bottom line is naturalism is essentially defined against what it denies: most obviously ‘the supernatural’. Which, in effect, is taken to mean religion - and not only that, but ideas associated with religion, which are a very broad palette of ideas. Nagel, commenting on Peirce’s platonist musings, says that Peirce’s idea of the ‘inward sympathy’ with nature is alarming to many people:

The reason I call this view alarming is that it is hard to know what world picture to associate it with, and difficult to avoid the suspicion that the picture will be religious, or quasi-religious. Rationalism has always had a more religious flavor than empiricism. Even without God, the idea of a natural sympathy between the deepest truths of nature and the deepest layers of the human mind, which can be exploited to allow gradual development of a truer and truer conception of reality, makes us more at home in the universe than is secularly comfortable. The thought that the relation between mind and the world is something fundamental makes many people in this day and age nervous. I believe this is one manifestation of a fear of religion which has large and often pernicious consequences for modern intellectual life.

That is the preamble to the famous and frequently-quoted passage on the fear of religion:

In speaking of the fear of religion, I don't mean to refer to the entirely reasonable hostility toward certain established religions and religious institutions, in virtue of their objectionable moral doctrines, social policies, and political influence. Nor am I referring to the association of many religious beliefs with superstition and the acceptance of evident empirical falsehoods. I am talking about something much deeper--namely, the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself. I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn't just that I don't believe in God and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief. It's that I hope there is no God! I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that.

My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. One of the tendencies it supports is the ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life, including everything about the human mind. Darwin enabled modern secular culture to heave a great collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world. Instead they become epiphenomena, generated incidentally by a process that can be entirely explained by the operation of the non-teleological laws of physics on the material of which we and our environments are all composed. — Thomas Nagel

I've observed it countless times in over 12 years of online debates of just these kinds of questions. There is an undercurrent, a kind of firewall, against such ideas as 'inward sympathy' or 'eternal verities' because they're associated with religion or at least with philosophical spirituality (which is the same thing for most people.)

So, this is the sense that 'fear of religion' drives a good deal of philosophical discussion, including naturalism about the mind. That is why I introduced it: not out of ‘finger pointing’ but because it is a real and potent undercurrent in debates about mind and cosmos.

Here Nagel turns to an analysis of the notion that reason itself has a naturalistic explanation, namely as a product of evolutionary adaptation - something which I’m sure nearly everyone accepts without questioning. It seems commonsense to say that ‘reason evolved in the service of survival’. He says, however, that

Unless it [this analysis] is coupled with an independent basis for confidence in reason, the evolutionary hypothesis is threatening rather than reassuring. It is consistent with continued confidence only if it amounts to the hypothesis that evolution has led to the existence of creatures, namely us, with a capacity for reasoning in whose validity we can have much stronger confidence than would be warranted merely from its having come into existence in that way. I have to be able to believe that the evolutionary explanation is consistent with the proposition that I follow the rules of logic because they are correct--not merely because I am biologically programmed to do so. But to believe that, I have to be justified independently in believing that they are correct. And this cannot be merely on the basis of my contingent psychological disposition, together with the hypothesis that it is the product of natural selection. I can have no justification for trusting a reasoning capacity I have as a consequence of natural selection, unless I am justified in trusting it simply in itself -- that is, believing what it tells me, in virtue of the content of the arguments it delivers. — Thomas Nagel

So notice here that Nagel rejects the idea that the faculty of reason can be seen as a product of adaptation - because to do so, is to undermine the sovereignty of reason. Which, one would hope, would be the last thing a philosopher would wish for.

I am talking about something much deeper--namely, the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself. I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn't just that I don't believe in God and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief. It's that I hope there is no God! I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that. — Thomas Nagel

The problem with this not especially useful observation from Nagel is there is an equal and commonly held fear of atheism which can be expressed in exactly the same way as Nagel talks about the fear of religion.

Having worked in palliative and end of life care, I have seen many religious and formerly religious folk die. It is quite astonishing how many Christians confess to their fear of atheism in the same terms Nagel uses but in reverse. Their faith often dies before they do. One former priest I knew, Vincent, put it along these lines -

"A lot of us in faith roles are haunted by the idea that we are wrong, that there actually is no god. That we have been selling people a lie and leading them on. We are terrified that the atheists are right. We are taught to avoid or pity atheists, but they seem to have a better account of suffering and morality and are generally better educated than believers and more tolerant about human behaviour and more charitable towards others. There is little evidence that there's order on our planet or any special meaning for humans, but we fight against this thought and hope our faith will protect us from doubt and from our true feelings."

In this vein there is even a busy organisation, The Clergy Project which supports large groups of clergy all over the world who have lost their faith and have embraced their worst fear - that atheism provides a more reasonable approach than theism. They never wanted a world like that. They were often unprepared for this, but can't help what they believe.

Interesting, I hadn't thought of it like that. But I'm not really reading it as an attempt to convert. The context is Nagel's observation about how the idea of any kind of consonance between mind and world is strenuously resisted, as a consequence of it seeming to be too near to religion. He followed it up with Mind and Cosmos in 2012, which The Guardian named as one of the most despised books of that year. This, despite his own frequent profession of atheism. He says that the idea that the mind evolved as a consequence of mindless physical forces is self-contradictory and that there must be a teleological explanation for the existence of conscious beings. Nagel suggests that the emergence of conscious beings in the universe may be the result of an inherent tendency toward the development of consciousness and value. But again this is on the basis of philosophy, although of course as soon as the book came out it was described as 'providing aim and comfort to creationists'. Which is kind of the point I'm making.

I had some experience when I was very young as a casualty wardsman in a Catholic hospital. The head nurse was a Sister Mary Louise, always immaculately turned out in crisp white and polished black shoes. She was a stern disciplinarian and indefatigible worker, but her compassion impressed me. There were often tragic scenes, it being an emergency ward, and I was hugely impressed by her ability to empathise and literally provide a shoulder to cry on and to weep with the patients, but then to return to her normal equilibrium and carry on with her day. (My wife had major surgery at that same hospital many decades later and again the sense of compassionate concern was palpable.)

The context is Nagel's observation about how the idea of any kind of consonance between mind and world is strenuously resisted, as a consequence of it seeming to be too near to religion. — Wayfarer

I did get that point, but from what I've seen, there is also the case of those strenuously resisting free-thought, for fear of it being too near to dangerous nihilism. There may still be great courage involved in holding that life has no inherent purpose, that we are here for a brief flash, then gone forever. There seems to be a comprehensive mechanism described in Terror Management Theory to deal with this elemental fear of meaninglessness and annihilation.

He says that the idea that the mind evolved as a consequence of mindless physical forces is self-contradictory and that there must be a teleological explanation for the existence of conscious beings. — Wayfarer

Yeah, well these, like Nagel's other arguments seem to be right out of the Christian apologist's playbook ('atheism is self-refuting', etc), in seeking to address atheism and the fear of nihilism. (And yes, I know N isn't a Christian and a nominal atheist) I have heard hours of this stuff over the years and it is ususally put in the sort of language Nagel uses here - especially if they are influenced by Van Til or Plantinga. They are cool arguments, I agree, but I don't find them convincing. My favourite is the one about the logical absolutes proving the perfect mind of god essentially as guarantor of intelligibility. 'God' of course can be understood as old language for 'higher consciousness'.

Maybe we need a thread on the evolutionary argument against naturalism if you haven't done one yet. There must be one here already... I've probably written in it.

He says that the idea that the mind evolved as a consequence of mindless physical forces is self-contradictory and that there must be a teleological explanation for the existence of conscious beings. — Wayfarer
Yeah, well these, like Nagel's other arguments seem to be right out of the Christian apologist's playbook ('atheism is self-refuting', etc), in seeking to address atheism and the fear of nihilism. — Tom Storm

Guilt by association may be emotionally persuasive, but it's not a good logical argument. Your implication of nefarious motives for the Christian rejection of an Atheist article of faith (based on "Fear of Religion" motives?) may be correct. But what if the Christian thinkers are also correct to see Mind from Mindless as a logical paradox?

I am a post-Christian, but I am not an Atheist, because I also see evidence for teleological patterns in scientific evidence*1, and the necessity for Mind from Mind, that is not dependent on ancient religious speculations. My own Enformationism worldview is non-religious, but it has some philosophical parallels, due to seeing the same causal implications (directional patterns) in the objective evidence*2. My thesis & blog go into some detail to provide a rationale for (non-religious) philosophical teleology, and for the not-so-mysterious origin of Consciousness in a material world.

I don't trace the positive direction of evolution (nothingness to stars to human aspiration) back to the wrathful Tyrant-god of Abrahamic traditions. But I am inclined to accept the ancient Greek notion of a First Cause or Prime Mover of some kind. And the "kind" is of the Logos type. Specifically, something with the power to Enform (to cause change of form). My 21st century origin myth is founded on Quantum & Information theories, not stories of loving & punishing & political absentee-father-figures in the sky. Even so, I am forced to agree with the "apologists" that there are signs of teleological intentions (a heuristic program) in the world. But I disagree on some of the attributed anthro-morphic characteristics of the mysterious Programmer. :smile:


*1. Why Teleology Isn't Dead :
Mention teleology in scientific circles and you’ll usually get a skeptical response. Purpose in the way the world is evolving? Patterns certainly—but purpose? No. . . .
Fascinating to be sure, but in the end, skeptics may ask, what's it all about? Is consciousness really inevitable in the universe?
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnfarrell/2016/06/08/why-teleology-isnt-dead/?sh=2ec8259e6d69

*2. Intentional Causation vs Random Chance :
"At the Santa Fe Institute [for the study of complex adaptive systems] one finds an unusually high density of people who dispute the notion that we are creatures of chance . . . . that there is an inevitability to life . . . . that the emergence of life itself is written into the universal laws."
___excerpt from Fire In The Mind, by George Johnson

Guilt by association may be emotionally persuasive, but it's not a good logical argument. Your implication of nefarious motives for the Christian rejection of an Atheist article of faith (based on "Fear of Religion" motives?) may be correct. But what if the Christian thinkers are also correct to see Mind from Mindless as a logical paradox? — Gnomon

Huh? I think you are projecting. I'm not intending to make a logical argument by raising this. I am making what I think is an interesting observation that an atheist philosopher would use the language and arguments of Christian apologetics. As far as I know, this has not been said about Nagel here before. You'll note, I also said they were 'cool arguments'.

'Mind from Mindlessness' as I also suggested, could be a thread here for further discussion.

There may still be great courage involved in holding that life has no inherent purpose, that we are here for a brief flash, then gone forever. There seems to be a comprehensive mechanism described in Terror Management Theory to deal with this elemental fear of meaninglessness and annihilation. — Tom Storm

:up:
Even little folks in peacetime get a taste this way of standing on the front line with clean pants (not shitting themselves, since we are talking psychoanalysis). It's an everyday heroism of not knowing, of maybe it being 'in vain,' with the courage to love and live anyway.

Your implication of nefarious motives — Gnomon

I also don't think I made the point that it is nefarious. Can you explain why this might be seen as nefarious?

Huh? I think you are projecting. I'm not intending to make a logical argument by raising this. I am making what I think is an interesting observation that an atheist philosopher would use the language and arguments of Christian apologetics. — Tom Storm

Sorry, It wasn't meant to be personal. I was referring to the "christian apologist" argument as "guilt by association". To wit : anything postulated by those committed to a different worldview is inherently emotionally motivated, hence unreasonable. It is indeed "interesting" that both sides in the "fear of nihilism" vs "fear of religion" contentions make similar "self-contradictory" arguments.

In the movie about pre-feminism women's baseball, A League of their Own, the catcher says to the tearful fielder : "there's no crying in baseball". Likewise, there's no Fear in Philosophy. :smile:

I also don't think I made the point that it is nefarious. Can you explain why this might be seen as nefarious? — Tom Storm

Sorry again. I was using a provocative word (Nefarious etymology = not divine truth) to describe the finger-pointing between pro vs con sides of the "whence Consciousness" disputes. Each side questions the illicit motives (or impiety), not the reasoning, of the other side.

I find some partial truths on both shores, but I think the final truth is in the inscrutable ocean between. After all these years, the origin of meta-physical Consciousness in a physical world remains a mystery. But people still have polarized opinions on the topic. I apologize, if my finger-pointing at Atheist & Theist apologists sounded offensive to you personally. Typically, I find your posts to be a calm port in a stormy sea of opinions :cool:

Meta-physical : non-physical ; mental vs material ; ideal vs real. Not necessarily super-natural.

Sorry, It wasn't meant to be personal. — Gnomon

No need to apologize - I don't take things personally. I was just correcting your take on my point.

I apologize, if my finger-pointing at Atheist & Theist apologists sounded offensive to you personally. Typically, I find your posts to be a calm port in a stormy sea of opinions :cool: — Gnomon

No problem I didn't take you as being finger pointing. You always seem reasonable towards other's views. :up:

It is indeed "interesting" that both sides in the "fear of nihilism" vs "fear of religion" contentions make similar "self-contradictory" arguments. — Gnomon

I'm not sure they are self-contradictory. They are just the same argument coming from opposite directions and demonstrate that we can't use either version as anything more than anecdote.

One of my issues with the evolutionary argument against naturalism is that I accept that human's don't have access to ultimate truth. I see no reason to think there is ultimate truth. Such truth that we have access too is either a value we hold, or something we can use to make sense of our environment (or both). We do acquire usable, demonstrated knowledge that allows us to survive. That in itself is a pretty good test of a quotidian truth value.

After all these years, the origin of meta-physical Consciousness in a physical world remains a mystery. — Gnomon

I agree that there is no certainty about this. But I don't believe this gives us permission to fill the gap with metaphysical speculation. We don't know. I'm not even sure we have the right questions about this subject yet. We have an incomplete understanding. Yet I am sympathetic to the idea that consciousness is a kind of illusory phenomenon. But I would never argue that this is the case until we know more.

I agree that there is no certainty about this. But I don't believe this gives us permission to fill the gap with metaphysical speculation. — Tom Storm

Ha! What would philosophers do with their free time, if "metaphysical speculation" was not permitted by the truth censors? :smile:

Probably he meant we can't impose our speculations on others as binding.

Ha! What would philosophers do with their free time, if "metaphysical speculation" was not permitted by the truth censors? :smile: — Gnomon

I hear you. I guess I'm saying I am the truth censor in my own life.

Yes, that's a good clarification.

After all these years, the origin of meta-physical Consciousness in a physical world remains a mystery. — Gnomon
I agree that there is no certainty about this. But I don't believe this gives us permission to fill the gap with metaphysical speculation. We don't know. I'm not even sure we have the right questions about this subject yet. We have an incomplete understanding. Yet I am sympathetic to the idea that consciousness is a kind of illusory phenomenon. But I would never argue that this is the case until we know more. — Tom Storm

I see a need to clarify what I mean by the general label for topics related to enigmas like Consciousness. For some modern philosophers, Metaphysics has a stigma of ir-rational un-truth, compared to the rational facts presented by empirical science. "If it ain't physical it ain't real". Yet that negative association derived mainly from reactions to medieval Catholic Scholasticism, which used spiritual assumptions & speculations to support official church dogma and propaganda.

However, that's not the kind of Meta-Physics*1 I'm referring to. Instead, I associate that descriptive label {{addendum to Aristotle's compendium on Nature}} with the second volume that focused, not on physical things, but non-physical ideas & opinions about Nature in general --- including Mind & Consciousness. Metaphysics is about Aboutness*2.

According to my understanding of Meta-Physics, the soft sciences of Psychology, Sociology, History, etc are primarily philosophical & metaphysical*3. They do try to collect "hard" data to support their speculations on topics that lie beyond the empirical tools of Physics. Due to "incomplete understanding" though, their hypotheses rarely reach the mathematical precision and theoretical utility of E=MC^2. Moreover, their conclusions remain unverifiable by empirical methods, hence endlessly debatable by philosophical methods. Sound familiar? :smile:

PS___ "Consciousness" as an "Illusory phenomenon" sounds like an interesting topic for another thread. Unless you want to pursue it in this one. Are illusions physical or meta-physical?



*1. Meta-physics :
The branch of philosophy that examines the nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, substance and attribute, fact and value.
1. Often dismissed by materialists as idle speculation on topics not amenable to empirical proof.
2. Aristotle divided his treatise on science into two parts. The world as-known-via-the-senses was labeled “physics” - what we call "Science" today. And the world as-known-by-the-mind, by reason, was labeled “metaphysics” - what we now call "Philosophy" .
3. Plato called the unseen world that hides behind the physical façade: “Ideal” as opposed to Real. For him, Ideal “forms” (concepts) were prior-to the Real “substance” (matter).
4. Physics refers to the things we perceive with the eye of the body. Meta-physics refers to the things we conceive with the eye of the mind. Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. Matter is just the clay from which a thing is made. Meta-physics is the design (form, purpose); physics is the product (shape, action). The act of creation brings an ideal design into actual existence. The design concept is the “formal” cause of the thing designed.
5. I use a hyphen in the spelling to indicate that I am not talking about Ghosts and Magic, but about Ontology (science of being).
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page14.html

*2. Aboutness :
Broadly, the book seeks to naturalistically explain "aboutness", that is, concepts like intentionality, meaning, normativity, purpose, and function; which Deacon groups together and labels as ententional phenomena. ____Terrence Deacon : Incomplete Nature
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incomplete_Nature
He variously defines reference as "aboutness" or "re-presentation," the semiotic or semantic relation between a sign-vehicle and its object.
https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/deacon/

*3. Quantum Psychology : How Brain Software Programs You and Your World :
"Quantum Psychology offers a coherent and humorous description of how our thoughts, values and behaviors have been colored by our use of language and our prevailing view of the universe."
https://www.amazon.com/Quantum-Psychology-Brain-Software-Programs/dp/0692767045
PS --- "Quantum Psychology: How Brain Software Programs You & Your World is a book written by science-fiction writer Robert Anton Wilson, originally published in 1990. It deals with what Wilson himself calls "quantum psychology," which is not a field within academic psychology." ___Wikipedia

I see a need to clarify what I mean by the general label for topics related to enigmas like Consciousness. — Gnomon

I don't think you do. It's my point that needs clarification. Like most people, I have no expertise in consciousness and only a passing interest. And the subject is a hotbed of controversy and incomplete understanding. Why would I attempt to acquire an account of it with those limitations? Ditto quantum physics. I am more than comfortable staying away. And I wish more people with no expertise would also stay away from such matters.

As to the more general use of the term 'incomplete understanding'. I take the view that humans are storytellers and build tentative accounts of 'truth' that are useful (or not) for certain purposes. I do not think we arrive at absolute truth. What we tend to do is inherit and choose accounts that, in our judgement, are useful to us.

Consciousness" as an "Illusory phenomenon" sounds like an interesting topic for another thread. Unless you want to pursue it in this one. Are illusions physical or meta-physical? — Gnomon

See above also. But I was just referencing how Dennett's account is often understood.

I don't think you do. It's my point that needs clarification. Like most people, I have no expertise in consciousness and only a passing interest. And the subject is a hotbed of controversy and incomplete understanding. Why would I attempt to acquire an account of it with those limitations? Ditto quantum physics. I am more than comfortable staying away. And I wish more people with no expertise would also stay away from such matters. — Tom Storm

That's a surprising position on a philosophy forum. As Descartes concluded, Personal Consciousness is the only thing we know for sure. Everything else is a theory. I assume the "expertise" you mentioned is limited to empirical scientists, since theoretical scientists, lacking hard evidence, can only guess about Consciousness as a general principle. So, the topic has been vexatious for theoretical scientists & philosophers for millennia*1, and untouchable by empirical scientists forever.

Immaterial Consciousness has been off-topic (extraneous, immaterial, inappropriate, inconsequential) for empirical scientists, for obvious reasons. Empirical evidence for non-physical Awareness is completely absent. Until recently, that is. Since information theorists concluded that Information occurs in both Mental & Material forms*2, the possibility of empirical experiments has been taken seriously. Especially by the Santa Fe Institute*3 in New Mexico, near Los Alamos, where mathematical quantum abstractions (ideas) were converted into actual physical earth-shaking power.

Since my philosophical worldview is centered on Information Theory, I am not vexed by the spookiness of Consciousness, but entranced. For empiricists, the notion of Consciousness as a ding an sich is often dismissed as religious nonsense or silly Idealism. But I have come to view the idea of Platonic Ideals through a frame of Pragmatic Idealism*4. Unfortunately, I have none of the kind of expertise you are looking for. I'm just an amateur philosopher asking "what if" questions about both Reality and Ideality. :smile:


*1. What Is Consciousness? :
Scientists are beginning to unravel a mystery that has long vexed philosophers
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-consciousness/

*2. Is Information Physical? :
It Depends On What You Mean by Physical… So my first point here is that information, like entropy, is a physical thing. It’s an extensive property…
https://mindmatters.ai/2022/07/is-information-physical-it-depends-on-what-you-mean-by-physical/

*3. The Santa Fe Institute is an independent, nonprofit research and education center that leads global research in complexity science.
https://www.santafe.edu/about/faq
Note -- Complex Systems are holistic combinations of Matter & Mind (logical structure = Information) .

*4. Pragmatic Idealism :
This term sounds like an oxymoron, combining practical realism with otherworldly fantasy. But together they describe the BothAnd attitude toward the contingencies of the world. Pragmatic Idealism is a holistic worldview, grounded upon our sensory experience with, and knowledge of, how the mundane world works, plus how Reality & Ideality work together to make a single whole. As a personal philosophy, it does not replace scientific Realism — and doesn't endorse fantasies of magic, miracles & monsters — because every thing or fact in the “real” parts of the world is subject to logical validation or empirical testing prior to belief.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page17.html
https://bothandblog.enformationism.info/page9.html

That's a surprising position on a philosophy forum — Gnomon

Well, there is mysterianism which takes a similar view. But I am not a philosopher - just interested in what the themes and issues are and what some people believe and why.

What may be surprising on a philosophy forum is members who know the limitations of what they can say.

As Descartes concluded, Personal Consciousness is the only thing we know for sure — Gnomon

Can I even be sure of that? How do I know it is me doing the thinking? For instance, I have worked for many years with people who experience mental ill health - thought insertion is a common experience. Not to mention disembodied voices. The experience of these is that they are not produced by your own mind.