You've developed a habit of blowing hot air in this thread, and this seems to fit right into that trend. — Tzeentch

Hot air like "Russia just wanted little chunks of Ukraine"? :wink:

I've put my arguments forward for all to criticize, and I'll happily defend them.

I gave you the opportunity to do just that, and you refused, hence my comment.

I've put my arguments forward for all to criticize, and I'll happily defend them.

I gave you the opportunity to do just that, and you refused, hence my comment. — Tzeentch

Again, your question had nothing to do with my remark. If you think it did, explain how.

Yeah, hard to see how this theory is consistent with Russian messaging early in the war or the info they produced for domestic consumption. This was March 2022.





And indeed, I recall people in this thread telling me how Russia was about to close a massive caldron across all of eastern Ukraine. "Thousands of tanks" were going to cross the gap and meet up in Dinpro, just as Russian state media and military maps suggested.

But now that the course of the war has changed, that past intent has also changed. We're supposed to focus on "data," who is taking control of more of the country apparently, but Moscow has been on the wrong side of that metric for almost 12 months now despite the mobilization 7 months ago that was going to change everything.

It's pretty clear they wanted to take Kiev. A lot of people were surprised at their ineptness, including me.

So lets look at the basic facts around the Battle of Kiev as we know them.

The Battle of Kiev lasted a little over a month, with few known casualty figures, only that around 15 March, almost a month into the fighting, the Ukrainian side listed 162 soldiers killed.

What we know of the order of battle is that between 15,000 and 30,000 Russian troops participated in the battle.

Of the Ukrainian side we know some ~18,000 irregular forces participated, and a conspiciously "undisclosed" amount of Ukrainian regular forces.

Anyone with an iota of military understanding sees what picture this sketches.


- 162 killed after a month of combat implies low intensity fighting, entirely uncharacteristic of a classic blitz for the capital.
- 15,000 - 30,000 seems like a very low number to occupy and hold a city the size of Kiev - a city with 2.8 million inhabitants.
- With a classic blitz one would expect the attacker to aim for a 5:1 or at least 3:1 force ratio in order to ensure offensive success. The Russians weren't anywhere close to that.


In fact, they may have been outnumbered:

In one of his interviews, Seymour Hersh quotes a source saying Kiev was defended by some ~60,000 Ukrainian troops (unclear whether that included irregulars or not).

That would certainly explain why the Ukrainian order of battle remains undisclosed, wouldn't it?

Hence, the diversion theory.


So , I don't see where you get the idea that "it's pretty clear" that the Russians wanted to take Kiev, when the available data certainly doesn't point to it.

:up: It's all becoming clear now. Thanks for explaining that.

In general, it's not a good sign if you've geared up for a big offensive and your soldiers begin driving into obvious mine emplacements, sometimes dismounting first. Seems like it might be a morale/training issue: https://files.catbox.moe/iqhmcd.webm

Makes me seriously question if this was ever really a joke:





Yeah, never mind the geotagged evidence of losses on both sides makes such a figure completely ridiculous. By this logic, Russia began shelling residential blocks in the suburbs and pounding Kiev proper with missiles "just to make their diversion more realistic."

Sure looks like a low intensity conflict.

By this logic, Russia began shelling residential blocks in the suburbs and pounding Kiev proper with missiles "just to make their diversion more realistic." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yea, sounds like a textbook military diversion if you ask me.

A bit odd that you seem to be implying there's something off about the logic there. That's exactly how it would work.

Weren't they trying to liberate their Ukrainian brothers and sisters from the Nazi regime? Generally you don't liberate people by getting frustrated that the progress of your diversionary probe has failed and then leveling apartment blocks. Likewise, the massacres in Bucha came amidst intercepted calls to "take the gloves off," after Russian forces were routed in Holstomel.

It's also unclear why a diversionary force would have men riding up with parade uniforms or have police in riot gear attached to it. Such gear is incomprehensible for a military use case, but makes perfect sense if the goal was to topple the government and then hold a parade in Kiev.

The Kyiv Axis utilized 70,000 soldiers and 7,000 vehicles. The 30,000 figure from the "Battle of Kyiv" Wikipedia entry is for the Kyiv Convoy, which tried to invest the city, but you had additional supporting efforts in the Kyiv region aside from that. If one axis out of six has one third of your entire invasion force, it's unlikely to be a diversion.

And was Kharkiv just a longer diversion? The rout and turning over of hundreds of tanks to Ukraine another gesture of good will? Sumny another feint? And I suppose the Kherson retreat was just the latest feint?

It's all a very complicated diversion. They're playing to the spy satellites. No one knows what they're really trying to accomplish.

The Kyiv Axis utilized 70,000 soldiers and 7,000 vehicles. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That figure is nowhere to be found in, for example, the ISW day-by-day campaign assessments.

Those instead speak of 31 BTGs (which would roughly amount to between 19,000 and 25,000 troops) being committed along the operational direction of Kiev.

Do note that I'm less interested in their assessments, and more interested in the information they are sharing.

If one axis out of six has one third of your entire invasion force, it's unlikely to be a diversion. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Given the relatively small size of the Russian invasion force (outnumbered from the start), it's unlikely occupying and holding Kiev was ever their goal.

If Hersh's figure of ~60,000 Ukrainian defenders was accurate it would have taken the entire Russian invading force and likely a months-long battle to take the city.

And was Kharkiv just a longer diversion? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Kharkiv showed much the same pattern as Kiev, with few casualties over a two-month period, not indicative of intense fighting. The order of battle here too implies no sufficient numerical advantage for the Russian side, thus unlikely a committed assault to occupy and hold.

We may well be witnessing the early stages where the economies of India, China and Russia coalesce into a single economic bloc. Such an alliance, undeniably offers advantages that are irresistibly compelling. — yebiga

You mean in terms of markets/competition? Something else? Feel free to explicate.

Political freedom in Russia
^{— European Council on Foreign Relations · 2016}
Freedom in the World 2018
^{— Freedom House · 2018}
Why Putin Is Not Okay
^{— Tyler Roylance · Freedom House · Jul 11, 2018}
The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule
^{— Sarah Repucci, Amy Slipowitz · Freedom House · 2022}
Putin’s Abuse of History: Ukrainian ‘Nazis’, ‘Genocide’, and a Fake Threat Scenario
^{— Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, Bastiaan Willems · Journal of Slavic Military Studies · Jul 6, 2022}
Rising Hostility to Democracy Support: Can It Be Countered?
^{— Nicolas Bouchet, Ken Godfrey, Richard Youngs · Carnegie · Sep 1, 2022}
“Ukraine commits genocide on Russians”: the term “genocide” in Russian propaganda
^{— Egbert Fortuin · Russian Linguistics · Sep 7, 2022}

↑ not something that "undeniably offers advantages that are irresistibly compelling"

Whilst, over in Washington and throughout the advanced western world we struggle with systemic racism, equity, inclusion, gender dysphoria and argue over how the climate is changing. — yebiga

FYI: Climate Change (General Discussion)

Rising authoritarianism and worsening climate change share a fossil-fueled secret
^{— Eve Darian-Smith · The Conversation · Apr 27, 2022}

@Tzeentch, how does it compare to the 2014 Crimea grab?

EDIT

Grabbing Crimea in 2014 apparently came as a surprise.

Invasion wasn't entirely a surprise: Operation Orbital in 2015, Multinational Joint Commission in 2015.

Except, later...

Zelensky asks for proof of invasion of Ukraine allegedly planned for February 16
^{— TASS · Feb 12, 2022}
Washington’s warnings that Russia is about to invade frustrate Ukrainians
^{— Matt Bradley, Veronika Melkozerova · NBC News · Feb 15, 2022}
EU 'did not believe' US warnings of Russian war
^{— John Silk · Deutsche Welle · Oct 11, 2022}

Much rhetoric/propaganda coming out of the Kremlin isn't about south east Ukraine in particular, but the lot.

Maybe they "hoped for Kyiv" (similar to Crimea?) and expected "shooting as usual" in the east? There were some weird activities north of Kyiv across the border.

Grabbing Kyiv would have been a victory for Putin.

As I stated, occupying and holding Kiev against a defending force would be an extremely costly operation in terms of both manpower and time. To me it seems completely infeasible and I think it is unlikely that was their goal.

My view is that by threatening Kiev they hoped to bring the West / Ukraine to negotiate about Ukraine's position. Given the geopolitical situation between the US and China, it's not surprising they thought the West would be open to this as opposed to prolonged war.

Negotations did take place in the early stages of the war, and purportedly a peace plan was close to being signed when the US blocked the negotiations.

If negotations failed, the operations in the north would double as a diversion for operations in the south, which is where the Russians' primary territorial goals would lie in case a diplomatic solution was impossible.

This is a false binary. I said that Russia cannot just waltz to the Moldovan border through hundreds of square miles of defenses and through major urban centers when they have failed to make any significant gains since last summer. Moreover, that Russia attacking NATO and opening up a second war through Belarus is preposterous. — Count Timothy von Icarus

None of these positions I was arguing.

However, it's not a false binary that one definition of a "better" army is winning on the battle field.

If you say it's going to happen, certainly you can argue that. However, actual arguments are needed to lend merit to such a position.

For example, The Nazi's and Japanese in 1944 still held more territory than they started out with, but were rapidly losing territory, suffering under strategic bombing and, most critically, fighting against larger armies and navies and airforces with larger populations and industrial capacity that would win any attritional warfare. There was lot's of factors that could be pointed to in 1944 to support the argument the Nazi's and the Japanese were on the pathway to defeat with little they could do about it (especially after D-Day).

Had the Nazis had a much larger industrial output, larger population, better access to oil, more soldiers, better control of the skies and oceans, then obviously the end result of defeat, even after D-day and fighting on two fronts, wouldn't have been all that clear if the Nazi's were in a position to win a war of attrition if the lines stabilised in the East and West.

This is the key point, if the potential for manoeuvre warfare is exhausted in this conflict in Ukraine (lines are simply too well built up and enough men mobilised to defend) then it's an attritional war which favours the Russians. Really strong arguments would be required to argue somehow Ukraine has an advantage and can "win" (whatever definition of winning you want to use that requires Ukraine winning battles and taking territory).

But all you seem to do is note deficiencies of and damage to the Russian military, which even if it's all 100% true and not a smidgeon of fabrication (which almost all the evidence we are talking about can be fabricated entirely or then misrepresented, such as dressing up a Ukrainian loss as a Russian loss, or implying a few ambushes or lost skirmishes are representative of the whole war), doesn't lead to any conclusions, if things are worse for the Ukrainian army.

However, as I mentioned, it's obviously in theory possible Ukraine has some hidden well trained and well equipped and supplied army assembled in secret by NATO which is about to enter the theatre and cut through Russian lines with ease using their NATO tanks protected by a vast fleet or NATO AA batteries and f-16s, that turn out to be far superior to any Russian defence. However, by definition such a hidden force we don't know about, so we can note that it's in the realm of possibility but there's currently no reason to believe it exists.

This is ridiculous. We can deduce "nothing," from the fact that Russia started the invasion with much more modern tank models and is now relying on early Cold War era equipment? We can obviously deduce that they don't have additional modern or even late Cold War Era tanks to use since they obviously preferred to use more recent equipment. — Count Timothy von Icarus

For example, yes, we can deduce nothing from the appearance of T-55's.

If they are just used as essentially stationary guns on fixed defensive positions, well why not use them? It's just common sense that a tank, even an older tank, can still fire at stuff and armour can still stop most munitions and shrapnel. If you place the tank behind further fortifications it can be just as well defended as any modern tank; of course, it cannot manoeuvre but if that's not what you're using it for then that doesn't matter.

Of course, it becomes a target for artillery, but it could take significant amounts of artillery to destroy a tank in a fortified bunker ... time that is both valuable and exposes their artillery to counter battery fire.

It doesn't matter how old these weapons are, you still have to deal with them, and pretty much anything that fires projectiles more modern than a musket can be of some potential use on hundreds of kilometres of defensive lines, hence Ukrainian's using Maxim machine guns.

Where modern and updated weapons are critical is in manoeuvre and precision, but that's not the kind of warfare that's happening right now. T-55 can still send rounds down range, can still hit buildings, can still blowup APC's, suppress infantry, engage older tanks, and can still critically damage even the most modern tanks.

And again, the Ukrainians are using WWI machine guns and WWII artillery and likewise any tank they have or can get, I believe a bunch of T-55s as well, so by your logic Ukraine is losing.

In a huge battle space such as Ukraine there is literally no reason to not position some functioning weapon somewhere if you have it.

Since you're so focused on these T-55s, here is literally the first video that came up in searching T-55's in Ukraine ... which describes how Ukraine is using T-55's.



A video which comes to the exact same conclusion as I presented above, that such older tanks cannot destroy modern tanks, but can still destroy other armoured vehicles and support infantry.

For some levity, check out the accents on this "intercepted radio call" by American mercenaries in Ukraine. Seems the Bradley's are all being destroyed and the Americans hate the Ukrainians. Can anyone place this US accent?

Smolensk, NY? Moscow, Kentucky? St. Petersburg, Florida? Maybe the accent of very far east Alaska, the trans-Bering Straight Region?

https://files.catbox.moe/ky2gnv.mp4



I'm not what the relevance here is supposed to be. Obviously the T-55s have a use. My point was that Russia was out of more modern tanks and that this is going to hamper their ability to make forward progress.

I am not sure how Russia failing to take meaningful amounts of territory for almost 12 months, despite carrying out large scale offensive operations, while also losing control of meaningful amounts of territory, is not evidence that they can't take more territory.

You have to either claim that:
A. Russia hasn't wanted to take any territory in these offensives and planned on losing territory it officially annexed or:
B. For some reason Russia is going to significantly improve its offensive capabilities in the near future.

Otherwise, I don't know how my assertion that Russia can't push to the Moldovan border isn't warranted. They tried that, were defeated, retreated from the area, and have now spent months failing to achieve much more modest goals.

But I am sure this will be followed by "but how can we possibly know! Any video of Russians being killed might be some CGI false flag, or videos Ukrainians posted of their own losses! Never mind that some types of equipment are only used by one side, uniforms, markings, etc. We just can't possibly know anything at all. Russian milbloggers might also have been mislead about the faliure of the offensives, even the ones who were at the front. Actually, Russia hasn't been failing to make progress for almost a year, the reality is that they have worn away the UAF and any second now they will begin making dramatic gains. A year of failures can't tell us anything, the lightning offensive is two weeks away."

Old tanks can destroy modern tanks if they have a modern ATGM. Actually, in a night engagement the edge might go to something like a T-55S with modern thermals over something like a base T-72 because it can identify the target first and larger ATGMs have good range, although you're still better off on a modern IFV that can do the same thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, you can fire a modern ATGM from an older tank, or any vehicle, but the point of my analysis was to demonstrate these tanks are useful without any upgrades at all. Any upgrades can make them significantly more "survivable" as you just point about the:

the very survivable Merkava, — Count Timothy von Icarus

And so if these T-55 can be upgraded to "very survivable" it is just further advantage for Russia in having thousands of them.

However, my argument does not depend on any upgrades at all and so whatever upgrades the Russians add to these tanks just makes them even more useful.

What makes an old tank a death trap is when it doesn't have any of these upgrades. Then you're manually aiming, without thermals or any warning systems for laser designators, radar, etc. while opposing infantry has a host of guided weapons that can destroy your vehicle.

Any tanks, even a fully upgraded M1, the very survivable Merkava, the new Type 10, etc. is unlikely to survive a direct hit from a 152-155mm shell. Digging in just helps with indirect hits. — Count Timothy von Icarus

First, we don't exactly know what upgrades Russia is putting on these tanks.

Second, digging in also protects against direct fire. You can literally just build a bunker around your tank protecting also against direct fire.

On the cheap, tanks can be deployed in a defensive fixed position by just digging a ramp and so the tank can peak over the ramp and fire and then hide again. If these positions are on elevated terrain, makes it even harder to assault.

Tanks in fixed positions are vulnerable to both air power and artillery ... but if Ukraine has no advantage in either area then adding T-55's all over the front line makes it harder, not easier, to assault Russian lines.

Even if it was true that "digging in just helps with indirect hits" (which obviously is not true) if Ukraine's only recourse is direct fire with its own tanks, to take out T-62s or T-55s, they need to get relatively close and will be vulnerable to being destroyed, if not by return fire from these tanks, then everything else the Russians have that can destroy tanks.

Think it through, if you imagine an entrenched infantry position with machine guns, and missiles of various kinds, and mortars and supported by artillery in the rear, maybe some mine fields in front ... and then you add tanks, even older tanks, it makes it harder, not easier, to assault this position.

Think of these older tanks as armoured field guns.

Maybe the accent of very far east Alaska, the trans-Bering Straight Region? — Count Timothy von Icarus

:razz:

I am not sure how Russia failing to take meaningful amounts of territory for almost 12 months, despite carrying out large scale offensive operations, while also losing control of meaningful amounts of territory, is not evidence that they can't take more territory. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The theory is pretty straightforward.

1. Russia invades, threatening Kyiv to force negotiations, while occupying the most strategically relevant areas in the south (land bridge to Crimea).

2. Negotiations fail, so Russia switches gear for prolonged war. The Russian army was overstretched and pulled back its lines to something more stable. This was mistakenly perceived (or deceptively marketed?) as a "Ukrainian offensive", which it clearly wasn't.

3. With the prospect of prolonged war and having to take parts of Ukraine by force, Russia's primary concern becomes the prevention of an insurgency. This means it will seek to pacify areas it occupies before conquering more territory - the 'bite-sized chunks' approach. This could take months, or even years.

4. Meanwhile local tactical battles are fought, with the primary goal of degrading the Ukrainian fighting capabilities.

Some other points:
- Neither Ukraine nor Russia has carried out large-scale offensives since the start of the invasion.
- It's debatable whether the territory lost by Russia was meaningful. Some argument has to be put forward as to why these areas would be strategically relevant. The fact that the Russians gave up most of that territory without a fight implies the opposite. Movement patterns of the Russian forces across the areas of northern Ukraine also do not imply the intent to hold for prolonged periods of time. You can still view these patterns on sites like https://liveuamap.com.

you tried to back him up with more handwaving. One can't fairly accuse others of "vacuous handwaving" while indulging on his own vacuous handwaving. That was the whole point of the two previous posts and I clearly stated so. — neomac


Yes. And I'm clearly stating that your claim of 'handwaiving' is not a "sharply formed, evidence-accompanied type of claim" and so fails your own requirements. You simply declared it to be so. You require of others what you fail to supply yourself. — Isaac

You dishonestly chopped out “from somebody accusing me of handwaving” again. I wasn’t the one who started accusing others of “vacuously handwaving”. Baden accused me of “vacuously handwaving” in the first place. And you backed him up. So I retorted: it’s on you both to give the example first, then you may challenge opponents to reciprocate. But you didn’t, so there is nothing on me to reciprocate.

Suggesting a vague relation between what I’m asking now and what you reported in the past, doesn’t prove that you already offered evidences to answer my question. — neomac

No. You actually taking the bare minimum of effort to look back (or even remember) what has been offered already is what would prove that. The evidence has been given. I'm not going to re-supply it every time it's asked for because the asking is itself just a rhetorical trick to make your opponent's positions sound un-evidenced. If you genuinely have just forgotten or didn't noticed you would be making a polite request for a repeat. You're not. — Isaac

Sir, would you kindly provide pertinent evidence which I was asking here: “Do you mean that since the end of WW2 until today at least more than 50% of the non-Western World misery (=poverty and sickness?) and death was the direct and exclusive consequence of ‘the western world under US leadership’’s policies? All right. Quote your preferred expert’s report concluding as much. Or prove it yourself”?

I claimed “I abundantly argued” and that’s a fact. I didn’t claim you agreed or you found my arguments persuasive or that the magical expected effect was changing your mind. — neomac

Then why "apart from the fact…”? If 'the fact' consists of nothing but your having written what you consider to be an argument, then my response doesn't stand "apart from" that fact, it stands alongside it. I've not disputed the mere fact that you've written copious words. I've, in fact commented several times on the inordinate length of your posts. — Isaac

Because I was accused of “vacuous handwaving” by Baden but I offered arguments that he or whoever else is interested can address. There is nothing in the accusations of “copious words” or “inordinate length of your posts” that contradicts the fact that I provided arguments. And if my arguments are vacuous handwaving I want to see who isn’t handwaving here when talking about geopolitics and morality.

A part from the fact that you were talking about calculations not me and that your defence of Baden’s accusations of “handwaving” against me is handwaving in all sorts of directions, but the point is that there is no way to get rid of the speculative and approximative dimension of geopolitical and moral considerations. That’s why a pretentious accusation of “vacuous handwaving” (or “give me the metrics“ or “no shred of evidence”) which you tried so clumsily to defend, is doomed to be self-defeating. — neomac


Bollocks. It's an absurd argument to say that if one cannot provide the actual mathematical calculations we are therefore in some hyper-relativistic world of speculation and hand-waiving. A bomb is more destructive than a stick. I don't need to do the maths, but nor is it mere speculation. — Isaac

You lost track of what I was talking about. When I asked “What is “taking into account” “those victims’ lives” supposed to mean?”. You answered: Including them in the calculation about what course of action we ought morally support. I abundantly and repeatedly argued against an “accounting model“ (not only against you), and I didn’t receive any compelling counter-argument, mostly just cheap dismissals like “inordinate length”, “copious words“. As I summarised previously: “there is no way to get rid of the speculative and approximative dimension of geopolitical and moral considerations”, that’s why cheap accusations of “vacuous handwaving” can be as cheaply retorted. In other words, “taking into account” “those victims’ lives” can be done, and it’s done, even without giving an exact and reliable estimate of the moral/geopolitical costs of certain policies (e.g. in the military context, how can one exactly estimate “morale” and “morale difference” in opposing armies when the war is ongoing? But morale is relevant in the conflict as much as affected by losses, among other factors). And if that’s true for experts, it is even more so for avg dudes.

In this thread, we have abundantly seen how problematic is to talk about “demonstrable effect” depending on the nature of the facts (e.g. an accounting of the victims of an ongoing war), the reliability of the source of information (e.g. if it’s mainstream or not mainstream, if it comes from Russia or Western sources of information etc.), the time range in which one wants to see the effects (the chain of effects is in principle endless which can cumulate and clash in unpredictable ways), the relevance of such effects (there might be all sorts of effects not all equally relevant for all interested parties, e.g. not all Ukrainians and Russians think that nationalities are just flags), the explanatory power presupposed by “effects” and “policies” (depending on the estimated counterfactuals, and implied responsibilities), and so on. — neomac


I don't know why you keep thinking this is a remotely interesting line of argument. Yes, different ways of working things out yield different answers. The same is true of your arguments (despite your pretence to some AI-like hyper-rationalism). So what? That just means that the matter is underdetermined - which is the argument I've been making all along. we choose which argument to believe. — Isaac

Because as long as human beings do not work out their moral/political differences and can’t tolerate each other, nor can avoid each other, then they will likely fight each other, as it happens in Ukraine.
The fact that human beings fail to work out differences is not necessarily a failure in rationality: i.e. opponents can overall be both rational, or both irrational, or one rational and the other irrational. 2 chess players can rationally move in compliance with basic rules and with sensible strategies, yet have opposing endgames. In a war between Russia and the West, it’s a rational move for Russia to run anti-West propaganda the most effectively they can, and for the West to run anti-Russia propaganda the most effectively they can. If it is rational for Russia to react to Western provocations, it is rational for the West to constrain potential competitors. If it is rational for Russia to threat nuclear escalation, it is rational for the West to not show panic. And the examination can go on, toward more general assumptions (e.g. the rationality of wars) or toward more specific assumptions (e.g. the rationality of supporting Ukraine the way the US did so far).
Concerning claims such as “the matter is undertermined“ and “we choose which argument to believe”, what is the argument? How do these claims support Baden’s accusation of “vacuously handwaving” against me? And if one chooses to believe in arguments, then why is there any need for arguments at all? One can choose to believe any claim without arguments.
If we are rational we can’t choose to believe fallacious arguments or arguments grounded on premises we find implausible. As long as there are reliable and shared epistemic rules to establish what premises are plausible and what arguments are fallacious we can converge in our assessments about statements and arguments. And if one fails them then this would be an unintentional rational failure, not a choice. If two arguments reach opposite conclusions from equally plausible premises, then one suspends judgement, not choose which argument is right.
“Choosing to believe an argument” happens when we do not engage in rational examination of our certain arguments on their own merits either because we can’t as when we trust experts or because we do not want to as when we indulge in wishful thinking.

“Diplomacy” requires leverage namely exploiting or exploitable dependencies over often unfairly distributed scarce resources (related to market opportunities, commodities at a cheaper price, or economic retaliation, military deterrence/escalation, territorial concessions, etc.) — neomac


Not at all. It can appeal to humanity, to popular opinion. It can appeal to public image, future stakes, the willingness to avoid mutual destruction. there's all sorts of levers for diplomacy that are not traditional forms of power. — Isaac

First of all, the examples I offered weren’t meant to be an exhaustive list (that’s why I put “etc.”), and the examples you suggested are nothing worth the qualification of “not traditional”. Most certainly, I didn’t mean to exclude “public image” among the leverages of power struggles, I argued about reputational costs in the international arena on several occasions. But the main argument is still the same: also good reputation needs to be capitalised by elites if it serves to win power struggles (that’s particularly evident when ideologies are involved like when we talk about the Roman Empire converting to Christianity or the end of slavery in American Civil War or Putin allying with the Orthodox Church). And the fight between Western democracies and authoritarian anti-West regimes is matter of reputation as well.
Second, “appeal to humanity, to popular opinion”, “public image” fall in the domain of propaganda for public consumption with related risks of hypocrisy or exploitation (like any “panem et circenses” of the past). Power struggles can boost propaganda wars as in this war where Russia (along with China) is expressly challenging the Western world order, the Western notion of human rights, sovereignty, international laws, US leadership. So those kinds of appeals may work for diplomatic compromises as much as to nurture propaganda wars (like when the Russians accuse the West of using Ukrainians as “cannon fodder”). And precisely because propaganda wars as much as economic and military wars can be threatened that they can be the content of a diplomatic pressure, as prospected by Western analysts when talking about military defeating Russia, but offering Putin something he could claim as a “victory” for his internal propaganda.
Third, most importantly, “appeal to humanity, to popular opinion”, “public image” do not necessarily offset imbalance on other leverages of power. That’s the diplomatic lesson given by Thucydides’ Melian dialogue: the power with greatest economic/coercive resources will impose its will over the much smaller power and the diplomatic argument would simply be like “if you want to survive, surrender to our dominance” from the former to the latter. For the same reason, also the allusion of “willingness to avoid mutual destruction” presupposes power to destruct each other e.g. in the form of nuclear arsenals. BTW the US, while leading “the most destructive force on Earth since WWII”, was running the risk of a mutual destruction situation and it didn’t screw up. It even promoted denuclearisation. So maybe the US too is not doomed to screw up after all.

“Sustainable development” and “fair trade“ presuppose public infrastructures, compliance to contracts, a financing flow efficiently allocated to say the least which all require a massive concentration of economic and coercive power. — neomac


No they don't. Things can be fairly traded on trust. and there's absolutely no requirement for "massive coercive power" to simply grow sustainably. what's more, the largest and most powerful force is, as history has repeated shown us, the populace. People strive for their well-being and will strive against authorities which seek to suppress it. It's people who represent the greatest coercive force. Mobilising those people is what drives progress. — Isaac

Maybe “the populace” drives progress and holds the greatest coercive power, but I still see elites in power practically everywhere, since states have been formed. And whenever the populace revolted, even when if that contributed to regime change, they just put new elites in power, sometimes as bad if not worse than the elites they revolted against.
Can you kindly provide examples of goods “fairly traded on trust” between countries, sir?

“International law” and “human rights courts” presuppose the monopoly of a coercive power (the opposite of disarmement) to be enforced or powerful economic leverage (whose effectiveness depends on how unfairly economic resources are distributed) — neomac


again, it does no such thing. Human rights laws were instigated against the will of those in power by force of will from those subject to that power. they are a restraint on power that was opposed at every step. People in power are (or should be) afraid of those over whom they have power. Governments are afraid of revolution. Company boards are afraid of strikes. Leaders are afraid of non-compliance. The moment they're not we get no progress at all. Human Rights are the result of that fear, not the exercise of their power. — Isaac

A part from the fact that fear of social unrest is what turns many political elites to be authoritarian and suppress “human rights”. Indeed what would be the point of being authoritarian if the populace is spontaneously submissive?
Anyways I didn’t talk about the genesis of “human rights laws”, I talked about their enforcement. And to enforce laws one needs the monopoly of coercive power (if not in theory, in practice). But the tragedy in “international law” (differently from national laws) is that there is no superior coercive power, so states have to ensure the means of their own security. You must know all that because you champion Mearsheimer’s offensive realism.

“Democratic reforms” can happen only if there is democracy (and assumed we share the notion of “democracy”), so how can democratic reforms happen when one has to deal with non-democratic regimes in building institutions like “International law” and “human rights courts” that should support and protect democratic institutions? — neomac


People. It was the people who brought down the Ceaușescu regime, not armies or international law. Workers. — Isaac

So now we do not need international laws anymore nor armies (yet Ceaușescu’s communist regime precipitated when his army turned against him, so I’m not sure it’s a good example), workers are enough (should we assume that the Romanian workers very happy after the fall of Ceaușescu, democracy and wealth spreading all around, no more corrupted elites, human rights raining everywhere?). Where are the workers revolting against Putin, Xi Jin Ping, Kim Jong-un, Ebrahim Raissi? What are they waiting for?
Besides, are you suggesting Western workers or populace should make a revolution against Western governments? Start a civil war against “the most destructive force on Earth since WWII”? If not, why not? After all given the following superlatives and bold expressions of anonymous outrage, populace and workers of the globe should mass revolt against the US all at once yesterday, shouldn't they? What was slavery in the US, absolute monarchy in France, Russia, China or Iran compared to what the US is doing to the entire earth at an unimaginable scale?!
“The western world under US leadership has been the most destructive force on Earth since WWII by an incredibly large margin, having positively ruined dozens of countries.”
“the one that causes most death and misery”
“We are literally in a 6th mass extinction event heading towards civilisational collapse that is entirely due to US policy and acquiescence of their fellow Western acolytes, not to mention pollution of various other forms as well as neo-colonialism and US imperialism”
“the dominant power since WWII setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US, and the consequence has been destruction on a hitherto unimaginable scale.”
“Our system is no better than the Russian system and arguably far worse (if only due to scale). Russian imperialism is a pretty banal reflection of our own imperialism, far from being in some different and worse category, and is far less destructive for the reasons Isaac has outlined in some detail (mainly as it's regional and not global)”

“Dis-coupling of politics from industrial influence (share holdings and lobbying)” like in China, Russia, North Korea, Iran you mean? Like in the Roman, Mongol, Islamic, Carolingian Empire you mean? Like in some Taliban village or in some aboriginal tribe in the Amazon forest? — neomac


The latter. If something's not having been done in recent history is your only argument against it being possible then I can see why our politics are at such odds. Had homosexuals ever been allowed to marry in law before this millennia? Good job you weren't involved in that campaign. Had slavery ever been outlawed before the eighteenth century? Did women previously have the vote and merely had it returned to them in 1928?

The idea that if a thing doesn't have precedent it can't happen is utterly absurd. — Isaac

Where on earth did I write that “a thing doesn't have precedent it can't happen”? You persistently lose track of what I’m arguing, or don’t understand it and make random objections. What I argued is that concentration of power leverages (economic, coercive, ideological, etc.) is a common trait of political entities we live in, namely states, and such concentration of power is required to enforce rules over wide enough territories and population. This is true from the earliest historical formation of states, it’s constitutive of them, that’s why there is no precedent. Acknowledging that there are no precedents, it’s relevant to investigate the reasons behind such phenomenon. The examples you are bringing up do not question my assumption, they confirm it in the most evident way: there was no homosexual, women, slavery revolutions led by the oppressed ones for their emancipation (“revolution” as in “French revolution”, “Russian revolution”, “Chinese revolution“, “Iranian revolution”) in any major state constituting the Western world. But there were homosexuals, women, blacks which allied with some pre-existing elite political power in a battle against other political competitors. It is claimed by some that none of such social changes ended exploitation and discrimination for blacks, women, workers. Exploitation and discrimination just evolved in new forms, to some, more tolerable, to others, still intolerable, or widened into something catastrophic if not apocalyptic (e.g. “the western world under US leadership has been the most destructive force on Earth since WWII”, “the dominant power since WWII setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US, and the consequence has been destruction on a hitherto unimaginable scale”, “Our system is no better than the Russian system and arguably far worse (if only due to scale)”). The point is that if one day there will be a decoupling of “industries” and “politics” the concentration of leverages of power will come in some other form (which doesn’t mean you or the populace or the workers will like it better). An example is the emergence of powerful elites leading the technological revolution of information which are competing with elites dominating more traditional technologies. As I already argued, competing moral or ideological movements require power to win over competitors (practical rationality demands it), so typically either they harvest economic/coercive power within them (which often leads to the emergence of a new powerful elites) or they rely and ally with on pre-existing power to succeed.
The end of the American hegemony in favour of authoritarian regimes won’t change that, I don’t even see how this could be a first step in that direction. The void of American hegemony will more likely boost the economic/military/ideological competition between European countries (the premises are already there, see the divergence between the UK and the EU, Eastern European countries and Western European Countries wrt the war in Ukraine, the rivalries between north Europe and South Europe about the immigrants) which can’t rely on the Western-lead international order, and between global powers (including the US) which will bring their competition in the heart of Europe more than ever. And will more likely encourage authoritarianism even in Europe, to control following social unrest (the right-wing turn in many European countries may favour this trend).

to ensure policies over time one advocates one needs to rely on massive, stable and unequal concentration of power in the hands of few with all related risks in terms of lack of transparency, lack of accountability, exploitation or abuses — neomac

No one doesn't. Progress has been a matter of resisting that power with an equal and opposite power afforded to the masses. — Isaac

It’s a very romantic and populist view of progress. It overlooks the role of the masses in social regress (how many revolutions - including the communist ones, which didn’t happen in capitalist societies contrary to Marxist predictions - ended up in bloody dictatorships, because populace and workers can turn out to be shitty human beings as those who exploit them), the role of pre-existing elites which promoted social progress to win over political competition, the role of technological inventions (which didn’t come from the populace or the workers) in altering power relations favouring social progress.

That’s what I asked you because that is what Tzeench claimed “the western world under US leadership has been the most destructive force on Earth since WWII” and that is how you interpreted it: “The one that causes most death and misery”. — neomac


@Tzeentch's claim here is pretty easy to support.

We are literally in a 6th mass extinction event heading towards civilisational collapse that is entirely due to US policy and acquiescence of their fellow Western acolytes, not to mention pollution of various other forms as well as neo-colonialism and US imperialism (however "soft" you want to call it -- being smothered by a pillow can have the exact same end result as being stabbed in the chest).

Now, if you want to argue that the Soviet Union, China and India weren't and aren't any better and would have done equally bad or worse things (and did and do their best to help destroy the planet as second and third fiddles) had they been the dominant super power and setting the terms of world trade, I'd have no problem agreeing to that.

But the reality is that the dominant power since WWII setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US, and the consequence has been destruction on a hitherto unimaginable scale.

Unsustainability literally equates to destruction, that's what it means: destroying the ecosystems we require for survival, not to mention a host of other species.

And global unsustainability has been a Western choice, championed by the US and supported by their vassals. The policies for sustainability are pretty easy and known since the 60s (public transport, renewable energy, less meat eating, sustainable fishing, strict care what chemicals are allowed in the environment and how much, and farming in ways compatible with biodiversity and soil protection) and since the 60s the policies critical to sustainability could have been easily implemented to create a smooth transition.

The War on Terror, and now this conflict with Russia and China, are sideshows to the main event. — boethius

“Setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US” may have significantly contributed to many events: triplication of the World population, peace/ greater wellbeing/cultural emancipation in Europe, technological progress, rise of competing powers (like China and Russia), not just destruction of “the ecosystems we require for survival” or its destruction on a “unimaginable scale” (whatever that means). But even acknowledging the latter won’t be much of a help in conceiving a realistic strategy to fix the world. The point is still the same: enforcing policies on a global scale effectively and stably is possible only if there is enough economic/coercive power (which I doubt the US/the West still have, if they ever had it). But such power doesn’t come for free (i.e. not all humanity will benefit from it, no possible cynical abuses or nasty unintentional consequences can be systematically prevented) nor without consensus (e.g. by being the perceived as the lesser evil wrt realistic alternatives). The point is that no long term goal policies (whatever they are) can be ensured if there isn’t enough economic/coercive power to support it, so no economic/coercive power will be likely spent by political elites to pursue such policies if that is perceived as just loss of power for themselves and/or for serving their base. Conclusion: until humanity can’t self-govern by itself (how?) and will rely on politicians to do what they are incapable or unwilling to spontaneously do by themselves, then the politicians will reason in terms of power to govern people for the good or the bad (including an unimaginable scale of human or environmental damage) with the populace’s or workers’ consensus as long as this is perceived to be the lesser evil.

Which, as I've mentioned before, is the counter argument to your actual position:

Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. Outrageous right?! — neomac


The West has no moral high ground. I wish it did, but it doesn't and so there is no justification to "inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power" because there is no moral superiority. Our system is no better than the Russian system and arguably far worse (if only due to scale). Russian imperialism is a pretty banal reflection of our own imperialism, far from being in some different and worse category, and is far less destructive for the reasons Isaac has outlined in some detail (mainly as it's regional and not global).

The West is not a responsible steward of global affairs and so there is simply not much moral differentiation that justifies sacrificing so many Ukrainians for the US policy of inflicting enduring damage on Russia, as you eloquently put it, which is debatable if that's even happening. — boethius

First, power struggles do not need moral justification to make sense. And most certainly they do not need to be grounded on your understanding of “moral justification” (which I find questionable for reasons I argued a while ago). Power struggles can simply raise from security concerns that transcend specific ideologies. And the intervention of the West in Ukraine is meant to frustrate threats from powerful anti-West competitors, independently from the question of who are the good guys or the bad guys. On the other side, your “morally justified” policies (whatever they are) would need massive concentration of coercive and economic power to be enforced on an international scale. So until you show me compelling evidences to support the idea that Russia or China (as US power competitors) or Europeans have means and will to enforce an ecologist program on a global scale more effectively than what the US can do, I’ll keep believing yours is just wishful thinking.
Second, if “Russian imperialism is a pretty banal reflection of our own imperialism” is reiterating the idea of the provocations from NATO enlargement or the US/Western intervention in the Middle East or in ex-Yugoslavia, then the argument would sound more compelling if it wasn’t for the entire history of Russia until Putin and the memories it left or the impression it leaves in neighbouring countries like Ukraine.
Third, that “our system is no better than the Russian system and arguably far worse (if only due to scale)” is debatable. In some relevant sense there must be a very significant difference in standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities otherwise people would have more incentives to migrate from the West to China, Russia, Iran than the other way around. Even Russian, Chinese and Iranian political/economic/ideological elites’ kids enjoy studying and living in the West more than the other way around. And your claim would sound hypocritical if said by a Westerner who still prefers to enjoy standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities of avg Western people instead of enjoying standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities for avg people living in Russia, China or Iran.

Russia withdrew from the Kyiv and Sunny axes. It left Kharkiv retreating past Kupiansk because of a general rout in which it turned over warehouses full of munitions and hundreds of vehicles. It withdrew from Kherson City and the general environs, but only after a grinding offensive had finally broken through Russian lines and made holding anything on the far side of the river untenable.

I mean, they legally declared land taken in both counter offensives part of Russia and put up billboards around the city that said: "here forever," lol.

Russia withdrew from the Kyiv and Sunny axes. It left Kharkiv retreating past Kupiansk because of a general rout in which it turned over warehouses full of munitions and hundreds of vehicles. It withdrew from Kherson City and the general environs, .... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure.

I don't see how that would be incompatible with the theory I've put forward.

"Setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US"

I wouldn't even grant this. Market equilibrium is an emergent phenomenon; no one state and certainly no small group of people is "in control" of global production decisions. Pollution is an example of a negative externality. While liberal democracies have put regulations into place to reduce such negative externalities within their borders and done much to raise the living/working standards of their populations, this has often just resulted in the working class of the West being exported to countries without these protections.

Obviously, it was not in the US's strategic interests to move so much of its production to China. Nor was it a good strategic move to become so heavily dependent on Taiwan for microchip production. It's not even clear that this shift was good for the economic wellbeing of the average American. The shift occurred because firms that moved overseas could outcompete firms that did not due to lower prices; no one had to plan to make this happen. To be sure, Clinton and W. Bush era policymakers did seem to believe that rising wealth in China would cause the state to liberalize, but the offshoring trend only accelerated as policy makers soured on this concept.

And we see the exact same patterns of consumption in China as it becomes wealthier that we saw in liberal states, even though, Deng's major reforms notwithstanding, it is very much still a communist country in key respects (state control of large corporations, the government's ability to freeze financial exchanges at will, etc.). Meat consumption is surging for example.

The Chinese state, which in many ways can exert more control on domestic production that Western states (see: the Covid lockdowns), has still been unable to stop the country's sliding food self-sufficiency rate. In 2000, China had a food self-sufficiency rate above the US's today, 93.6%. That has plunged to 65.8%. This isn't because China lost the ability to produce as much food; it's because labor got more expensive as the country grew wealthier (changing opportunity costs for workers) and Chinese food became relatively more expensive compared to exports (also rising incomes increasing demand for limited domestic meat production). Chinese farms responded by cutting production, or switching to producing meat with foreign feed, and net imports increased. This is despite a powerful state actively working against this trend. No one was "deciding" anything here, it's just the logic of the dynamical system.

But such power doesn’t come for free (i.e. not all humanity will benefit from it, no possible cynical abuses or nasty unintentional consequences can be systematically prevented) nor without consensus (e.g. by being the perceived as the lesser evil wrt realistic alternatives). The point is that no long term goal policies (whatever they are) can be ensured if there isn’t enough economic/coercive power to support it, so no economic/coercive power will be likely spent by political elites to pursue such policies if that is perceived as just loss of power for themselves and/or for serving their base.

Exactly. The problem with global warming and ocean acidification is that it is a global collective action problem. Every state has an incentive to cheat because even the largest emitters still represent a small share of the global total. Adding to the problem is that some states are far more susceptible to climate risks than others. Current international institutions lack any teeth for enforcement.

Every state would be better off if all states agreed to do more to tackle the issue, although some would benefit more than others since they are more at risk. However, every state also has an incentive to cheat. Within states, politicians also have an incentive to get their states to shirk their responsibilities so that their constituents can realize the benefits of doing so. What is needed for climate change, the problem of powerful transnational corporations, global inequality, and migration is some sort of regional/global governance mechanism with enforcement power akin to the EU or the US federal government. That is, a system that keep particularity for local governance, but which has authority on global issues.

I am not optimistic that such a system will evolve without a crisis. Such a system needs coercive powers, but it also needs to offer members significant benefits. Military alliances that allow members to achieve a "peace dividend," what you've seen in Europe, is one way to do that. However, I think that bringing lower income states into such an organization probably requires aid budgets to grow to a size around the same scale as defense budgets, something that is currently unthinkable unfortunately.

The theory is pretty straightforward.

1. Russia invades, threatening Kyiv to force negotiations, while occupying the most strategically relevant areas in the south (land bridge to Crimea).

2. Negotiations fail, so Russia switches gear for prolonged war. The Russian army was overstretched and pulled back its lines to something more stable. This was mistakenly perceived (or deceptively marketed?) as a "Ukrainian offensive", which it clearly wasn't.

Sure, they gave up on the quick victory plan. That doesn't mean they never expected it to work. A lot appears to have hinged on bribes and the expectation that areas would be handed over by collaborators, as in Kherson.

3. With the prospect of prolonged war and having to take parts of Ukraine by force, Russia's primary concern becomes the prevention of an insurgency. This means it will seek to pacify areas it occupies before conquering more territory - the 'bite-sized chunks' approach. This could take months, or even years.

This doesn't explain continued offensive operations against Bakhmut. If the goal is to sit back and consolidate gains, why keep attacking? The Vuhledar offensive, widely panned as a catastrophe by Russian milbloggers and resulting in the sacking of officers, resulted in the loss of 13 BTGs worth of tank compliments and plenty else aside. That isn't "sitting back and consolidating." Not to mention that Russian state media has definitely tried to play up what small gains it has made as the result of a "renewed offensive."


4. Meanwhile local tactical battles are fought, with the primary goal of degrading the Ukrainian fighting capabilities.
[/quote]

This is inconsistent with continued Russian offensive operations. For example, by all accounts, Ukrainian losses were proportionally much higher when they were forced to attack entrenched defenders in Kherson. But Russia isn't sitting back and waiting for Ukraine to attack entrenched positions, they have been attacking in a number of areas.

Some other points:
- Neither Ukraine nor Russia has carried out large-scale offensives since the start of the invasion.

Given the shortage of armored vehicles and of well-motivated, well-trained troops on both sides, I would consider regiment-scale operations (3,000-5,000 soldiers) to constitute major efforts. At time's both sides have put together division sized offensives, but they have been the exception. Leaked estimates for Russian losses at Bakhmut are the equivalent of 3-5 US divisions, which constitutes a major offensive anywhere, even if the losses were disproportionately low-quality, under equipped Wagner forces.

- It's debatable whether the territory lost by Russia was meaningful. Some argument has to be put forward as to why these areas would be strategically relevant. The fact that the Russians gave up most of that territory without a fight implies the opposite. Movement patterns of the Russian forces across the areas of northern Ukraine also do not imply the intent to hold for prolonged periods of time. You can still view these patterns on sites like https://liveuamap.com..

If their goal is to hold all of Kherson Oblast, which they annexed, then it is not debatable that losing their foothold across the river is a major setback.

On a more general note: this conflict seems to have reversed the trend towards trying to create smaller, more flexible formations as the primary unit for combat operations (e.g., the Russian Battalion Tactical Group, US Brigade Combat Teams).

Doctrine seems to be falling back to a focus on division level operations. I think this makes increasing sense given the larger role drones and UGVs will play in the future. These require more infrastructure to support.

Autonomous 60-81mm mortars that can be mounted on IFVs, UGV 105mm field guns, autonomous support drones, etc. all give smaller units more organic firepower, but they do so at the cost of a larger logistical footprint.

You can see this in the new US divisional structure, with the Robot Combat Vehicle Company attached to each ABCT. RCVs will also be broken out into light/medium/heavy akin to the divisional structure, in terms of equipment, except now divisions are penetration or armored (heavy reinforced or heavy), light, airborne, or air assault. So, "medium" sticks around as a classification in some respects, but the old medium level division (Stryker) is gone.

:up:

This doesn't explain continued offensive operations against Bakhmut. If the goal is to sit back and consolidate gains, why keep attacking? — Count Timothy von Icarus

There are myriad possibilities for why they continue to pressure the Ukrainian lines.

Securing local tactical advantages, degrading the Ukrainian fighting capability, pressuring the Ukrainian forces to keep them off balance and unable to recuperate, etc.

Since they've been at it for several months, my impression is that whatever it is, they probably believe it's working in their favor.

This is inconsistent with continued Russian offensive operations. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, I think it is definitely consistent.

That they do not intend to take large amounts of territory does not mean there aren't many other purposes those offensive operations might have, some of which I already listed.

But Russia isn't sitting back and waiting for Ukraine to attack entrenched positions, ... — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's probably because the Ukrainian forces lack any offensive capabilities, and if the Russians had any intention of further degrading the Ukrainian fighting capability they would have to bring the fight to them.

Given the shortage of armored vehicles and of well-motivated, well-trained troops on both sides, I would consider regiment-scale operations (3,000-5,000 soldiers) to constitute major efforts. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's besides the point.

In my view, we haven't seen any large-scale offensives intent on taking large amounts of territory since the initial invasion.

No one is questioning that there is intense fighting going on around Bakhmut. The question is what purpose that fighting serves, and the capture of territory to me seems an unlikely explanation.

If their goal is to hold all of Kherson Oblast, ... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Some point needs to be made as to its strategic relevance weighed against the cost of holding it. We can make guesses towards the former, but for the latter we simply lack all relevant information.

However we can use the Russian actions to make an educated guess and my view is that the Russians leaving Kherson voluntarily points towards it neither being particularly stragetically relevant, nor the Russians being willing to pay a high cost for holding it.