Where would causality enter into that? — Terrapin Station

Are you asking me? It's not my theory. Ask the op.

No, because I don't accept the casual analysis. I'm saying that if you define representation in casual terms, then you are in trouble (but the same argument applies to meaning if you don't like representation) — Fafner

But it's not defining "representation in causal terms." It's saying that meaning IS causality and that meaning is NOT mere representation.

I get what you're doing now. You're thinking of meaning in the way that you usually think of meaning--so that representation counts, for example, and then you're seeing the theory as attempting to say that representation (and everything else you take meaning to usually be) is somehow causality.

But I don't think it's saying that. I think it's rather saying that meaning is causality in the way that you usually think of causality, and that it's not the same thing as representation.

So if having a representation of something--like the wind--isn't having causal information about the wind, then on this view, we're not talking about meaning (when we have a representation of the wind), we're simply talking about representation, and representation isn't meaning. Meaning is causality.

I get what you're doing now. You're thinking of meaning in the way that you usually think of meaning--so that representation counts, for example, and then you're seeing the theory as attempting to say that representation (and everything else you take meaning to usually be) is somehow causality.

But I don't think it's saying that. I think it's rather saying that meaning is causality in the way that you usually think of causality, and that it's not the same thing as representation. — Terrapin Station

But you can't say that meaning is synonymous with causality, because that will make your claim vacuous (then you will be saying in effect that causality means causality - a claim hardly worth defending). So in order to give an informative or substantive philosophical analysis of a given concept, your analysis must satisfy some pre-theoretical desiderata, which means that you first got to assume that the concept you want to analyze behaves in such and such ways (something that even people who don't agree with your analysis are likely to accept), and then show how your analysis supposed to explain why it behaves thus; otherwise you will not be offering an analysis of an existing concept (or an explanation of a phenomena) but just a pointless stipulation about words.

So in our case, I think the plausible desiderata for the concept of 'meaning' is that it involves things like representation or reference, but even if I'm wrong about this, the point is that you must assume something about the thing which you analyze before you actually offer the analysis, otherwise it will not be an analysis of anything but an arbitrary stipulation. (another strategy is to simply deny that anything in the world actually satisfies the pre-theoretical desiderata for a given concept - which in our cases will be do deny that there is such thing as 'meaning', but I don't think that this is what the op meant).

(also I'm not assuming that my account of analysis is without problems - there's the well known "paradox of analysis" - but at least this is how typically most theories or explanations proceed in the philosophical literature, and therefore I would expect from anyone who offers an analysis of a concept or an explanation to at least accept something like this framework as a background for discussion)

But you can't say that meaning is synonymous with causality, because that will make your claim vacuous (then you will be saying in effect that causality means causality - a claim hardly worth defending). — Fafner

Sure you can say that meaning is synonymous with causality, and that's what I believe it's saying.

That's not saying that "causality means causality." Because under this view, "means" doesn't denote identity or synonymy.

A person claiming this can be claiming that the normal concept is misconceived, or that people have what meaning is wrong, etc. It doesn't have to conform to the normal concept. They might feel that the normal concept is in the ballpark, but that it's not quite right, and that realizing that meaning is just causality, synonymously, does get it right, and if folks would realize this, confusion about what meaning is would disappear.

You could feel that this makes it uninteresting or not worth bothering with, but why should the person forwarding the view that meaning and casuality are synonymous care that you feel that way? It's not as if what's the case in the world is determined by whether you like a particular way of approaching philosophy or not, or whether it's the conventional way.

Sure you can say that meaning is synonymous with causality, and that's what I believe it's saying.

That's not saying that "causality means causality." Because under this view, "means" doesn't denote identity or synonymy. — Terrapin Station

It doesn't change my point. Synonymy is a trivial thing however you understand it - it doesn't prove anything if you substitute one word for another (whether 'substitute' means identity, or "sameness of meaning" or whatever).

A person claiming this can be claiming that the normal concept is misconceived, or that people have what meaning is wrong, etc. It doesn't have to conform to the normal concept. — Terrapin Station

As I said, in this case, it would be an entirely different discussion. But don't pretend to offer an analysis of something if what you really mean is to deny the existence of that thing.

It doesn't change my point. Synonymy is a trivial thing however you understand it - it doesn't prove anything if you substitute one word for another (whether 'substitute' means identity, or "sameness of meaning" or whatever). — Fafner

Right, so it's a trivial thing and it doesn't prove anything. Well, so what? Why would you be taking anyone to be trying to prove anything anyway?

As I said, in this case, it would be an entirely different discussion. But don't pretend to offer an analysis of something if what you really mean is to deny the existence of that thing. — Fafner

Well, they'd be offering an analysis of the thing per what's correct about it in their view, and cutting off the stuff they think is incorrect.

You could feel that this makes it uninteresting or not worth bothering with, but why should the person forwarding the view that meaning and casuality are synonymous care that you feel that way? It's not as if what's the case in the world is determined by whether you like a particular way of approaching philosophy or not, or whether it's the conventional way. — Terrapin Station

If you want to persuade other people (and not just talk with yourself), then you ought to care about what they think and believe in, and attempt to present your views in such a way that they would find them plausible from their own perspective. Otherwise why should you bother with arguments in the first place? (or write anything on a forum for that matter). If someone is happy and satisfied with his own definitions and doesn't care about what others think, then he shouldn't bother other people with his 'ideas' in the first place.

Well, they'd be offering an analysis of the thing per what's correct about it in their view, and cutting off the stuff they think is incorrect. — Terrapin Station

A=A is not a correct analysis of A, because it is not an analysis of anything, but a pointless repetition of the same sign.

Right, so it's a trivial thing and it doesn't prove anything. Well, so what? Why would you be taking anyone to be trying to prove anything anyway? — Terrapin Station

Because no one is infallible, and you can learn a great deal by talking and trying to persuade other people. Unless of course you assume in advance that you must be right about everything.

If you want to persuade other people (and not just talk with yourself), then you ought to care about what they think and believe in, and attempt to present your views in such a way that they would find them plausible from their own perspective. Otherwise why should you bother with arguments in the first place? (or write anything on a forum for that matter). If someone is happy and satisfied with your own definitions then and doesn't care about what others think, then he shouldn't bother other people. — Fafner

Personally, I participate on forums to share my views, not to persuade other people--which I think is a pointless, futile thing to do on message boards like this, anyway, because everyone treats them like they're at the Monty Python Argument Clinic.

I think it's worthwhile and interesting to learn something about what other people think, simply because they're other people who think different things than I do. I inquire about persons' views because I want to better understand what they think, why they think it, etc. And I operate under the assumption that that's what other people are interested in, too. I know that's not what everyone is interested in, but I prefer to operate under that assumption. This is also largely what attracted me to philosophy in general in the first place. I ran into a lot of people thinking what seemed to me to be very strange things, and that fascinated me. I wanted to learn more about what they thought and why, because it was so unusual to me.

I think it's amusing that if what was meant was that meaning was synonymous with causality (more or less), that you're misunderstanding of that is something you'd parse as the other guys' fault, because he's supposed to cater to what you want him to be doing. Hahaha.

A=A is not a correct analysis of A, because it is not an analysis of anything, but a pointless repetition of the same sign. — Fafner

Right. But in a case like this, it's not the same sign, and you certainly hadn't considered the view of meaning being synonymous with causality before.

Yes as I said - unless you assume in advance that you must be right about everything. Whatever floats your boat.

Because no one is infallible, and you can learn a great deal by talking and trying to persuade other people. Unless of course you assume that you must be right about everything. — Fafner

It's not that either you try to prove things or you believe that you are infallible, haha. Talk about a false dichotomy.

Your views will evolve simply by going through the process of trying to explain them to others, by the way.

Your views will evolve simply by going through the process of trying to explain them to others, by the way. — Terrapin Station

Which is precisely what I said...

Right. But in a case like this, it's not the same sign, — Terrapin Station

It doesn't matter if this is not the same sign in this context. If "A=B" means something like "whenever the sign 'A' occurs you can interchange it with the sign 'B'", then "A=B" becomes equivalent to to saying that "A=A".

and you certainly hadn't considered the view of meaning being synonymous with causality before. — Terrapin Station

It's not a 'view' about anything, it's just an arbitrary stipulation which doesn't achieve anything.

This shows that you don't understand meaning-as-use. Wittgenstein wasn't saying that simply speaking any old sounds makes it the case that one has uttered meaningful words.

Dancing is just the movement of one's body, but that doesn't mean that any movement of one's body is a dance. — Michael

If W. wasn't saying that then he must be implying that there is more to meaning than simply use. So maybe we shouldn't be calling it a "meaning is use" theory.

Dancing is just the movement of one's body, but that doesn't mean that any movement of one's body is a dance. — Michael

Yet, any movement of one's body IS a dance if one intends it to be a dance. Again, intention comes into play, as with using words. It is your intent that a listener or reader attempts to get at as the cause of their speaking or writing. Why are they saying what they are saying? What is it that they mean (intend)? We often use "mean" and "intend" interchangeably.

Was it something like (to use our banana example again) pointing at a banana and thinking that it's yellow, but saying, "That is blue"?

The thing there, though, is that you're not really personally using "blue" for that color. You're using "yellow" but just saying "blue" for whatever reason you've decided to say "blue" instead. (Maybe just for this example.) In other words, you're thinking "That's yellow but I'm going to say that it's blue"--thus you're using "yellow" for that color.

Now, someone who hears you will either say, "What? You're crazy, that's not blue! It's yellow"--further cementing that they're using "yellow" for that color. Or maybe it's a really young kid who doesn't know his/her color terms well yet. In which case they might start calling it "blue" instead.

None of that goes against meaning hinging on use, really. It's just that maybe you're trying to squeeze what counts or doesn't count as "use" into some unusually narrow idea. "Use" isn't normaly limited to "utterance." — Terrapin Station

What if I have the intention to mislead? I could tell someone on the phone that these bananas here are blue. They would then picture blue bananas in their head, not yellow ones, all as a result of my intent to mislead. If I never intended to mislead, the person on the phone would have never had a visual of blue bananas.

I keep hearing that my arguments are a straw-man because of how I'm using "use". (Go figure). If they would care to define "use" in such a way that makes sense in the use of words is consistent with it's other uses, I'm open-minded.

I think it's amusing that if what was meant was that meaning was synonymous with causality (more or less), that you're misunderstanding of that is something you'd parse as the other guys' fault, because he's supposed to cater to what you want him to be doing. Hahaha. — Terrapin Station

There's a thing called 'the principle of charity', which says that you ought to try interpret other people's words in the most plausible or charitable way that you possibly can, before you jump to the conclusion that they must be saying something totally absurd or plainly false (even if they do sometimes say such things).

If W. wasn't saying that then he must be implying that there is more to meaning than simply use. So maybe we shouldn't be calling it a "meaning is use" theory. — Harry Hindu

No, it's simply that it's a particular kind of use.

Yet, any movement of one's body IS a dance if one intends it to be a dance.

Perhaps, but the dance itself is the movement, not the intention. Dances happen on the dance floor, not in your head.

It is your intent that a listener or reader attempts to get at as the cause of their speaking or writing. Why are they saying what they are saying? What is it that they mean (intend)? We often use "mean" and "intend" interchangeably.

And for me to understand what you're saying, it must be that the meaning of your words is publicly accessible. Your intentions aren't. We're not mind-readers. So for communication to work, meaning must be found in the things that we actually see and hear and feel. That you intend to achieve some end doesn't refute this.

Meaning cannot be a causal relation. If X means Y because Y causes X (X being some mental state in our heads, or whatever you like), then you can't know that X means Y, since causality is something that can only be known through experience, but you cannot learn from experience that Y causes X, unless you already know the meaning of Y, so you get a circle here (in other words, you already need a language that can represent the causes of your mental states in order to know them, but if this is the case, then you cannot know what means what since knowing the causes of your representations requires a prior ability to represent them). — Fafner

Wrong. We establish causal relations all the time that we never experience, and we make good predictions from this knowledge often. What does a crime scene investigator do if not creating an explanation of causes of the effects of the crime scene - all without having been an eye-witness to the crime itself? This fingerprint along with this DNA means that this person was at the crime scene when it happened. We can predict behaviors of things we never experienced based on similarities with things of a similar kind.

This is simply not true. What about false sentences or negative truths? They don't 'refer' to any states of affair by their very nature. For example: "Bernie Sanders is the president of the united states" (the sentence is false but meaningful despite the non-existence of the state of affairs which it represents), and "Bernie Sanders in not the president of the united states" (which is true and meaningful, despite again the non-existence of the state of affairs which it describes). — Fafner

How is "Bernie Sanders is the president of the united states" meaningful, or useful?

Which is precisely what I said... — Fafner

Explanation isn't the same this as persuasion or "attempt to prove."

It doesn't matter if this is not the same sign in this context. If "A=B" means something like "whenever the sign 'A' occurs you can interchange it with the sign 'B'", then then "A=B" becomes equivalent to to saying that "A=A".

That's certainly the case logically once one realizes the identity (or assumes it for the sake of argument or understanding the view). But they're not the same semantically, especially if one has never considered the identity.

It's not a 'view' about anything, it's just an arbitrary stipulation which doesn't achieve anything. — Fafner

Sure it is. That A and B are identical is a view, just like that they're not is a view.

There's something called 'the principle of charity', which says that you ought to interpret other people in the most plausible or charitable way that you possibly can, before you jump to the conclusion that they must be saying something totally absurd or plainly false (even if they do sometimes say such things). — Fafner

Haha--piling arrogance on top of arrogance. Now not only do you expect them to be conversing in the way you prefer or it's their fault, but the way you prefer is the most charitable way to interpret something, because it's the most reasonable way to do things rather than being totally absurd or plainly false.

What if I have the intention to mislead? I could tell someone on the phone that these bananas here are blue. They would then picture blue bananas in their head, not yellow ones, all as a result of my intent to mislead. If I never intended to mislead, the person on the phone would have never had a visual of blue bananas. — Harry Hindu

I don't know why that changes anything. The idea with the scenario with the kid that I presented would be an intent to mislead (at least as a joke for a minute). It's still not the case that you're using "blue" to refer to "that color" and neither would the person on the phone be in that situation.

If W. wasn't saying that then he must be implying that there is more to meaning than simply use. So maybe we shouldn't be calling it a "meaning is use" theory. — Harry Hindu

Maybe you should stop thinking "use" is a synonym for "emit" and then a lot of this would seem less idiotic to you.

No, it's simply that it's a particular kind of use. — Michael

Yeah, like using a tool. You use a tool to accomplish a goal, which requires intent. Again, the tool is only part of the process so it would be wrong to say that the tool itself and how it is used is the meaning when the tool wouldn't be used at all if intent didn't precede the use.

Perhaps, but the dance itself is the movement, not the intention. Dances happen on the dance floor, not in your head. — Michael

Wrong. You can dance anywhere you want - all you need is the intent. You can imagine you are dancing in your head.

And for me to understand what you're saying, it must be that the meaning of your words is publicly accessible. Your intentions aren't. We're not mind-readers. So for communication to work, meaning must be found in the things that we actually see and hear and feel. That you intend to achieve some end doesn't refute this. — Michael

What is publicly accessible is the world we share and that is what we are talking about when we use language - or meaningful, useful words.

That's certainly the case logically once one realizes the identity (or assumes it for the sake of argument or understanding the view). But they're not the same semantically, especially if one has never considered the identity. — Terrapin Station

But you said earlier that synonymy is not sameness of meaning, so you can't appeal to semantics here.

Sure it is. That A and B are identical is a view, just like that they're not is a view. — Terrapin Station

If A and B are identical, it means that there is only one thing and not two - so there is no 'it' that you can ask about whether it is identical or not, and so there's nothing to affirm or deny.

It's not the same scenario as the kid because this person on the phone knows their colors and the words associated with them. This is why they picture blue bananas in the mind. How did that happen if the color I was referring to when I say "blue" is actually "yellow" which is nonsense, because I picture blue bananas, not yellow ones, when I say "blue bananas", and that is what I'm trying to get the listener to think when I say it.

Yeah, like using a tool. You use a tool to accomplish a goal, which requires intent. Again, the tool is only part of the process so it would be wrong to say that the tool itself and how it is used is the meaning when the tool wouldn't be used at all if intent didn't precede the use. — Harry Hindu

Neither the intention nor the goal is the act of hammering. Neither the intention nor the goal is the meaning of the word.

Wrong. You can dance anywhere you want - all you need is the intent. You can imagine you are dancing in your head.

An imagined dance isn't a dance. A dance is the movement of the body, not your intention or your goal. The meaning of a word is its use, not your intention or your goal.

What is publicly accessible is the world we share and that is what we are talking about when we use language - or meaningful, useful words.

The meaning of a word must be publicly accessible if we are to understand each other. Therefore the meaning of a word can't be your intention or your goal.

Neither the intention nor the goal is the act of hammering. Neither the intention nor the goal is the meaning of the word. — Michael

Wrong. The goal is always in mind while using the tool. It is what keeps you using the tool, at least until the goal was accomplished. This is why we hate people who repeat themselves. We get the idea, shut up already.

An imagined dance isn't a dance. A dance is the movement of the body, not your intention or your goal. The meaning of a word is its use, not your intention or your goal. — Michael

As I said, you wouldn't keep dancing if you didn't intend to keep dancing.

The meaning of a word must be publicly accessible if we are to understand each other. Therefore the meaning of a word can't be your intention or your goal. — Michael

If all we needed was a publicly accessible word catalog, then there would never be misunderstandings. When you don't understand what someone says or writes, it is the speaker or writer's intentions you aren't getting.

Wrong. We establish causal relations all the time that we never experience, and we make good predictions from this knowledge often. What does a crime scene investigator do if not creating an explanation of causes of the effects of the crime scene - all without having been an eye-witness to the crime itself? This fingerprint along with this DNA means that this person was at the crime scene when it happened. — Harry Hindu

He need not to be a witness to the crime, but he must know that a general rule of the form "if such and such evidence exist in the crime scene then probably a crime of type x took place" is true, and my point is that this principle is something that you do need experience to know it's truth.

Let's take your example of DNA.

1. Every person in the world has a unique DNA fingerprint.
2. The DNA sample collected in the crime scene matches the genetic profile of X.
3. Therefore, X must've been present at the crime scene.

Now, my point is that you can infer (3) from (2) only if you know that (1) is true, but you can't know it apriori since (1) is a hypotheses that could be known only via experience (it could've been false - it is false in the case of some insects for example).

How is "Bernie Sanders is the president of the united states" meaningful, or useful? — Harry Hindu

But it is meaningful. (I rest my case)