Exactly. It's a behavior. Things behave in different ways make different sounds, different smells. As I said ,we simply make associations between behaviors and their causes.

How is that NOT referring to anything? Are you not saying that there is an actual cat ON an actual mat? Is not your visual of a cat on a mat a visual of a cat on a mat, not a visual of scribbles on a screen and that is what the words on the screen refer to? That is the visual I got when reading your words. Your words were simply a temporary replacement for the visual of a cat on a mat in order for you to communicate that there was a cat on the mat. If I were there looking at the cat on the mat with you and you say that, wouldn't it be redundant? It is redundant because communicating is simply sharing information about some state-of-affairs, and if I already see the cat on the mat, saying so would just be a waste of breath. — Harry Hindu

I don't see how this addresses my question. You said that we can use words but not refer to anything. So how can one use the words "the cat is on the mat" and not refer to anything, and how does this differ from using the words "the cat is on the mat" and referring to something?

Exactly. It's a behavior.

So you accept that an expression can be relevant or irrelevant even if there's nothing more to it than its use. If that is true of a handshake, then why not also of a word?

Keep posting. You keep proving my point that you aren't simply using words. You continue to point to some state-of-affairs. You continue to behave in a certain way that proves my point.

So no argument from you then OK thanks for playing.

I don't see how this addresses my question. You said that we can use words but not refer to anything. So how can one use the words "the cat is on the mat" and not refer to anything, and how does this differ from using the words "the cat is on the mat" and referring to something? — Michael

When I said that we can use words to not refer to anything, I meant like this: "shoes make donkeys beat black" Does that make any sense to you? Is that meaningful? If simply using words creates meaning, then that string of words would mean something, but it doesn't - not even to myself the user of the words! It's simply a string of gibberish. You may even ask, "what do you mean?" You may even attempt to imbue meaning into the phrase by trying to get at what the words are referring to. Maybe the donkeys and black are two different soccer teams and the donkeys' shoes are better than the blacks, which is why the blacks get beat. In other words, meaning didn't come from my use of words, they come from you establishing a reference between the words and some real event or thing in the world.

I made my argument. You simply keep proving it for me. Thanks.

You simply can't help yourself from using words to point to states-of-affairs. Yes, we use words, but the meaning doesn't lie in your use of words. It lies in the relationship between the state-of-affairs and the words you use to refer to that state-of-affairs.

I already quoted some passages from Wittgenstein where he gives an argument (especially the sections about the cube picture) against views like yours, but you however completely ignored that argument. — Fafner

And I keep pointing out that if meaning were use then we could never say what we don't mean. We could never lie. But everyone on your side seems to ignore that.

When I said that we can use words to not refer to anything, I meant like this: "shoes make donkeys beat black" Does that make any sense to you? Is that meaningful? If simply using words was creates meaning, then that string of words would mean something, but it doesn't - not even to myself the user of the words! It's simply a string of gibberish. — Harry Hindu

This shows that you don't understand meaning-as-use. Wittgenstein wasn't saying that simply speaking any old sounds makes it the case that one has uttered meaningful words.

Dancing is just the movement of one's body, but that doesn't mean that any movement of one's body is a dance.

And I keep pointing out that if meaning were use then we could never say what we don't mean. We could never lie. But everyone on your side seems to ignore that. — Harry Hindu

I haven't read every post in this thread, sometimes it's moving pretty fast, but what did you give as an example for that?

Was it something like (to use our banana example again) pointing at a banana and thinking that it's yellow, but saying, "That is blue"?

The thing there, though, is that you're not really personally using "blue" for that color. You're using "yellow" but just saying "blue" for whatever reason you've decided to say "blue" instead. (Maybe just for this example.) In other words, you're thinking "That's yellow but I'm going to say that it's blue"--thus you're using "yellow" for that color.

Now, someone who hears you will either say, "What? You're crazy, that's not blue! It's yellow"--further cementing that they're using "yellow" for that color. Or maybe it's a really young kid who doesn't know his/her color terms well yet. In which case they might start calling it "blue" instead.

None of that goes against meaning hinging on use, really. It's just that maybe you're trying to squeeze what counts or doesn't count as "use" into some unusually narrow idea. "Use" isn't normaly limited to "utterance."

I have already stated that "meaning" is the causal relationship between causes and their effects. Minds, which are just sensory information processing systems, are able to establish associations with different experiences. Hearing a voice speak is no different than hearing the waves of the ocean. It's all just noise until you establish some link, or association, with some cause of hearing some thing. Once I hear and see the waves crash, or a person speak, then I'm able to establish to a connection between the sounds and what I see. — Harry Hindu

Meaning cannot be a causal relation. If X means Y because Y causes X (X being some mental state in our heads, or whatever you like), then you can't know that X means Y, since causality is something that can only be known through experience, but you cannot learn from experience that Y causes X, unless you already know the meaning of Y, so you get a circle here (in other words, you already need a language that can represent the causes of your mental states in order to know them, but if this is the case, then you cannot know what means what since knowing the causes of your representations requires a prior ability to represent them).

I keep making the argument that every time you write or say anything you are simply making noises or referring to some state of affairs. No one has yet been able to prove otherwise. — Harry Hindu

This is simply not true. What about false sentences or negative truths? They don't 'refer' to any states of affair by their very nature. For example: "Bernie Sanders is the president of the united states" (the sentence is false but meaningful despite the non-existence of the state of affairs which it represents), and "Bernie Sanders in not the president of the united states" (which is true and meaningful, despite again the non-existence of the state of affairs which it describes).

You simply can't help yourself from using words to point to states-of-affairs. — Harry Hindu

Sure, but this has no bearing on use-theory. Or if you think it does, then you don't understand what it entails. Which seems pretty clear from your posts here.

then you can't know that X means Y, since causality is something that can only be known through experience, but you cannot learn from experience that Y causes X, unless you already know the meaning of Y, — Fafner

I don't agree with his view--I would say that meaning is a mental association, but I wouldn't frame it as anything about causality--but I don't understand this objection to his view. If meaning is causality on his view, why would he have to know the casuality of Y in order to know that Y causes X?

Let's say that Y is the wind and X is a paper blowing off of a table outside. The wind causes the paper to blow off the table outside. So if that's what meaning is--the meaning of the wind is that is causes the paper to blow off the table outside, then why would you have to know what causes the wind to know this?

And I keep pointing out that if meaning were use then we could never say what we don't mean. We could never lie. But everyone on your side seems to ignore that. — Harry Hindu

We ignore it because you don't understand the view that you try to attack, and therefore your arguments simply don't make any sense.

The 'use' conception of language doesn't equate between meaning something (or sincerely believing it) and saying it out loud (therefore you can have the two at the same time). This argument shows that you simply don't understand what the position even mean.

I don't agree with his view--I would say that meaning is a mental association, but I wouldn't frame it as anything about causality--but I don't understand this objection to his view. If meaning is causality on his view, why would he have to know the casuality of Y in order to know that Y causes X? — Terrapin Station

This is because causes cannot be inferred apriori from their effects, but only established by empirical observation (as Hume has thought us). So if a certain event in the world Y causes a mental state in your mind X, you can't know what causes your mental state without observing the causal regularities which obtain between your mental states and events in the world. But if this is the case, then you already must have a way of identifying the relevant cause Y in order to know that it causes X; and if so, then your ability to represent Y must be independent of your knowing what causes your mental state X (either this, or meaning is inscrutable: you simply cannot know anything about the meaning of your mental states).

Let's say that Y is the wind and X is a paper blowing off of a table outside. The wind causes the paper to blow off the table outside. So if that's what meaning is--the meaning of the wind is that is causes the paper to blow off the table outside, then why would you have to know what causes the wind to know this? — Terrapin Station

No that's not what I said. In my example X (the paper blowing off the table) means Y (there is wind) just in case Y causes X, and so it doesn't require knowing what causes Y.

I'm having some trouble following you:

This is because causes cannot be inferred apriori from their effects, but only established by empirical observation (as Hume has thought us). — Fafner

I don't get what the difference would be there, really. Inferring something due to effects is what we're doing when we make empirical observations (well, and we subsequently think about those empirical observations). It might be important to note here that there would be a difference between whether A is really the cause of B and thinking that A is the cause of B. He wasn't saying that meaning is only about whether A is really the cause of B, was he?

So if a certain event in the world Y causes a mental state in your mind X, you can't know what causes your mental state without observing the causal regularities which obtain between X and events in the world.

I have no idea what that's saying really. What are "the causal regularities which obtain between X and events in the world?"

Why wouldn't simply repeated observations of Y being antecedently correlated with X be enough?

But if this is the case, then you already must have a way of identifying the relevant cause Y in order to know that it causes X; and if so, then your ability to represent Y must be independent of your knowing what causes your mental state X

On a view that meaning is causality, what does mentally representing Y have to do with meaning?

Maybe if you give an example instead of just using variables.

No that's not what I said. In my example X (the paper blowing off the table) means Y (there is wind) just in case Y causes X, and so it doesn't require knowing what causes Y. — Fafner

Okay, but needing to know what causes Y seemed to be your objection to his argument. So if you don't need to know that then I don't see any objection.

I have no idea what that's saying really. What are "the causal regularities which obtain between X and events in the world?"

Why wouldn't simply repeated observations of Y being antecedently correlated with X be enough? — Terrapin Station

Yeah I meant something like that. Of course in actual science there are many complications when it comes to determining that two phenomena are causally related, but the general idea is that to know that X causes Y it is at least necessary (though probably not sufficient in most cases) to know that Y always follows X, all things being equal.

He wasn't saying that meaning is only about whether A is really the cause of B, was he? — Terrapin Station

He was, quote "I have already stated that "meaning" is the causal relationship between causes and their effects".

On a view that meaning is causality, what does mentally representing Y have to do with meaning? — Terrapin Station

It really doesn't matter how you call it; you can replace 'represent' by 'mean' without affecting my argument (though the concept of representation (or even that of reference) is much clearer in my opinion than meaning).

Okay, but needing to know what causes Y seemed to be your objection to his argument. — Terrapin Station

No it wasn't, where did I say this? All I said is that we need to know that a causal relation obtains between Y and X.

But you're not explaining your objection to that I can understand it. Take my example. If you say that meaning is causality, you can't know that the paper blowing off the table means that there is wind because . . . ? The objection can't be that you can't know that without observing the correlation between the wind and the paper, because that's part of the theory. You make those sorts of observations and then you arrive at the meaning. Your objection seems to be something about the wind, but I don't know what about it.

The objection can't be that you can't know that without observing the correlation between the wind and the paper, because that's part of the theory. — Terrapin Station

What theory?

That would be part of the theory that meaning is the same as causality.

Could you explain your objection clearly?

That would be part of the theory that meaning is the same as causality. — Terrapin Station

I don't see how it is relevant to your objection. You wrote:

The objection can't be that you can't know that without observing the correlation between the wind and the paper, because that's part of the theory. — Terrapin Station

But the mere fact that the theory analyzes meaning in casual terms doesn't mean that you are entitled to simply assume that we somehow know the casual relations between phenomena in advance, because clearly knowing what causes what is an empirical matter, and therefore you need observations - you can't have this for free.

Could you explain your objection clearly? — Terrapin Station

First let's see what premises you don't agree with. I can't really formulate it more clearly than I already did.

But the mere fact that the theory analyzes meaning in casual terms doesn't mean that you entitled simply to assume that we somehow know the casual relations between phenomena in advance, because clearly knowing what causes what is an empirical matter, and therefore you need observations - you can't get this for free. — Fafner

It seems to me like what I wrote is very straightforward. If meaning is causality, the way you know meaning is by making observations. That would be part of the theory. So no one would be saying that you know causality a priori. I don't know where you'd even be getting that idea from.

First let's see what premise exactly you don't accept. I can't really formulate it more clearly than I already did. — Fafner

I'm not even clear on what your objection is in the first place. So it's difficult to tell you a premise I don't accept.

Someone says that meaning is causality.

And in a case like a paper getting "swept" off of a table meaning that there's wind, which is known because of empirical observations in the past, you'd argue that meaning can't be causality in that case because_______?

It seemed like you were saying something about what you'd be required to know about the wind, but I was very confused just what your objection was.

It seems to me like what I wrote is very straightforward. If meaning is causality, the way you know meaning is by making observations. That would be part of the theory. So no one would be saying that you know causality a priori. I don't know where you'd even be getting that idea from. — Terrapin Station

But I just quoted you where you contradict what you just said "The objection can't be that you can't know that without observing the correlation between the wind and the paper" - so can I object on this ground or not? Which way is it?

But I just quoted you where you contradict what you just said "The objection can't be that you can't know that without observing the correlation between the wind and the paper" - so can I object on this ground or not? Which way it is? — Fafner

What in the world?? We are having serious communication problems.

It wouldn't make any sense to object based on observations being necessary, because the theory would be saying that we know causality based on observations.

in a case like a paper getting "swept" off of a table meaning that there's wind, which is known because of empirical observations in the past, you'd argue that meaning can't be causality in that case because_______? — Terrapin Station

Because to know empirically that the wind causes the paper to move you must first be able to observe the wind, and being able to observe the wind means that you can identify it as a wind; and if you can identify something as a particular thing (as opposed to something else), it means that you can mean it/represent it/refer to it through language or somehow in your thoughts. Thus we get into a circle:

1. Meaning can only be established by observation (since meaning=causality, and causality is an apostriori disclosable relation).
2. Observation depends on meaning (as I explained above).
3. But you cannot know the meaning of anything prior to observation (from (1))
4. So you cannot make observations (from (2) + (3)).
5. Therefore you cannot ever know what you mean by anything (or premise (1) is false).

I hope the argument is clearer now.

Because to know empirically that the wind causes the paper to move you must first be able to observe the wind, and being able to observe the wind means that you can identify it as a wind; and if you can identify something as a particular thing (as opposed to something else), it means that you can mean it/represent it/refer to it through language or somehow in your thoughts. — Fafner

The problem with this is that representation, reference through language, etc. is not at all meaning on a theory where meaning is causality.

It wouldn't make any sense to object based on observations being necessary, because the theory would be saying that we know causality based on observations. — Terrapin Station

"objecting based on ..." simply means that you are using something as a premise in your argument, and since it is true (and you seem to accept it) that we know causality based on observation, then there's nothing illegitimate in basing my objection on this premise.

The problem with this is that represntation, reference through language, etc. is not at all meaning on a theory where meaning is causality. — Terrapin Station

I use the terms interchangeably so it doesn't matter.

Representation is causality on your view you're saying?

Say that you take this series of symbols "&^#" to represent the sound "flurf."

Where would causality enter into that?

Representation is causality on your view you're saying? — Terrapin Station

No, because I don't accept the casual analysis. I'm saying that if you define representation in casual terms, then you are in trouble (but the same argument applies to meaning if you don't like representation).