Why do I want to specify a location for my memory? — mcdoodle
These days, I say we put them in the world. — plaque flag
I think that model is too linear to be analogous. Are you familiar with Douglas Hofstadter's writings on 'tangled hierarchies' model of cognition (e.g. Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer Models of the Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought)? Artificial neural networks seem to me much closer analogues to the processing of (meta)cognition than von Neumann architecture 'programs'. In the 'sketch' at the bottom of my last post I use bidirectional arrows to simplistically suggest nonlinear relationships (i.e. self-recursion / self-referencing) among the 'nodes'.Would you consider the IPO model useful here or of little value? — universeness
Well, how about an extension of the IPO model, that is more in-line with current computer systems and their various network topologies (star, bus, ring, mesh and fully connected mesh.) Do you have any knowledge of network topologies and the workings of stand alone operating systems/networked operating systems?I think that model is too linear to be analogous. — 180 Proof
No, but I will follow your link and become a little more familiar with it. I have found your suggested links in the past, to be useful and informative. I will comment after I have read the material your link offers.. Are you familiar with Douglas Hofstadter's writings on 'tangled hierarchies' model of cognition (e.g. Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer Models of the Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought)? — 180 Proof
What neural network examples are you referring to? One based on biological components or ones based only on electronic components?Artificial neural networks seem to me much closer analogues to the processing of (meta)cognition than von Neumann architecture 'programs'. — 180 Proof
In the 'sketch' at the bottom of my last post I use bidirectional arrows to simplistically suggest nonlinear relationships (i.e. self-recursion / self-referencing) among the 'nodes'. — 180 Proof
to begin with. I see perceptual cognition something like this: phenomena —> data —> experience <——> memory traces <——> information (signal:noise) ... etc. — 180 Proof
I've found it most informative and insightful in the last fifteen or so years – the monumental Being No One (or it's nontechnical summary The Ego Tunnel (re phenomenal self model)) by Thomas Metzinger. I highly recommend his work if you're not familiar with it. — 180 Proof
I want to stress that while I appreciate that perceptual cognition, etc in primate brains is computational, I'm also convinced that these brains are not computers in the (mostly) linear 'IPO' sense – just as David Deutsch points out that it does not follow from the computability of fundamental physical laws (re: constructor theory) that the universe is a computer simulation. — 180 Proof
's distinction between a Function and a Phenomenon may be relevant to your question. But not necessarily in the dismissive irrelevance he intended. A brain function*1 is a causal relationship between input & output, this because of that. And a phenomenon*2 is what the physical senses detect. So, objectively, there are no phenomena in your brain. Unless you count the targets of inwardly focused senses."Memories" are functions, not "phenomena". — 180 Proof
What function do the memories of my brother serve. Or what function does my earliest memory of having a cold and being in a pram sucking a cough sweet on a wet day serve? — Andrew4Handel
It doesn't make sense to attribute mental states like my memory of my grandmother or my belief that 2 + 2 = 4 to the whole of my body or a function.
But that does sound like a rehash of behaviourism.
I have distinct mental contents which is not similar or identical to any part of my body or behaviour. — Andrew4Handel
Are you familiar with Douglas Hofstadter's writings on 'tangled hierarchies' model of cognition — 180 Proof
No, but I will follow your link and become a little more familiar with it. — universeness
I will comment after I have read the material your link offers. — universeness
I think it's best to pause here — 180 Proof
Depending on the context and the used of the term, memory can be a process but also its product or content. Like "thought": it can refer to either the thinking process or its product or content.When one has a memory of an event, it seems to me that memory is a phenomenon. — Bylaw
You and I seem to be more attuned to Part/Whole paradoxes*1 than most forum posters. I suppose that sensitivity derives from a General/Holistic (philosophical) rather than Specific/Reductive (scientific) worldview. Ironically, I am better read in Science than in Philosophy --- but not much depth in either. So my Holism stems mainly from my focus on the multiform roles of Generic Information in the world : including Energy & Mind. It's not so much influenced by familiarity with Eastern philosophies.Talk of ‘what brains do’ was called ‘the mereological fallacy’ in a well-known book on neuroscience and philosophy. The mereological fallacy is to ascribe to parts of the body what only agents or actors are capable of doing. ‘The brain’ becomes a kind of explanatory unit, an idealised black box which ‘does’ this or ‘produces’ that and so on. But ascribing thoughts to ‘the brain’ is like saying your computer writes your entries in this thread. Humans think, humans write. They need normal brain function to do so, but it’s not ‘the brain’ which is doing that. Brains are always situated as part of a whole, which is precisely what ‘mereology’ refers to. — Wayfarer
As noted, the "paradigm" you are struggling with may be the Reductive perspective of Classical physical science (since Newton), which focuses on collections of parts, rather than whole systems. Since the isolated parts are not viewed in the context of an integrated interrelated System, the Cause of their functional integrity is a mystery : the Hard Problem.I feel like it is too convenient just to try and correlate any concept and or mental state with a brain state and assume the brain state does all the explanatory work we need without an actual causal explanation.
It seems to lead to a kind of apathy where it is almost too much effort to look for another type of explanation. (For me anyway). It means fighting against an entrenched paradigm. — Andrew4Handel
As ↪Wayfarer noted, the "paradigm" you are struggling with may be the Reductive perspective of Classical physical science (since Newton), which focuses on collections of parts, rather than whole systems. Since the isolated parts are not viewed in the context of an integrated interrelated System, the Cause of their functional integrity is a mystery : the Hard Problem. — Gnomon
Yes. Dreams seem to be re-constituted memories. But, they sometimes seem to portray someone else's experience. However, that's probably due to lack of context, or to altered perspective. When awake, with eyes open, the context of incoming imagery is obvious. But when asleep, the brain is free to improvise, and to alter the original context. For example, I used to dream of an extremely wide residential street that may have impressed me as a small child. But that dream image was used, years later, in different contexts, perhaps to express some childish feeling of awe that, as an adult, I can't explain in words.But my eyes are closed and I am receiving no input from the external world. The number one candidate at the moment for where the dream is occurring is entirely in the brain. — Andrew4Handel
Humans have perception of time, internally -- pulse and heartbeats, as examples. This is our starting point of the temporal nature of the mind. Consciousness develops because of the temporal and spatial nature of the brain itself. It is very common to describe the mind as "mental" (and the brain as physical/material). Yet, while we are correct about the brain, to say that the mind is mental is nonsensical. We are not saying anything new there!My issue is that I know I have vivid mental states like dreams which I have every night that have phenomenal content. Including dreams about dead people and places I lived as a child and fictional scenarios.
But my eyes are closed and I am receiving no input from the external world. The number one candidate at the moment for where the dream is occurring is entirely in the brain. — Andrew4Handel
Maps are also territories, just not the territory they portray. I agree that remembrances don't appear to the senses, but isn't anything that occurs a phenomenon? Something that happens, and in this case experienced.↪Bylaw To my mind: a "memory" is a map and "phenomenon" is the territory. A "rememberance" isn't an appearance to the senses (i.e. phenomenon). — 180 Proof
Events are phenomena, abstractions are not.... isn't anything that occurs a phenomenon? Something that happens ... — Bylaw
"Maps are" abstract, or imaginary, "territories" like memories. We cannot 'experience' abstractions because our 'experiences' are structured by abstractions. Do you believe that 'real numbers' or a 'map of Middle-Earth" are phenomena?Maps are also territories ...
... isn't anything that occurs a phenomenon? Something that happens ...
— Bylaw
Events are phenomena, abstractions are not. — 180 Proof
If I have a map of New York City. It is a map of NYC and a piece of paper with various inks on it and other physical features. The map is not imaginary.Maps are also territories ...
"Maps are" abstract, or imaginary, "territories" like memories. We cannot 'experience' abstractions because our 'experiences' are structured by abstractions. Do you believe that 'real numbers' or a 'map of Middle-Earth" are phenomena? — 180 Proof
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