I tend to hold that such absolutes are probably how human minds are cognitively arranged in order to make sense of reality. Do they map to 'reality'; do they operate outside of a human perspective? — Tom Storm

That's a deep question. As a jolly metaphysician, I'll argue for the primordial unity of the lifeworld. We live in our symbolic sediment which is there in the world as part of its structure. Some people like to think of the image that physics presents as the bottom layer which is finally real. Some say that even this is just projection, that the bottom layer is unknowable (outside the human perspective.) But I say it's all encompassed by the lifeworld , which is just the world before we skim off the human cream as unreal.

Perhaps we can say that some beliefs seem less likely to become incorrect than others, including basic norms (which are often explications of concepts or tautologies anyway ? )

Still feel as though the point I was labouring has somewhat slipped the net here — Wayfarer

How so ?

As I see it, we start from something like:

Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images.

What is it we are trying to explain ? Our sociality, our reason, our language. 'Mental experience' and 'images' say something but very little. We have to tell a coherent, plausible story.

As far as I know, we evolved from simpler organisms, and our language also evolved. So any story has to account for the genesis as well as the structure of whatever concepts turn out to be.

I think we both very much care about how logical/rational norms are to be accounted for. A naturalist approach would see us as cooperative beings articulating a more and more complex set of mostly tacit rules. Eventually we learn to talk about these tacit rules, grasp them explicitly, amazed at what we've achieved.

You and I inherit millions of years of research and development. Our DNA and our culture are timebinding or even bound time, compacted trial-and-error.

:up:

Selves also are almost logical absolutes. The tradition of a ghost in the machine of the body, which is held responsible for telling a coherent story, seems unavoidable. A culture without selves like this would be like a culture without wheels or fire. It's a technology so basic we think it came from god. — plaque flag

That's a cool way of framing things.

Thanks!

Still feel as though the point I was labouring has somewhat slipped the net here
— Wayfarer

How so ? — plaque flag

The question I was asking, is how come esteemed philosophers, such as W V O Quine, sought to 'avoid any appeal to rational insight?' Why does the paper that this article was based on deny that there could be knowledge of mathematical objects? What is behind those denials?

The question I was asking, is how come esteemed philosophers, such as W V O Quine, sought 'avoid any appeal to rational insight?' Why does the paper that this article was based on deny that there could be knowledge of mathematical objects? What is behind those denials? — Wayfarer

Are we not verging here on folkpsychology which cuts both ways ? To me that's a distraction from the hard work. What's needed is a detailed case for rational insight (some kind of platonic organ) and not accusations of bias.

What's needed is a detailed case for rational insight (some kind of platonic organ) and not accusations of bias. — plaque flag

It's not an 'accusation of bias', I'm trying to understand the rationale behind the article, and why the faculty of reason was called into question in the first place. And, pray tell, how could one make a 'detailed case' for reason, without relying on reason to make the case?

It's not an 'accusation of bias', I'm trying to understand the rationale behind the article, and why the faculty of reason was called into question in the first place. — Wayfarer

Sorry if I came off as rude or misread you.

And, pray tell, how could one make a 'detailed case' for reason, without relying on reason to make the case? — Wayfarer

This is a strange question.

Of course we are always already embedded in rational/semantic norms. We inherit a culture in which certain inferences are treated as valid and others not. It has always been only in terms of current norms that such norms could be questioned. Neurath's boat. One part of us questions another part of us. We also make tacit norms explicit, draw out concepts. This is the hermeneutic circle. We 'know' what rationality and being are, but we aren't done knowing what they are.

Not at all.

We 'know' what rationality and being are, but we aren't done knowing what they are. — plaque flag

To put that another way, although science relies on the efficacy of scientific law, the nature of scientific law is not itself an empirical question. As soon as you wonder whether the laws we know - like Newton's laws - could be different to what they are, then you're straying into metaphysics, knowingly or not. I've noticed articles come up in my news feed by physicists calling the idea of scientific or natural laws into question (e.g. this one). They seem motivated by a similar impulse to that which prompts scepticism about mathematical knowledge.

I think, maybe, it's because reason is the faculty which explains, not something to be explained. And that this sits uneasily with naturalist philosophy.

the nature of scientific law is not itself an empirical question. — Wayfarer

:up:

As soon as you wonder whether the laws we know - like Newton's laws - could be different to what they are, then you're straying into metaphysics, knowingly or not — Wayfarer

I have to disagree here. As I have seen from interviews, some physicists freely imagine different versions of reality. Models are just videos games, and Jim Gates confirmed a similar view in his interview with Lex Fridman. So they are comfortable with the contingency of these laws. They are painters at a canvas, and they project/contemplate how this or that invented law would fit in with other commitments (and measurements of course).

reason is the faculty which explains, not something to be explained. And that this sits uneasily with naturalist philosophy. — Wayfarer

If you mean this :
In philosophy, naturalism is the idea or belief that only natural laws and forces (as opposed to supernatural ones) operate in the universe.
then maybe some of them.


How typical is such crudity among serious philosophers though? Maybe you can find it, but I hope it's rare. Reasoning about reason is much of what we do.

How typical is such crudity among serious philosophers though? — plaque flag

What is behind the requirement to 'avoid any appeal to rational insight?' Why is it that mathematical insight is said to call into question our nature as 'physical beings'? Isn't that the very point at issue?

What is behind the requirement to 'avoid any appeal to rational insight?' — Wayfarer

We need true explanatory force. 'By means of a faculty' is not really an answer. But people who know biology can connect an organ like the liver with all of the other organs.

Why is it that mathematical insight is said to call into question our nature as 'physical beings'? — Wayfarer

In my opinion, only a bad philosopher would say we were 'just' physical beings. What 'physical' means isn't terribly clear anyway, no more than 'supernatural' is exactly clear. Maybe it's the case that the stuff that we call mental is the highly patterned movement of stuff that, when it's not moving with memory and purpose, not binding time, we wouldn't call mental.

Whatever we are (which seems to largely be whatever we decide we are), we aren't like rocks or even like chimpanzees. We live in or as 'spirit' (deeply and essentially in a socially constructed and preserved symbolic layer of the lifeworld). Or something like that....We don't need platonic integers to be assured of our transcendence of every other entity we've seen.

We live in or as 'spirit' (deeply and essentially in a socially constructed and preserved symbolic layer of the lifeworld). — plaque flag

Yes, the meaning world. I quite agree. Thanks for the discussion.

Yes, the meaning world. I quite agree. Thanks for the discussion. — Wayfarer

:up:

What if it is all an illusion; what if the self is just a construct of thoughts that belong to no-one, but that insist on belonging to someone? — Ø implies everything

How about the self as a social habit, something we all perform and insist that others perform ?

That's nearer to what I'm on about. Note the convergences with (neo)advaita and the like. There's an academic, Robert M. Wallace, who has written on Hegel's philosophy of religion, see this. — Wayfarer

I missed this post the first time. Good link !

God is commonly described as a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and so forth. Hegel says this is already a mistake. If God is to be truly infinite, truly unlimited, then God cannot be ‘a being’, because ‘a being’, that is, one being (however powerful) among others, is already limited by its relations to the others. It’s limited by not being X, not being Y, and so forth. But then it’s clearly not unlimited, not infinite! To think of God as ‘a being’ is to render God finite.

But if God isn’t ‘a being’, what is God? Here Hegel makes two main points. The first is that there’s a sense in which finite things like you and me fail to be as real as we could be, because what we are depends to a large extent on our relations to other finite things. If there were something that depended only on itself to make it what it is, then that something would evidently be more fully itself than we are, and more fully real, as itself.

This is why it's hard to not understand Hegel as making all of the world God. It's the only entity without otherness, without negation, truly infinite.

... when Hegel and his predecessors in this project talk about human beings becoming more ‘themselves’ by stepping back from their current desires and projects, they aren’t focusing on a narrowly intellectual kind of functioning. Plato wrote extensively about love ( eros). His central concern in this writing was to show two things. First, that love necessarily has an intellectual dimension, a dimension of inner freedom or questioning. This is because love seeks what’s truly Good for those it loves, and therefore it has to ask the question, what is truly Good? And second, Plato wanted to show that inner freedom ultimately has to lead to love of others, for their capacity for freedom. So inner freedom and love, head and heart aren’t ultimately separable from one another.

For his part, Hegel explains that inner freedom leads to love of others – this is a part of Plato’s argument that Hegel spells out more fully than Plato did – because attempts to be free independently of others necessarily fail. They fail because by excluding others from what I’m concerned about I define myself by my relationship to them (namely, the relationship of excluding them), and thus I prevent myself from being fully self-determining: that is, from having inner freedom.

This connection between freedom and love will come as a surprise to some of the self-described admirers of freedom. But it’s easy enough to see in everyday life that people who think of themselves as having ‘enemies’ seldom manage to be very free, internally. Plato and Hegel aren’t saying that we must agree with others about everything, or endorse everything that they do. Rather, they’re saying that we need to be able to see something in others that we can identify with, so as not to be confronted by something completely alien, which will define us (always) by this relationship rather than by ourselves.

Great stuff ! Reminds me of Jung's individuation process and the integration of the shadow. Also reminds me of Siddhartha with the ferry man in Hesse's novel. Nothing human is alien to me. The highest position (which may always be only the highest so far) is maybe just a harmonious fusion of all that came before, with nothing wasted. This justifies what looks like error as determinate negation, a mistake made and marked so not to be made again. Two wrongs, if they meet perpendicularly perhaps, can make a right.

I also think of Shakespeare, who must have known all his heroes and villains and clowns in himself. But he was also the spirit in the balcony, a magic circle embracing them all, aware of being their unity along with a view from outside this ring of personalities.

Why would it be that one of the purportedly major 20th c philosophers wants to 'avoid any appeal to rational insight?' — Wayfarer

Dunno, but Quinne at least, wishes to avoid such appeal by substituting “ontic necessity”, in that if a scientific theory is grounded by abstract mathematical objects, and the theory is believed to hold, then those objects are necessary, re: indispensable.

Apparently, the escape from rational insight reflects the disregard for the origin of those abstract objects, and those a priori conditions by which they are even possible. In other words, such objects are merely given, hence the rational insight for their origin is not required, insofar as the accepted theory is concerned, it doesn’t matter.

As for the avoidance of rational insight altogether, Quine 1981, “…abandonment of the goal of a first philosophy…”, re: naturalism writ large, relegates all rational insight to the back burner, when the goal of a first philosophy is the deduction to principles by which natural science itself is possible, which seems a perfect way to shoot yourself in the foot.
————-

Still feel as though the point I was labouring has somewhat slipped the net here. — Wayfarer

I would like to think I helped put it back.

Have I ever discussed this article with you - The Indispensability Argument in Mathematics? It makes reference to a 1963 paper by Paul Benacerraf which is apparently canonical. The maths experts on this forum generally know it and judge it accordingly. But some of the statements made illustrate what I see as the basic philosophical point, to wit:

Standard readings of mathematical claims entail the existence of mathematical objects. But, our best epistemic theories seem to deny that knowledge of mathematical objects is possible.

Why is this? Because apparently our 'best epistemic theories' include the assumption that

human beings [are] physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.

Whereas,

Some philosophers, called rationalists, claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought.

The basic drift of the remainder of the article is this:

The indispensability argument in the philosophy of mathematics is an attempt to justify our mathematical beliefs about abstract objects, while avoiding any appeal to rational insight. Its most significant proponent was Willard van Orman Quine.

What am I not seeing here? Why would it be that one of the purportedly major 20th c philosophers wants to 'avoid any appeal to rational insight?' — Wayfarer

There is a 'compromise' to this problem with "rational insight" which allows for both of these positions, it's called dualism. This is the position presented by Thomas Aquinas. The immaterial soul, in its present condition, as united with a material body, in the human being, is restricted in its capacity to know the truly immaterial Forms (God and the angels) because of that union with matter, and the human being's dependence on the material body. The soul itself is not dependent on the material body, but the human being is, so it is not the immaterial soul itself which is limited in it's capacity to know immaterial Forms, but the human being is.

The human being, in its present condition, as an immaterial soul united with a material body, is limited in its capacity to truly know immaterial objects because human knowledge is dependent on the material body. So the human being's knowledge of the immaterial is always through the means of material representations. In the case of mathematical objects and other logical forms, the material representations are symbols. The need to use material representations, and therefore the material body with its sense organs, in the human mode of understanding, greatly hinders our capacity to grasp the reality of the truly immaterial. Monist materialists for example will refer to these material aspects as evidence that there is no need to assume anything immaterial, thus hindering the advancement of this knowledge which is already restricted.

For Aquinas there is a proposed condition of the soul posterior to the existence of the human being, when the soul is freed from this dependence on the material body. It is only in this condition, when the soul is freed from the human being's dependence on the material body, that the soul can truly know the immaterial Forms. You'll notice how Faith is a requirement here. If we cannot truly know the reality of the immaterial Forms when we are immaterial souls united with a material body, in the human condition, then the whole reality of such Forms within the human conceptual structure, therefore the "rational insight" which you refer to, is subject to skepticism. Materialism, (physicalism included), which is best characterized as a radical skepticism, undermines faith, and the capacity of the immaterial soul to know itself as such, consequently the capacity to know all immaterial Forms is corrupted.

Empiricism and naturalism have an innate bias against the idea of innate knowledge (irony alert!) Whereas, I believe that the a priori reflects innate structures within the mind that are operative in the exercise of reason. — Wayfarer

Yes. It seems likely that functional brain structure may establish the basic categories into which we catalog our sensory experience. But a quick Google search didn't find much corroboration. However, Steven Pinker's The Blank Slate argued against the then-prevailing cultural bias of the Nature vs Nurture and Gene vs Environment politics. He provided evidence to support the notion that much of characteristic human behavior (perhaps including reasoning facility) is built-in at birth. Even Intuition may indicate that, prior to conscious thought, we instinctively recognize the logic behind sensory inputs : categories plus experience. Maybe Idealism is related to those innate epistemological categories (what ought to be true), and Realism is more influenced by our direct personal experience of the world (e.g. poverty or wealth). Surely some scientist or philosopher has investigated the roots of a priori and a posteriori knowledge. :smile:


In epistemology, Innatism is the doctrine that the mind is born with ideas, knowledge, and beliefs. The opposing doctrine, that the mind is a tabula rasa (blank slate) at birth and all knowledge is gained from experience and the senses, is called Empiricism. ___Wiki

I suggest that we drop the ocular metaphor and talk about dancing. In other words, we perform 'universals' in the way we trade marks and noises. This 'seeing' of 'form' (this metaphorical interpretation of our situation) has its pros and cons. It's helped us trick ourselves into believing in ghosts. — plaque flag

Since humans are primarily visual creatures, our metaphors tend to emphasize imagination. But we also have some limited sense of "natural rhythm". So, maybe we "dance" to the tune that harmonizes with our innate rhythmic patterns. However, it may also be possible that we "hear" a tempo that we are predisposed to rock to. Dancing with ghost music? :joke:

If one insists that X installed such concepts in us, without being able to provide details, where X is more mysterious than we are ourselves, then this allusion to X is a sentimental antiexplanation, a hiding-from rather than an addressing-of our lack of clarity about of our nature. Or so I claim. — plaque flag

Unfortunately, the mysterious "installer", Mr. X, could be either Nature or God or some other First Cause. As noted above, "functional brain structure may establish the basic categories into which we catalog our sensory experience." {my interpretation} But, the details to support that natural explanation are scarce.

Even the notion of "Nature" as an "installer" agent is an imaginary humanoid rationalization of a trial & error process. So, it seems that the ultimate source of human conceptual ability remains a mystery*1, missing in the a priori gap of Big Bang theory, which doesn't actually begin at the beginning. Therefore, any "Installer" we might posit might be a "sentimental antiexplanation". Nevertheless, I have developed a non-empirical, and un-sentimental theory of my own : X = Enformer. :cool:


*1, How could random chance produce rational thought, and unreal Ideals?

As for the avoidance of rational insight altogether, Quine 1981, “…abandonment of the goal of a first philosophy…”, re: naturalism writ large, relegates all rational insight to the back burner, when the goal of a first philosophy is the deduction of principles by which natural science itself is possible, which seems a perfect way to shoot yourself in the foot. — Mww

That's pretty much what I thought. Glad there's someone else who sees the point.

Surely some scientist or philosopher has investigated the roots of a priori and a posteriori knowledge. :smile: — Gnomon

That would be Immanuel Kant, it was the subject of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Plato believed that we had mathematical knowledge because the soul acquired it before birth. I sometimes wonder if that is poetic analogy for the existence of faculties which had actually been acquired during the course of evolution. (I'm sure someone has thought of that.) Notice also that Noam Chomsky is a proponent of innatism via his (contested) theory of universal grammar.

There is a 'compromise' to this problem with "rational insight" which allows for both of these positions, it's called dualism. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I subscribe to a from of dualism, with the caveat that I reject any idea of a 'spiritual substance' or objectively-existing mind, or of mind and body as separate substances. Mind is the capacity to grasp meaning and is present in very rudimentary form even in the simplest organisms. In rational sentient beings it attains the capacity for reason and self-knowledge.

I suggest that we drop the ocular metaphor and talk about dancing. In other words, we perform 'universals' in the way we trade marks and noises. This 'seeing' of 'form' (this metaphorical interpretation of our situation) has its pros and cons. It's helped us trick ourselves into believing in ghosts. — plaque flag

:fire: re: Homo [confabulator]!

Platonism sometimes seem to merely assume its own conclusion. — plaque flag

:up:

'Theory of Forms' (universals) via reification + circular reason fallacies. Later 'deconstructed' as the problem of the criterion, no?

Selves also are almost logical absolutes. The tradition of a ghost in the machine of the body, which is held responsible for telling a coherent story, seems unavoidable. A culture without selves like this would be like a culture without wheels or fire. It's a technology so basic we think it came from god. — plaque flag

:clap: So on point – brilliantly succinct!

You blinded me with Science (again)! :up:

Neurath's boat. One part of us questions another part of us. We also make tacit norms explicit, draw out concepts. This is the hermeneutic circle. We 'know' what rationality and being are, but we aren't done knowing what they are. — plaque flag

:100:

How about the self as a social habit... — plaque flag

... or metacognitive bias (via neo-natal bonding + mirror neurons —> developing 'theory of mind'). :chin:

it seems that the ultimate source of human conceptual ability remains a mystery — Gnomon

As far as I can tell, the only 'mystery' (and I think @180 Proof agrees ?) is that of any postulated origin, because we can always ask but why ? Why this and not something else ?

Thank you for the kind words. It helps keep me reaching.

... or metacognitive bias (via neo-natal bonding + mirror neurons —> developing 'theory of mind'). — 180 Proof

That sounds right. I really ought to know more about the brain. I'd like to study it as a prediction machine, especially in the light of what transformers are doing. Attention is drawn to surprise, right?

:up:

:cool: