Does Consequentialism give us any Practical Guidance?

RolandTyme

Hello everyone,

Another thing I've been wondering about on the back of my thinking about nuclear weapons.

I've been concerned about the prospect of nuclear war as it would basically wipe out our current civilisation. We would have some enclaves left, but they would have to rebuild.

However, from a strict consequentialist perspective, is this worth worrying about?

Consequentialism, I think, only makes sense if we are concerned with what will be the actual consequences of our actions (or systems of rules or whatever), rather than what we believe to be the consequences. If the whole point is to have a unitary item which is "The Good" and to try to maximise it (I think these are both key - if you have inconmensurable goods, there is no rational way to chose between them. And as Rawls said "everyone is concerned with consequences" - if you don't maximise, you're just some other theory).

I also think it makes no sense for consequentialism to be anthropocentric - why should only humans be capable of having good lives, etc.?

The Earth has existed for billions of years, and will exist for billions more. Who can say what is going to happen in the future? What if the nuclear catastrophe leads, in the long run, to more of the good on planet Earth.

My whole point is - we can't know. I don't think we can even make an educated guess. We could if nuclear would wipe life of the earth, but those in the know reckon it wouldn't.

If this is all true, it means consequentialism has no practical important (it may closer to the end of life on earth, as the solar system changes, but not now). This would lead us with no moral guidence.

I don't think consequentialism is true anyway, as I don't think that the good is unitary, or should be maximised. But it is natural to fall into consequentialist - or what seems like consequentialist thinking when faced with the prospect of something like nuclear armageddon.

I think something else is up with me. I simply think it's a collossal waste and folly to nuke ourselves, when we all have our lives to live, and so many interesting things may yet happen with humanity. This is leaving aside even the obvious point that such indescriminate weapons are morally inexusable - but as they exist and our cursing them and their owners won't get us very far, we may as well move onto more practical considerations.

What do people think? Is anyone here a consequentialist who would care to argue?

180 Proof

I agree "the good" is not definite, or definitive, enough to function as a coherent object (goal ~ value) in ethics. I am a negative consequentialist because, I think, "the bad" (suffering), however, does function as a coherent object (avoidable hazard ~ disvalue). The link here is to a wiki article which summarizes the thesis.

Agent Smith

I agree "the good" is not definite, of definitive, enough to function as a coherent object (goal ~ value) in ethics. I am a negative consequentialist because, I think, "the bad" (suffering), however, does function as a coherent object (avoidable hazard ~ disvalue). The link here is to a wiki article which summarizes the thesis. — 180 Proof

Keep it coming, keep it coming! :up:

Agent Smith

Consequentialism is the mathematization of ethics (vide Bentham's felicific calculus). It isn't a bad idea and could've made a difference; unluckily, joy and suffering are as of yet poorly quantified i.e. they remain subjective enough to gum up the works as it were. Perhaps it's an idea that's premature - it must lie dormant/kept in suspended animation until advances in science make it implementable. We had ideas of flying yanas (vehicles) thousands of years before the Wright brothers made their first heavier-than-air flight.

Tate

Is anyone here a consequentialist who would care to argue? — RolandTyme

Consequentialism hasn't failed in this case. It doesn't provide moral guidance here because there is no moral way forward in the realm of war. The actions that take place in war are for the sake of survival.

180 Proof

↪Agent Smith

:point:

↪180 Proof

(&

↪180 Proof

)

Hillary

because suffering, in contrast to "happiness", is objective in so far as it is factual what deprivations & harms, fears & losses render (almost) every individual of a / our species dysfunctional or dead, that is, whatever is not good for a / our kind, and, therefore, that it can be known whether or not "gratuitous suffering" is foreseen and, if so, prevented or mitigated or reduced. — 180 Proof

Likewise:

because happiness, in contrast to "suffering", is objective in so far as it is factual what opiates, sex, dance, ecstasy, love, food, touch, render (almost) every individual of a / our species functional or alive, that is, whatever is good for a / our kind, and, therefore, that it can be known whether or not "gratuitous happiness" is foreseen and, if so, stimulated, or intensified, or increased"

180 Proof

Parody whatever you can't understand, lil troll-stain.

Agent Smith

↪180 Proof

Gracias señor!

Agent Smith

↪180 Proof

Negative utilitarianism is, it seems, less confusing than, what?, positive utilitarianism since we're more familiar with, we have a comparatively better handle on, suffering than happiness.

This :point:

Better Socrates dissatisfied thsn a fool/pig statisfied. — J. S. Mill

gives an inkling of what I mean.

Merci beacucoup.

RolandTyme

↪Tate

I'm not sure a consistant consequentialist - whether negative or positive - would agree with you here. The whole point of this perspective is it gives us one principle ("Maximise the good" - I guess the negative alternative would be "minimise the bad"), which technically always gives us a single result.

The problem is our situation doesn't give us enough information to make an informed choice. This in itself doesn't make the principle wrong. It simply means we can't follow it. If I lock the code for my safe in a car then lose the keys, it doesn't mean there isn't a way to open my safe with the keypad. It means, in practical terms, I don't have access to that method for opening the safe.

Consequentialism must apply in times of war, or any other extreme situations, basically. The whole point of siding with it against "common-sense" morality is to decide an outcome when common sense leads to contradictions, or gives us no clear and consistent advice.

A consequentalist, faced with a war causing 10,000 deaths, or 1 million deaths, wouldn't go "Oh no - no moral choices in war!" They would - assuming more death means less of the good, choose to wage the first war.

We may not agree with the theory - I don't - but that's what it is.

Tate

The problem is our situation doesn't give us enough information to make an informed choice. — RolandTyme

Isn't that true in every case?

RolandTyme

↪Tate

Not necessarily. In a more limited scenario, you can make an informed choice. I can make informed choices about what to have out of my fridge, as I know what's in the fridge just now. I can make an informed choice about the (professed) values of candidates in a general election, as I can read their manifestos. It's a further stretch to say I can make an informed choice about either

[a] the actual values of the candidates (as politicians can lie, after all - the answer would be whether overall we can trust enough of what they say to say that voting on a manifesto tracks sufficiently how governments then go onto act. I'd estimate it probably does - governments (in the UK at least) can be forced into a general election if it is seen they are departing overall from manifesto promises, as may be the case in the current Tory leadership race depending on who is the winning candidate.

whether voting for candidates who have certain values will actually lead to the promotion of those values, or whether it may actually lead to ironic outcomes with regards to those values. For instance, certain far left wingers think that right wing governments actually make left wing values winning out in the long run, as they increase disatisfaction in the long run with the status quo (which for the far left is by necessity right wing), where as voting left forstalls the change in the status quo away from the right to the left.

Tate

↪RolandTyme

Honestly, I think of voting as a ritual in the religion of democracy (that's roughly how I see it, anyway).

Democracy is cumbersome, inefficient, and prone to corruption. The voting ritual creates an expectation of control, though. This expectation gets people out protesting.

Although this may all be wrong as Chinese people do a lot of protesting.

javi2541997

For instance, certain far left wingers think that right wing governments actually make left wing values winning out in the long run, as they increase disatisfaction in the long run with the status quo (which for the far left is by necessity right wing), where as voting left forstalls the change in the status quo away from the right to the left. — RolandTyme

This is how modern politics works. We don't see candidates with good rhetoric or ambitious plans to the citizens. They just plan some strategies to get benefits from our disappointment and angry. When years pass by it is understandable that the government still losing popularity. But instead of making a national plan, the opposition take some advantage of this issue to "steal" old voters from the government.
Then, I can't see if there still "ideologies" like in the past. I guess we just have some public representatives doing weird stuff without challenges

Bylaw

↪180 Proof

While I find nothing to disagree with in your post, negative consequentialism seems iike a breeding ground for anti-natalists which is a negative consequence and leads to suffering at least in some philosophy forums.

Agent Smith

Most interesting. — Ms. Marple

180 Proof

a breeding ground for anti-natalists — Bylaw

:smirk:

Fooloso4

Consequentialism is related to phronesis, practical wisdom. Deliberation regarding ends and practical means to achieve them. It is opposed to Kant's notion of "good will" which, for which, according to Kant, consequences play no role.

Unintended consequences do not vitiate the concern with consequences.

"The good" is not a Platonic Form. It is not independent of particular needs and interests. The lack of unity, like the inability to predict the future, is not a failure but a condition for moral deliberation.

180 Proof

Consequentialism is related to phronesis, practical wisdom. — Fooloso4

:up:

Cuthbert

My whole point is - we can't know. I don't think we can even make an educated guess. — RolandTyme

True - about some things. But not true about others. Some consequences we can reasonably predict. We can't predict the consequences of all-out nuclear war. We can predict the consequence of putting a hand in boiling water. So far we can say that consequentialism is limited to the extent that we can make good predictions. We can't yet say that -

consequentialism has no practical important — RolandTyme

Consequentialism may well not be true. But the OP does not do enough to establish that.

Agent Smith

I'm thinking Thanos! In one story Thanos saves a young girl from being run over by a bus. Everyone is jubilant at this and so is the girl who, in Star Wars terms, now owes a life debt to Thanos. It turns out that Thanos' saved the girl because she would grow up to be the one who destroys the world, no scratch that, the whole friggin' universe! So much for consequentialism, eh?

RolandTyme

↪Cuthbert

The problem is though Consequentialism can't afford to be be limited by the extent to which we can make good predictions. It asks us to bring about the best consequences. If we have choices we can assign rough probabilities to, then we can still try to follow it's guidence. But if we can't even do that, any choice is as good as another, from our perspective, and hence we can't even really try to follow consequentialism. I mean, we might hit on it by luck, but that's not the same thing.

On consequentialism being fine for situations for we have a good grasp on, but not more distant ones (temporarily distant, here, in the nuclear issue) - this doesn't help rescue consequentialism. As consequentialism is meant to be a global ethical theory - it's no good by it's own lights if it only gives us guidence in a limited scope of cases. I mean, you could defend cosequentialism in limited cases if you want, but that's not quite the same as trying to defend it as THE right ethical theory. Saying that consequentialist reasoning will win out in a specific battle you face as a general, for example, is not the same as thinking you should be a consequentialist at all times.

On The Original Position (I assume you mean this by OP) - I don't see how this thought experiment not working has bearing on the conversation.

RolandTyme

↪180 Proof

Sorry 180 Proof - I didn't really consider your contribution when I was replying initially to the discussion.

I guess what I would have to think in order to disagree with your position would be to think that suffering, badness, avoidable hazard etc. aren't capable of being unified either. I guess we would think this if we thought that bad things can be incommensurable, so that you have no ability to trade off one bunch of bad things with another bunch of bad things, in some cases.

Also, we would have to think that avoiding bad things always outweighs gaining good things.

I don't know what I think about these two propositions, so I'll have to think about it.

RolandTyme

↪Fooloso4

Consequentialism is related to practical wisdom - however, that's as far as it goes. They commonly aren't taken to be the same thing. You would need to give an argument for that.

I agree unintended consequences do not vitiate a concern with consequences. However - consequentialism is more than simply a concern with consequences. It is the position that, morally, we should try to maximise the amount of good in the world. If you are a virtue ethicist, for example, you are concerned, at least in part, in the consequences of your actions. But that is not the same as being a consequentialist.

You don't need to think that Platonic forms exist in order to think that good things have to have a substantive thing in common between them, which can be aggregated, in order to consequentialism to get off the ground. But, in this case, if things can be aggregated, and are commensurable, then you can freely substitute them for each other. So it would be moral, if possible, to convert all the matter of the universe into crystals, if we accept crystals are good (which they are - they are shiny and lovely), and this crystal universe would maximise the good. I simply don't think that good things are freely substitutable in this way. There's stuff in Moore about good things which are more than the sum of their parts (I forget the technical term), but I can't get into that here, and I still don't think it is going to work.

Even if you think that good things share something in common, which can be aggregated, you may not think that you are morally required to maximise this quality. You might think, for example, that buying your neice a card for her birthday is good, and giving money to a charity is good. Now what if it is the case that giving all the money to charity will bring about the most good? But you might not think that it is moral to do this. You might accept that's as may be, but think ideally you should do both, even though the overall cosequences will be worse. The consequentialist has to insist you are doing the wrong thing here. I simply don't believe you are.

Fooloso4

Consequentialism is related to practical wisdom - however, that's as far as it goes. They commonly aren't taken to be the same thing. — RolandTyme

One is a theory the other is not.

But, in this case, if things can be aggregated, and are commensurable,then you can freely substitute them for each other. — RolandTyme

What different medications have in common is that they promote health. They are in that sense commensurable, but that does not mean they are interchangeable.

but think ideally you should do both — RolandTyme

I don't follow. Birthday card vs. charity? All your money to charity vs. some of your money? All of your money vs. birthday card? The only case in which it is possible to do both is the first one. What you should do is limited by what it is possible to do.

None of this should be taken as a defense consequentialist moral theories, or any moral theory for that matter.

180 Proof

↪RolandTyme

Maybe these links make my position a little clearer:

↪180 Proof

(&

↪180 Proof

).

RolandTyme

↪Fooloso4

I was using commensurable in the technical sense - able to be measured on the same scale. You can't measure medications on a single "promotes health" scale, as some taken together will counteract each other, only some at one time will be applicable to a person's ailment, and so on. In contrast to antiques, say, as "promoting wealth". Antiques are all different from each other, but they all share a quality that they make one more wealthy when they are possessed, and having more simply adds to wealth.

That's the sense I meant commensurable. Sorry I did not define my terms. It's not the same as things simply having a shared property.

I don't have an issue with your first point, and I'll take it for granted I wasn't sufficiently clear as regards your third one - my apologies. No point in arguing if you aren't defending consequentialism anyway.

Fooloso4

I was using commensurable in the technical sense - able to be measured on the same scale. — RolandTyme

You said:

if things can be aggregated, and are commensurable, then you can freely substitute them for each other. — RolandTyme

RolandTyme

↪Fooloso4

My apologies - I am not being clear. The simplest thing to do at this point is for you to go and read the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on "comensurability", if you are interested in what I am trying to say. I apologise that I am not being clear - I don't think that philosophy and trying to dip in and out of a forum like this mix very well, actually. In philosophy, you should be very patient both with how you formulate things, and also in assessing what other people are trying to say. That exactly how we approached it when I was at a philosophy department. I do feel I have let you down in not allowing myself the time to make sure I am being as clear as possible in what I am saying, but you have also let me down in not attempting to be charitable and aim to understand and express what I may be saying in the best possible light - then criticising it.

Anyway, being on this site is literally wasting my time, as I don't have the mindset to do a professional job in talking to people on it. And if you can't do something well, you shouldn't do it at all. Best wishes.

Fooloso4

go and read the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on "comensurability" — RolandTyme

I know what the term means.

assessing what other people are trying to say — RolandTyme

I was assessing what you did say. Not only did you say that you can freely substitute things for each other, you went on to argue that doing so is moral, even though the example you give of converting everything to crystals seems to argue against that claim.

The most charitable thing I can do is to take what you said seriously enough to respond and give you the opportunity to explain what you said and why you think it correct.

Does Consequentialism give us any Practical Guidance?

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