@Jamal,

Why bother with Kant. It's confused waffle. Quine and Kripke provide firmer and more fertile ground.

But to go there, we need to differentiate various sorts of definition, and differing ways to refer. That'd get you past page eight.

But we were in agreement on the terms empirical and a priori and it was just a mixup as to which one I was referring to in making the point about Kant creating an “object” and then putting it outside of knowledge’s ability to access. — Antony Nickles

Oh, ok. So when you said:

"Of course elsewhere he puts this "thing-in-itself" outside the reach of our knowledge, thus the lack of faith in our ordinary understandings."

By "ordinary understandings", didn't you mean our assumptions about the mind-independence of the world we experience? Or what?

So is "the chap who wrote Hamlet" a definition of Shakespeare?

If identity statements are true, then they are necessarily true.

So not all definitions are identity statements?

By "ordinary understandings", didn't you mean our assumptions about the mind-independence of the world we experience? Or what? — frank

What I was trying to bring back to the fore was what Kant denigrates as our "given conceptions", which are our existing, cultural, historical, common concepts which Kant admits we "employ... in our application of the conception" but that he calls "confused" and only "presented to the mind", and requires to be "complete", "a clear representation", and "adequate with its object", yet, when they cannot be, they are judged unable to be defined, where I am claiming that our given, ordinary concepts are sufficient to define (though that is a process, takes effort--examples, distinctions between uses, etc.).

I see. Thanks.

Is “define your terms!” always or often or ever a legitimate imperative? — Jamal

Seems extremely helpful for readers... to me anyway. I mean, when there are terms that have more than one commonly accepted use, it's certainly helpful for mutual understanding.

So is "the chap who wrote Hamlet" a definition of Shakespeare? — Banno

Only if he did write Hamlet would that be a part of the definite description of Shakespeare. It's not necessarily true that he did write Hamlet, no matter how likely we might think it to be.

We can easily modify the description to "the chap most people believe to have written Hamlet". What about "chap"? Maybe Shakespeare was a woman.

Why bother with Kant. It's confused waffle. Quine and Kripke provide firmer and more fertile ground. — Banno

I’m far more interested in Kant (it's not waffle and to the extent that it's confused it’s in the most interesting ways), but I see what you mean: just on definitions they’re more useful. I like Naming and Necessity; haven’t read Quine.

But to go there, we need to differentiate various sorts of definition, and differing ways to refer. That'd get you past page eight. — Banno

I guess that’s what I was asking for before, since I recognized that my own taxonomy of definitions was creaking under pressure.

Thank you for your efforts in getting us to page eight. :grin:

when there are terms that have more than one commonly accepted use, [definitions are] certainly helpful for mutual understanding. — creativesoul

The definition of terms is an interesting case. Kant differentiates between a priori concepts and arbitrary ones, which I take him to mean: technical terms (set aside by @Jamal; referred to as “stipulated” by @Banno). He says they are ones (conceptions) that we create, which (unlike the other kinds of concepts) we can define; he says: however we choose, as we created them (which Kant excelled at).

But it makes me think of Wittgenstein’s use of the word “criteria” (or, even more starkly, “grammar”) in Philosophical Investigations. He is not “creating” it so much that it is not recognizable along its ordinary use, but there are differences, distinctions, such that it must be recognized as a “Wittgensteinian term”. However, he cannot “define” it for you, even for himself. It takes the whole book for him to bring you along with him, to show us the differences to the ordinary use through examples (playing chess, following rules, knowing others’ pain, etc.), dialectically against other terminological uses (even Kant’s, called “crystalline purity”), and (à la Austin) to show how they go wrong (through the interlocutor).

Socrates (paraphrased) would say that we must understand what the other is saying, on “their terms”. But this is not because they “created” what they are saying, as if a Kantian technical term; nor that an individual reinvents a concept unique to them, apart from its ordinary use, (without breaking it off from its ordinary contexts), but maybe that our concepts stretch and grow as we do, perhaps because our lives and judgments are reflected in them—that we are created by them. So getting us to see a new way means one might not even know yet what to tell (as Heidegger seemed unable to ever do). Mill didn’t even pick one audience to write to; and Nietzsche wanted to create his own (to change us).

The definition of terms is an interesting case. Kant differentiates between a priori concepts and arbitrary ones, which I take him to mean: technical terms (set aside by Jamal; referred to as “stipulated” by @Banno). He says they are ones (conceptions) that we create, which (unlike the other kinds of concepts) we can define; he says: however we choose, as we created them (which Kant excelled at). — Antony Nickles

I'm sympathetic to Kant(given his time), but much as Banno hinted at earlier, he's far too confused/confusing and - I think anyway - overcomplicated things by unnecessarily multiplying entities. I think that Kant's taxonomy could not perform the task of drawing and maintaining the distinction between that which exists in its entirety prior to our taking note of it(prior to our naming and describing), and that which does not.

Definitions have no place in philosophy — Jamal

Isn't this too absolute?

A definition of a philosophical concept might be required at the beginning of a discussion only in the case that the term is equivocal. — Jamal

1) Doesn't this contradict the above title and statement of the topic?
2) What if a new term is entered during a discussion by any of the interlocutors?

Then, when one asks someone else "What do you mean by [term]?", isn't the reply a form of definition?

Sorry, not only any of this makes no sense, it is prepares the ground for confusions, misunderstandings and infertile discussions.

Knowing the meaning and being able to define the words one uses, is one of the most important traits of intelligence.

And on the contrary, not knowing the meaning or being able to define the words one uses, is one of the most important traits of stupidity.

Many people in here and elsewhere kind of "hate" dictionaries and definitions. (I have very good and quite disappointing examples regarding dictionaries, definitions, Wikipedia and all kinds of sources of knowledge.) So I consider this topic quite an "unhealthy" one since it promotes stupidity.

(I'm sorry, but you have hit a very important point in any field of knowledge, not only philosophy but everything.)

The tree fern I often used as an example died. Damn pity.

It was neither a tree nor a fern. I, and most other folk, cannot give you a definition, a set of words that set out the differences between the tree fern and a tree, or a fern, and yet if I go to Cool Climate Natives and ask for a tree fern they will give me what I am after.

An infant knows who mum is, but could not provide a definite description.

Being unable to provide a set of synonyms for a term on demand is not indicative of a lack of capacity to use the term correctly.

Why bother with Kant. It's confused waffle. — Banno

Owie wowie.

Tho I do love waffles...

Thank you for your efforts in getting us to page eight. :grin: — Jamal

A pleasure, and the least I could do after you saved Heidegger’s Downfall from the dumpster. Some more semi-pointless trouble making should easily get this to ten pages.

Normal Form
We've got this far without setting out the structure of definitions. Let's fix that.

Any statement can be put into what logicians call Normal Form. Since implication can be defined in terms of "and" and "or", a statement can be written as a sequence of predications linked by "^" (and) and "v" (or). This is called normal form

So any definition can be put in terms of a series of disjunctions and conjunctions.

With you so far. What’s next?

Yeah, that was what I was wondering. There isn't one direction to go in, but multiple paths. My apologies, I've lost he thread here. It gets very complex very quickly.

In ancient logic the idea was that a definition picks out something. A bachelor is, by definition, a person, and male and not married, or holding a first degree from a university. The idea is to give the necessary an sufficient conditions. But that word, "necessary", was defined much more clearly by Kripke and subsequent logicians. The necessary a posteriori, and so on.

Alternately, one common notion is that a definition is a shortcut, replacing a longish definition with a shorter defined term: "unmarried male" with "bachelor". But of course it's not true that we can substitute the one term for the other in all cases salva veritate.

There's definitions of singular terms - also called definite descriptions, which again force a reconsideration of what it is to be necessary and sufficient.

I was tempted to go into real and nominal definitions. Supposedly the one tells us what a thing is, while the other tells us how to use a certain word, but perhaps that the distinction cannot be usably maintained.

Think I need more coffee.

However, he cannot “define” it for you, even for himself. It takes the whole book for him to bring you along with him, to show us the differences to the ordinary use through examples — Antony Nickles

I propose that he creates a miniature form of life in his works. One hangs out in his world and gradually groks when and how to use the phrases (as tools) in his workshop, just by watching, or even better trying to philosophize originally in a same-ish style by paraphrasing.

In ancient logic the idea was that a definition picks out something. A bachelor is, by definition, a person, and male and not married, or holding a first degree from a university. — Banno

Looks like a bundle of universals. An individual bachelor is a member of a set. The criteria for the set is a definition.

And where does that go?

Here's a definition of the set G: G=df{Frank, the North Pole, electrotherapy}. These items form a set, but perhaps not in virtue of having some universal which is exclusive to just them.

The idea that a definition always, or ought always, specify some set by family, genus and species is problematic.

Would universals fair any better? It's not obvious that they would.

Listening to some of your responses made me think about this video my husband made when I asked him how he defined definition. I would be curious to hear others’ thoughts on it. “Define definition”

Here's a definition of the set G: G=df{Frank, the North Pole, electrotherapy}. These items form a set, but perhaps not in virtue of having some universal which is exclusive to just them — Banno

So maybe all definitions are sets, but not all sets are definitions.

This is the definition of an elephant:

"a very large herbivorous mammal of the family Elephantidae, the only extant family of proboscideans and comprising the genera Loxodonta (African elephants) and Elephas (Asian elephants): Elephants of all species are characterized by a long, prehensile trunk formed of the nose and upper lip, pillarlike legs, and prominent tusks, which are possessed by both sexes of Loxodonta and just the males of Elephas."

1. This definitions is full of universals.
2. We could easily use this as the criteria for a set. If Jumbo meets the criteria, he's in the set.

The point is that a definition is an abstract object.

Rather than just posting a link, maybe you could present his arguments or ideas if you think they’re interesting. Note that the guidelines say, under the heading “Types of posters who are not welcome here”: “Advertisers, spammers, self-promoters: No links to personal websites.”

But welcome to the forum.

The point is that a definition is an abstract object. — frank

Definitions are objects? I don't understand what that might mean.

all definitions are sets — frank

Do you mean that all definitions specify sets? But we can define lists and multisets and so on, which are not sets...

And you are not a set, yet (Frank=def the person to whom this post is a reply) perhaps defines you; and elephants are not sets - they are elephants.

Which brings us back to the difference between real and nominal definitions...

Well that was really confusing. My work here is done!!

Anyway, with the next post this thread will be of equal length to my thread.

Maybe there won't be one.

If there were to be one, i wouldn't reply; That'd put @Jamal over.

Interesting point of view, but I didn't intend for it to be a promotion. For one, it's a martial arts channel so it wouldn't be aiming at this group in particular. And two, writing out a transcript would not give the same impact as the words, voice, and visuals do. I believe philosophical ideas can be presented in interesting and innovative ways. Please believe that not all new users are here to spam your forum. I'm a long time reader and enjoy reading the posts here. I finally had something interesting to share because it reminded me of something that I had a personal connection with.

I think it's interesting that this thread, aimed to demonstrate that definitions are not needed in philosophical arguments, has become a platform not just for definitions, but definitions of "definition."

Exactly. That would have been impossible had I asked everyone to adhere strictly to a definition given at the beginning. The process of conceptual exploration and clarification is part of what philosophy is, rather than a necessary unquestionable first step.

The OP title is an exaggerated provocation, and the less radical thesis is…

A definition of a philosophical concept might be required at the beginning of a discussion only in the case that the term is equivocal.

I’m not committed to this, because I don’t trust my own taxonomy of definitions, but I hope there’s a good kernel of truth in it.



Good stuff. I’m currently unsure how best to judge the relevance of each of those approaches or where to go with them, or where to go with this discussion.

It’s possible that @T Clark’s approach is more relevant than I thought, although it’s an approach to analyzing TPF discussions in terms of psychology rather than analyzing definition itself. What I mean is, I’ve noticed that people are disagreeing in what seems a temperamental or polarized way rather than substantively. It’s not clear that, for example, @Janus and @Isaac, or @T Clark and I, would really differ much given an actual discussion to look at, and what differences there would be might be to do with temperamental levels of tolerance for troublemaking.

Whether that is interesting or philosophical, I don’t know.