Ex post facto confabulating rationalization aka wishful thinking (e.g. "I could have made another choice that I didn't make" ... without also changing the prior unknown conditions which had constrained whatever had caused you to have made the actual choice :roll: ).A good definition of libertarian free will?
For example, "Could have done otherwise" or "The ability to make choices not constrained by determinism or randomness". — Cidat
I would also struggle to find an instrumental definition of the use of the term 'free will' when interspersed with the notion of a 'libertarian'. — Alexander Hine
My own view is that compatibilism is incorrect, but the two types of incompatibilism mentioned above are also misguided. Instead, I advocate for a form of libertarianism that is compatible with determinism at the low level of the physical implementation of our cognitive abilities but not with determinism at the emergent level of our rational decisions. The belief that determinism governs both levels if it operates at the lower level stems from misguided views about supervenience. — Pierre-Normand
So, the emergent level of our rational decisions is not determined at all by neuronal activity? Or are you making a Spinozan point that the rational decision and the neuronal activity are the same thing understood from different perspectives? — Janus
For example, "Could have done otherwise" or "The ability to make choices not constrained by determinism or randomness". — Cidat
"The ability to make choices not constrained by determinism
or randomness
You seem to be saying that rationailty drives the brain, rather than the brain drives rationality. What if the ability to be rational is embodied in neural structures, and rational processes are preceded by, and the outcomes of, neuronal processes? Processes of (valid) reasoning seem to follow the rule of logical consistency, but they sometimes fail to maintain that; could that be seen as a neuronal malfunction or dysfunction? — Janus
Should we think that the series of neuronal processes that enable a rational train of thought are completely deterministic? If every thought is preceded by a neuronal event, and neuronal events follow one another deterministically then freedom of thought would seem to be an illusion.
By the way, I'm not arguing for determinism, but even if the processes of the brain were indeterministic, how would that change the situation? Perhaps allow for novel thought processes?
In a paper I wrote on the topic — Pierre-Normand
I would be interested in reading it - it sounds like an interesting take. I lean towards compatibilism, but I am sympathetic to some libertarian perspectives, particularly agent-causal. — SophistiCat
Yes, I am suggesting that rationality drives the brain, while the brain "drives" rationality in a different sense: through enabling us to think rationally. Likewise, the driver drives the car while the car "drives" the driver (through enabling the driver to go where they want to go). The main difference, of course, is that the car and the driver are separate entities whereas the brain is a part of a whole person. But I don't think that undermines the point of the analogy. — Pierre-Normand
So, are you suggesting that there is an additional component to rational thought, a purely semantic aspect, that is enabled by, but is not itself determined by, neuronal activities, and that can feed back into the neuronal activities and change them, thus creating a situation which is not completely physically deterministic? Or something like that? — Janus
(The CPU maps inputs to outputs in the exact same way regardless of the program that it is running.) — Pierre-Normand
I know little about computers, but on the face of it seems to me that, even if the CPU maps inputs to outputs in the same way whatever program it is running, the actual inputs and outputs themselves are not the same. — Janus
Suppose you are being challenged to explain how you arrived at some belief, or formed some intention, after some episode of deliberation. The how question usually refers to the justification of your belief, or decision, and aims at probing the cogency and soundness of your justificatory argument. The probe, or challenge, can be conducted (as well as your defense) in complete abstraction of the underlying implementation of your cognitive abilities. — Pierre-Normand
Is this a difference that contradicts determinism?
If someone asks me how I beat some opponent at some computer game, I can describe it in such terms as predicting their moves, using attacks that they’re weak against, etc., or I can describe it as pressing the right buttons at the right times. Your approach to free will seems similar to the first kind of explanation and the determinist’s approach seems similar to the second kind of explanation. But they’re not at odds. They’re just different ways of talking.
So I would think that if you accept the underlying determinism then your position is compatibilist, not libertarian. — Michael
Until anyone can show that an action is not self-generated — NOS4A2
Broadly, we may say that the doctrine of determinism entails that all the facts about the past together with the laws of nature uniquely determine the future. — Pierre-Normand
In order to make sense of this, it is necessary to delve a little deeper into the arguments that make the contrary thesis seem compelling (and that Jaegwon Kim has formalized as a causal exclusion argument). And it is also necessary to elucidate with some care the notion of possibility that is at issue in Harry Frankfurt's principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). When both of those tasks have been accomplished, it becomes easier to see how an agent-causal libertarianism can be reconciled with merely physical determinism. As I said to SophistiCat, I intend to recruit GPT-4's assistance for rewriting my paper on this topic in order to improve its readability. — Pierre-Normand
There has been a long controversy as to whether subjectively 'free' decisions are determined by brain activity ahead of time. We found that the outcome of a decision can be encoded in brain activity of prefrontal and parietal cortex up to 10 s before it enters awareness. This delay presumably reflects the operation of a network of high-level control areas that begin to prepare an upcoming decision long before it enters awareness.
Does determinism allow for stochastic quantum mechanics? — Michael
But until then, what do you make of unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain? — Michael
Broadly, we may say that the doctrine of determinism entails that all the facts about the past together with the laws of nature uniquely determine the future. — Pierre-Normand
It doesn't but quantum indeterminacies often are seen to provide no help to libertarians. — Pierre-Normand
I don't see any consistency between these two statements. If, following the laws of nature is a requirement for determinism, and "stochastic" refers to actions describable by probability rather than law, then it would definitely be true that the stochasticity of quantum indeterminacies supports the rejection of determinism. — Metaphysician Undercover
Our results and drift-diffusion model are congruent with the RP representing accumulation of noisy, random fluctuations that drive arbitrary—but not deliberate—decisions. They further point to different neural mechanisms underlying deliberate and arbitrary decisions, challenging the generalizability of studies that argue for no causal role for consciousness in decision-making to real-life decisions.
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