Chomsky said language is "a computational system" one month ago, at 4.40 into the following.
https://youtu.be/OPCGmsUTAlc

he's saying that linguistic ability emerged suddenly and 'was designed as a computational system' - although I see that as an analogy in this context. I don't think it says anything about computers as such.

It responds to stimuli - whether that amounts to 'counting' is moot, in my view. — Wayfarer

It counted without language.

Short answer...

Because the dog isn't capable of thinking about stuff. — creativesoul

I don't believe that we have the faintest idea whether that's true.

And if the dog is making a mental association, then the dog is capable of thinking about stuff.

If I say to my dog Ginger "where's Fiona" she darts around the house, looking everywhere where Fiona (my other dog) usually is (on the bed, under the bed, in the basement, upstairs in the kid's room) and she barks when she finds her. This is a very basic task for a dog. Part of Ginger's excitement is that she knows once Fifi is found, they both get to go outside.

That is, Ginger understood what I was talking about (Fiona and going outside) and her behavior was future oriented, fully expecting her current behavior to lead to an anticipated result. I am quite sure she has no language going through her brain, but the thought of her and her little buddy running outside was in her head as she went looking for her.

I am quite sure she has no language going through her brain, — Hanover

I wouldn't be so sure of that. She has to understand something about the sounds "Where's Fiona?" in order to behave the way she subsequently does. It seems to me that that would count as "having language in her brain." She'd not be able to make the sounds "Where's Fiona," and who know what those sounds are like qualitatively to her, but she has to be able to parse those sounds versus other sounds.

Given all that's been talked about thus far, how important is our methodological approach in terms of providing the strongest possible ground for positing the existence and the necessary elemental composition of pre and/or non-linguistic thought/belief and/or meaning?

Oh, and I hope you can pardon my lack of proper greeting. Too many discussions, I suppose, that I ought to have ended participating in much sooner than I did. This one looks rather promising. It's a welcome change, because it's been a while to say the least. — creativesoul

I'm not sure what you have in mind by "methodological approach"; I see it more as a matter of commitment. The assumption of an "elemental" real that provides the conditions for actual experience is essential. The assumption that actual experience, both pre-and post-linguistic is an expression of the real is essential. Without those commitments, everything we say will be, to quote Gurdjieff, nothing more than "Pouring from the empty into the void".

It seems you wanted to point out how important it is that post-linguistic ideas are strongly connected to real pre-linguistic feeling, belief and experience, and, implicit in this seems to be an injunction to avoid empty reification of mere "imaginaries" that are made (at least more) possible by language. I would agree with that, but it is a task that is not overly easy. And it is complicated by the fact that what is purely imaginary can certainly lead to real feeling, belief and experience. We're merely human, so perhaps we're never going to nail it, but to surrender to the merely arbitrary imagination is not an option, either. Welcome to the discomfort of uncertainty. :)

You wrote:

...Any thought is a thought of x or that x, with x being a proposition...

The above is false, albeit quite popular. All thought consists entirely of mental correlation(there are no imaginable exceptions to the contrary). All propositions are correlations. Not all correlations are propositions. The same is true regarding predication.

If you want to disregard the empirical/scientific approach, then what are your options? You could approach it as a rationalist, in which case you'll need to lay out the principles you'll be using to draw your conclusions. Otherwise: phenomenology?

I'm not sure why you've said this. Does it seem to you that I disregard an empirical/scientific approach? If so... how so?

You're neglecting to draw and maintain the crucial distinction between thinking and thinking about stuff. I suspect that you've also neglected to consider the difference between pre-linguistic thought and linguistic. I would even go as far as to guess that you also neglect to consider the difference between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.

You neglected to address the long answer, which argued for the short. Gratuitous assertions aren't acceptable.

All thought consists entirely of mental correlation(there are no imaginable exceptions to the contrary). — creativesoul

I don't really understand what you're saying.

You wrote:

If I say to my dog Ginger "where's Fiona" she darts around the house, looking everywhere where Fiona (my other dog) usually is (on the bed, under the bed, in the basement, upstairs in the kid's room) and she barks when she finds her. This is a very basic task for a dog. Part of Ginger's excitement is that she knows once Fifi is found, they both get to go outside.

That is, Ginger understood what I was talking about (Fiona and going outside) and her behavior was future oriented, fully expecting her current behavior to lead to an anticipated result. I am quite sure she has no language going through her brain, but the thought of her and her little buddy running outside was in her head as she went looking for her.

Hey Hanover!

I see nothing obviously problematic with this account aside from being perhaps a little too loose. Generally speaking, it makes perfect sense. If I were to place it under the scrutiny of my own position, I would question only the parts regarding the specifics of thought being attributed to Ginger.

A couple of questions come to mind...

1. What pre-existing thought/belief of yours grounds the certainty that Ginger has no language going through her brain?

2. What pre-existing thought/belief of yours grounds the certainty that Ginger had thoughts of her and Fifi running outside in her head?

It seems to me that we could certainly draw some valid(perhaps even sound) conclusions about Ginger's mental ongoings, but I'm not at all certain that what you've claimed counts as such. Could you show the reasoning/argument which leads to what you claim Ginger is thinking?

I could be much more specific, but it may not be helpful. What part is troublesome?

I'm thinking of a square. What correlation do you suppose is going on?

You're offering another a report of your own thought/belief. The ability to do such a thing requires untold numbers of prior correlations. Roughly, it seems you would be drawing correlations between the word "square" and what the word identifies. Or perhaps, your thinking of a square was more picture-like, in that you had envisioned one. That would also require an untold amount of past correlations be drawn. So...

Once language acquisition begins in earnest, and certainly after one is fluent, the correlations become 'entangled' so to speak. Web-like, I suppose. Not literally. Rather, operatively...

So thought is a web-like thing?

Operatively... yes. Many triggers. All products of physiological sensory perception. Memories. The woven life.

Obviously the mind is not a blank slate.

Obviously.

One's mind... prior to gaining one's initial worldview... is.

One's mind... prior to gaining one's initial worldview... is. — creativesoul

Why do you think that?

Because part of one's mind - namely all the parts only involved with holding a worldview - are language constructs and as such are entirely adopted. At conception there can be no worldview.

Other parts of one's mind are not existentially contingent upon language. Those aren't blank.

You wrote:

I'm not sure what you have in mind by "methodological approach"; I see it more as a matter of commitment. The assumption of an "elemental" real that provides the conditions for actual experience is essential. The assumption that actual experience, both pre-and post-linguistic is an expression of the real is essential. Without those commitments, everything we say will be, to quote Gurdjieff, nothing more than "Pouring from the empty into the void".

Committing oneself to a conceptual scheme(linguistic framework) is being methodological.

Elemental... I'm fine with using here as a means to denote the category of basic things(pre-linguistic) necessarily presupposed by and/or within all spoken and/or written statements of thought/belief.

The overly-used "real"... I'm not always...

The "actual" is always superfluous in light of knowing the difference between what being true requires and being called "true" requires.

If - when we use the term "real" - we're discussing the category of things that have an affect/effect, then I may be willing to speak in such terms.

It seems you wanted to point out how important it is that post-linguistic ideas are strongly connected to real pre-linguistic feeling, belief and experience, and, implicit in this seems to be an injunction to avoid empty reification of mere "imaginaries" that are made (at least more) possible by language. I would agree with that, but it is a task that is not overly easy. And it is complicated by the fact that what is purely imaginary can certainly lead to real feeling, belief and experience. We're merely human, so perhaps we're never going to nail it, but to surrender to the merely arbitrary imagination is not an option, either. Welcome to the discomfort of uncertainty.

Yes. Logical possibility alone is insufficient warrant to believe.

The "actual" is always superfluous in light of knowing the difference between what being true requires and being called "true" requires. — creativesoul

I don't think so. The actual is what makes the difference between being true, and merely being thought to be true. As I see it. truth both speaks and reveals actuality; in the propositional as well as the alethic senses.

If - when we use the term "real" - we're discussing the category of things that have an affect/effect, then I may be willing to speak in such terms. — creativesoul

I think of the actual as the twin categories of things which act, which "have an effect", and which are acted upon, which are affected. Of course, the two are not mutually exclusive. The real I think of as both the actual, and the conditions that are necessary, whatever they might be, for the actual to be.

I think you're right about "logical possibility", in one sense, but I do think that logic is sufficient warrant to believe that things must be certain ways (at least if they are to be objects of experience). But there will always be some problem(s) with anything we say. The real, and even the actual are not the same as anything we can say about them. As the old cliche would have it: "The map is not the territory". That's a hard truth to live with.

That I didn't quote your entire post doesn't imply that I wasn't addressing it.

Again, to be making a mental association would require that there's some sort of identificational idea--at least some sort of rudimentary concept in mind, otherwise the notion of a mental association would be incoherent. This is the same thing I said, I'm just saying it in a wordier way here.

Is a dog making a mental association? We at least have no grounds at all for definitively saying it's not.

And enough with the patronizing attitude bs. You might be fit to be my student. You're certainly not fit to be my teacher.

Sure, she understands the sounds, but in terms of her own thought processes, she doesn't rely on language. For example, should she think about where Fiona is, the meaning of those thoughts are not internally reduced to language.

Sure, she understands the sounds, but in terms of her own thought processes, she doesn't rely on language. For example, should she think about where Fiona is, the meaning of those thoughts are not internally reduced to language. — Hanover

Why wouldn't making mental associations with the sounds amount to language?

Is Meaning Prior To Language? Yes, meaning comes from sensation first. What we feel, see, taste, smell and hear is what we experience first. What the first man heard was a buzzing sound – then the bite of a mosquito. As time when on this man pieced together associations of his sensations. He understood the buzzing and bite go together. This is the beginning of cognition. Further on in time he heard the mosquito and saw his neighbor slap it dead. So, the associations got more and more complex in his cognition. Perhaps over time he made a buzzing sound to indicate the presence of the mosquito. This is the beginning of language.

Well put for simplicity's sake...

I wrote:

..."actual" is always superfluous in light of knowing the difference between what being true requires and being called "true" requires.

You replied:

I don't think so. The actual is what makes the difference between being true, and merely being thought to be true. As I see it. truth both speaks and reveals actuality; in the propositional as well as the alethic senses.

Ah yes, I had suspected we work from different conceptual schemes.

What you are calling "the actual" requires further reduction into what I call "fact/reality" and "truth". Being true requires correspondence with/to fact/reality. Being believed(thought to be true) presupposes it.

On my view, saying that "truth both speaks and reveals actuality" is mistakenly attributing agency to a relationship. For poetry, that's beautiful... For philosophical rigor, not so much.

I think of the actual as the twin categories of things which act, which "have an effect", and which are acted upon, which are affected. Of course, the two are not mutually exclusive. The real I think of as both the actual, and the conditions that are necessary, whatever they might be, for the actual to be.

It seems to me that that is unnecessarily confusing.

Would I be correct in surmising that your use of the terms "real", "actual", and "actuality" indicate awareness of our own fallibility? I mean, do they include the unknown realm?

You wrote

That I didn't quote your entire post doesn't imply that I wasn't addressing it.

You did not directly address what was written. Directly addressing what was written requires a participant to provide a meaningful, relevant, appropriate rejoinder and/or counterargument to what was written. You've done no such thing.

Anyone can go look for themselves.

What you are calling "the actual" requires further reduction into what I call "fact/reality" and "truth". Being true requires correspondence with/to fact/reality. Being believed(thought to be true) presupposes it. — creativesoul

I don't want to argue with this except to say that I understand the word 'fact' to be equivocal. It is variously used to mean both 'true proposition' and 'actual state of affairs'. I think the first usage is the more common and consistent one, so I stick to that and avoid using 'fact' to mean state of affairs or actuality.

On my view, saying that "truth both speaks and reveals actuality" is mistakenly attributing agency to a relationship. For poetry, that's beautiful... For philosophical rigor, not so much. — creativesoul

To elaborate a bit, what I wanted to express in saying that truth speaks actuality is to say that to speak the truth is to speak actuality, along much the same lines as Aristotle's formulation:

"To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”.

To say that truth reveals actuality is to say that actuality 'comes to fruition' in our true speaking of it. I admit that there is something of poetry in all this, but I think philosophy is more of an art than a science, so that is not inappropriate, as I see it.

It seems to me that that is unnecessarily confusing.

Would I be correct in surmising that your use of the terms "real", "actual", and "actuality" indicate awareness of our own fallibility? I mean, do they include the unknown realm? — creativesoul

Can you tell me what is in it that confuses you?

I maybe inadequately understand your questions here. I'm not sure if it is relevant to the intention of them, but I will say this: I believe we know the real, the actual, actuality, intimately. Here I mean knowing in the 'Biblical' sense, knowing by intimate relation. For various reasons, though, what we say does not always reflect the real, the actual; and once we begin to argue (with ourselves or others) about it; then we begin the descent into confusion.

I tend to distinguish between the real and the actual; I think of the latter as meaning something like 'the totality of what we humans experience' and of the former as 'containing, but not limited to, the actual'. The actual is what we humans experience because that is what acts upon us, and what we act upon, as actual beings ourselves; it is the world of interaction. It is real, but we also must think that what lies beyond our sphere of interaction is real, and that it includes the conditions that give rise to our sphere of interaction.

Of course objections may always be made on terminological grounds; that is due to the imprecision of language.