The National Gallery of Australia has commissioned an independent review of a major upcoming exhibition of artworks from the APY (Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara) Lands, following explosive allegations in The Australian.

The gallery said it was launching a review into the provenance and creation of works in its forthcoming exhibition Ngura Pulka - Epic Country after it was alleged that non-Indigenous arts workers painted parts of works by Aboriginal artists. — APY studios deny 'whitewashing' allegations as National Gallery launches investigation

It's illegal for non-indigenous people to pass their works off as indigenous, but indigenous people can make whatever they like and call it indigenous. — frank

Yep. That's not what was happening here.



Try https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-04-11/nga-launches-independent-review-into-apy-artwork/102207680

Yep. That's not what was happening here. — Banno

Oh, I see. Right, that's illegal.

How do you classify words? I think you could picture them in such a way that it's absurd to say they have the property of being definable. — frank

At the moment, I really like Brandom's approach. Words/concepts are not semantic atoms. Claims are, because people are held responsible for them. Words/concepts are 'parasites' on the meaning of claims, of what they make a discursive self responsible for saying and doing in the future. We all keep one another honest. We all tend the garden of meaning together.

Neorationalism, but it's just us inheriting software, messing with it, and passing it on. We 'are' (in our most disembodied ghosty selves) evolving semantic norms.

Well, I don't see how you would get a better insight into the relation between two traditions by rejecting one of them. — Janus

I didn't say 'rejects', I said 'questions'.

Rejecting a whole tradition as being wrong-headed seems itself to be wrong-headed, in any case. A balanced view sees all traditions as forms of life. I understand that AP is a form of life, that must yield some insight within a certain field of enquiry. — Janus

Except, it seems the tradition that holds that some traditions are wrongheaded. That, apparently is the exception to your rule, which you proceed here to reject as wrongheaded.

You won't get far in any field if you call into question the "usefulness" of the entire discipline. — Janus

I don't see why not. Ruling out the possibility that the discipline is useless seems an entirely unnecessary shackle.

I didn't say 'rejects', I said 'questions'. — Isaac

I was responding to this:

deciding in advance that 'better' only consists of answers which accept both traditions rather than question them — Isaac

Questioning a tradition does not equate to not accepting it. Questioning some ideas within a tradition involves accepting the tradition overall and questioning it from within. So, your locution here suggests that the alternative to questioning a tradition is accepting it, which makes questioning look like not accepting, i.e. rejecting.

Except, it seems the tradition that holds that some traditions are wrongheaded. That, apparently is the exception to your rule, which you proceed here to reject as wrongheaded. — Isaac

I haven't said that thinking some traditions are wrongheaded is unacceptable, but that attempting to participate in a discussion within a tradition by rejecting the whole tradition as wrongheaded is wrongheaded. That is, if you think a tradition is wrongheaded then there is no point attempting to discuss its ideas with those who think it is a good tradition because you will be off topic from the start. It's a kind of "poisoning of the well". On the other hand, if the discussion is about whether or not the tradition is a good or useful one, then by all means have at it.

I don't see why not. Ruling out the possibility that the discipline is useless seems an entirely unnecessary shackle. — Isaac

So you think that, for example, you could advance QM by arguing that the whole discipline is useless? :roll:

Questioning some ideas within a tradition involves accepting the tradition overall and questioning it from within. — Janus

Not at all. If one can question some of the ideas in a tradition (and find them flawed) it follows that one can question all ideas in a tradition (and find them flawed). There's no logical reason why every tradition must contain at least one non-flawed idea.

Since a tradition made up entirely of flawed ideas has nothing left to 'accept', it follows logically from being able to question ideas in a tradition that one can reject the entire thing.

The reason I made the distinction is that rejecting a tradition as a result of questioning its ideas is different to merely rejecting it dogmatically.

if you think a tradition is wrongheaded then there is no point attempting to discuss its ideas with those who think it is a good tradition because you will be off topic from the start. — Janus

What? You seem to be saying that disagreeing is off topic. That If I think something is bad, I'm off-topic when discussing it with people who think it's good.

So you think that, for example, you could advance QM by arguing that the whole discipline is useless? — Janus

Yes, absolutely - assuming that argument had any merit (which I can't see how it would with QM), but it seems unarguable that if a discipline is useless, then arguing that case will advance that discipline. Finding out that it is useless is one of the possible end points of a field of enquiry. Phrenology, for example.

Not at all. If one can question some of the ideas in a tradition (and find them flawed) it follows that one can question all ideas in a tradition (and find them flawed). There's no logical reason why every tradition must contain at least one non-flawed idea. — Isaac

Ir's not a matter of logic. If what you said were true we could find the whole of science or mathematics to be flawed. Traditions tend to have their own premises, so to reject the entire tradition would be to reject the premises. But if you reject the premises of a tradition then there would no point entering into discussion with those who hold to the premises; you would just wind up talking past one another.

The reason I made the distinction is that rejecting a tradition as a result of questioning its ideas is different to merely rejecting it dogmatically — Isaac

To reject a tradition is to reject its founding principles. Such a rejection is inevitably dogmatic, since premises are not supported by reason; rather they are what reason must, to adhere to any particular tradition, think consistently with.

Yes, absolutely - assuming my argument has any merit (which I can't see how it would with QM), but it seems unarguable that if a discipline is useless, then arguing that case will advance that discipline. Finding out that it is useless is one of the possible end points of a field of enquiry. Phrenology, for example. — Isaac

What? You seem to be saying that disagreeing is off topic. That If I think something is bad, I'm off-topic when discussing it with people who think it's good. — Isaac

No, I'm saying that if people are trying to have what to them would be a productive discussion in, for example, theology you barge in with what amounts to "theology is bullshit" that you will not be contributing to a productive discussion and you will be off-topic. On the other hand if the subject of the discussion were 'is theology a worthwhile pursuit' then that would be a different matter.

The premises of your example phrenology seem arbitrary to begin with. Nonetheless some people may find it yields them insights into character. Astrology is another case (although there the premises seem somewhat less arbitrary); many people find astrology useful. You can say what you like about their motives, but the truth cannot be demonstrated; it remains possible that astrology, even phrenology, could be true.

In any case this discussion is concerned specifically with philosophical traditions; where usefulness is impossible to establish. And in any case even if the uselessness of a whole tradition could be established, that is not going to advance that discipline but rather will demolish it

@Janus I want to say that the most interesting and famous philosophers have radically undermined or rejected the premises of their predecessors. If this is an exaggeration, it’s not much of one.

EDIT: should we, along the lines of Kuhn, distinguish normal and revolutionary philosophy? Maybe the analytic logic-choppers and the continental disciples of whichever big postmodern philosopher you care to mention are doing the former.

I want to say that the most interesting and famous philosophers have radically undermined or rejected the premises of their predecessors. If this is an exaggeration, it’s not much of one.

EDIT: should we, along the lines of Kuhn, distinguish normal and revolutionary philosophy? Maybe the analytic logic-choppers and the continental disciples of whichever big postmodern philosopher you care to mention are doing the former. — Jamal

Yes, I agree that most of those we consider the greatest philosophers have found flaws in their predecessors, only to have their own ideas overturned later. I think it's interesting to consider how many foundational premises there have been in all of philosophy, and it seems likely to me that there have not been that many.

Kant rejected the premise of intellectual intuition, for example, which Hegel arguably wanted to reinstate. It's not much in favour these days, so it might seem Kant won the argument. But who's to say it might not come back into favour?

I've never found Kuhn's idea of radical paradigm shifts all that convincing; I think the questions that of concern today are the same questions, albeit perhaps in different garb, that interested the Ancients. I seem to remember reading somewhere that Hegel referred to philosophy as "The same old stew, reheated", but I've never been able to find where he said that, so maybe I dreamed it, who knows. We also have Whitehead's 'philosophy as footnotes to Plato'.

Do we want philosophy to be reduced to being the way Rorty characterized it: "The truth is what your contemporaries will let you get away with saying". I don't and that's why I'm not enamoured of the idea of philosophy as normative rationality.

Almost there. Just one more dust up should do it.

A definition of a philosophical concept might be required at the beginning of a discussion only in the case that the term is equivocal… implies different things for us… [ and ] are poor substitutes for a skill, namely the ability to use terms successfully… — eat with a Jamal

I think I understand and agree that: starting a philosophical investigation of a concept (separate from a technical "term") with a tidy unexamined single explanation in advance is antithetical to what I take philosophy to be for, which is learning about ourselves through explicating what matters to our concepts.

And, as one who uses Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s methods, I, as well as--I take it--you, believe that there is an implicit understanding of the implications of our concepts in being brought up and trained in the life of our culture, as evidenced in our language (what I take as your expression “shared meaning”).

And that you are right to make the distinction that these are not individual understandings but unexamined conflicting public "uses" of these concepts (Wittgenstein also refers to them with the additional term: "senses").

And that we should not ("ought" not, as @Isaac says) be arguing to persuade the other of our initial position, but working together to see the breadth of our world in openly, seriously "producing" the terms the other is using, by creating examples and imagining a context where they are valid (as pointed out by @plaque flag); to, as Socrates says, stand in the other's place, their shoes. I take this "unfolding", as you say, of our unexamined (shared) lives as the purpose and skill of the philosopher (mirroring @Banno).

I would point out that: philosophy is exactly for when we are lost as to what to do; when, as you say, our understandings of our concepts are “equivocal”, and we don’t yet see why (see the different use(s) of the concept, their different implications). That we don’t yet consciously “know”, and we are “talking past each other”.

So I agree that we should not start by stating and arguing for the right or correct use (as Socrates desired, however fruitful his method), that we are not just naming an "object" (as @Manuel pointed out through Leibniz), but differing about complex actions and ideals, like thinking, meaning, seeing, doing justice, determining right, etc. In these instances there are multiple "categories" (as Kant terms it) for a concept (like "knowing") which (possibly of interest to @frank) each have their own "proper", valid (necessary and sufficient) "conditions" (again, from Kant--Wittgenstein will call them Grammar, or criteria) with my point being that these criteria reflect our various interests, judgments, failings, etc. inherent in our lives together, which is really what we are trying to learn about and reconcile.

Thank you for bringing up an interesting and important topic. I think it will help to address your discussion of Kant (which I'll do separately), to look at why we want these kind of "definitions".

but working together to see the breadth of our world in openly, seriously "producing" the terms the other is using, by creating examples and imagining a context where they are valid (as pointed out by plaque flag); to, as Socrates says, stand in the other's place, their shoes. I take this "unfolding", as you say, of our unexamined (shared) lives as the purpose and skill of the philosopher — Antony Nickles

:up:

That's also what I would call hermeneutical ontology or phenomenology. Philosophers scrape away some of the crust or sediment of traditional and mostly 'unconscious' pre-interpretation (Heidegger's interpretedness.) So it's not like physics. We walk in the city talking, challenging, responding, more sensitive than to inferential/semantic norms, giving more of a damn than most for the best word, the fiery sign that liberates, only to become a trap for those who must make it all new tomorrow. Sufficient unto the day is the stupidity thereof.

If what you said were true we could find the whole of science or mathematics to be flawed. — Janus

Yes, that's right, but only if a sound argument were given finding flaw in every single premise. That seems incredibly unlikely. Not so with a philosophical tradition.

Traditions tend to have their own premises, so to reject the entire tradition would be to reject the premises. But if you reject the premises of a tradition then there would no point entering into discussion with those who hold to the premises; you would just wind up talking past one another. — Janus

Again, this just seems to rule out disagreement. How is this any different from saying that that it's pointless to talk to someone who disagrees?

We could both be talking about some aspect within the post-analytic tradition and I hold to Quine's indeterminacy and you argue for Davidson's elimination of content-scheme dualism. Instead of talking, you just say "well, this is a discussion from the point of view of Davidson, so your Quinean response is off topic"

Then some more minor disagreement occurs about the exegesis of Davidson's attack on the 'third dogma' where someone points out the conflict with the Quinean indeterminacy-underdetermination distinction. You say "No, this is a discussion assuming there is no such conflict, pointing out the conflict is off topic"

...etc.

You know how many people are going to be left in that conversation?

To reject a tradition is to reject its founding principles. Such a rejection is inevitably dogmatic, since premises are not supported by reason — Janus

Firstly, not all premises of all traditions are unsupported by reason. German Idealists didn't believe they'd drawn together rationalist and empirical as an unargued-for leap of faith. It's quite carefully and rationally argued out. Likewise, in fact, the argument between rationalist and empiricist traditions in the first place. I can perhaps think of a few traditions with foundational principles that they don't argue for, but they're the minority and usually religious.

Secondly, even when traditions are based on faith-based principles, there are more angles of discussion than reason. One can talk about aesthetics, simplicity, elegance... All valid forms of discussion about differing ideas.

No, I'm saying that if people are trying to have what to them would be a productive discussion in, for example, theology you barge in with what amounts to "theology is bullshit" that you will not be contributing to a productive discussion and you will be off-topic. — Janus

Yes, I get what you're saying, but I'm trying to draw out an actual argument for saying it.

This is a public discussion forum, so people ought to expect the full range of public opinions on a matter. One of them is that theology is bullshit. If the person who thinks 'theology is bullshit' progresses the discussion in a direction they think is valid and useful, then the fact that the pro-theology participants don't agree is just an inevitable part of public debate.

If you start closing off debates into their own little echo-chambers then all you get is stagnation.

in any case even if the uselessness of a whole tradition could be established, that is not going to advance that discipline but rather will demolish it — Janus

As I've said. Demolition is one of the possible stages of any enquiry. To rule it out is dogma.

Kant says that "no a priori conception, such as those of substance, cause, right, fitness, and so on, can be defined. For I can never be sure, that the clear representation of a given conception (which is given in a confused state) has been fully developed, until I know that the representation is adequate with its object."

I take Kant as claiming that our non-empirical concepts (thinking, meaning, causing, doing right, etc.--those not subject to science, to explanation) cannot be defined because our ordinary understanding ("given" to us culturally) is "confused" and cannot be made certain--that our knowledge cannot reach the standard of complete clarity--representing its "object".

I claim that what Kant has done here is put the cart before the horse. In wanting to be certain of our concepts, to have our knowledge of them be complete and clear (ahistorically), he has created the idea of an "object" that they would represent, as with a Platonic "form". Of course elsewhere he puts this "thing-in-itself" outside the reach of our knowledge, thus the lack of faith in our ordinary understandings.

"But, inasmuch as the conception, as it is presented to the mind, may contain a number of obscure representations, which we do not observe in our analysis, although we employ them in our application of the conception, I can never be sure that my analysis is complete, while examples may make this probable, although they can never demonstrate the fact. Instead of the word definition, I should rather employ the term exposition— a more modest expression, which the critic may accept without surrendering his doubts as to the completeness of the analysis of any such conception."

I take it here that Kant wants it demonstrated as fact (to be certain, beforehand) that we have made explicit every use of a concept ("completely"), and then comes to the conclusion--because we cannot ensure a concept will not be expanded in its uses, applied obscurely--that he will only allow that we are exposing examples.

However, exposing examples is the bread-and-butter of what Austin and Wittgenstein do in order to show that, as @Jamal has said, we do not need certainty to apply our concepts, to operate their uses, and to make the terms and criteria of those uses explicit. This "definition" does not meet Kant's standard of mathematical certainty, but it is nonetheless precise, rigorous.

Thank you for your interesting posts Antony.

But in this latest one you've managed the remarkable feat of agreeing with Kant in substance while appearing to believe you disagree with him. So I think you're reading him wrong. You, I, Austin, Wittgenstein, and Kant are similarly sceptical about definitions in philosophy, claiming that we can use these concepts without such "mathematical certainty". Indeed the whole point of that section of the CPR is to say that what works for mathematics is not appropriate for philosophy.

Of course elsewhere he puts this "thing-in-itself" outside the reach of our knowledge, thus the lack of faith in our ordinary understandings — Antony Nickles

In fact, in the realm of empirical reality—that which we can know—Kant is very much on the side of our ability to know, to directly perceive and to judge objectively.

I'm on my phone so I don't know if I want to get into CPR exegesis right now, but I thought I'd give you an initial response. Let me know if I've misunderstood you.

[In fact, in the realm of empirical reality—that which we can know—Kant is very much on the side of our ability to know, to directly perceive and to judge objectively. — Jamal

Well, this is the realm of science, not philosophy (which deals with what Kant calls the “a priori”—and Wittgenstein calls our “concepts”), and this is a digression, but we also fail to define the empirical, to Kant’s satisfaction, because, though we do explain it (rather than describe, as we do with our concepts), in doing so, we set the limits of what counts or doesn’t (which is a terminal fault for Kant). In creating “objectivity”, Kant cordoned us off from the world “directly”, unfiltered by us, though that was his ideal.

And my contention is Kant’s ideal makes his standards for a “definition” untenable; that defining a concept is different than he imagines, though I agree that our understanding is never immediate and there is the need for development of a concepts senses.

Indeed the whole point of that section of the CPR is to say that what works for mathematics is not appropriate for philosophy. — Jamal

Again, digressing, but Kant takes this as a failure and a tragedy for philosophy, rather than a fact that nevertheless doesn’t make philosophy less rigorous than science, less methodical, practical, relevant.

You, I, Austin, Wittgenstein, and Kant are similarly sceptical about definitions in philosophy, claiming that we can use these concepts without such "mathematical certainty". — Jamal

Kant denies that we can “define” our “a priori” concepts because we cannot obtain certainty. I (and Austin and Wittgenstein) believe his desire for that standard leads to his conclusion, and that, despite the openness of our concepts, we not only are able to operate them, but that we can “define” them, which, against Kant, would mean that we can rigorously make explicit and precise (no less than certainty) the implications and criteria of and for the different senses (or “uses”) of our concepts. Only, they reflect our lives, rather than are rational apart from our fragility, as Kant would have it.

The overall point being that our “a priori“ concepts are “rational”, have depth and precision (not “confused”, not ordinarily lacking intelligibility—are definable), even without meeting Kant’s requirements of completeness; certainty, finality, closed to expansion, etc.

Again, digressing, but Kant takes this as a failure and a tragedy for philosophy, rather than a fact that nevertheless doesn’t make philosophy less rigorous than science, less methodical, practical, relevant. — Antony Nickles

He regards speculative metaphysics as a failure, of course, as I suppose Wittgenstein and Austin do too, but the fact that what works for mathematics doesn’t work for philosophy is part of what he sets out as the bounds of good philosophy. It is part of his assessment of the failure of philosophy hitherto, a fact to be observed rather than a “failure and a tragedy” itself. The section is in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, the purpose of which is precisely to set out the limits of the rigorous and methodical use of reason, limits that enable this methodical use.

In other words, that we cannot reason mathematically in philosophy is not a “failure and a tragedy”; it is what must be payed attention to if we want to philosophize.

Well, this is the realm of science, not philosophy — Antony Nickles

I was responding to your claim that his notion of the unknowable thing-in-itself implied a “lack of faith in our ordinary understandings.” I was trying to point out that this is not at all the thrust of the idea. Rather, it is part of a critique of metaphysics, which attempts to know things beyond the conditions under which we can know things.

And you’ll notice that Kant did not stop philosophizing when he realized that speculative metaphysics was barking up the wrong tree. This is because philosophy still has a place, in examining our concepts, concepts that apply meaningfully to experience. That’s what transcendental philosophy is. The upshot is, it’s not just science.

we also fail to define the empirical, to Kant’s satisfaction — Antony Nickles

I’m really not sure where you’re getting this “to Kant’s satisfaction”, as if he has a demand and expectation that we should be able do this. The point is that we should not even try, because we can philosophize without definition, and indeed must. The point is critical—of those who carry on defining regardless.

In creating “objectivity”, Kant cordoned us off from the world “directly”, unfiltered by us, though that was his ideal. — Antony Nickles

This is a respectable interpretation of Kant, though I don’t share it. At the very least, it is not what he was trying to do. Reality for Kant is the world of experience, and we are not cordoned off from it.

I don’t really want to do more of this exegesis, but I suppose it’s fair if what you’re saying is that I was mistaken in using Kant to back up my point.

I don’t really want to do more of this exegesis, but I suppose it’s fair if what you’re saying is that I was mistaken in using Kant to back up my point. — Jamal

I also don’t want to turn this into it a digression about Kant. I was not trying to say that to you were wrong to use him to show that we need to dig into our concepts to explicate the different uses and their criteria. My only point was that Kant’s requirement overlooks that we can come to a place of deep intelligently and rationality within our ordinary concepts and examples, which only adds to your point that we can already apply our concepts, to say that we can actually “define” them, draw them out, despite Kant’s doubts (created by his desire for certainty).

Ok cool. I still disagree with your angle on Kant but otherwise (I’ve read your first post in this thread) I think we’re in agreement.

I still disagree with your angle on Kant but otherwise (I’ve read your first post in this thread) I think we’re in agreement. — Jamal

Well, it might be worth discussing the Kant if it is regarding his section on a priori definitions, though your first response does point to a wider difference in interpretation (I would say focus) on his broader approach, which I agree would be a different matter entirely.

Maybe it does not matter, but we may disagree because I would say that we can define our concepts, after investigation, and it’s just that Kant’s understanding of, and requirement for, a “definition” is wrong.

Maybe it does not matter, but we may disagree because I would say that we can define our concepts, after investigation, and it’s just that Kant’s understanding of, and requirement for, a “definition” is wrong. — Antony Nickles

Yes, I understand. But since Kant does say that in philosophy we can arrive at a good definition, even though we shouldn’t begin with one, he would appear to be not far from you on this.

Of course elsewhere he puts this "thing-in-itself" outside the reach of our knowledge, thus the lack of faith in our ordinary understandings
— Antony Nickles

In fact, in the realm of empirical reality—that which we can know—Kant is very much on the side of our ability to know, to directly perceive and to judge objectively. — Jamal

This exchange clearly shows a case where agreeing on definitions would avoid cross-talk.

By "knowledge," Antony means knowledge of a mind-independent world.

By "empirical reality," you mean a world that's bound by conditions.

You're talking past one another.

No.

Yes.

Read again. Think again.

I'm actually pretty straight on this point. Kant did not believe we have access to a world beyond our own conditions of knowledge. To the extent that this was the goal of a British Empiricist, he was agreeing with Hume that their project was doomed.

He saved empiricism by changing the meaning of it. For him, the world we observe is the world bound by a priori knowledge.

If you disagree with this, I think you've misunderstood Kant.

I meant read the exchange again. We weren’t talking past each other.

Yes, that's right, but only if a sound argument were given finding flaw in every single premise. That seems incredibly unlikely. Not so with a philosophical tradition. — Isaac

What you're not seeing is that any such argument will be based upon premises that cannot themselves be demonstrated rationally without relying on further premises, which themselves will require rational argument based on even further premises and so on, and thus it will ever remain a matter of opinion.

But that's not what this is about, anyway. What you are failing to see, or at least acknowledge, is that I am only speaking about what is appropriate argumentation in specifically exclusive contexts. So, for the last time I'll give another example to illustrate the point: say someone sets up a discussion which is intended to explore the idea of the trinity and its relationship with and relevance to Abrahamic theology in general.

If someone just wants to argue "theology is flawed from the get-go" or " the trinity is an incoherent idea", that is not going to be relevant to the discussion, which is intended to involve looking at the nature of the ideas themselves and their relations to Abrahamic theology overall, and not the question as to whether they are "flawed", whatever "flawed" might be understood to mean.

Of course, someone could initiate a discussion intended to explore the argument as to whether theology as a whole is flawed, or the idea of the trinity is coherent. If the aim is to have a fruitful discussion within some area of investigation, then it is a good strategy to outline the general aim of the discussion and the relevant definitions of the central terms that will be used, as this will avoid time-wasting and derailing of the discussion.

So, I have nowhere said or implied that I want to rule out disagreement per se, even though you seem to want to keep distorting what I've said to make it appear that I have.

By "knowledge," Antony means knowledge of a mind-independent world. — frank

You were suggesting a definition of “terms” (which is a separate category from those under discussion, though getting confused into it anyway). But we were in agreement on the terms empirical and a priori and it was just a mixup as to which one I was referring to in making the point about Kant creating an “object” and then putting it outside of knowledge’s ability to access.

You, I, Austin, Wittgenstein, and Kant are similarly sceptical about definitions in philosophy, claiming that we can use these concepts without such "mathematical certainty". — Jamal

I agree with this, that all concepts are more or less fuzzy, polysemous, historically and culturally evolved and evolving, so there cannot be one universal correct changeless definition of any concept. But it is the very polysemy of concepts that makes it advisable that someone initiating a discussion involving some concept or concepts should outline the particular interpretation of the concepts she is working with, so as to avoid the inevitable misunderstandings and distortions that will otherwise follow.